1992
The Red Army launches a major program of modernization using the lessons of Desert Storm to make sure that any ground combat between the Soviet Union and NATO will not be as one sided as the US-Led War against Iraq. The Soviet Union attempts to create a professional NCO Corps in a manner similar to that of the West and many of the nations of the Warsaw Pact.
Inside the Kremlin, existing tensions between the various factions of the Soviet leadership became more pronounced after the start of the war. Since the coup in 1989, the highest echelon of Soviet leadership had begun to split into two groups: the Danilovians and the Tukhachevskyites. The former group, led by Premier Dmitri Danilov, had allied themselves with the latter, led by Defense Minister Nikolai Ivanovich Tukhachevsky, for the purpose of deposing and replacing the Gorbachev government. However, the alliance between the two groups was always a shaky one. The Danilov group, smaller and less powerful than the Tukhachevsky cabal, was made up of true reformers. The Tukhachevskyites were arch conservative Communists whose principal goal was to hold onto power. The Danilovians needed the Tukhachevskyites for their control of the military, much of the security apparatus, and the economy. The Tukhachevskyites needed the Danilovians because Danilov was the only rival to Tukhachevskyite power in the KGB and because Danilov was much more palatable to the mid level Communist Party officials and to the international community than any of the Tukhachevskyites. From the start, the intent of the Tukhachevskyites had been to use Danilov as a front man while Tukhachevsky and his cohorts wielded the real power in the USSR.
Danilov proved to be a master power broker, however. He spoke the Tukhachevskyite language fluently. He reminded the Tukhachevskyites, together and separately, that unless the Soviet economy were fixed, there could easily be another coup attempt. Worse, there might be open revolution. Even a successful counter revolution on the part of the Soviet security apparatus would further erode the Soviet economy. Grudgingly, the Tukhachevskyites empowered Danilov to enact most of the reforms he sought.
After the Black Winter, The Soviet Union had replaced Egon Krenz with the return of Communist Hardliner Erich Honecker to power as the leader of the German Democratic Republic. And under Honecker’s leadership, the DDR had quickly proven itself a major stronghold for hardliner communist leadership. Over the next few years Honecker had quickly became a major hurdle for many of the much needed reforms that Danilov had wished to implement throughout the Communist Bloc, and this was why the Kremlin took a direct hand in having Hans Modrow chosen to replace Erich Honecker as the leader of the German Democratic Republic after Honecker had been strongly urged by Danilov to retire due to complications that had increased with his failing health. Hans Modrow quickly proved himself to be much more responsive to the reforms and policies that had been started by to modernize the economy of Eastern Europe.
1993
Madrow reestablishes the office of the President of the German Democratic Republic as a ceremonial head of state with no official governing powers. The creation of this ceremonial position allows the average citizen to elect a representative from any political party or organization. <name> will become the first elected President of the German Democratic Republic, from the <>.
President of the DDR (Head of State).
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the DDR (Head of Government).
President of the People’s Chamber of the DDR (Head of Parliament).
1994
On 29 May 1994, Erich Honecker dies from cancer. <Hans Modrow> uses the death of his predecessor to create a national week of mourning by giving him a state funeral with full ceremony. This allows <Modrow> to launch a major reorganization of East German political power, and ends the stranglehold of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany over political power in the DDR. Even with the modernization of the East German government, <Madrow> does not change the fact that the position of the Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic would remain the supreme leader of the DDR.
1995
In August of 1995, a group of world renown archeologists whom where working in the Harbor of Hong Kong searching wrecks from the Second World war discover a lost treaty between the United Kingdom and both sides of the Chinese Civil War that gives the British the rights to Hong Kong in perpetuity (along with several other nations being granted the same rights to their ‘colonial concessions’ such as the treaty made with the German government-in-exile after Nanking massacre). This causes a series of political problems and tensions between the United Kingdom and the People’s Republic of China that ambassadors and negotiators from both sides to hold a series of summits to decide their countries future course of action. The People’s Republic of China hold talks with East and West German representatives in hopes of economic assistance in exchange for the opening of a neo-colonial concession.
1996 - 1999
After nearly a year of intense five party negotiations, the United Kingdom is able to get the People’s Republic of China to solve the "Hong Kong question" with a referendum of the citizens of the colonial concessions being allowed to decide their own fate. The referendum to decide the future of Hong Kong and the other concessions are held and the people of the cities all choose overwhelmingly to remain independent of the People’s Republic of China. In exchange the People’s Republic of China is able to get the British government and other foreign nations to agree to pay ‘taxes’ to the Chinese Government as well as giving a sweet-heart trade deal that would allow the continued growth of the Chinese economy. This agreement has placed the British Government as the primary powerbroker who is able to negotiate with foreign investment groups and nations and the People’s Republic of China to create new neo-colonial concessions to allow for the economic growth to assist the Chinese economic miracle.
