Quote:
Originally Posted by Raellus
Thanks for clarifying. For what it's worth, I agree with you on most points.
To clarify my counter-point, I don't think, at this stage, anyone in places of power is overly concerned about a Russian strategic nuclear attack on Ukraine or any NATO member nation. The concern at present seems to be about Russian use of battlefield tactical nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil.
Battlefield tactical nukes require much less preparation than strategic nuclear weapons do. They're reasonably easy to deploy and conceal, and launch-warning is minimal. AFAIK, there's no way to differentiate between the release of a nuclear-armed air-launched missile and a conventional one (of which the Russians have used hundreds so far). The Russians have a sizeable arsenal of tactical weapons, some of them of quite recent vintage, with several means of delivery at their disposal.
If Putin decides to avoid a major operational/strategic defeat in Ukraine by the application of one or more TBNs, would he be particularly concerned about retaliation in kind? Probably not. Ukraine is not a NATO member, so NATO would not be obligated to respond directly, or with nuclear weapons. NATO's not going to nuke Russian forces on de jure ally Ukraine's home soil, and it's probably not going to risk an escalation with Russia by nuking Russian troop concentrations on Russian soil. Putin's a cunning fellow, and we all know he's willing to take big risks to achieve his geo-political goals. Who, in the Russian hierarchy, is likely to stop him? At this point, he's surrounded by yes-men. That's a real worry.
What's the red line for Putin? No one knows, but I think some analysts believe that any threat to Putin's grip on power in Russia, a particularly destructive attack on Russian soil, or the impending loss of Russian territory (read: Crimea), could provoke a [tactical] nuclear response. Desperate people, take desperate measures.
A not un-reasonable fear is that if and when the Pandora's box of tactical nuclear weapon use is reopened, things could quickly spiral out of control. The USA does not have an established post-Cold War nuclear doctrine/strategy, so there's no playbook.
-
|
TBNs are definitely easier to deploy than strategic weapons but the posture of the Russian forces would still need to change. They would need to distribute MOPP gear to their forces and prep border cities (on the Russian side) for the inevitable literal fallout. As we've seen Russian OpSec is terrible so any such preparations would be broadcast on Telegram immediately.
But in terms of danger to Russia, them using even a single TBN would likely see "the west" taking the gloves off for assistance to Ukraine. I would imagine a naval blockade and no-fly zone would be the minimum response. There would also be little reason not to give Ukraine long range weapons.
If Russia pulled out of Ukraine tomorrow there's a number of countries that would drop sanctions against them by the end of the week. While the lower classes in Russia are screwed for the next few decades the oligarchs would be back on their yachts by October.
Even these Russia agnostic (if not friendly) countries would not be so forgiving if Russia used nukes in Ukraine. This would mean the post-war economic pain would affect Putin and the oligarchs.
The threat of being in range of Ukrainian weapons and a total destruction of their wealth might finally be enough to turn the Russian ruling class against Putin. I think he's well aware as long as he only inflicts pain on poor Russians and minorities he doesn't need to worry about falling out of a window onto some bullets.