[robj3]

dragoon500ly wrote:

Don't be sorry, lots of good info in the post!!

Thanks. Next little project is to see whether a Morrow-level TEOTWAWKI could be precipitated by an alternate Korean war or Cuban Missile Crisis.

Tony Stroppa wrote:

Not all of the target and missile data jives with real life!

There are some bits that are close, and some that are way out, as previously noted.

Not to mention the weapons are not MIRVs but MRVs and not independently targeted.

I'm using TM1-1 3d. ed (1985).
p.4 and 5 specifically refer to MIRVs in the 'Russian nuclear missile data' table and the following section 'MIRV Impacts'.

One assumption is that the Soviet bomber fleet would be caught on the ground by the surprise/accidental strike.

That's not present in TM1-1, but is sort of reasonable given that the attack came with minimal warning (satellites detecting U.S. ICBM launches gives at most 30 minutes). The problem is that the Soviets maintained strategic patrol flights at all times until 1992 (after remarks by Vladimir Putin in 2007 when he resumed bomber patrols). What proportion of the 163 aircraft available were in the air?

Note that this contradicts doctrinal notes in Podvig (Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, p.363) where nuclear capable aircraft were kept at a low level of readiness.

Command sequences were strict:
- alert
- load and ready weapons
- authorization of use
- takeoff
- travel to launch/target points

In any case, there's an enormous discrepancy between force used (~16% of total) and available force.


Rob