By 1996, Danilov appeared to Defense Minister Nikolai Ivanovich Tukhachevsky to be getting out of control. Danilov’s economic reforms were showing real progress. Relations with the West were as warm as they had been at any time in the history of the Soviet Union. Industrial productivity was up, and for the first time in her history the Soviet Union was feeding herself. Many luke warm Tukhachevskyites were converting to Danilovism. The Soviet people were enjoying more liberties than they had in a generation—more so even than under Gorbachev. And they were demanding more. Just as it had been under Gorbechev, the very existence of the Soviet state as Stalin and Khrushchev had known it was threatened.
Unfortunately, there was only so much Tukhachevsky could do about it. Danilov was terribly popular among the people, the KGB, and most of the Party. His reforms were working, and everybody seemed to be doing better. Simply doing away with him wasn’t an option. Tukhachevsky had to find a way to discredit Danilov before replacing him.
War with China seemed the perfect way. By the late 1990’s, it was apparent that China would have to be put in her place sooner or later anyway. A war that dragged out a bit longer than it should have would fit the bill nicely. China would be set back, while much of the economic progress Danilov had made would evaporate. With Danilov out of favor, Tukhachevsky could move to replace him or at least strip him of much of his power.
Through a series of carefully-orchestrated maneuvers, Tukhachevsky knew that he could bring the Soviet Union and China to the edge of war, then let mutual mistrust and the situation on the border take their natural courses.
Exactly how and why Danilov allowed things to evolve as they did over the next four years is still a mystery. He had much better control over events earlier in his career, when he was technically weaker. It has been suggested that he didn’t really believe war would start. It has been suggested that Danilov believed a last-minute deal with Chinese Premier Zhu would head off a war and bring even greater prestige to himself. Whatever the reason, by the end of August 2000, Dmitri Danilov would find his country involved in a war he had never wanted.
Selling this war would become a painful exercise for Danilov. There was very little he could say to the West that had any meaning beyond the usual propaganda, though he dutifully made his efforts at the UN and in the capitals of the West. For the most part, Danilov was forced to trade in much of the good will he had built in the West over the past decade in an effort to keep the economic credits flowing.
Since there was little the Soviets could do to justify the war in world opinion, it was important that they convince the world that the USSR was winning the war. Superiority of Soviet arms and soldiery would be its own justification in the end. As a result, Soviet propaganda efforts initially focused on the excellent progress being enjoyed by Soviet armed forces in Manchuria. Never mind who was right—the Soviets were winning.
By contrast, China would find it quite easy to portray herself as the innocent victim. Though the Western media were never given the free reign on the Manchurian battlefields they would have liked, images of smashed Chinese villages and dead and injured Chinese civilians poured back to Western television virtually from the outset of the war. The Chinese Communist Party strove to play up two key images: the suffering of the Chinese people and the heroic resistance of the People’s Liberation Army. In this effort they were largely successful.
Beijing quickly moved to exploit the swell of sympathy among Westerners—particularly among Americans. The large Chinese-American community was solicited to provide financial support, political support, and propaganda support for China. Though not successful everywhere, Chinese-Americans answered the call of the motherland in large numbers. Though many conservative Americans were delighted to see the two great Communist powers at war, at least as many Americans were telling pollsters that the gallant Chinese people deserved the support of the United States against the Soviet aggressors. Washington took notice.
Throughout the Western political circles, the initial reaction was one of muted relief. Despite the warming of Soviet-Western relations during the first half of the 1990’s, NATO remained ready to defend against a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Many were concerned that Danilov’s Soviet Union was a more dangerous Soviet Union because her core strength was greater. A Soviet Union with a healthy economy and the ability to feed herself might come under the control of an aggressive militarist. At the same time, the growing economic power of China was causing concern in the West. How long would it be before China’s burgeoning economic power translated itself into military power?
Already the mid 1990’s, the People’s Liberation Army was undergoing a significant modernization. With the Soviet Union and China at war, the West appeared to have killed two birds without actually having to throw its own stone.
Naturally, there was some concern about the war going nuclear. This fear was at its most intense during the first few days of the war, when chemical weapons were used on a large scale both on the front lines and in the rear areas. Some Western military analysts feared that whoever got the worst of the chemical exchange might go nuclear as a means of rectifying the situation. Fortunately, the chemical exchange died down without the use of nuclear weapons; however, there were several very tense days at the UN as Western mediators attempted to get both sides to pledge to no-first-use of nuclear weapons (despite the fact that both parties to the war already had pledged as much).
In Europe, there was some alarm over the rapid rate of advance of Soviet ground forces in the opening weeks of the campaign. If the Soviets could make such short work of the PLA, how would they fare against the much less numerous Western European ground forces? Speculation was rife that NATO would be incapable of stopping a sudden Soviet sweep to the English Channel. As the Soviet advance ground to a halt, such irresponsible talk died down, though.
World opinion elsewhere varied. India gleefully watched one of her two principal rivals stagger under the heavy Soviet blows. Pakistan issued belligerent statements in support of China, one of her chief benefactors. Without China to counterbalance India, the Pakistani security situation was far more tenuous.
