November 18 1989 - an analysis

[robj3]

I was reading through back issues of the 'Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists'

http://www.thebulletin.org/archive

(thanks Google Books!)
and thought I'd compare the TM1-1 numbers to what was actually around at the time. Apologies for the formatting.

Total strikes from TM1-1 target list:

Type      #     Yield(Mt)
SS-16     12      12
SS-17     95      76
SS-18-1   25     625
SS-18-1b   9       -
SS-18-2  106    2120
SS-19     34     61.2
SS-N-8    55    110
SS-N-17   67    100.5
Total    394    3104.7 in 1937 bursts

This is a very small proportion (16.7%) of the total Soviet strategic offensive missile force described at the end of the target list.

The description of total Soviet forces in TM1-1 is close to the actual number.
The description is probably taken from the Time magazine issue referred to in the TM1-1 bibliography - the Soviets complied with the provisions of the SALT, so the actual 1989 numbers would closely match with the TM1-1 projection.

The only hints of ICBM bio-warheads I can find in the open literature come from Ken Alibek, former director of Biopreparat and the late Bill Patrick of USAMRIID, as well as some OTA reports. I will not discuss them further here.


Dockery, TM1-1:

Missile  Warheads     N      
SS-16     1x1Mt       60 
SS-17     4x200kt     752
SS-18-1   25Mt        110
(bio variant          50)
SS-18-2   10x2Mt      110
SS-19     6x300kt     240

SS-N-8    2Mt         452
SS-N-17   3x500kt     544

Total     8294       2308 
          8763.6Mt   (2358)

Bull. Atom. Sci. 7/1989, p.56 Nuclear Notebook:
Strategic offense (l = launchers, w = warheads):
ICBMs: SS-11, SS-13, SS-17, SS-18, SS-19, SS-24, SS-25:1368 l, 7300 w
SLBMs: SS-N-6, SS-N-8, SS-N-17, SS-N-18, SS-N-20, SS-N-23: 942 l, 4000 w
Bombers: Blackjack, Bear A,B,C,G,H (bombs and cruise missiles): 170 l, 1400 w

There are some discrepancies in inventories.
For example, the SS-16 was never deployed. There were some other weapons in the Soviet force that made up the numbers, described below.
In general, the yields as discussed in TM1-1 were also on the high side.


Present in reality but not in TM1-1:

Type      Warheads(n x Mt)   Number**
SS-11       1.1/1.3            360
            3x0.35 MRV[1]
SS-13       0.75               60
SS-17       4x0.35, 0.55-0.75  100
            3.5-6
SS-18-1/3   18-20 or 25        36
SS-18-2     8x0.5-1.3          272
SS-18-4/5   10x0.55-0.75
SS-19       6x0.5-0.75         300
            2.5-5       
SS-24       10x0.35-0.55       80
SS-25       0.55               170

Subtotal                       1378

SS-N-5      0.8-1, 2-3.5       24
SS-N-6      1, 3x0.6-1.2       224
SS-N-8      0.5-1, 0.8         280
SS-N-17     0.5                12
SS-N-18     3x0.2, 0.45, 7x0.1 224
SS-N-20     10x0.1             120
SS-N-23     4x0.1              80

Subtotal                       964               

Total                          2342

** Podvig et al. Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces. Table 4.1 p.138, Table 5.1 p.251.
Numbers are not quite the same as the Nuclear Notebook estimates. Also
note the presence of the SS-N-5 in the inventory (it was being phased out).

[1] multiple re-entry vehicles (non-independent).


Given the data above, the TM1-1 attack looks 'small'.

It is not clear to me why this should be the case. By the 1980s, both sides had very well developed early warning systems - alerts were due to false alarms. A first strike from either side would not catch a large proportion of
the opponent's force on the ground.

At worst, time from launch to arrival would be 7 minutes (sub-launched missile from close to a target nation's coast). 15-30 minutes would be an average value. The time required to launch was about ten minutes for Soviet ICBMs and most of the SLBMs once the decision to go had been made.

The Soviet strategic bomber force would be used on targets in Europe and Asia.
The primary target for the bulk of the Soviet rocket force would be North America, I think.

The reliability of rockets and bombs is not an explanation either. A pessimistic value for rocket reliability would be 1 in 6. A pessimistic value for warhead reliability would be 1 in 100.

Fratricide - warhead failure due to being caught in the radiation zones of other detonating warheads (the neutron flux causes predetonation with a very low yield) seems unlikely as well.

The circular error probable (CEP) for the weapons listed above ranges from 0.3 - 2.8km (SS-N-5), with the later generation weapons being more accurate. The later generation weapons tend to be MIRVed, so are less susceptible to fratricide effects.

The TM1-1 attack, despite being 'small' is devastating.
Urban attacks (vs. named towns/cities):

SS-16    7 
SS-17   46 
SS-18-1 15 
SS-18-2  9 
SS-19   16 
SS-N-8  28 
SS-N-17 36
Total  157

The total urban area affected by 5psi overpressure or greater exceeds 18,000 square miles (46,692 km^2).

