[Raellus]

Yes he was, if you look at the actual evidence.

First off, I think it's interesting that you put more stock in some rando* Monty apologist making Youtube "the real story" videos than the bulk of eminent WW2 historians (3/4 I mentioned being British). Also, Frost isn't unbiased. If anyone had a dog in the fight, he did.

BTW, have you read any of the books Mr. Youtube historian cited? If you don't accept Ryan, Hastings, Beevor, and Atkinson's analysis (to name but a few), I'm probably not going to be able to change your mind, but here is the evidence:

Montgomery's whole plan hinged on linking up with the airborne divisions at the bridges quickly, but there was only one MSR- an elevated highway with soft shoulders, running through woodlands and little towns, crossing several canals and rivers- between the start line and Eindhoven, Nijmegen, and Arnhem.

It doesn't take a rocket scientist to understand that if that MSR can be obstructed or cut for any length of time, the Airborne divisions- especially the one at the end of the line- are going to be hung out to dry. Monty grossly overestimated the ability of an armored corps to advance along a single axis through country that was far less than ideal for tanks, and simultaneously underestimated the German's ability to interfere with the planned advance. The plan, on paper, only survives a cursory glance. Look closely, you will see that it was deeply flawed on multiple levels.

Also, downplaying intel that there was at least one SS Panzer division in the Arnhem area was foolish, to say the least. Cornelius Ryan agrees.

Plus, the whole plan wouldn't even have been necessary if Montgomery had cleared the Scheldt estuary in the first place. Failure to do so meant that the Germans could prevent the Allies from using the port of Antwerp (which was captured 90% intact), and they did. This prolonged the Allies' supply problems. Market Garden was an attempt to puncture the German defenses before supplies ran out. This was only an issue because Antwerp remained closed due to Monty's oversight. As it turned out, Market Garden burned through the Allies existing supply stockpile, necessitating a freeze on major offensive operations that allowed the Germans the breathing space to prepare Wacht am Rhein (the Ardennes counteroffensive).

For Market Garden to have succeeded, everything would have had according to plan. What are the odds of a plan surviving contact with an enemy, especially one as competent as the Wehrmacht/Waffen SS? It was a gamble that set the Allies back months (by burning the last of its fuel supplies) and led to the Hongerwinter in Holland.

Ike deserves part of the blame for approving the plan, but Monty, as the advocate, architect, and administrator, deserves the lion's share. Monty was a pompous tool.


*Differently biased is not "unbiased".