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Old 06-25-2012, 11:07 PM
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Originally Posted by Jason Weiser View Post
See and that's the problem with the entire Soviet war effort. It's a war in search of a war aim? How do you put the Chinese "in their place"? They're not going to meekly acknowledge the Soviet superiority, especially after Red Willow. So, I think pre-Red Willow, you can make this murky argument (not your fault, it's the kind of thin thinking that got the Soviets into RL trouble in Afghanistan). But after? If the Soviets make peace, the Politboro may wind up like Beria. If the Chinese make peace, their own Politboro might wind up the victim of a military coup or a popular uprising. Both sides are riding the tiger from the start, and neither can afford to get off.
Too true. I have postulated that the Soviets created a stop line that would encompass all of Manchuria and Beijing. They pick this stop line in line with the belief that China can be driven the bargaining table and settle on terms for peace that are favorable to the Soviets. I’ve also postulated that there is no Plan B in case the Politburo doesn’t come to the table in the event of the fall of Beijing. Of course, the fall of Beijing might have resulted in the failure of the Chinese regime; but there is no guarantee that a replacement regime would be willing to come to the table, much less settle for peace on Soviet terms. I agree that Operation Red Willow does recast the situation dramatically.

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Originally Posted by Jason Weiser View Post
True, but what level of casualties do the Soviets begin to consider troublesome under these circumstances?
That’s good question. Knowing the answer would mean reading the thoughts of men who are dramatically unlike any of us posting here. The best I can say is that the operations staff at each major command (division and higher?) would be encouraged to give their best assessment about the impact of chemical weapons on operations. At some point, the effects of ongoing chemical use will be more detrimental than beneficial as regards operational tempo, estimated exchange rate, or logistical effort. I’m inclined to think that in the first eight weeks of the offensive, the Soviets would be most concerned with the operational tempo. The assessments of the division and corps staffs would be compiled at the respective army headquarters, who would pass them on to the front headquarters. I believe that at some point in the first eight weeks, the front commanders are going to tell the Far Eastern TVD commander that ongoing chemical use is costing them forward momentum, on balance.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Jason Weiser View Post
Yes, Danilov's charm offensive will need to pay attention, but Sauronski is running the Ministry of Defense, short of nuclear release, there is a lot of shenanigans he could pull. And he might have a point:

"Comrade General Secretary, we should worry what the capitalists think of what we're doing in China? The same capitalists who arm the Chinese to kill our boys?"
That makes me smile. I do believe you’ve captured Sauronski’s spirit. Danilov might well reply that without Western grain, the regime is going to have to choose between further privatization of Soviet agriculture, famine, or revolution.

The Minister of Agriculture might point out: “Comrades, you realize that the capitalists are playing both sides in this game. They sell us their grain, making the excuse for their profiteering by claiming that they bear no ill will towards the Soviet people and do not wish to see the people starve. They supply China with weapons and food to help them repel foreign aggression. We may be fighting China, but the Americans are winning the war.”

Finance Minister: “The same situation offers us an opportunity to hurt both our rivals. China has borrowed extraordinary sums from the West—especially the United States. If we can push China to the point at which the government changes hands, we can score a double victory. We can fix the terms of peace with China. A new government may default on the Western loans. This will have devastating effects on the economies of the capitalists. We will be able to buy grain at better terms, and their ability to make war will be appreciably diminished. Who can say what opportunities that may open up?”

Murmurings of assent went round the table.

Danilov snorted. “Who here thinks the Americans don’t understand the financial position at least as well as we do? No doubt they have legions of bankers and financiers lined up inside the White House and the Capitol telling the President and Congress that the West cannot afford to let China default on its debt. We already know that weapons and ammunition are on their way. Since we have never intended to occupy all of China, we can’t keep them from using and copying whatever they get from the West. If I have to choose what the Americans are willing to sell China, I’d prefer it be tanks and guns over chemical weapons technology and ballistic missiles.”

Danilov turned his gaze on Sauronski. “Ivan Sergeyovich, did you not support the first chemical cease-fire because chemical weapons were slowing our progress? Why support their use now, when we are on the defensive? We won’t reach our goals any more quickly, and we inspire the Chinese to improve their own arsenal. Once we stabilize the lines, we’ll have to rebuild to finish this damned business next spring. Our troops can’t swim through a sea of blood agents between the front line and Beijing. Every use at this point jeopardizes our next offensive.”

Raising one eyebrow, Sauronski said, “So, Comrade, you are committed to a spring offensive?”

“What choice do we have, Ivan Sergeyovich? We can’t make peace with nothing to show for it.”

“Very good, Comrade. In that case, will you meet with some of my generals and admirals regarding a plan I asked them to submit regarding strategic operations to be carried out throughout the winter? In the event that we had to suspend operations through the winter?”

Danilov expression soured. “I suppose we had better.”
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