Generally, the Soviet client states gave their support for the USSR, while their Western clients loudly decried the invasion. Many countries in trouble spots around the globe heightened their military readiness, and some even mobilized additional troops. However, for the most part things settled down in the countries not directly affected by the fighting. Notable exceptions were the two Koreas, Vietnam, and Pakistan.
2000
Exactly how and why Konstantin Dmitrievich Danilov allowed things to evolve as they did over the past four years is still a mystery. He had much better control over events earlier in his career, when he was technically weaker. It has been suggested that he didn’t really believe war would start. It has been suggested that Danilov truly believed that a last-minute deal with Chinese Premier Zhu would head off a war and bring even greater prestige for himself. Whatever the reason, by the end of August 2000, Konstantin Dmitrievich Danilov would find his country involved in a war he had never wanted.
Selling this war would become a painful exercise for Danilov. There was very little he could say to the West that had any meaning beyond the usual propaganda, though he dutifully made his efforts at the UN and in the capitals of the West. For the most part, Danilov was forced to trade in much of the good will he had built in the West over the past decade in an effort to keep the economic credits flowing.
Since there was little the Soviets could do to justify the war in world opinion, it was important that they convince the world that the USSR was winning the war. Superiority of20Soviet arms and soldiery would be its own justification in the end. As a result, Soviet propaganda efforts initially focused on the excellent progress being enjoyed by Soviet armed forces in Manchuria. Never mind who was right—the Soviets were winning.
By contrast, China would find it quite easy to portray herself as the innocent victim. Though the Western media were never given the free reign on the Manchurian battlefields they would have liked, images of smashed Chinese villages and dead and injured Chinese civilians poured back to Western television virtually from the outset of the war. The Chinese Communist Party strove to play up two key images: the suffering of the Chinese people and the heroic resistance of the People’s Liberation Army. In this effort they were largely successful.
Beijing quickly moved to exploit the swell of sympathy among Westerners—particularly among Americans. The large Chinese-American community was solicited to provide financial support, political support, and propaganda support for China. Though not successful everywhere, Chinese-Americans answered the call of the motherland in large numbers. Though many conservative Americans were delighted to see the two great Communist powers at war, at least as many Americans were telling pollsters that the gallant Chinese people deserved the support of the United States against the Soviet aggressors. Washington took notice.
Throughout the Western political circles, the initial reaction was one of muted relief. Despite the warming of Soviet-Western relations during the first half of the 1990’s, NATO remained ready to defend against a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Many were concerned that Danilov’s Soviet Union was a more dangerous Soviet Union because her core strength was now greater. A Soviet Union with a healthy economy and the ability to feed itself might come under the control of an aggressive militarist at a future date. At the same time, the growing economic power of China was causing concern in the West. How long would it be before China’s burgeoning economic power translated itself into military power?
Already the mid 1990’s, the People’s Liberation Army was undergoing a significant modernization. With the Soviet Union and China at war, the West appeared to have killed two birds without actually having to throw its own stone.
Naturally, there was some concern about the war going nuclear. This fear was at its most intense during the first few days of the war, when chemical weapons were used on a large scale both on the front lines and in the rear areas. Some Western military analysts feared that whoever got the worst of the chemical exchange might go nuclear as a means of rectifying the situation. Fortunately, the chemical exchange died down without the use of nuclear weapons; however, there were several very tense days at the UN as Western mediators attempted to get both sides to pledge to no-first-use of nuclear weapons (despite the fact that both parties to the war already had pledged as much).
In Europe, there was some alarm over the rapid rate of advance of Soviet ground forces in the opening weeks of the campaign. If the Soviets could make such short work of the PLA, how would they fare against the much less numerous Western European ground forces? Speculation was rife that NATO would be incapable of stopping a sudden Soviet sweep to the English Channel. As the Soviet advance ground to a halt, such irresponsible talk died down, though.
World opinion elsewhere varied. India gleefully watched one of her two principal rivals stagger under the heavy Soviet blows. Pakistan issued belligerent statements in support of China, one of her chief benefactors. Without China to counterbalance India, the Pakistani security situation was far more tenuous.
Generally, the Soviet client states gave their support for the USSR, while their Western clients loudly decried the invasion. Many countries in trouble spots around the globe heightened their military readiness, and some even mobilized additional troops. However, for the most part things settled down in the countries not directly affected by the fighting. Notable exceptions were the two Koreas, Vietnam, and Pakistan.
As seen, after a period of increasing tension and escalating border incidents, a full-scale war had erupted between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. The Red Army had enjoyed rapid initial successes, and tank columns had roared deep into the northern Chinese industrial heartland.
However, the Chinese surpassed the expectations of most military analysts in their ability to mobilize reserves from the interior and shift them to the fighting front. While the Soviets continued to make impressive gains, their losses mounted and the tempo of advance slowed. Soon, large bodies of citizens' militia were operating in the rear areas, attacking installations and destroying supply convoys. More and more front line troops had to be detailed to mopping up these patches of guerrilla resistance, and the advance ground to a halt.
