Thunder Empire Observations

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I spent Christmas with my parents, who moved to Green Valley (south of Tucson) last April. I used the opportunity to get eyes on the geography of Thunder Empire for the first time in ten years. I’ll share a few of my reflections.

I was reminded of the scale of the place and its relative emptiness. Tucson is densely populated, but outside of the city the population gets pretty sparse pretty quickly. Sierra Vista is an island in a great valley of scrub, grass, and small trees. The area I have marked out for SAMAD really is tremendous, and most of it is sparsely inhabited or empty. Tucson and Sierra Vista, the two main settlements, are separated by long stretches of highway with very little between them.

On the plus side, there’s little need to use very much of the available land. If one person can be supported on 4500 square feet of intensively cultivated land (go with me on this one for now), then the entire population of SAMAD can be sustained on a tiny fraction of the landmass available. This bodes well for the groundwater situation.

Patrolling outside the towns is going to be a big job. On the plus side, the terrain and vegetation generally works against intrusive movement by day. Men walking out in the open during daylight would be plainly visible throughout much of the San Pedro River Valley. There are various features in the landscape (like arroyos) that can be exploited to conceal daylight movement. Otherwise, the vegetation is insufficient to cover daylight movement throughout vast portions of SAMAD—so much so that daylight movement by foot, on horseback, or by vehicle would be restricted to areas that could be identified for special attention, both in the valleys and on the mountains. However, throughout much of the area the vegetation could provide concealment during the day. Infiltrators could move during the night and lie up during the day.

More than ever, I’m of the mind that patrolling would have to be a mixture of horse mounted patrols (the Arizona Rangers might specialize in this—thank you, Canadian Army!) and dismounted patrols moved to an area of special interest or restricted terrain by truck. The operational mode of the Rhodesian Light Infantry with trucks in the place of helicopters comes to mind. Daylight hours would be a time for patrolling/tracking, while night would be a time for laying ambushes. The scale of the area to be defended vis-Ã*-vis the manpower makes me feel much better about Thomason’s conservatism during 1998 and early 1999.

I visited the border at Naco. The border crossing is no place for a defensive position. In fact, there aren’t a lot of places along that section of the border that lend themselves to fortification. I’ve decided that the best that can be done is the establishment of a fire base near the junction of Highway 92 (which connects Sierra Vista and Bisbee) and Naco Highway. 105mm howitzers at this location could fire on targets south to the Mexican border, east and north across the entirety of Bisbee (although hitting targets inside some portions of Bisbee might be tricky even for howitzers), and west just about to the San Pedro River. The roads south of Highway 92 all would have to be destroyed to prevent rapid vehicle movement through the area. Observation and regular patrolling/ambushes would be a necessity. Of course, the Mexican side of Naco would have to be razed to drive the civilian population out and to deny the Mexican Army cover and staging areas. Modest fortifications where Highway 92 enters the Mule Mountains, where Highway 80 leaves the Mule Mountains heading east for Douglas, and where South Bisbee Junction Road becomes Arizona St. in South Bisbee would be adequate to protect the city (except for the portion southeast of the Mule Mountains) from attack.

Douglas is another matter entirely. Thomason isn’t going to want to let his troops get tangled up in urban fighting. He’s not going to want to try to occupy Agua Prieta, either. I’m sad to say that pretty much everything east of Bisbee and south of Bisbee-Douglas International Airport (such as it is) will get left to the enemy, which is to say that the Americans will burn the lot to the ground after carrying out everything of value. Sorry again to the civilians in Agua Prieta. However, the area north of the airport has too much agricultural value to be abandoned. A FOB will have to be established at the airport, along with some means of controlling/canalizing movement east and west of that point. I’m still working on that one.

Raids by Mexican infantry (especially the Chupacabras) will tend to depopulate the rural areas. Isolated houses and even small groups of houses will, over the course of time, tend to be sacked and/or burned down. This phenomenon will be especially prominent from September, 1998 through March, 1999 when the 111th is rebuilding its strength and the Americans are developing their ability to track infiltrators and respond appropriately. Fortunately, Sonora Army is so badly weakened by the first campaign season that small-scale raiding is all that is possible, for the most part. The dry, open, large scale of the land, combined with low troop density on both sides, is one of the chief factors in the American defense.

In the defense, the Americans do have something of an advantage. Once they have found Mexican raiders, superior numbers can be trucked to the spot. Provided the Mexicans can be prevented from launching a rescue force into SAMAD, the Americans can bring in much superior numbers and firepower. The further north the Mexicans attempt to penetrate, the more this becomes the case.

Getting back to managing the population, I foresee a strong trend of concentrating the population in a handful of towns. In order to manage water and power, Fort Huachuca will simply cut off the electricity to whole areas. Without electricity, ground water can’t be pumped. Refugees from the more rural areas of SAMAD will tend to come to Tucson, Sierra Vista, and a few other towns. This will make security a much easier issue.

That’s enough for now, I think.


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