[dragoon500ly]

Sources are Omaha A Flawed Victory by Adrian Lewis, D-Day by Steven Ambrose and D-Day by Tute, Costello and Hughes

Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory was commander in chief of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF). Under this command was the U.S. Ninth Tactical Air Force and the RAF Second Tactical Air Force. General Carl Spaatz was the senior U.S. airman in the theater. He commanded the U.S. Strategic Air Force (USSTAF). He directed the operations of the U.S. Eighth Air Force, administratively controlled the Ninth Air Force and operationally controlled the U.S. Fifteenth Air Force in Italy. In terms of the employment of American airpower in Europe, Spaatz was the most powerful man in the theater. He was firmly wedded to the strategic bombing campaign and opposed any diversion of resources to support ground operations. Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris commanded the RAF Bomber Command and, like Spaatz, believed that strategic bombing would win the war.

On April 14, 1944, less than two months prior to the invasion, Eisenhower was given “direction” of the USSTAF and RAF Bomber Command. Throughout March, the issue of the command of these forces was hotly debated. The Chiefs of Staff objected to the use of the word “command”, so “direction” was used instead. Eisenhower would exercise his authority through Leigh-Mallory who was responsible for coordinating the activities of the strategic and tactical air forces. No single individual had complete authority over the use of air power and every operation was subject to appeal.

An example of the failure of this command structure is found in the control of the Ninth Air Force. On March 10, Leigh-Mallory issued a directive to the Ninth Air Force: “The Supreme Commander has decided that the time has now come for the operations of the U.S. 9th Air Force to be directed towards preparation for OVERLORD. Henceforth 9th Air Force will operate exclusively under the AEAF and will be released from its commitment to assist U.S. 8th Air Force POINTBLANK operations under arrangements made by the force.” Spaatz had been using the long-range fighters of the 9th Air Force to escort his bombers in Europe. Spaatz sent a memorandum to Eisenhower on March 18th that stated: “I think this is a matter of utmost importance in our operations. Unless the 8th Air Force operating out of the U.K. can be assured of the availability of all the long range fighters, including P-47’s, their deep penetrations will result in greatly increased heavy bombers losses and we will be losing many opportunities to deal punishing blows to the German Air Force.”

Eisenhower accepted Spaatz’s argument and control of the 9th Air Force’s fighters remained with Spaatz. Had Spaatz lost this argument, he was prepared to go over Eisenhower’s head to General Henry H. Arnold, commanding general of the Army Air Forces. In such interservice disputes, the air force usually won because of the view that it was necessary to achieve air superiority.

The close air support mission was last in priority in the minds of American airman, and as a consequence, the air force was poorly trained for such missions on June 6, 1944. The Allies never created a single overall air command in northwest Europe, to this can be added a lethal cocktail of doctrinal differences, interservice rivalry, opposing mission priorities and national egos. Each air force commander had his own staff working on different target lists to support Overlord.

The Initial Joint Plan estimated that the RAF and USSTAF would have available (by June 1, 1944) the following forces: The USSTAF would have 163 bomber squadrons (12 planes per squadron) and 45 fighter squadrons (25 planes per squadron). The Ninth Air Force would have 32 squadrons of medium bombers (16 planes per squadron), 12 squadrons of light bombers (16 planes per squadron), 55 squadrons of day fighters (25 planes per squadron), 3 squadrons of night fighters (12 planes per squadron) as well as reconnaissance and troop carrier aircraft.

The RAF would provide 72 squadrons of heavy bombers (20 planes per squadron), 18 squadrons of light bombers (20 planes per squadron); 20 squadrons of fighter-bombers (18 planes per squadron), 64 squadrons of day fighters (18 plans per squadron), 22 squadrons of night fighters (18 planes per squadron) as well as reconnaissance and transport aircraft.