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Old 06-25-2012, 04:46 PM
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Webstral Webstral is offline
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It’s been a week since I wrote a word in reply to you, Jason. I’m going to knock out something rough and dirty rather than continue to try to give a polished product that might never get finished.

Okay, so the bottom line is that I think chemical warfare in the Far East as I outlined it in my piece on the Sino-Soviet War could stand an update. I don’t agree that Chinese attempts at chemical retaliation are going to go the way of the nuclear attacks for a couple of reasons. I stick to my thesis that general chemical use will enter abeyance; however, I acknowledge that you’ve got a point about the temptations of use. I now believe that chemical warfare will be highly punctuated. I maintain that the lessons learned in the Far East will result in a dramatic lessening of chemical use in Europe until the nukes start to fly.

The attitude of the Soviets towards the Sino-Soviet War matters a lot. This is not a war of national survival for them in 1995. In 1996, the regime might be feeling a bit more pressure. But in 1995, chemical use will be in keeping with battlefield necessities. They aren’t out to kill millions of Chinese. They aren’t out to topple the regime, though obviously that might be beneficial side effect if it could be done without widening the war or risking a strategic exchange of WMD. The Soviets are in the game to put the Chinese in their place and reassert themselves as the other superpower such that Soviet prestige recovers from Operation Desert Storm and Soviet weapons—especially aircraft, air defense systems, and MBT—reclaim their place on the international market.

So we should expect to see non-persistent agents used to prepare Chinese defenses for Soviet breakthroughs, while persistent agents are used for area denial on vulnerable Soviet flanks, Chinese supply dumps and depots, and PLAAF bases near the front. Of course, the Chinese are going to retaliate as best they can. The simplest form of retaliation is the application of persistent agents right where the Soviets are going to break through. Blood agents could act as Chinese FASCAM. Naturally, the Soviets would motor through these as required to maintain the impetus of the advance. Pretty soon, though, the already-taxed Soviet supply system is going to be hard-pressed to meet the needs of soldiers continually exposed to persistent agents. If the Chinese combine persistent agents with well-placed blocking or canalizing minefields tied into good defensive terrain, the Soviets are going to have real problems. Either the Soviets will have to slow the tempo of advance or find a way around the chemical weapons problem.

One solution would be to up the ante of chemical use in the hopes that saturation of the Chinese would forestall defensive use by the Chinese. This approach is problematic. How much does one have to up the ante to prevent the Chinese from using chemical weapons? I really don’t know the answer, but I bet the term “profligate” probably would apply to the level of use required. There are two drawbacks with going this route. The first is that at a certain point the Chinese are going to a) use chemical weapons against Soviet population centers to even out the casualties and b) be sorely tempted to go nuclear—because, after all, at a certain point the loss of life on the Chinese side starts to look a lot like a nuclear exchange. The Soviets aren’t in this game to go nuclear. If they were, they’d have started off with nuclear use.

The other problem is Western perception. Here I refer to my own work, which one is free to accept or ignore. The Soviets have worked hard to mend fences with the West. Win or lose in the Far East, profligate chemical use will have a negative effect on relations. Worse, profligate chemical use will have an unforeseeable affect on Western support for the PRC. Therefore, the costs of profligate use might outweigh the benefits long after the battlefield matter has been settled.

Ballistic delivery of chemicals by the Chinese poses a separate problem for the Soviets. The v1 chronology notes that Chinese ballistic missile attacks are frustrated by an active an efficient ABM system. Whatever ABM system the Soviets have in place in 1997 is going to be oriented towards defending Soviet Europe. That’s where the population centers are. This isn’t to say that there won’t be some sort of ABM system east of the Urals. Such a system will not have the lion’s share of capability—whatever that capability is. If the Chinese are pushed by Soviet chemical use to reply in kind against Soviet logistical hubs in the rear, then the Soviets have hard decisions to make. Let’s imagine that the Soviets use theater ABM to intercept a single Chinese TBM (theater ballistic missile) en route to a hub on the Trans-Siberian Railroad. This tips their hand and invites the Chinese to try a saturation attack with TBM. The results cannot help but give the Chinese a much clearer picture of what is required to get WMD on-target in-theater. This is dangerous for the Soviets.

The simplest solution simply might be to come to an agreement about chemical use. Once the Soviets stop believing that they are deriving an advantage from chemical use, they’ll want to stop. The Chinese will be motivated to stop using chemical weapons because they will want to spare their own troops, populace, and landscape.

The beginning of Operation Red Willow might very well see a Soviet resumption. If ORW achieves operational surprise and early success, the Soviets might be startled into resuming use of chemical weapons. Under these conditions, we might expect to see them using persistent agents against communications hubs, which would mean using them against population centers. Here, Western opinion again would be aggravated. By this time, China has been borrowing as rapidly as possible. The US can’t afford for China to go down and not pay her debts. Therefore, the US might be strongly tempted to provide offensive and defensive chemical warfare materiel to China. Perhaps such an offer even might include cruise missiles (refitted for export) that can deliver chemical agents (or nuclear warheads) under the Soviet ABM shield. And again, the Chinese would be sorely tempted to retaliate against Soviet targets they can reach, like Vladivostok. If 10% of the Chinese TBM get through, it shouldn’t be too hard for the Chinese to cause major casualties. And again, this isn’t yet a fight to the death for the Soviets. They are still looking to win a limited conventional war.

It’s possible that the Soviets would open the 1996 offensive with chemical weapons. However, by this point we should expect that the lessons from 1995 would have been absorbed. The Chinese would be ready to lay down barriers of persistent agents in as much depth as required to bring breakthroughs to a halt. They already will have had all winter to prepare defenses. I question the math behind further chemical use on the battlefield or behind the lines, given that the Soviets are looking for rapid breakthroughs to bring the campaign to a rapid conclusion.

Of course, all bets are off once the nukes start flying.
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