Wow. Clearly some great analysis here. I'll merely add my two cents to what has already been said.
I think it is easy to underestimate the tenuous position of the Soviet divisions in eastern Germany in 2k. While they are numerically superior to their NATO adversaries, it is not clear that they could make headway against prepared positions without heavy losses. They are at the far end of an increasingly insecure line of supply that runs all the way through the chaos of 2k Poland including increasingly mutinous divisions. A number of Polish units and at least two Soviet formations have recently gone rogue (I'm without my references, but one pulled out of SE Germany w/o orders and another near Warsaw declared for US Civgov (?!?) in addition to the 10thTD? mutinying east of Krakow). There is risk that front line divisions pull out of their own accord or simply tune out in place without adequate support from home.
In the cannon there is a notable lack of loyal formations in central Poland before the arrival of the 4thGTA. In fact it would be dificult to establish a reliable line of supply between Kiev and Minsk and Berlin with all the marauder and warlord activity going on.
In this context I think there could have been a middle road where the 4thGTA was pushing west, but not neccesarily with the goal of making additional territorial gains into Germany. Significant portions of that formation could be used to move into central Poland toward Warsaw and Lodz to shore up the situation in those areas, provide support to the Polish communist government in Lublin and still provide coverage against additional mutinies in Ukraine and Bielorussia. From there they provide a bridge between the remaining Soviet heartland and the true front outside of Berlin. Some formations may have been intended to push on into Germany, but likely with more local goals around consolidating territory under their control and spoiling NATO offensives.
In this context, the actions of the German 3rd Army force the soviets hand. As misguided as it may have been, the offensive of the 5thID did threaten to further isolate the divisions across the Oder and jeopardize the gains already made there. This required the full commitment of the 4thGTA to keep the lines of communication and supply open where a partial commitment might have have done the job and secured the area from local bandits and prevented additional defections.
This drew the army further West and committed it more than originally intended. This came at the cost of additional partisan fighting capability in the bread basket, but if it prevented additional mutinies and solidified Soviet gains in Germany it might have been worth the trade.
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