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Originally Posted by Legbreaker

Why were they issued with petroleum? Firstly, and possibly formost, for the suprise factor. The entire Army was reported to be in the Ukraine and unable to reach the front for months if running on alcohol. If Nato had been sufficiently dug in and prepared, the Pact units already in the area, while numerically stronger, would probably have a tough time making much headway. Nato command might even think they could hold without radical redeployment of units.

Secondly, the 4th GTA were issued with petroleum over a period of time, not in one, short sharp delivery - there simply wouldn't have been sufficent transportation for tens, if not hundreds of thousands of litres in one go. Therefore we can assume that the 4th's move was planned a very long time in advance.

The question of the original intent for Fourth Guards Tank Army is very interesting. I have written a number of ideas on the subject over the past couple of days. Each draft leads to more material. (Not convenient, as I have been trying to finish a piece for Thunder Empire) In essence, I think one could go either towards seeing the Fourth Guards Tank Army as the operational exploitation force for a Pact strategic offensive into Germany in the summer of 2000 or as a mobile reaction force for the Western TVD that happened to be used against the NATO summer offensive. The difference between the two ideas is one of interpretation of the intent of a handful of senior surviving Soviets about whom we know nothing at all.

We know that Fourth Guards Tank Army received the entire monthly output of the Ploesti oil fields. Regardless of the quantity of fuel this represents, as one-twelfth fraction of an absolutely critical strategic reserve, the investment in the mobility of Fourth Guards Tank Army is massive. Legbreaker is right on target that this sort of investment requires a great deal of lead time, which implies a great deal of planning.

We know a few other factors that will impact the thinking of the senior Soviets. The fighting in 1998 will have demonstrated that mechanized armies have extremely limited endurance, given the incredible imbalance between the need for fuel, ammunition, and spare parts and the ability of the respective supply systems to provide these resources. No doubt the Soviets will notice that the infantry and their light support weapons now are the centerpiece of any kind of prolonged campaign. The armored fighting vehicles still pack a powerful punch, but their effective range and endurance will have contracted so much by mid-1998 that a complete re-thinking of military doctrine is in order. This is not to say that mechanized action is abandoned; mechanized forces are as effective as ever, provided they can be kept in supply and repair. However, correlating military planning with the new, logarithmically downgraded logistical situation of both sides means that mechanized forces take a back seat to light infantry action.

We see this emphasis on light infantry in the v1 chronology, which states that deep raids by infantry define the operations of 1999. I agree with Legbreaker and others that 1999 is a year of readjustment, although I would not go so far as to label said readjustment as true reconstruction. While I don’t doubt that as much reconstruction as can be executed is carried out, I think the activity being undertaken is more that of adjusting to cope with the decentralized, somewhat de-specialized post-Exchange economy. This is a somewhat clinical way of saying that everyone is adapting to the fact that growing and distributing 1,000 calories of food takes vastly more labor than it did in 1996, thanks to the disruption of the petroleum supply system. The breakdown in the transportation system means that every region must now grow its own food, so the ability for regions to specialize in particular types of labor is dramatically reduced. Also, the breakdown in the transportation system means that raw materials and finished goods can’t travel very far, further limiting the economies of scale enjoyed by pre-Exchange industry—even where highly specialized facilities and expertise aren’t required.

The Soviets and NATO probably both realize that any future major offensive action will require very careful stockpiling. I wonder if either or both sides don’t plan some sort of action during 1999 but discover that the logistical realities simply don’t support such plans. In any event, the ongoing infantry actions continue to gather intelligence on the enemy’s disposition, though obviously the intelligence becomes sketchier as one tries to look further into the enemy’s rear.

For the Soviets, 1999 is a transformational year. A lot of divisions go rogue. I counted at least six divisions in the Ukraine as turning marauder or rebel, depending on how one interprets the limited information in the Soviet Vehicle Guide. The Central Asian and Transcaucasian republics also begin to throw off the yoke of central control in 1999. Late in 1999 would be an appropriate time for the remaining Soviet senior leadership to plan for providing Fourth Guards Tank Army with a major stockpile of gasoline. The remaining question is what they intend to do with that gasoline.

