[Adm.Lee]

Some commentary, mostly in agreement:

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

that his initial role as Commander In Chief Mediterranean did not go well. ... It was only later, as he got rid of ineffective leaders and combat experience began to impact tactics, that his soldiers were able to begin to face the Germans on near equal footing.

Gen. Marshall said as much when he admitted he had been too enthusiastic about invading France before 1944.

Perhaps Eisenhower’s greatest failing of the Overlord operation include the weak pre-landing bombardment,

I'm not sure how much the pre-landing bombardment could have been boosted without blowing the important tactical surprise.

the use of strategic bombers in a tactical role (ignoring the simple fact that the heavy bomber crews were not trained for this role)

My recent reading has been that the Ninth US Air Force's medium bombers did reasonably well at shaking Utah Beach, but the Eighth's heavies were the ones that badly missed at Omaha. Perhaps if they had been combined, things could have gone better?

and his instance on the use of strategic bombers to cut the French rail network to shreds, instead of allowing them to complete their assaults on the German oil production/storage facilities.

Gonna disagree with you on this one, I think it was the proper call. SHAEF needed the railnet wrecked to allow the Allies to win the buildup of forces to secure the lodgement in the first few weeks. The oil facilities had been targetted for a while, and it still took months for there to be a strategic effect. As it was, I understand it was the degradation of the whole German transportation network (rail and river) and electrical grid later in the war that had a true strategic effect.

In the operations to encircle and destroy the Germans in the Falaise Corridor the failings of Eisenhower’s style of leadership can be most seen. His failure to push the British-Canadian forces in the north and the American forces in the south to complete the encirclement, allowed significant numbers of Germans to escape to fight again another day.

I'm not sure what Eisenhower could have done to speed the Canadian-Polish forces from the north, they were facing heavier opposition. OTOH, I agree that it seems a mistake to not intervene to allow the Americans to go past their stop-line and close the pocket in the short envelopment, or to allow the long envelopment (along the Seine River) that Patton and Bradley urged. I'm trying to recall if this was the same time that SHAEF HQ was located in that out of the way spot that blotted out radio comms?

Here Eisenhower’s orders to destroy the French rail network came back to haunt him as the Allies were forced to rebuild the network almost from the ground up…

I'm gonna disagree again. You seem to imply that the French railnet would have been in working condition after the Germans were done with it? That the Germans wouldn't have applied the same scorched earth idea that they applied in the East? I don't see it-- the Germans would have taken every train with them and blown the bridges, track, signals, and repair shops, even if we hadn't done it already.

One of the greatest mistakes of the European fighting took place around the port of Antwerp. ... His plan called for a corps thrust up what was essentially a two-lane hardtop road, with much of the road built upon dike. Utterly dependent on the seizures of critical bridges, Market-Garden was doomed to failure before it was even launched.

Little argument from me.

Eisenhower’s failure to manage his subordinate commanders also reached into the U.S. Army as Bradley started a series of assaults into the Hurtgen Forest. Here several divisions were thrown into head-long attacks into prepared defenses that resulted in these divisions being bled white in return for little or no gain.

Also little argument from me, perhaps Montgomery was right, in that a theater ground commander was needed.

Having walked the terrain of the Hurtgen Forest, including the infamous Kall Trail, all I can say about this was that Bradley should have been relieved of his command.

I am in some agreement with this assessment.

Eisenhower’s role in managing battle (of the Bulge) was to allow Bradley to manage the initial fighting and then, as the Germans advanced to the River Meuse, to select Montgomery to command the northern shoulder. This decision was highly unpopular with U.S. commanders. Looking back, it was the correct decision. Bradley’s placement of his Army Group headquarters so far forward, led to the endangerment of his communications with his troops on the northern shoulder. What else could have been done?

IMO, Bradley (and eventually his HQ) should have moved north to command both Ninth and First US Armies, and the Third should have been attached to the 6th Army Group. Thus, no one's feathers get ruffled about allied commanders, and Bradley gets to command more than one army, like an AG commander should do. He could then put his emphasis on stopping the Germans aiming for the Meuse, and he would have encouraged an earlier attack from the northern flank to create another pocket.

I've read that the southern French ports could have supplied Third Army in addition to the 6th Army Group, so that shift is even a gain to Bradley's supply net.

Again IMO, that should have been done as early as October; it would have fine-tuned Eisenhower's so-called broad front, as it meant that Bradley could have focused on fighting *north* of the Hurtgen and Ardennes, and Devers south of it, aiming for the Saar and the Rhine. Both pushes would have clear axes of advance, drawing German reserves to them, perhaps preventing the Bulge attack, perhaps not.

As the war entered 1945, Eisenhower’s Broad Front strategy, so cursed by Patton and Montgomery the year before, finally began to pay off as the Germans, suffering brutal losses were forced to defend everywhere, with fewer troops and equipment.

Yep.

His genius, instead lay in managing the Allied forces and controlling his collection of prima donnas and keeping them focused on the key objective, the defeat of Nazi Germany. Could a MacArthur have managed to do so well?

Double yep. Keeping your subordinates working together is really, really important.