Quote:
Originally Posted by Ursus Maior
So basically, 5ID conducted some form of spoiling attack, in order for a SFODB team to make it to Lodz and back. Why this wouldn't be a ODA team augmented by tech expertise is beyond me, but that's what it says.
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I’ll take a stab at this:
An ODB is the company equivalent in SF units. A company is made up of six ODAs under an ODB, which is led by a major. The ODB typically provides C2 and support to disperse red ODAs conducting FID and UW missions, but may provide “on the ground” tactical C2 of multiple ODAs conducting DA, CT, or CP-WMD missions or in cases where external units (AR, EN, Infantry, etc) are supporting the mission. One company in every forward deployed battalion (as of 1989 3/7, 1/10, and 1/1) was structured as a Commander’s In-extremis Force (CIF) company. The CIF was structured with a mix of assaulters, snipers, and area study personnel and designed to perform CT and Hostage Rescue missions as well as DA. An example of the the role of the CIF was the 3/7 CIF in Operation Just Cause who conducted multiple raids under the tactical leadership of the company commander against key PDF targets. Currently, the CIF is being replaced by the Hard Target Defeat Companies, which seem to optimized for the DA, CP-WMD role.
How this might play out:
Strike Zulu is built around the CIF from 3/10 SF reinforced with ground mobility assets from the group support battalion, MI assets from the MICO, additional POL, and engineer assets to facilitate mobility. The mission was planned and resourced by EUCOM, with USAEUR and USASOC providing forces using intelligence gained through NSA, NIMA, and DIA (humint) sources. Because of the sensitivity and national interest involved, planning and coordination for the mission was kept in US channels and not shared with the SOF Liaison Elements (SOFLEs) at 3rd German Army or it’s downtrace units.
While the pre-war CIF was an “elite within an elite”, the current CIF has become a best of what’s left. Heavy SF casualties during the course of the war and the commitment of teams sustaining UW efforts throughout the European theater have reduced the numbers of SF qualified personnel. Excess SF personnel have been stripped from across the theater and supplemented with volunteers who attended a watered down in-theater “SF Combat Replacement Course” run by 7th Army Training Command. However, the cohesion and competence of prewar units remains lacking.
The concept of operations (CONOPS) for the mission had the force infiltrating by ground behind 5ID. Once in the Łódź area they would establish a hasty patrol base, conduct final reconnaissance, and execute actions on the objective. After securing the target personnel and equipment, they would collapse the objective and move to a preselected LZ; two MH47s that had been made operational through herculean efforts over the past few months were on ground alert at a FOB near Stettin. The detainees and captured equipment would be evacuated by air, then the remainder of the force would begin a ground exfil behind the screen provided by 5ID. The alternative exfil plan had the entire force exfiltrating by ground if pickup was infeasible. The contingency exfil plan was for the ODB to break into ODA sized teams, abandon excess equipment, and exfiltrate separately to a linkup point on the Oder.
As it happened, the operation went smoothly until the exfiltration phase. 5ID had inflicted plenty of disruption on Polish forces around Łódź, and the force went relatively unnoticed, seizing the objective by surprise with no resistance. The MH47s launched to the LZ, but the trail aircraft (restored by cannibalizing two others) suffered a combining transmission failure while forming up; the second MH47 made a forced landing after incurring damage from German small arms and 20mm fire after overflying a Bundeswher unit who were unaware of the possibility of friendly rotary wing activity. Upon hearing the news from the CJSOTF HQs, the ODB commander made the decision to execute the alternate exfil plan.
The ground exfil swiftly ran into trouble as polish forces were converging on 256th brigade. The force bypassed several polish positions, but their luck ran out within 24 hours, as they encountered a Polish cavalry troop while refueling. The massed fire of the SF GMVs and trucks swiftly overwhelmed the Poles, but not before a messenger got away. Without knowledge of 5IDs situation, but able to see and hear the battle to his west, and with additional polish troops converging from the north, the ODB commander made the decision to abandon some of the heavier equipment and head south towards an area of seemingly less resistance, informing CJSOTF of his plan. He was directed to make his way to Krakow, where a DIA contact could arrange exfiltration of the detainees and equipment…