When the main Chinese conventional forces counterattacked, to the amazement of the world's military experts, large pockets of Soviet troops were formed. Most of the Soviet units, due to their superior mobility and tremendous firepower, were able to fight their way out of the pockets, but Soviet losses were great and the front was shattered.
The Soviet Union had already been mobilizing additional troops from the western military districts, and this was now placed on an emergency priority basis. As a stop-gap, a half dozen combat ready divisions were withdrawn from Eastern Europe and sent to the Far East. But the Far Eastern Front had become a meat grinder, which devoured divisions as quickly as they could be committed. As factory output switched more and more to wartime production, the flow of consumer goods dwindled to a trickle and standards of living in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union fell.
Motor vehicles and railroad rolling stock were increasingly drawn out of the civilian sector to support the war effort. As the first snows of winter fell, the Soviets began soliciting the other members of the Warsaw Pact for volunteer formations to serve on the Far Eastern Front. Resistance to this was surprisingly strong, but by the new year the first Polish, Czech, and East German divisions were traveling east by rail. At least one Hungarian and Bulgarian division would follow once they finished mobilizing and re-equipping with more modern weapons. No Romanians would be going east.
2001
Their ranks swollen with fresh troops, the Pact forces launched a spring offensive against the Chinese. Despite good initial gains, the drive soon stalled, with further horrendous casualties. Winter had witnessed a flood of new, modern equipment through Chinese ports from the NATO nations, particularly the United States. Now Soviet and Pact tanks were not facing obsolete wire-guided missiles, but modern Tank Breaker and Assault Breaker systems that made the massed tank assaults, which had been so successful the year before, suicidal.
New tactics were devised, but more troops were needed. Most Soviet category II readiness divisions were mobilized and sent to the Far East by mid-year, and almost a quarter of the category I divisions from the Eastern European garrisons were committed. Many of the low readiness category III divisions were upgraded to category II or mobilized, and for the first time in fifty years the mobilization-only divisions began training.
Appalled at the losses taken in their expeditionary forces, the other Eastern European members of the Pact agreed only reluctantly to provide more troops. In June, however, a small group of senior officers of the East German Army opened secret talks with a select group of their counterparts in the Bundesheer and Luftwaffe, the army and air force of the Federal Republic of Germany.
In September, a third call for troops from Eastern Europe was made, to be ready for movement by mid-October whether their equipment and training were complete or not. On October 7th, 2001, the Bundeswehr crossed the frontier between East and West Germany and began attacking Soviet garrison units still in the country. The army of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) remained quietly in barracks.
Having not only having been appalled with how the best troops that the DDR could provide where treated by the Soviet Union and with the continuing increase of how harsh the Soviet Forces in Germany where treating the East German citizens who lived near their bases, Hans Modrow realized that his options where severely limited in how to respond and slowly starts to sink into a severe depression. When he received reports that the West Germans had crossed the frontier he made a live radio broadcast where he asked the East German people to remain in their homes, and attempt to avoid conflict with either NATO or Soviets. Hours later when the commander of Soviet Armed Forces in Germany demanded that Modrow order the East German NVA to immediately mobilize and assist in driving the Bundeswehr forces out of the country, Modrow politely refused the order. Even when the Soviet Primer Danilov had personally called Modrow and ordered him to mobilize the E. German NVA, he once more had to politely refuse the order, and he stated that he simply knew that he no longer actually had the power or authority to issue orders the NVA.
Despite the initial surprise, the fifteen Soviet divisions remaining in Germany put up a spirited resistance and were soon joined by two more divisions from Poland and three from the garrison of Czechoslovakia. By November 15th, there were also two Czech divisions and four Polish divisions in Germany, their orders to leave for the Far East hurriedly rescinded. To the surprise of the Western nations, the Czechs and Poles fought well, as neither wished to see a reunited Germany.
By the end of November, the Bundeswehr was in serious trouble. Soviet Frontal Aviation had left their most modern aircraft in the west; these were qualitatively a match for the Luftwaffe and quantitatively more than a match. As the Bundeswehr lines began to crumble, high ranking officers of the East German Army made their move. In a bloodless coup, the civilian leaders of the country were deposed and replaced with a military junta. Two days later the new government ordered the army into the field against the Pact forces in the country and formally requested intervention on their behalf by NATO.
After the bloodless coup Marshall der DDR <name> officially replaced Hans Modrow as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, who remained as an unofficial advisor for the new provisional government. During the conflict the E. German NVA mobilized all of their reserves, and enacted a nationwide draft to allow the DDR to liberate their nation from foreign occupation.
On 9 December <name>, the representative of the DDR to the United Nations, had announced the German Democratic Republic’s desire to remain an independent state that that would remain neutral in world affairs, and formally requested any assistance and support from the other members of the United Nations. Despite the assurances that the DDR wished to remain an independent state, many other nations did not believe these statements to be true. Despite the initial desire to remain as a separate independent nation, the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany would later reunify as the German Federal Republic after years of negotiation that would see the new government taking the best aspects of both governments, while purging the worst.
