[Webstral]

The casualties suffered by US units between 01 JUL 00 and 01 APR 01 may be a reflection of the quality of new recruits and the challenge of tackling marauders. As WW2 dragged on, the Luftwaffe changed from a force of well-trained airmen to a force with a kernel of exceptional veterans surrounded by a gaggle of poorly-trained freshmen. US formations in CONUS may reflect a similar state of being. Training probably isn’t what anyone would like it to be for most units. When an infantry company moves to clear out a marauder nest, you get a lot of inexperienced privates doing what poorly-trained soldiers do everywhere. Ongoing operations yield steady attrition. New privates probably are the ones most likely to desert once they decide their chances of making buck sergeant aren’t very good. Close quarters combat yields very high casualties.

I do agree that the Howling Wilderness numbers reflect an agenda directed towards chaos. If chaos weren’t the desired end, then the formations in CONUS might have retained more of their 01 JUL 00 strength. Counterbalancing the stream of casualties would be concerted efforts at providing realistic training focused on the basics (above all discipline) and a recruiting effort that would remind the population that the riflemen eat regularly. Some commanders would do better others at getting seasoned E-6 and E-7 into training positions.

Another factor is ambition on the part of the chain of command. A lot of US commanders may try to control more territory than is feasible. Again, losses add up.

One of the reasons I haven’t felt any shame in assigning comparatively high manpower to Fort Huachuca is that Huachuca has a lot of the problem that face units in other parts of the country beat. The food supply is pretty secure, although there are some scary moments in early 1999. The manpower supply is pretty secure because the food supply is pretty secure. There are only a couple of set-piece battles between US and Mexican forces in Arizona after 1998. Most of the action is fought at a fairly low level. The fighting along the border is conducted mostly on the US side, and the Americans can bring up reinforcements more-or-less at will. There are losses, to be certain, but the losses don’t add up the same way as they do elsewhere. The fighting in eastern Arizona in 1999 also produces losses, but most of the fighting takes place under conditions that favor the firepower of 111th Brigade. The Huachuca command specifically avoids entering Phoenix in force before 2001 due to anxiety about losses in CQB.