[Webstral]

I have enjoyed reading everyone's thoughts on the real world Soviet Army immensely. I want to offer a few specific items without writing my customary essay.

At the risk of sounding like a pundit for the Quartermaster Corps, modern warfare is an exercise in logistics to a degree that is truly difficult to comprehend. The sheer tonnage of fuel and large caliber ammunition to be moved from place to place is almost beyond imagining. Add in spares, and moving and organizing all of this gear requires an effort that is probably beyond that of any nation on Earth. Yes, even beyond the United States. More so than any other war, World War Three (the Twilight War) would be characterized by relatively brief periods of almost unimaginably intense mechanized combat separated by lengthier periods of moderate activity and near-quiescence. Logistics would drive these cycles.

The Soviet Army doesn't have enough trucks. There is the bottom line. The West doesn't have enough trucks, but the situation is closer to tolerable in the West. At the start of the Twilight War, the Soviets understand their limitations better than the West understands their own, and Soviet doctrine, equipment, and training are designed to operate with Soviet logistical limitations in mind. In 1995, the Soviets understand that they are going to surge ahead 200-300 kilometers, then stall. This is why all supply and support goes to the most successful subordinate formation at any level of command. The Soviets go into the war understanding that they cannot possibly support all of their forces equally; nor can they predict who is going to achieve success. (Obviously, they have a strong interest in trying to do so, but who doesn't?) Given that the offensive is going to stall due to lack of fuel, ammunition, and spares, whatever is available at any given moment must go to support whichever formation is achieving a breakthrough. Ideally, the Soviets will accomplish against the West or China what the Germans accomplished against the Soviets in 1941: the encirclement and annihilation of major commands. The fact that said encirclement and annihilation didn't end the war on favorable terms for the Germans doesn't mean the idea isn't worth trying. The Rhine is much closer to Berlin than Moscow is to Berlin. (I have my doubts that the capture of Moscow by the Wehrmacht would have ended the war in Eastern Europe, anyway.)

The Twilight War puts the Soviets in a bad position. The Soviet Army is set up to deliver a knockout blow. Support for combat formations is spartan by Western standards. This is fine in the short term, but over the long haul there will be real trouble. Granted, Soviet equipment can better tolerate periods of low or no maintenance, but sooner or later the machines with poor maintenance will break down. This is one reason the Soviets have so many tanks. Create a table showing how many tanks will break down over the course of a three-week campaign; see how many are available at the end of that time; adjust the number of tanks available at the start of the campaign to get the desirable number at the end. Basic and brutal math, but this is the thinking of people who used that pattern successfully in World War Two and who planned to upgrade it for the next big show.

The war in China puts the Soviet Union's entire basis for waging war off-balance. The army that has been set up for a lightning offensive finds itself bogged down in extended operations. Becoming bogged down is not merely an inconvenience for the Soviets. Bogging down exposes the inherent weaknesses of the Soviet Army and of the Soviet state.

Getting back to the trucks, the war in China requires more trucks than the Soviets want to commit. As the front line moves further into China, the supply line moves forward. Use of captured rail can help ease the logistical burden, but the rails are quite vulnerable to action by Chinese partisans, etc. The lion's share of stocks must go by truck. Soon, the triple whammy of extending supply lines, breakdowns, and losses to enemy action threatens to strand the Soviet forces in Manchuria on a hostile beach. Trucks must be drawn from elsewhere. The v1 chronology refers to this fact by mentioning that vehicles come out of the civilian pool.

The Soviets have trucks in reserve, true enough. These are going to be drawn upon. The Soviets can make more trucks. However, unfortunately for the Soviets their industry is already heavily committed to war production. It's safe to say that in the 1980's, the Soviet economy is on a war footing. There isn't much slack to take up in terms of war production. Adjustments can be made, of course; the Soviet people can be forced to live with yet less. However, the Soviet military already is consuming the lion's share of manufacturing, metals, fuels, and educated manpower. "Ramping up" production means something completely different to the Soviets vis-a -vis the West.

Consequently, the demand on trucks in the Far East is a tremendous problem for the Soviets. The logistical weaknesses serve to undo much of the maneuverability and firepower of the Soviets. The BMP-3, impressive as it seems, is not useful in its primary role with empty fuel tanks, empty ammo bins, or broken tracks. The Tiger was undone principally by its demands on an already badly weakened German logistical situation. The Soviet Army in China would find itself in much the same position.

As trucks come out of the reserve units to make good losses in the Far East, the Soviet reserve system is going to lose a good deal of its potency. Again, the trucks coming out of the reserve aren't going to be replaced. New trucks are going straight to the front. Therefore, combat formations called up aren't going to have the kind of mobility or logistical staying power called for by Soviet doctrine—itself not exactly a formula for abundance.

As an example of how serious this problem can be, one need look only at the two most recent wars in the Persian Gulf. In Desert Storm, the US Army was on the verge of running out of some key items after four days of intensive operations. The show would have rolled on anyway, but corners would have had to have been cut. Every day of operations thereafter would have exacerbated the problem. And let us never forget the operational pause in the race for Baghdad in 2003.

The Soviets will have certain advantages in Germany when the Bundeswehr commences operations. The Soviets will be fighting defensively, which will give them certain advantages. Also, the GSFG is the most likely of Soviet commands to retain the best part of its trucks. Stocks are close-at-hand. Nevertheless, losses in wheeled transport among the Soviets in Germany are going to be pretty darned serious. Were it not for the fact that the NATO offensive in April 1997 moves through Poland, where the Pact has had plenty of time to lay mines and can use rail to offset the weaknesses in trucks, the Western powers probably would have demolished the defenders. As it is, the West's own logistical problems, combined with what must have been a truly daunting series of obstacle belts running east from the Oder, combine to turn a potential war of maneuver in Poland into a war of moving attrition.

Okay, I said no essays and I meant it. I enjoyed reading all of your posts, gentlemen.

Webstral