Thanks for clarifying. For what it's worth, I agree with you on most points.
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Originally Posted by bash
Launching nuclear attacks takes preparation, if for no other reason than to make sure your forces can absorb a retaliation. Russia hasn't changed their posture to one that is preparing for nuclear retaliation. So the threats (to me) ring pretty hollow.
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To clarify my counter-point, I don't think, at this stage, anyone in places of power is overly concerned about a Russian
strategic nuclear attack on Ukraine or any NATO member nation. The concern at present seems to be about Russian use of battlefield tactical nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil.
Battlefield tactical nukes require much less preparation than strategic nuclear weapons do. They're reasonably easy to deploy and conceal, and launch-warning is minimal. AFAIK, there's no way to differentiate between the release of a nuclear-armed air-launched missile and a conventional one (of which the Russians have used hundreds so far). The Russians have a sizeable arsenal of tactical weapons, some of them of quite recent vintage, with several means of delivery at their disposal.
If Putin decides to avoid a major operational/strategic defeat in Ukraine by the application of one or more TBNs, would he be particularly concerned about retaliation in kind? Probably not. Ukraine is not a NATO member, so NATO would not be obligated to respond directly, or with nuclear weapons. NATO's not going to nuke Russian forces on
de jure ally Ukraine's home soil, and it's probably not going to risk an escalation with Russia by nuking Russian troop concentrations on Russian soil. Putin's a cunning fellow, and we all know he's willing to take big risks to achieve his geo-political goals. Who, in the Russian hierarchy, is likely to stop him? At this point, he's surrounded by yes-men. That's a real worry.
What's the red line for Putin? No one knows, but I think some analysts believe that any threat to Putin's grip on power in Russia, a particularly destructive attack on Russian soil, or the impending loss of Russian territory (read: Crimea), could provoke a [tactical] nuclear response. Desperate people, take desperate measures.
A not un-reasonable fear is that if and when the Pandora's box of tactical nuclear weapon use is reopened, things could quickly spiral out of control. The USA does not have an established post-Cold War nuclear doctrine/strategy, so there's no playbook.
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