[Adm.Lee]

Off the top of my head, I think you may be onto something, with one exception. IIRC, wasn't NATO's 1997 drive months long? While that would increase casualties among Poles, I don't think it would result in inordinate amounts of prisoners. (Of course, there could always be a division or two surrounded). Anyway, there's one hard-fought campaign eastward across Poland, one rapid westward withdrawal, and then it's pretty stable there through '98 and '99, right?

As for using the Poles as a screen for Soviet troops, that would depend on how many Soviets were pulled to go to China (right now, I forget). There were six Soviet armies in East Germany (4-5 divisions each, a half-dozen of those were East German), and 2 Polish and 1 Soviet army in Poland (half of the Soviet army's divisions were Polish). Nearly half of the Polish divisions are reservists, but that shouldn't matter by spring of '97. So you're talking about at least a quarter of the Pact forces in Poland are Polish. If I were the Pact theater commander, I'd certainly be backstopping the Polish forces with Soviet ones, but they wouldn't be covering the whole line, and I read the situation as more than a speedbump that slowed NATO down.

All that said, I think there will be a dire shortage of military-age men in villages and cities, but not an absence. There could be draft exemptions for key workers as well as draft dodgers and black marketeers, desertions and/or marauders. Oh, and discharged wounded veterans.

I hadn't considered what NATO might do with its EPWs, though. Recruiting them for anti-Soviet forces would seem a natural thing, even if they would have to overcome the anti-German and anti-invasion attitudes of the Poles. (Hmm, something else to fit into my hobbyhorse of the '00 offensive as driven by desire to push a Polish defection.)

Final answer: I was going to argue, but I think I'll agree with you.