If we are choosing between seeing a uniquely mobile Fourth Guards Tank Army as offensive weapon versus an essentially defensive weapon, we should ask ourselves which option will be perceived as providing the Soviets with the greatest measure of security. Is it better to attack Germany or improve internal security in the western Soviet Union and some of Eastern Europe?

There are strong arguments for using Fourth Guards Tank Army in an attack on Germany. The Germans have been a problem three times already in a century. Although the nuclear exchange has wrecked Germany as a modern industrial nation, the same can be said of the USSR. If the front lines settle where they are in late 1999, Germany is basically reunited. The whole war was fought to prevent this. Granted, the toppling of modern civilization has dramatically altered the context and meaning of German reunification. Still, the Germans are a disciplined and driven people. In twenty or thirty years, they might emerge from the ruins as a new great power and once more cast their baleful gazes eastward. Certainly, any self-respecting Russian would want to see Germany damaged as badly as possible. Ideally, Germany could be re-divided and NATO finally defeated in the field.

From this standpoint, the provision of Fourth Guards Tank Army with a high degree of operational mobility makes good sense. Soviet doctrine entails the use of combined arms armies to create gaps in the enemy defenses which are then exploited by tank armies in follow-on. If we see the Pact forces in place in western Poland and southeastern Germany as the combined arms armies, then Fourth Guards Tank Army can be the force that exploits whatever gap opens during a general offensive. Given the slow movement of forces in 2000, a gasoline-driven tank army would have plenty of time to exploit any gaps in the NATO defenses.

We don’t really know much about the state of NATO and Pact forces on the front lines, though, other than location, rough head count, and operational AFV. Differences in national character may still count for something. For instance, the Western Allies start the war with much larger support organizations than their Pact counterparts. Support organizations tend to have a higher level of technical expertise than the combat arms. Add to this the fact that the level of education among Western armies would be considerably greater than in the Soviet Army, and you may have a recipe for a superior ability to adapt to the post-Exchange reality. Admittedly, the emphasis here is on “may”. By 1999, all armies are putting their uniformed personnel into combat units, while civilians take over the non-combat jobs.

We don’t know much about either side’s supply situation, either. We may assume that both sides are in equally wretched condition, but I’m not certain such an assumption is based on anything more rational than lack of analysis and/or imagination. If the Soviets are going mount a large-scale offensive, they are going to need logistical support and ample forward supply dumps. We don’t know these things don’t exist, but we don’t know they do, either. Again, we really know very little about the supply situation of the Soviet forces in First or Second Western Fronts or in the NATO commands opposite. However, if they are going to be attacking prepared defenses in Germany, the Pact will need significant supplies of artillery ammunition and fuel. Do they have what they need?

Getting back to the supply situation, the amount of food, fuel, and locally-manufactured items in each area in eastern Germany and western Poland will depend on a variety of variables. What kinds of surpluses are being generated in these and adjacent areas? How successful are the surviving governments at securing the existing surpluses? How successful are the surviving governments at encouraging the production of surpluses? How much of the available produce is being lost to spoilage, marauder action, and so forth? If one side is markedly more successful at securing the industrious cooperation of the local inhabitants, then paper strengths may not mean much.

Specifically, how successful are the Soviets at securing the cooperation of the Poles and Czechs in their respective homelands? It’s all well and good to threaten and brutalize. The locals soon find their own ways of retaliating, even if there is no actual bloodshed. There’s no way around the fact that the Germans, Poles, and Czechs are the only ones operating on their home turf in this area. If the Poland-based modules are any guide, the Soviets get mixed support from the people of Poland. It’s hard to say what level of support the non-German members of NATO receive in Germany. It would be hard for the local Germans to see British and American troops as invaders, as many Poles will be wont to look on the Soviets; however, in times of real shortage, the locals may come to see American and British units as occupying forces and/or unwelcome guests. It doesn’t take very many chuckleheads on a two-day bender to turn the local populace against the foreign military. On the other hand, summary execution for raping local girls will be a lot easier to complete in the post-Exchange environment and could go a long way towards restoring trust between the locals and the non-German NATO unit in the area. How enthusiastically the locals support a given cantonment will have a huge impact on such things as supply, unit readiness, morale, and the like. We don’t know very much about these things in western Poland and eastern Germany.

