Originally Posted by Webstral
US Army Vehicle Guide tells us that 1st CD, the balance of 2nd AD, 4th ID, and 3rd ACR deployed to Europe by air before the end of November, 1996 and took over equipment stored in POMCUS sites. The next division to go is 5th ID, which starts deploying in December. Since 11th ACR crosses the border on 02 DEC 96, it’s a reasonable bet that 5th ID starts deploying after US-Soviet hostilities commence. An argument could be made that no replacement equipment goes across—just fuel, ammunition, and spares to sustain the existing forces in the event of “untoward developments”. In other words, Washington isn’t going to let the USSR capture West Germany in the event the West German bid for reunification fails, but (in October and November) the US isn’t going to participate, either.
Naturally, the Soviets are incensed. I picture Sauronski advocating for an all-out effort by the forces in place around the world almost as soon as the West German offensive kicks off. Danilov says no. While he despises American skullduggery in standing on the sidelines while the West Germans attempt a reunification by force, he recognizes that it’s going to be hard enough to contain the Bundeswehr without the other NATO allies. Going to war with NATO means bringing in NATO forces already in-theater. This will not improve the correlation of forces in Germany.
Sauronski points out that until the Northern Fleet closes the North Atlantic to traffic from North America, the Americans will be at their liberty to build a second strategic echelon in West Germany. Whether one believes that the US was taken by surprise by the West German move or has retained its peacetime deployments as part of the deception plan, on 02 DEC 96 the US Atlantic Fleet is not deployed to block the GIUK Gap. The time to move the Northern Fleet attack subs is that moment. If they wait, NATO will gain the upper hand in the North Atlantic without firing a shot.
Further, Sauronski says, Soviet and allied forces around the world are in a better position to pursue goals in their respective parts of the world than the Western powers are. Transcaucasus Front has forces on-hand on the Iranian border. Iraq can send forces into Kuwait in a matter of days. North Korea can attack from a standing start, while the US will have to choose between reinforcing Europe, Korea, or the Middle East. The longer the Soviets wait, the more powerful the Western allies will become in the theaters of conflict.
Acknowledging that Sauronski is correct that time can work to the favor of the US, Danilov reminds his comrades that the West German attack on the DDR does not invoke the mutual assistance clause of the North Atlantic Treaty. An attack on US shipping in the North Atlantic, on the other hand, definitely constitutes an attack on a signatory. The same is true of an attack on Norway. Attacking US forces in international waters almost certainly will bring in every other NATO party. As it stands, several NATO members are openly questioning the actions of the FRG. Why, Danilov asks, would we settle the matter of involvement for the other members of NATO? Let the political situation brew for a bit, and perhaps some members of NATO may become convinced that they should sit out Germany’s mad war. Given another 3-6 months of mobilization time, the USSR will be in a far better position to seek reparations—after the invasion of East Germany has been repulsed.
In order to maintain the fiction that the US isn’t party to war in Germany, the White House may agree not to ship new heavy formations to Europe. A host of other arrangements will have to be made so that the Soviets can take those actions necessary to defend a Warsaw Pact signatory against foreign aggression without attacking the forces of nations not involved in the aggression. The Soviets hate it, but the unhappy fact remains that it quickly becomes clear that defending East Germany against the West Germans is going to require an all-out effort. They can’t afford to have the other European powers getting involved. Thus, they agree to a set of restrictions and conditions on their attacks against targets in West Germany in the interests of keeping the conflict limited and localized.
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