For reference:
New York 'Tri State' area: 6,720 square miles
Los Angeles metro: 4,850 square miles

and see:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of...es_urban_areas
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Table_o...tistical_Areas

As a rule of thumb, the number of survivors inside the 5psi radius equals the
number of fatalities outside it; so this is a shorthand for a 100% prompt fatality zone - no survivors within the affected area.

Using a conservative population density of 1,500 people per square mile yields 27 million prompt casualties. Every population centre with more than 200,000 people has been hit by at least one weapon (using 2000 census data from Wiki page above).

Conspicuous in their absence from the TM1-1 list are the continuity of government sites (e.g. Mount Weather, Mount Pony, the Graybrier) in the Virginia-Maryland region, as well as oil refineries across the country.


Sorry about the length of this post.


Rob

[dragoon500ly]

Don't be sorry, lots of good info in the post!!

Looking through some of my old source material, it may simply be that the old Timeline used what public info was readily available, even some of the Jane's gave different info on the Soviet Union nuclear capability.

[helbent4]

Originally Posted by robj3

The only hints of ICBM bio-warheads I can find in the open literature come from Ken Alibek, former director of Biopreparat and the late Bill Patrick of USAMRIID, as well as some OTA reports. I will not discuss them further here.

Rob,

Very nice!

According to Kevin Dockery, he wrote a paper theorising the Soviets were deploying warheads that could deliver bio-warfare packages. That element, plus the inclusion of BZ grenades raised some official eyebrows.

Not all of the target and missile data jives with real life! Not to mention the weapons are not MIRVs but MRVs and not independently targeted. And a lot of crucial sites are left off the list. The latter can be "taken care of" by assigning some of the warheads the PD is allowed to allocate.

One assumption is that the Soviet bomber fleet would be caught on the ground by the surprise/accidental strike.

Tony

[robj3]

dragoon500ly wrote:

Don't be sorry, lots of good info in the post!!

Thanks. Next little project is to see whether a Morrow-level TEOTWAWKI could be precipitated by an alternate Korean war or Cuban Missile Crisis.

Tony Stroppa wrote:

Not all of the target and missile data jives with real life!

There are some bits that are close, and some that are way out, as previously noted.

Not to mention the weapons are not MIRVs but MRVs and not independently targeted.

I'm using TM1-1 3d. ed (1985).
p.4 and 5 specifically refer to MIRVs in the 'Russian nuclear missile data' table and the following section 'MIRV Impacts'.

One assumption is that the Soviet bomber fleet would be caught on the ground by the surprise/accidental strike.

That's not present in TM1-1, but is sort of reasonable given that the attack came with minimal warning (satellites detecting U.S. ICBM launches gives at most 30 minutes). The problem is that the Soviets maintained strategic patrol flights at all times until 1992 (after remarks by Vladimir Putin in 2007 when he resumed bomber patrols). What proportion of the 163 aircraft available were in the air?

Note that this contradicts doctrinal notes in Podvig (Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, p.363) where nuclear capable aircraft were kept at a low level of readiness.

Command sequences were strict:
- alert
- load and ready weapons
- authorization of use
- takeoff
- travel to launch/target points

In any case, there's an enormous discrepancy between force used (~16% of total) and available force.


Rob

[nuke11]

Originally Posted by robj3

I'm using TM1-1 3d. ed (1985).
p.4 and 5 specifically refer to MIRVs in the 'Russian nuclear missile data' table and the following section 'MIRV Impacts'.

Rob

The pictures in the book are wrong. A MIRV will not be used in this fashion. MRV maybe, but that is only 1 missile SS-11M3 was in this configuration. I could see a few warheads used to bracket a target, but the patterns shown would not be used as it is a big waste of the potential targets the bus could target along the flight path.

A typical MIRV pattern would be 100 miles to eitherside along the track of the bus. The missile fields maybe would get patterns like this (but that is what the big 20 MT warheads where for), but they really need to be timed as to not Interfere with the previous dentations. Patterns would need to be developed to help support and boost the dentations blast waves as they move out.

[robj3]

nuke11 wrote:

The pictures in the book are wrong. A MIRV will not be used in this fashion. MRV maybe, but that is only 1 missile SS-11M3 was in this configuration.

Yes, they are very much in error.
The key concept is to maximise area destroyed, rather than 'the areas of total destruction overlap'. The latter tries to satisfy both target kill probability and destruction area. I agree that this may be a potential MRV attack mode, but it seems to waste weapon effect for either hardened point or softer area targets.

Chapter 2 of the Office of Technology Assessment report 'The Effects of Nuclear War', available here:

http://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk3/1979/7906_n.html

has a good illustration of a MIRV attack against Leningrad which illustrates the damage maximisation concept (p.44). 5psi overpressure zones touch each other. 10 40kt weapons are equivalent to a single 1.17Mt detonation.

The MRV configuration of the SS-11 was noted in the initial post.

A typical MIRV pattern would be 100 miles to either side along the track of the bus.