Do the Soviets believe they have the muscle to launch an offensive into Germany in the summer of 2000? This is a very difficult question to answer. What the division and army commanders in First and Second Western Fronts believe may be entirely different than what the senior surviving Soviet planners believe. It may be that even if the local commanders believe that offensive action is unwise, the theater leadership feels an urgent need to destroy the NATO forces in eastern Germany and/or capture the agricultural lands east of the Elbe. Or it may be that the local commanders are telling the theater leadership that an offensive is possible, provided certain conditions are met. It’s all very hard to say.

Looking at the reasons for seeing Fourth Guards Tank Army as a mobile strategic reserve, we can see that there are at least six rogue Soviet divisions in the Ukraine by the end of 1999. Rebellion is brewing. The movement of Soviet forces to the Ukraine shows that the Soviets are worried about what is going on in the Ukraine. The Soviets were willing to go nuclear to avoid losing the Ukrainian grain belt (although I rather believe that the senior pre-Exchange Soviets were just as worried about their own necks as they were about the future of the Soviet Union). Will they be any more willing to see the Ukraine lost to separatists and rebels? The Ukraine is the breadbasket of the USSR. If the Soviet Union is to get back on its feet after the Exchange, the State is going to need Ukrainian produce. Crushing flare-ups of Ukrainian rebels is critical. According to the Soviet Vehicle Guide, First Ukrainian Front disposes about 13,250 troops and 28 tanks in its divisions and separate brigades. Adding in support units may double the total number of men under arms; and we should not fail to take into account the value of lighter AFV, such as the BRDM-3 belonging to 98th Guards Motorized Rifle Division in the color plates of the Soviet Vehicle Guide. Nevertheless, the Ukraine is the size of France. There is a lot of ground to cover in a place that will have mixed loyalty to the Soviet state. Local militias and State security troops can go a long way towards filling the manpower gaps. However, there are thousands of rebel or marauding troops from combat formations. This is an entirely different challenge than that faced by MilGov in Colorado or Oklahoma.

Then, too, there security issues in Romania, Slovakia, Poland, and the Baltics. Rebels and warlords in any of these locations might need swift destruction by a powerful mobile force. A highly mobile Fourth Guards Tank Army has the ability to move rapidly into any of these areas. As an added bonus, a highly mobile tank army in Belarus can be used to parry any NATO offensive action in Poland.

I think it highly likely that the Soviets knew something about the NATO plans for action in 2000. Human intelligence is a traditional strong suit for the Soviets. The build-up of NATO forces in northwestern Poland is unlikely to have escaped Soviet attention. Knowing how difficult it would be to attack NATO forces in prepared defensive positions, the Soviets may have decided to let the Western Allies come out on their own. It may not be a coincidence that a gas-powered tank army and a horse cavalry force met Third German Army fairly soon after the NATO offensive started. If the Soviets had these forces on standby, they could be used to parry NATO attacks as well as crush local rebels. If NATO failed to make its move, Fourth Guards Tank Army still would be available for security missions throughout the Western TVD.

In the end, I think it comes down to personalities. If the CINC Western TVD is the man responsible for getting Fourth Guards Tank Army supplied with gasoline, is he the type to believe that it is better to knock down Germany, or is he the type to believe that the USSR is better off holding onto what she has? It seems to me that there is little point in seizing eastern Germany if the Soviets lose control of the Ukraine. However, I’m not the commander of Western TVD. A Soviet leader may believe that what can be done to end the German menace for the next generation should be done.

All of this said, I realize that a deliberate Pact offensive into Germany is a far more exciting idea than the creation of a mobile reaction force. I know I’m selling Treasury bonds, while a Pact offensive in 2000 is an IPO. Twilight: 2000 is as much about good story-telling as it is about military realism.

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