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Old 12-17-2022, 03:56 PM
castlebravo92 castlebravo92 is offline
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Raellus View Post
I wasn't addressing your comments specifically. It was more of a general admonition and excuse to link to another thread.



I think Russia's military failings in Ukraine are largely the result of an overly sanguine Plan A, with no apparent Plan B in place when Plan A failed miserably. By the time the Russians pivoted, they'd lost nearly every advantage other than numerical superiority.

In a late Cold War era land war in Europe scenario (ie T2k), I imagine that the Soviets would have multiple contingency plans in place, all of which had been war-gamed out ahead of time. Likewise, I think their logistics would be a lot more squared away as well. They'd probably still be expecting a rather brief war, but this one on a massive scale, so they'd be prepared to move large quantities of men, fuel, and ammunition over long distances on a fairly broad front from day 1. In the Ukraine War, the Russian thinking was that they'd be in Kiev in less than a week and that, as they say, would be the end of that.

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The reason why I said the USSR probably would have struggled on the offensive...and forgive me, I forget where I read it, but there was some analysis that the USSR and Russia is hugely dependent on rail for their supplies, and they have _aways_ had insufficient truck transport at the divisional and corps level to supply offensive operations very far from an intact railhead (and by very far, I mean more than a hundred km). Interdict a rail supply line, and they logistics basically unravels in a hurry.

Additionally, overall truck capacity is something the USSR didn't have enough of (nor does Russia), which is why they resorted to stealing vehicles very early on in Ukraine and pulling civilian vehicles into military service for supply.

This logistical constraint is something that gets worse the more troops, tanks, and artillery you throw at an opponent. I think this is the fundamental problem holding back a Russian general mobilization right now. More troops doesn't fix their original core problem, which is insufficient logistical support to actually conquer Ukraine (of course, now that they have lost 100k of their best troops dead, and most of their modern AFVs, they have other problems).

Their current strategy of press-ganging men off the streets, handing them a gun and 1,000 rounds of ammunition and having them shoot for a day as their mobilization training is something you would expect to see in Berlin near the Fuhrer bunker at the tail end of the Nazi regime in terms of desperation.
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