[Ursus Maior]

The Polish people feared a new partition, yes, but they loathed the Soviet Union, because they saw the Soviet Army as one of occupation. And frankly, that's exactly what it was. The Soviet army was not there to defend Poland, but to create a buffer to secure the USSR. Everyone in the Warsaw Pact knew this, but only two-and-a-half countries made it out of the conundrum that was the Eastern Bloc's fear of being occupied by Soviet armed forces ad perpetuum.

Yugoslavia left the bloc early, when the USSR war still weak. Having liberated itself during the war, Tito wasn't depending on Stalin as much as others. So, when the Soviet leader finally botched his relationship with Tito for good, Tito could leave the Soviet sphere of influence with Western help. Yugoslavia was not as important for the Soviet security cordon and when Stalin died, Khrushchev went for a climate change. So, Yugoslavia was safe.

Albania went second, and the matter is quite complicated, but in the end, Albania wasn't worth any effort and the split became public during the Khrushchev thawing. So the tiny Adriatic state, never having been occupied in the first place, left the Eastern Bloc per se almost quitly.

Next were Hungary and the ČSSR, both failing in their endeavors ultimately. In both cases, however, the enterprise to leave the Soviet zone of influence was almost doomed from the start. Hungary and ČSSR were direct neighbors of the USSR and thus extremely important to the defense of it. Them being part of the Soviet empire was not something that could be discussed. Also, in both cases, the split was to occur on the basis of local leaders aiming at not only leaving the Soviet empire, but also Marxist socialist ideals as preached by the USSR. In both cases, popular revolts were important parts of the political shift, something the Soviets always feared for themselves. So they went down hard on both, Hungary and the ČSSR.

Thus, when Romania aimed at leaving the direct zone of influence and especially occupation by the USSR, their leaders looked at the lessons others had endured and counted two and two together: being a direct neighbor of the USSR, Romania couldn't hope to leave the bloc entirely. But it got rid of occupation quite early. This left being tied militarily to the USSR by means of the Warsaw Pact. This was hardly negotiable, but Romania pulled off to never participate in big exercises and especially not having Soviet troops on its soil.

Romanian leadership had a narrow and slippery path to walk, in order to accomplish that. First of all, any form of official disobedience to Marxist socialist ideals was out of the question. Second, any form of popular unrest was, too. And third, the economy had to provide enough so that the USSR couldn't bully Romania into submission. The latter part worked, thanks to large scale investment into heavy industries, especially steel. This led to considerable fallout as the USSR basically sanctioned Romania, but Romanian leadership cooperated with the West as a consequence.

Romania only barely made it. While the Soviets never set foot into the country militarily, Romania's economy was so desolate and the security apparatus so immense that Romanians struggled probably the most during the fall of the regime in 1989. In the end, Ceaușescu and his wife were the only Eastern Bloc dictators to get killed by their own people for what they had done to their country. However, the killing of the Ceaușescus had profound impact on Erich and Margot Honnecker, the East German counterpart of Nicolae and Elena Ceaușescu.