Quote:
Originally Posted by dragoon500ly
British amphibious doctrine relied on speed, tactical surprise, control of the sea and air in the immediate vincity of the operation, limited commitment against targets of opportunity, short duration of operations, unopposed assaults on terrain that allowed rapid advance inland and interservice cooperation rather than unity of command.
The Dieppe raid revealed the weakness of this doctrine.
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This is the difference between an "amphibious landing" and an "amphibious assault". Most British (and American) landings before 1943 were "landings"-- as were most of the Japanese landings in 1941-42, and even a few of the American ones in the Southwest Pacific. If you land were the enemy isn't defending, you can get away with a lot of mistakes, and maneuver is possible. See: Anzio's first few days, the 1944 Guam landings, Sicily, and so on.
If the enemy is on the same beach as your troops, then the stakes go up a lot higher-- your only tactical option is the frontal assault. Good luck with that, it doesn't work a lot of the time. See: Gallipoli, Wake Island, "The Battle of the Points", Milne Bay; all of the Normandy Beaches, Tarawa and most of the Central Pacific atolls and islands.
I'd say that Bradley both did and did not see that Omaha and Utah were amphibious assaults, ignoring that the Pacific operations (like Tarawa and Eniwetok) had anything to inform him or his staff.
I just finished reading "The dead and those who are going to die", about the 1st US Infantry Division's assault on Omaha Beach, and it laid into American planners for overloading the assault troops (couldn't most of that gear go in the later waves) and overloading the early waves with vehicles that only provided targets for the Germans. The book did provide a very detailed look at the handful of company and platoon leaders who did get their men moving early on, and get them inland ASAP and into the rear of the German positions.