[dragoon500ly]

Sources are Omaha A Flawed Victory by Adrian Lewis, D-Day by Steven Ambrose and D-Day by Tute, Costello and Hughes

Operation Overlord has often been called Eisenhower’s greatest victory. And there is no doubt that this is true. But any analysis of this victory reveals that it succeeded by the narrowest of margins.

The Joint Fire Plan

Eisenhower planned on winning the battle for Normandy with tactical surprise and with what was believed to be the greatest concentration of firepower ever assembled for an amphibious assault. But Eisenhower, Montgomery and Bradley had ever conducted an amphibious assault against a deliberate defense. No such assault had ever been necessary in the Mediterranean or European theater of operations. This left the Overlord planners with no body of knowledge with which to measure the adequacy of their plans or of the firepower resources allocated. While the Navy/Marine Corps Pacific doctrine and experiences were available, this was, for the most part, ignored. Instead Overlord would see a new hybrid doctrine, one based on new technology, new tactical organizations and new units. The Allies never tested this new doctrine and at Omaha Beach, it failed. The air force was untrained and lacked the technology and doctrine to perform the beach bombing mission in overcast skies. The rocket launchers and artillery mounted in landing craft were inaccurate systems because it was impossible to determine the height of the waves on which these small vessels road at the instant of firing. And naval gunfire, the best means of destruction, was provided in insufficient quantity and given insufficient time to produce the needed effects on the target areas.

The Joint Fire Plan was seriously flawed and utterly failed to produce the necessary amount of damage needed to destroy or suppress the German defenses.

The Allied commander’s high expectations for the Joint Fire Plan created a misleading mental picture of the battle to be fought on the beaches of Normandy. In turn, this false picture caused the tactical commanders to prepare to fight the wrong battle. It also failed to prepare the soldiers psychologically to fight the wrong battle. The JFB’s use of such phases as “drenching fire” and “saturation bombing” gave the soldiers cause to believe that they were about to witness the greatest show on earth. This gap between the plan’s expectations and reality was to cause shock and paralysis to the first assault waves. The soldiers paid a brutal price for this failure in planning. And what happened on Omaha Beach could have easily happened on the other beaches.

The planning for the Joint Fire Plan was laid down by the FUSA Artillery Planning Group. The planning group was made up of officers from SHAEF, Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF), Allied Naval Commander in Chief Expeditionary Force, British 21st Army Group, British 2nd Army, and US Navy Task Force 122. Doctrine was created exclusively for Overlord, this work was further complicated by the fact that the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy used different systems to determine grid coordinates, which in turn, identified precise locations on the invasion beaches. Because the Royal Navy would be providing warships to support the American beaches, extensive training, coordination and procedural development were required.

In January 1944, when Montgomery’s plan for a 5-division landing replaced the 3-division COSSAC plan, Admiral Ramsay pointed out that it would be necessary to expand the naval gunfire support fleet in order to cover the entire front and that the British lacked the resources to provide the additional vessels. As a result, in March, the U.S. Navy was asked to provide the necessary additional support. After several heated discussions, the U.S. Navy finally provided three battleships, two cruisers and thirty-four destroyers for escort and fire support duty. These ships were allotted as follows: Force O (supporting Omaha Beach) would consist of two battleships, four light cruisers and twelve destroyers) Force U (supporting Utah Beach) would consist of one battleship, three heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, one monitor and ten destroyers.

The Naval Bombardment Plan was divided into three phases. Phase 1 was the counter battery bombardment which was to begin at “first light” and continue until all designated German artillery batteries were “silenced”. There were fourteen such batteries capable of firing on Omaha Beach. Each of these batteries was assigned a target number and placed on a priority list. These targets were to be engaged methodically in accordance with the priority given. Spotter aircraft and spotters aboard ship could also designate targets.

Phase 2, the suppression of the beach defenses would begin when the cruisers and destroyers moved up to locations where they could best support the assault. This was scheduled to begin at H-20 minutes and end at H-5 minutes. This so-called drenching fire was to be augmented by the battleships upon completion of their counter battery missions. At H-Hour, close support fire was to be shifted to targets inland or on the flanks.

Phase 3 was close support fire on call. This phase was to commence as soon as naval fire control parties were ashore and ready to call for fire, at about H +30 minutes. A naval fire control party accompanied each battalion. In the initial assault, there were four battalions, each supported by two destroyers in direct support.