<Danilov’s attempt to negotiate an end to the fighting in Europe, and is purged…>
While the political leadership of the European members of NATO debated the prudence of intervention, the U.S. Army crossed the frontier. Within a week, France, Belgium, Italy, and Greece first demanded that U.S. troops withdraw to their start line and then withdrew from NATO in protest. British and Canadian forces crossed the border, however, while Danish and Dutch troops remained in place, still partners in NATO but not party to war.
In the far north, Soviet troops made a bid for quick victory in northern Norway. Most of the best Arctic-equipped divisions had already been sent east, however, and the third-line troops available were unable to break through to the paratroopers and marines landed in NATO's rear areas. As crack British commandoes and U.S. Marines joined the battle, the front line moved east again toward the Soviet naval facilities on the Kola Peninsula, and the elite Soviet paratroopers and marines were isolated and destroyed.
At sea, the Soviet Red Banner Northern Fleet sortie and attempted to break through the Greenland-lceland-United Kingdom Gap into the north Atlantic. For three weeks the opposing fleets hammered each other, but the western fleet came out on top, badly bloodied but victorious. 80% of the Soviet northern fleet tonnage rested on the bottom of the Norwegian and North Seas. Scattered commerce raiders did break out, however, and by year's end were wreaking havoc on the NATO convoys bringing ammunition and equipment across the Atlantic.
Having repeatedly given excuses when asked to provide troops for the war effort, Romania was finally presented with an ultimatum on December 5th: either support the war effort fully or suffer the consequences. The time limit expired without a formal reply from the Romanian government, but throughout Romania troops hurried to their emergency mobilization posts.
The Warsaw Pact apparently had expected Romanian compliance with the ultimatum, for it was not until December 20th that sufficient troops were assembled to begin an invasion. As
Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Soviet troops cross the border, Romania formally withdrew from the Warsaw Pact, declared war on the three invading nations, and applied to NATO for assistance.
The first nation to rally to Romania's aid was her neighbor, Yugoslavia. Within 24 hours, three divisions and five brigades crossed into Romania and two days later were at the front under Romanian command. NATO responded shortly thereafter with the offer of full membership in the security organization to both nations, which they accepted. More concrete assistance took the form of the Turkish 1 st Army, which launched its offensive against a thin Bulgarian covering force in Thrace on Christmas Eve.
2002
On the first day of the new year, the NATO heads of state declared their support for a Polish government in exile, headed by a committee of Polish émigrés. While the news was greeted with scattered worker uprisings in Poland, the majority of the Polish Army remained loyal to the central government, and open resistance was soon crushed. An underground movement began forming, however, and by spring small guerrilla bands, leavened by Polish Army deserters, began to harass Warsaw Pact supply convoys and installations.
During January, continuing Turkish successes in Bulgaria sparked a wave of patriotism in the Turks, particularly since Greece had remained neutral in the fight against the communists. On Cyprus, unoccupied and supposedly re-united for three years, the Turkish Cypriots demonstrated in favor of Turkey. The demonstrations turned into anti-Greek riots, and the Cypriot Army moved to restore order. In response, the Turkish Army invaded Cyprus and quickly occupied most of the island. Greece first sent military units to Cyprus to resist the Turks and then declared war on Turkey and attacked the Turkish forces in Thrace.
In late February, the socialist governments of Italy and Greece concluded a mutual defense pact. While Italy was not obligated by the pact to enter the Greco-Turkish war, the Italian government declared the war to be a regional conflict unrelated to the more general war raging elsewhere, promising to intervene on Greece's side if NATO tried to tip the balance in Turkey's favor. Within a week Greece declared a naval blockade against Turkey and warned the world's shipping that the Aegean was now considered a war zone.
In an attempt to restore the situation in Germany, Soviet and Czech troops went over to the offensive in southern Germany but did not have the strength to make any significant gains. With the coming of spring the NATO offensive gained momentum and in April the first German troops crossed the frontier into Poland. By June 17th, Warsaw was surrounded, and Polish army units and the citizens of the city prepared for a siege.
By late spring, NATO's Atlantic fleet had hunted down the last of the Soviet commerce raiders, and the surviving attack carriers and missile cruisers moved to northern waters. The NATO drive in the north had bogged down on the banks of the Litsa River, but the Northern Front commander now contemplated a bold move to destroy the remnants of Soviet naval power there. While U.S. and British units attempted a rapid outflanking move through northern Finland, the NATO Atlantic Fleet would close in on Murmansk and Severomorsk, subjecting the Soviet fleet anchorages and air bases to a massive bombardment. On June 7th the ground offensive was launched and the fleet closed in on the Kola Peninsula shortly thereafter.
Finland had been expected to offer token resistance to the violation of its territory; instead the Finnish Army fought tenaciously, seriously delaying the flanking move. At sea the plan fared even worse, as coastal missile boats and the remnants of Northern Fleet's shore-based naval aviation inflicted crippling losses on the NATO fleet. By mid-June the last major naval fleet in-being in the world had been shattered.
