In Vietnam, there was quite a bit of variation in how firebases were manned and operated. Some were relatively small, designed for a single battery of 105 or 155mm guns. Some were larger, with multiple batteries and many firebases had infantry companies attached to perform base security. Firebases were sometimes used as patrol bases for more active area denial- not just for leg infantry patrols, but for mechanized patrols (sometimes with tanks in support) as well. In these cases, when not on patrol, armor was incorporated into the base defenses. I see T2K firebases as falling into this latter category of more dynamic, flexible, active area denial type facilities as opposed to just artillery parks.
Since, as Chalk pointed out, armies in T2K wouldn't have the manpower to defend a continuous front (at least not in depth), firebases would surround high value strategic areas near the FOB- productive agricultural and industrial areas, for example. Firebases would be cited at intervals around the cantonment, with OPs, thin screens, and patrols covering the gaps. The firebases would be manned by infantry and artillery units, well equiped with AT weapons. An operational reserve of heavy mobile units (i.e. the division's surviving tanks and IFVs) would be located centrally and available to act as a reaction force should any link in the chain be threatened.
I think that in many cases the zones between cantonments would largely be ceded to the enemy since those areas would be unable to support military operations. So, major operations would revolve around the attack or defense of the cantonment areas themselves, since those are the areas that can support life. I mean, how else could the U.S. 5th ID have covered all of that ground largely unnoposed in the lead up to the "Death of a Division" scenario unless is was travelling through large, thinly defended gaps between major cantonment areas?
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