It’s true that canon does not specifically address the issue of Anglo-American (or Dutch, Danish, or Norwegian) air power in Europe. However, the fact that canon doesn’t address the issue of Anglo-American air power over Germany in December ’96 doesn’t mean that Anglo-American air activity doesn’t contribute massively to Allied victory in the opening stages of the superpower confrontation in Europe.
We know a few things about air power in Europe in Twilight: 2000. Perhaps the most relevant to the subject at hand is the idea that the SAF(1) leaves its most advanced airframes in the West, despite the ongoing conflict in China. [v1 chronology] Qualitatively, the SAF in the West is a match for the Luftwaffe, while having a quantitative advantage over the West Germans. We may infer that the Luftwaffe is nearly annihilated during the 06 OCT-30 NOV timeframe; I think this is a reasonable conclusion. However, if we’re going to be canon fundamentalists, then it should be pointed out that all we really know is that the Luftwaffe fails to provide adequate support for the Bundeswehr. I’m perfectly happy discussing what I believe is the likely demise of the Luftwaffe within the context of acknowledging that any speculation about the numbers of aircraft lost under what conditions is beyond the reach of the existing body of canon. (I don’t have the NATO Vehicle Guide, so I am happy to be brought up to speed by any information given therein.)
We know that the United States transfers III US Corps to Europe to claim equipment stored in POMCUS sites before the US joins the fighting in Europe. We also know that some US Army formations, such as 5th Infantry Division, were sent to Europe by air and sea in time to join the fighting in East Germany in December ’96. (US Army Vehicle Guide) In other words, while West Germany is duking it out in East Germany, the United States is REFORGER into practice. Canon may not actually say the USAF reinforces Western Europe to its pre-assigned levels, but should canon have to tell us that? If the Army is going to reinforce Europe to the level given in the US Army Vehicle Guide, then the only reasonable conclusion is that the USAF is also reinforced massively.
By 01 DEC 96, the SAF in the West has been fighting for seven weeks or so. Seven weeks of high-tempo operations are going to take their toll on aircraft readiness. Even if the Pact sweeps the Germans from the sky, front-line commanders still will be screaming for air support. The danger (as opposed to the likelihood) of losing the fight in Germany will seem so great to the Soviets that they are likely to feel compelled to maintain CAS and interdiction missions at the greatest possible tempo. Commissars may play their role in all of this, pointing out that tens of thousands of Soviet patriots have spilled their blood on the ground. Why the [expletive deleted] do the pilots deserve to sit on the ground drinking coffee and eating doughnuts while the battle against the hated Germans hangs in the balance?
By the end of November, the Soviets probably enjoy air supremacy over the DDR; this may seem good reason to ground the air superiority fighters, give the crews a rest, and let the ground personnel catch up on maintenance. However, the Anglo-Americans loom over the western horizon. One simply never knows when the Anglophones will get off the fence and treacherously join the invasion of the DDR. Therefore, some fighters will have to escort strike missions and maintain CAPs against Anglo-American involvement. As a consequence, the fighter crews may not be able to catch up on rest and maintenance as much as the air situation may indicate.
When the Anglophones join the fight, it will be with relatively fresh air crews, fresh aircraft, and a wealth of information about how the Soviets operate over Germany. The numerical advantage of the Pact air forces vanishes once the USAF and RAF (and CFAC) enter the war. I’m not going to reiterate all of the advantages the NATO aircraft, crews, and operational handling have over their Pact counterparts. To some degree, the experience in China will offset some of the inherent weaknesses of the SAF. However, the Allies will have good intelligence regarding changes in the Soviet application of air power due to the fact that Germany and China have abundant recent experience. Also, the Communists are firmly wedding to the idea of positive ground control because they are firmly wedded to the idea of controlling the military. Only in WW2, when the fate of the Soviet Union was at stake, did the political officers lose some of their power. Even then, it took some time for the effects to manifest themselves. Inertia is going to keep the SAF over Germany recognizably Soviet, even if a modest loosening of ground control improves effectiveness somewhat.
Given the advantages on the Allied side, there is no good reason to assume that the Allies don’t take control of the air over Germany in short order. Operating under surge conditions, the USAF will generate two to three sorties per day per aircraft, whereas the Pact air forces will have passed the time when they can generate a surge lasting more than a day or two. Therefore, the USAF, RAF, and CFAC will be putting their aircraft up two to four times as often as the Pact defenders. In effect, the sortie rate will act as a multiplier on the apparent number of airframes. Since one of the main missions of the Anglo-American forces will be to knock out runways and hardened aircraft shelters, the initial advantage possessed by the English speakers will increase dramatically in the first few days.
As for Soviet aircraft returning from China, I believe indeed the Soviets would transfer some air regiments to the West in October. However, this is not canon. Nevertheless, since I am not a canon fundamentalist, I will address the idea of transfer of forces by saying that the introduction of veteran regiments of late-model MiGs and Sukhoi into the fight in Europe would be a problem for the West out of proportion to the numbers of aircraft and pilots introduced. However, as my wife is always telling me, timing is everything. If these regiments of veterans flying late-model fighters transfer to the West at the beginning of the German-Soviet fighting, then by 01 DEC 96 they will be in much the same condition as the aircraft and crews left in the West: fatigued, in need of down time, and with a few kill markers under their canopies. If the air regiments in question transfer west once the American get involved, they will find themselves operating without their support. This may not be too much of a problem, since the arriving air regiments can operate from airfields in western Russia. Still, there are only so many ground crews familiar with the MiG-29, MiG-31, Su-27, and so on. Getting them and their gear from their air bases in the Far East will take a few days. By then, the USAF will have generated literally thousands of sorties. It’s a problem for the Soviets.
I do want to note that I am addressing only the fighting in East Germany at this point. Poland is another matter entirely, which I believe we addressed at some point in the past year. The introduction of ten or more fresh US/UK heavy divisions into the fighting in the DDR in early December will change the situation on the ground completely. Here the Allies will almost certainly attempt large-scale envelopments. Pact troops, overmatched by their fresh and numerous counterparts, will be obliged to conduct rapid withdrawals. In some instances, Pact forces will break completely. Under these conditions, some troops will dutifully destroy their own vehicles and hardware. Others won’t, either because they don’t bother or don’t have the opportunity.
Again, Poland is a completely different situation. I agree with you, Leg, that envelopments and large-scale surrenders will be few and far between during the Poland phase of the NATO drive towards the Soviet border.
Regarding the immediate destruction of Pact gear, there are a couple more users who might appreciate having some Pact gear: Jugoslavia and Romania. Whether a single BMP captured in East Germany ever reaches either nation isn’t the point. The intent to supply the new NATO members with equipment similar to their own is enough reason to hold onto captured gear.
1. Soviet air forces are divided into several groups that have distinct and sometimes overlapping roles. Rather than spend time nitpicking about which of the Soviet air arms does what, for the purposes of this discussion I’m going to roll all of the Soviet air power into a single umbrella term: SAF
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