In the south, the front in Romania stabilized and entered a period of attritional warfare. Soviet mobilization-only divisions, largely leg-mobile and stiffened with a sprinkling of obsolete tanks and armored personnel carriers, entered the lines. Although the Romanians proved better soldiers than the over-aged and ill-trained Soviet recruits, the manpower difference began to be felt. The best Soviet troops were shipped further south to Bulgaria, and by May had managed to halt the Turkish drive. As Greek pressure on the Turkish left flank in Thrace built, unit after Turkish unit was shifted to face the Greeks. It became clear that, without aid, the Turkish Army would have to fall back or be defeated.
On June 27th, a NATO convoy of fast transports and cargo ships, accompanied by a strong covering force, attempted the run to the Turkish port of Izmir with badly-needed ammunition and equipment. Light fleet elements of the Greek navy intercepted the convoy and, in a confused night action off Izmir, inflicted substantial losses and escaped virtually unharmed. Two days later NATO retaliated with air strikes against Greek naval bases. On July 1st, Greece declared war against the NATO nations, and Italy, in compliance with her treaty obligations, followed suit on the 2nd.
In early July, Italian airmobile and alpine units crossed the passes into Tyrolia. Scattered elements of the Austrian army resisted briefly but were overwhelmed. By mid-month, Italian mechanized forces were debouching from the Alpine passes into southern Germany, and their advanced elements were in combat against German territorial troops in the suburbs of Munich. The Yugoslavian Army launched a gallant but costly offensive against northeastern Italy, but soon was stalled. Italy responded with a major counteroffensive which, while draining troops from the German front, quickly shattered the thinly-spread Yugoslavian northern grouping.
The Italian Army enjoyed tremendous success in the first month of its involvement in the war, primarily for logistical reasons. Most of its opponents had already been at war for six months or more. Their peacetime stocks of munitions and replacement vehicles had been depleted, and their industries had not yet geared up to wartime production. The Italians had intact peacetime stockpiles to draw on. As summer turned to fall, however, the Italians too began feeling the logistical pinch, aggravated by the increasing flow of munitions and equipment from the factories of their opponents.
In Asia, pro-Soviet India and anti-Soviet Pakistan drifted into war through an escalating spiral of border incidents, mobilization, and major armed clashes. Outright war began in the spring, and by mid-year the Indian Army was slowly advancing across the length of the front, despite fierce resistance.
By early July, NATO advanced elements were closing up on the Polish-Soviet frontier in the central region, while continuing the siege of Pact-held Warsaw. The Polish government in exile established its temporary capital in the city of Poznan, and asserted its claim to the pre-1939 Polish borders in the east. In the Far East, Pact forces began major withdrawals all along the front, and the mobile elements of the Chinese Army began a victorious pursuit.
On July 9th, with advanced elements of the 1st German Army on Soviet soil, the Red Army began using tactical nuclear weapons. In the West, they were used sparingly at first, and for the first week were used only against troop concentrations no further than 50 kilometers from the Soviet border. In the Far East, however, they were used on a massive scale. Chinese mechanized columns were vaporized, caught in the open on the roads in imagined pursuit. Strike aircraft delivered warheads on the northern Chinese population and industrial centers still in Chinese hands. The Chinese response was immediate, but Soviet forward troop units were dispersed and well-prepared. Ballistic missile attacks on Soviet population centers were frustrated by an active and efficient ABM system, and the Soviet Air Defense Command massacred the handful of Chinese bombers that attempted low-level penetration raids. Within a week, the Chinese riposte was spent, but Soviet attacks continued. The Chinese communication and transportation system, already stretched to the breaking point, disintegrated. The roads were choked with refugees fleeing from the remaining cities, all of them potential targets. China began the rapid slide into anarchy and civil disorder.
On the western front, the forward elements of both armies on the Soviet-Polish frontier were hit hard by tactical nuclear strikes, as NATO matched the Warsaw Pact warhead-for-warhead. By late August, the first of the Soviet divisions released from the Far East were entering the lines. Although the front lines were fluid everywhere, they began moving gradually west. On September 15th, the siege of Warsaw was lifted, and a week later Czech and Italian troops began a renewed offensive in southern Germany. The southern offensive gained momentum, and NATO forces in Poland increased the rate of their withdrawal, practicing a scorched earth policy as they fell back.
The Soviet and Bulgarian forces in Thrace also began a major offensive against the Turks in September. The one-sided use of tactical nuclear weapons broke the stalemate, and by month's end Bulgarian tank brigades were racing toward Istanbul. Simultaneously, Greek and Albanian troops launched a drive against southern Yugoslavia, and the Yugoslavian Army began to break up. The Yugoslavian expeditionary force in Romania was recalled for home defense, but before it could return, Beograd had fallen to Italian mechanized columns. At the same time, the limited use of tactical nuclear weapons, the increasing numbers of Soviet reserves, and the withdrawal of the Yugoslavians caused the Romanian front to collapse. As War saw Pact columns swept through both countries, isolated military units withdrew into the mountains and began to wage a guerrilla war.
