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Old 01-27-2023, 05:09 AM
Ursus Maior Ursus Maior is offline
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Location: Ruhr Area, Germany
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Raellus View Post
Recent reports put Russian KIA and WIA, combined, at between 100-180k. Ukrainian losses- again, both KIA and WIA combined- are believed to be upwards of 100k. That's not even a 2 to 1 ratio in Ukraine's favor.
The big factor here would be the ratio between KIA and WIA and from what we know about the war - reliable sources are the biggest problem here - Ukrainian medical care is superior to Russian. That has several factors:
  1. Russian (and Soviet) CASEVAC and care was always far worse than Western and Ukraine was trained close to Western standards,
  2. supply issues regarding first aid and all other tiers of medical care are well documented for the Russian side in this war,
  3. Ukraine is fighting on its own soil, so hospitals are closer at hand and
  4. civilian volunteer forces are available, because defense of the nation is an accepted common goal,
  5. Russia is fighting an invasion and occupying Ukraine after a very destructive conquest, so their own hospitals are further away from the frontlines, even those in territories of their proxies, and
  6. critical infrastructure in occupied territories is often damaged, especially due to the destructive nature of Russian offensive warfare: where Russia goes, its forces can hardly use critical infrastructure or only in vastly diminished forms, also, local volunteers are hardly available.
None of these factors benefits Russian forces to regenerate its forces from MIA casualties. In fact, it all of these factors are detrimental to medical care, increasing the number of Russian casualties that decease after reaching rearward medical care as MIAs or become permanently invalid.

Next, permanently invalids of the Russian forces are lost for the war effort almost completely. They will receive a pension, at least nominally, but are unlikely to contribute meaningful to further force generations. Ukrainian invalids have started civilian efforts to further the war effort (humanitarian aid mostly) or can, in some cases, be of use to the armed forces in administrative positions. This allows the armed forces to free up certain personnel.

Quote:
I'd like to see some POW figures from both sides. My impression is that more Russian troops have been captured, but what's the actual difference? Is it statistically significant?
That's a big blurry subject in open sources, yes. My impression from the few numbers released was that Ukraine is eager to get its people back, so they often made deals that released their own people in infavorable ratios: more Russians were released than Ukrainians. But that seems to have changed recently, this compilation at the end of the text tells me: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casual...isoners_of_war

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Again, Ukraine is at or near full mobilization. Russia, on the other hand is not. They still have untapped manpower reserves. Yes, qualitatively, Russia's replacement troops are inferior but, quantitatively, Russia still has a decided edge.
Ukraine is very far from total mobilization and I don't know where you get an otherwise impression. Ukraine has somewhere around 11 million men at an available age for service and around 6,5 to 7 million fit for military service. About 400,000-450,000 men reach mobilization age each year. Mobilization so far has brought the strength of the armed forces to around 700,000 soldiers.

Quantities don't matter unless they're exploitable. And Russia's junta has clearly refrained from exploiting the full quantities available. This partially thanks to dismembering the necessary infra structure and blatant corruption in the remaining structures of mobilization during the years of "reforming the army", i. e. building a professional, expeditionary force and largely abandoning conscription service. However, another big factor is that mobilization en masse would mean mobilizing in the metropolitan centers of Moscow and Saint Petersburg as well as other large cities. This would be hugely unpopular and would mean bringing large swathes of unhappy people from all across the country into these cities - because that's how large scale transport works in Russia - and arm them. That trick didn't work well in 1917 for the government in power at the time.

As long as Russia mobilizes by scraping barrels in the provinces and sending inmates to the front as mercenaries, their quantitative factor remains unexploited. And since they lost most of their experienced long term cadre, including a good chunk of school staff early in the war, their training is now hampered.

Ukraine on the other hand trains new troops by the thousands, including the core of two new armored/mechanized divisions in the UK, Poland and Germany (by German and American instructors). Their instructors are among the best in the world, training them in mechanized warfare to the standards that so far kept Ukraine free and were proven successful at least twice in Iraq.

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True, but I worry about the psychological toll that almost a full year of near continuous combat operations is taking on the Ukrainian military. Combat exhaustion is real. Physical and psychological wounds tend to degrade combat effectiveness over time.
Combat exhaustion is a true problem and its effects remain to be studied in this war. However, it's not true that Ukrainian soldiers or Western volunteers don't get time off. Force regeneration is definitely important and Ukraine knows this.

However, what Ukraine's forces can do that Russia's cannot is transfer of experiences. Human wave tactics - as seen in Bakhmut recently - and the horrific losses during the early weeks around Kyiv and the Northeast of Ukraine, have destroyed previously prestigious Russian divisions, including the vaunted VDV, and prohibit learning lessons on an operational level.

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Why are you so certain?
Lukashenka is good at one thing: Staying alive and in power. He gains nothing from joining the war. He can loose everything. First of all, it makes his nation a target. Second, he couldn't count on Putin defending Belarus, if NATO would take punitive actions against Belarus. The Belarusian armed forces are a joke. Their size was reduced to minimal forces, equipment is decrepit and their best tanks were given to Russia. Lukashenka did this on purpose. The armed forces are pro-Russian and were for a long time his most likely internal opposition with the means to oust him.

He built his own internal security troops to counter that inner threat to his power. Fortunately, this also made Belarus a military dwarf. The installations and barracks are still around, though. So he could offer Russia his help training Russian soldiers, similar to what Western armies do for Ukraine. The difference though is that Belarus has no high standards to train Russians too. They have no experience. So, most likely Belarussian soldiers guard the barracks and donate equipment, letting Russia do all the rest: bring trainers, curricula and recruits.

Next, Russia is clearly playing the long game in Belarus. ISW stated that for the foreseeable future, the northern attack vector through Belarus seems unlikely for a new Russian offensive. They neither have the troops nor the equipment ready there. Would Belarus join in an offensive in the next winter? Unlikely. Again, Lukashenka would have to expand his military for that and reequip it, too. That only gets him to have a well armed internal opposition. Should Putin win, they would be on his side and better experienced than Lukashenka's internal security force. Should Russia loose, they'd likely drag Belarusian troops with them, probably sacrificing them first. This would generate unrest in the forces, making a mutiny more likely. Who'd be guilty of getting Belarusians killed in Ukraine? Lukashenka! That's a good way to end up like Ceaușescu.

Lukashenka needs to fear the war on all layers and probably does so. But the new sanctions hit him hard too, so he needs Russia for his survival, too. Also, if Russia becomes chaotic, that's not good for him either. Should the war end with a Ukrainian victory, Belarusian fighters who volunteered for Ukraine, will return home and probably start to dismember his power, maybe even using direct action and guerilla warfare. So, a frozen conflict would be Lukashenka's best option. For that, he needs Russia to keep going, but not win.
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