[Webstral]

Matt brings up an important point regarding the US response to the Mexican invasion. It’s 1998. Four guys, all senior military men, are running the United State s of America. One of them is first among peers. The United States has been brought to its knees by nuclear action. The entire global order has been disrupted—even for countries that haven’t been touched by nuclear fire. It’s difficult for us to know the frame of mind of the Joint Chiefs, and yet it’s hard to say how they would respond to the Mexican invasion without having a decent understanding.

There is a case to be made for action running the gamut from conventional strikes against the enemy’s logistical system to a massive strategic nuclear attack on Mexico. A tiny number of people make the decision. Logic certainly plays a part, but the frame of mind of men who have been under unprecedented stress for a year may play an even larger part.

Assuming that the US is not responsible for nuclear strikes against Mexican oil, the Joint Chiefs understand that the Mexicans have been duped by the Soviets. One can argue that lingering Mexican resentment about a raft of issues going back to the Mexican-American War play their part. Nonetheless, the Mexican invasion is not the action of a neighbor playing out ages-old hostilities, such as Russo-Polish or German-Polish issues. It’s bad, but it’s an aberration.

All this said, the surest means of restoring the situation is to turn the twenty largest Mexican population centers into irradiated ruin. Given that a single boomer can accomplish this mission (and it’s mid-1998), I daresay destruction of said cities is within Milgov’s capacity. Yet the Joint Chiefs don’t kill 60% of the population of Mexico. Why not?

At the other end of the spectrum, you have the option of conventional strikes against the Mexican logistical system. Assuming that a few precision-guided weapons and platforms are left, the destruction of a handful of rail bridges ought to do the trick. You don’t even have to go after rail hubs to sever the rail connections between the front and the Mexican interior. We can’t rule this option out entirely because GDW is silent on the subject.

One reason not to go the conventional route, though, is psychology. A nuke makes a statement. A nuke tells Mexico that it could get much, much worse for them. A nuke very near a city is hard to ignore.

Of course, the Mexicans don’t seem to get the message, do they? We know from the printed materials that the Mexican Army stays in the US right through the end of 2000 at least. We know as well that five brigades are sent to Texas in 1999 to support Fourth Mexican Army against the counteroffensive by Fifth US Army. Clearly, in 1999 the Mexicans intend to stay.

This brings us back to psychology. Clearly, there is a lot of thinking going on that is not addressed at all in the printed materials. GDW seems to have intended it to be this way. At various points in time I have tried to imagine what the Mexicans hoped to accomplish and how they hoped to accomplish it. My ideas are only one possibility.