In the west, NATO air units began making deep nuclear strikes against communication hubs in Czechoslovakia and Byelorussia in an attempt to slow the Warsaw Pact advance. The Pact responded with similar strikes against German industrial targets and major port cities. NATO's theater nuclear missiles were launched against an array of industrial targets and port cities in the western Soviet Union. Throughout October the exchanges continued, escalating gradually. Fearful of a general strategic exchange, neither side targeted on the land-based ICBM's of the other, or launched so many warheads at once as to risk convincing the other side that an all-out attack was in progress. Neither side wished to cross the threshold to nuclear oblivion in one bold step, and so they inched across it, never quite knowing they had done it until after the fact.
First, military targets were hit. Then industrial targets clearly vital to the war effort. Then economic targets of military importance. Then transportation and communication, oil fields and refineries. Then major industrial and oil centers in neutral nations, to prevent their possible use by the other side. Numerous warheads were aimed at logistical stockpiles and command control centers of the armies in the field. Almost accidentally, the civilian political command structure was first decimated, then eliminated. The exchange continued, fitfully and irregularly, through November and early December, and then gradually petered out.
Pakistan and India waged their own nuclear war. Facing defeat, Pakistan launched a pre-emptive strike on India's economy and nuclear strike force. Although industrial centers were hit hard, enough of India's nuclear arsenal survived to launch a devastating retaliatory strike. The Indian-Pakistani war soon wound down, as each country's economy no longer could feed its civilians, let alone supply military units.
2003
The winter of 2002-03 was particularly cold. Civilian war casualties in the industrialized nations had reached almost 15% by the turn of the year, but the worst was yet to come. Communication and transportation systems were non-existent, and food distribution was impossible. In the wake of nuclear war came famine on a scale previously undreamed of. Only the exceptionally cold winter delayed simultaneous epidemics. In the nations of the Third World, destruction of their major industries together with cessation of western food aid caused severe dislocations, with famine and starvation in many areas. With the spring thaw, the unburied dead finally brought on the epidemics the few remaining medical professionals had dreaded but were powerless to prevent. Plague, typhoid, cholera, typhus, and many other diseases swept the world's population. By the time they had run their courses, the global casualty rate would be 50%.
In Europe, France and Belgium had been hit the lightest and stood virtually alone in maintaining a semblance of internal order throughout the cataclysm. As refugees began flooding across their borders, the French and Belgian governments closed their frontiers, and military units began turning back refugees with gunfire. The French government authorized the army to move west to the Rhine to secure a solid geographical barrier. As the refugees piled up on the French and Belgian frontiers, a large lawless zone sprang into existence. Open fighting for food was followed by mass starvation and disease, until the lawless zone had become barren and empty.
The average strength of NATO combat divisions at the front had fallen to about 8,000, with U.S. divisions running at about half of that. Warsaw Pact divisions now varied widely in strength, running from 500 to 10,000 effectives, but mostly in the 2-4,000 range. Lack of fuel, spare parts, and ammunition temporarily paralyzed the armies. Peace might have come, but there were no surviving governments to negotiate it. Only the military command structures remained intact, and they remained faithful to the final orders of their governments. In a time of almost universal famine, only the military had the means of securing and distributing rations. Military casualties had been much lower than casualties among civilians.
In the Balkans, the partisan bands in the mountains of Romania and Yugoslavia had escaped almost untouched, while many Pact regular units had been destroyed in the exchange or had just melted away after it. The Romanians and Yugoslavians began forming regular combat units again, although still structured to live off the land and subsist from captured enemy equipment. At first, there was a great deal of enemy equipment just lying around waiting to be picked up.
There were border changes as well. The Italian Army formed the satellite states of Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia while the Greek Army directly annexed Macedonia. The Albanian Army, always a reluctant ally, first protested, then withdrew from the temporary alliance, and finally began sporadic attacks on Greek military units. At the same time, many Italian and Hungarian units were withdrawn from the Balkans and shifted to Czechoslovakia and southern Germany.
In North America, a flood of hungry refugees began crossing the Rio Grande, and most of the remaining military forces of the United States were deployed into the southwest to deal with the mounting crisis. They moved at the orders of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, now the de facto government of the United States. Widespread food riots and violence in refugee areas were met with military force. The Mexican government protested, and within months Mexican Army units crossed the Rio Grande to protect Mexican lives. More U.S. units were shifted south. Scattered fighting grew into open warfare, and Mexican armored columns were soon driving northeast toward Arkansas and northwest into southern California. The front quickly stabilized in northeast Texas and central California. Elsewhere in the U.S. civil disorder and anarchy increased with the withdrawal of Army units.
