That's awesome that you've been able to walk parts of those battlefields.
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Originally Posted by fightingflamingo
Ultimately I think that the offensive in to Poland, is going to come down to two things. 1) the air situation over the battlefront, and the ability of NATO fixed and rotary wing CAS to support the offensive. 2) the abilty of NATO artillery to suppress WP ATGM systems and dismounted infantry.
We have some idea's regarding how this will be accomplished, but that is another thread, and I for one, would like to wargame the Oder Crossing before I comment on that at length.
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Fair point.
It is sort of a topic for a new thread but I'd like to share my thoughts anyway.
1.) I think the European battlefield would be even deadlier for aircraft than it would be for AFVs. MANPADs and SPAAA would take a heavy toll of helicopter gunships. The Soviet's extensive and multilayered AAD network would give NATO fits. Sure, NATO was able to take out the Iraqi's AAD networks relatively easilty, and the Serbian's somewhat less so (although, IIRC, the Serbs were able to shoot down an F-117 with a Soviet made SAM), but those networks were poor imitations of what the Soviet' s would have had. A better model would be the Egyptian's network during the Yom Kippur war.
The popular media and the companies that manufacture combat aircraft and their weapon systems tend to portray modern air warfare as neat and tidy. NATO, especially, seems to put a lot of faith in BVR first kill ability. Yes, NATO has a technological edge in AWACs, combat aircraft, and missile systems, but only just a slight one. With hundred of aircraft in the air at once, AWAC would quickly break down. Contrary to popular belief, radars are neither all seeing nor all knowing. As recently as the '91 Gulf War, a flight of F-15s had trouble differentiating between a low flying MiG-25 and another flight of F-15s. They had to radio each other to waggle their wings to finally make a visual determination. At that point, any BVR edge is out the window. In a huge furball, a lot of NATOs technological advantages would dissappear. In fact, Soviet helmet mounted sights and aircraft-mounted IR seekers on the MiG-29 and SU-27 (the Soviets fielded these technologies first) would actually give a slight edge to the Soviet fighter pilots.
I think NATO's pilot training was clearly superior to the Soviets', though, so I still think NATO would have an overall advantage in air combat. The Soviet's numbers advantage would somewhat negate that, though. Overall, I think that the skies over central Europe would be particularly deadly for
everyone involved, well before the TDM. This is one thing, IMO, that canon got dead on.
2.) IMPO, the Soviet's one clear cut edge, numbers notwithstanding, is artillery. I think NATO would lose a lot of its guns to Soviet counterbattery fire. The Red Army in the '80s still fielded artillery
divisions and had gun and rocket systems dedicated exclusively to counterbattery fire.
This is one area where I think NATO's philosophy of technology trumping numbers is the most flawed. MLRS is awesome, but their simply aren't enough of them to negate the Soviet's massive fleets of BM-21s and BM-27s. The respective counter battery radars aren't that different in terms of their capabilities. The Soviet's venerable D30 howitzers are just as capable as the american's M117. The Soviets fielded a lot more large calibre guns (and mortars) than NATO and most of their guns (of all calibres) had a range advantage.
I think NATO counted on taking out Soviet batteries from the air, assuming the establishment of air superiority. I believe this was wishful thinking, on at least two counts. First, I don't think NATO could have achieved anything more than brief, local air superiority. Second, I think Soviet AAD systems would make hitting artillery positions a deady mission for NATO pilots.
I guess all of this reflects my skepticism regarding the ability of technology (as the primary causal factor) to win modern wars.
Mo, I think you're right on concerning the Soviet soldier. They may not be as educated or technologically astute as their western counterparts but, if properly motivated, they are tough, resourceful fighters. By most accounts, the average Soviet citizen is better suited to the privations of life on the battlefied than the average western soldier.