I won’t repeat what’s been said about the A-10’s wonderful attributes other than to echo everything that has been said about the beauty of a machine designed to fly low and slow, take plenty of punishment, loiter all day, and deliver a range of fires to service a variety of targets. The negative attitudes expressed about have been expressed many times since the end of the Cold War. The A-10 doesn’t remain on duty because someone is embarrassed about creating an awesome and awesomely cost-effective fighting machine. The A-10 stays in the inventory because there is nothing else that can do its job the way the A-10 does it.
Combat aircraft should not be asked to perform multiple roles. In most cases, combat aircraft are obliged to take on multiple roles because air force budgets won’t allow for the kind of specialization that makes for a truly dominant aircraft in one area. The Tornado, a truly splendid aircraft, is a good example of how budgetary considerations drive combat aircraft to perform multiple jobs. By all accounts, the Tornado does very well at its jobs—especially ultra-low penetration of hostile airspace. However, aircraft optimized for a given role have the edge over a jack-of-all-trades—even if that jack is about as good as one can expect jack to be. It’s no coincidence that during the Cold War the air forces with the most money to spend produced the widest variety of designs.
__________________
“We’re not innovating. We’re selectively imitating.” June Bernstein, Acting President of the University of Arizona in Tucson, November 15, 1998.
|