In late June, the Pact forces in southern Germany renewed their offensive in an attempt to seize the scattered surviving industrial sites in central Germany. Actually, the most intact parts of Germany were those areas in the south which had been under Warsaw Pact occupation, as neither side was willing to strike the area heavily. Galvanized into renewed action, NATO forces made a maximum effort to reform a coherent front, and the Pact offensive finally stalled along a line from Frankfurt to Fulda. In late August, NATO launched its own offensive from the area of Karl Marx Stadt, driving south to penetrate the Pact rear areas in Czechoslovakia. The thinly-spread Czech border guard units were quickly overwhelmed and Pact forces in central Germany began a precipitous withdrawal to Czechoslovakia, laying waste to southern Germany as they retreated.
A simultaneous offensive by the Yugoslavian Army drove north in an attempt to link up with NATO. The Yugoslavians were halted near Lake Balaton, however, and then thrown back. As more Pact units arrived in Czechoslovakia, the NATO drive ran out of steam and lost its sense of direction. Troops were shifted west to garrison the recaptured but devastated south of Germany, and many lives were wasted in a futile attempt to force the Alpine passes into Italy. As the autumnal rains began, NATO and the Pact initiated a short and weak second nuclear exchange, directed primarily at surviving industrial centers in the United Kingdom and Italy.
Fighting gradually ran down to the level of local skirmishing as both sides prepared for another winter.
2004
Once spring planting was finished, the United States Congress reconvened for the first time since the first exchange of missiles. Senator John Broward (D, Ark), the former governor of Arkansas who appointed himself to fill one of the two vacant senatorial seats, was elected President by the House of Representatives. General Jonathan Cummings, then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, refused to recognize the constitutional validity of the election, citing the lack of a proper quorum and numerous irregularities in the credentials of the attending congressmen.
(Although Cummings' decision would later be widely criticized, there was much validity to his position. Many congressional seats were disputed; several of the congressmen in attendance were merely self-appointed local strongmen who had gained control of large parts of the old congressional districts, and some had never seen the districts they purported to represent. There was at least one confirmed shooting between rival claimants to a seat while Congress was in session.)
General Cummings declared a continuation of martial law until such time as a new census was practical, that being necessary for a meaningful reapportionment of congressional seats and presidential electoral votes. President Broward responded with a demand for Cummings' resignation, which Cummings declined to submit. While some military units sided with the new civilian government, the majority continued to take orders from the Joint Chiefs, particularly those overseas, for two simple reasons. First, the habit of obedience was deeply ingrained, and, in many cases, was all that had allowed units to survive thus far. Second, the Joint Chiefs controlled virtually all surviving telecommunications networks.
In North America, the main effect was a further erosion of central authority. Forced to choose between two rival governments, both with considerable flaws in their claims to legitimacy, many localities simply chose to ignore both.
The surviving foreign and national organizations dealing or concerned with the United States, choose between the rival governments. The German military government and Polish government in exile continued relations with the Joint Chiefs, while the partisan commands of Yugoslavia and Romania recognized the civilian government. The remnants of the Central Intelligence Agency obeyed the orders of the civilian government, while the Defense Intelligence Agency, loyal to the Joint Chiefs, organized a field operations branch to replace the CIA "defectors." Officially, forces of the two governments refrained from violent confrontation, but there were sporadic local clashes over key installations, occasional bloody coups within military units, and numerous assassinations and "dirty tricks" by rival intelligence agencies.
In the autumn, the dispatch of troops to Europe resumed, although only as a trickle. A few warships were available as escorts, and various old merchant vessels were pressed into service as transports. Initiated by the civilian government, both governments briefly competed in a struggle to outdo the other, viewing success as a litmus test of their ability to mobilize the nation. In fact, the call-ups affected only the Atlantic coast and led to widespread resistance. The dispatch of troops, supplies, and equipment to Europe made little sense to most, considering the appalling state of affairs in the United States.
The actual reinforcements sent included a small number of light vehicles and ammunition but consisted mostly of light infantry. Mortars were becoming the most popular support weapon for troops, as they could be turned out in quantity from small machine shops and garages.
In Europe, the fronts were static for most of the year. Low troop densities meant that infiltration raids became the most common form of warfare. The "front" ceased to be a line and became a deep occupied zone, as troops settled into areas and began farming and small-scale manufacturing to meet their supply requirements. Local civilians were hired to farm and carry out many administrative functions in return for security from the increasing numbers of marauders roaming the countryside. In other areas, the security the military unit provided to its civilians was from the unit itself. Many units stationed in barren areas drifted apart or turned to marauding when supplies did not arrive. Although most attacks by large bodies of marauders were directed at areas held by "the enemy", they begin to be directed at "allied" units as well, although at first not against units of the same nationality.
2005
By the spring of the year 2005, the armies of Europe had settled into their new "cantonment" system. Civil authority had virtually ceased to exist. Most military units were practicing extensive local recruiting in an attempt to keep up to strength, and stragglers were often incorporated into units regardless of nationality. Thus, U.S. units contain Germans, Poles, Danes, and former soldiers of Warsaw Pact armies in addition to Americans. Nominal titles of units (brigades, divisions, etc.) have little bearing on the actual size of the unit.
In early summer, the German Third Army, spearheaded by the U.S. Eleventh Corps, moved out of its cantonments on what was to become one of the last strategic offensives of the war.
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