That's pretty close to what I've read. Exact MIRV capabilities are classified, but 'The Effects of Nuclear War', refers to MIRV footprints on p.65:

Like all MIRVed missiles, the SS-18 has limitations of “footprint” –the area within which the warheads from a single missile can be aimed. Thus, the Soviets could strike not any 80 refineries but only 8 targets in each of 10
footprints of roughly 125,000 mi^2

This corresponds to an ellipse about 500 miles long (840km) and 250 miles
wide (420km) whose long axis corresponds to the direction of flight/fire (azimuth). So for ICBMs fired over the pole, this is very roughly north-south.
Page 66 of the 'Effects' report has some illustrative maps.

The missile fields maybe would get patterns like this (but that is what the big 20 MT warheads where for), but they really need to be timed as to not Interfere with the previous dentations. Patterns would need to be developed to help support and boost the dentations blast waves as they move out.

You can't have both blast wave boosting and not interfere with previous detonations - the former is constructive interference, by any definition.

Against ICBM silos and launch control centres you're relying on cratering or ground shock effects to produce a kill. This is easier to do with a high yield warhead, but by the 1980s both sides had sufficiently accurate weapons that high yield warheads were unnecessary.

In the MP scenario, the 20MT warheads were excellent area-wrecking weapons (cities, soft military bases and airfields).


Rob

[nuke11]

I'm surprised you are not also using the FEMA NAPB-90 document, which is an interesting read. The document FEMA 160 Surving a Nuclear War is a light interesting read as well.

Then I'm guessing you have also read the book "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons" 3rd Edition by Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan. The "calculator" is great to use.

[robj3]

I was looking over this again and realise I made a silly math error.
Totals are wrong here:

Dockery, TM1-1:
Missile  Warheads     N      
SS-16     1x1Mt       60 
SS-17     4x200kt     752
SS-18-1  25Mt         110
(bio variant          50)
SS-18-2   10x2Mt      110
SS-19     6x300kt     240

SS-N-8    2Mt         452
SS-N-17   3x500kt     544

7802 warheads on 2268 missiles with a total yield of 7763.6 megatons...
then the other 50 biological tipped ones.

The rest of the values check out.

[mikeo80]

Originally Posted by robj3

I was looking over this again and realise I made a silly math error.
Totals are wrong here:

Dockery, TM1-1:
Missile  Warheads     N      
SS-16     1x1Mt       60 
SS-17     4x200kt     752
SS-18-1  25Mt         110
(bio variant          50)
SS-18-2   10x2Mt      110
SS-19     6x300kt     240

SS-N-8    2Mt         452
SS-N-17   3x500kt     544

7802 warheads on 2268 missiles with a total yield of 7763.6 megatons...
then the other 50 biological tipped ones.

The rest of the values check out.

That is what the US got hit with. With the USSR response. I shudder to think what the US hit USSR & etc with on first strike. We got our B-52's off the runways, the Minutemen out of the silos and the Posidens and Tridents out of the subs.

My guess is we hit with 10,000 plus megatons.

Just my two cents.

Mike

[Matt W]

But that does lead to a potentially "interesting problem" for international relations: any surviving states know that the USA started WW3.

[mikeo80]

Originally Posted by Matt W

But that does lead to a potentially "interesting problem" for international relations: any surviving states know that the USA started WW3.

Interesting point. Especially first 5 years or so.

1) What states still exist? IMHO, Europe, Northern Africa, North America, Northern Asia, Middle East are toast. That leaves South America, Southern Africa, Southern Asia, Australia, New Zealand. IMHO, some of these survivors got a "gift" or two.

2) How would they know anything? Major powers are gone. Sensor systems of major powers are gone. Rumor at best.

3) Does it matter in TMP game setup? TMP is 150+ years after The Day. A Morrow Team is trying to deal with local needs. There could be a local taboo on US Military due to rumors??!!?? Morrow Team LOOKS like US Military????

Just my two cents worth!

Mike

[robj3]

Mikeo80 wrote:

That is what the US got hit with. With the USSR response. I shudder to think what the US hit USSR & etc with on first strike. We got our B-52's off the runways, the Minutemen out of the silos and the Posidens and Tridents out of the subs.

In the neighborhood of 6000 megatons, from Department of Energy stats (they released total yield figures periodically).

Elsewhere, I'm having a discussion with people who wonder why the Soviet attack was so big because the USSR was technically incompetent. It is difficult to reconcile this with their impression that the U.S. arsenal needed to be big to deal with the Soviet strategic threat.

The size of the first strike depends on how quickly the U.S. went on the attack. There may not have been time to mobilise all the subs and bombers - only a fraction of both forces is on launch on warning type alert.

From the NRDC database:
http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datainx.asp

US Forces, 1989:
ICBM
Minuteman II 450: 1.2Mt W56
Minuteman III 500: 3x 170kt W62 (200) OR 3x 335kt W78 (300)ea.
MX/Peacekeeper 50: 10x 300kt W87 ea.

SLBM: 25 Poseidon, 8 Trident subs. 50% on patrol during normal conditions.
Poseidon C3 208 10x 50kt W68 ea
Poseidon C4 192 8x 100kt W76 ea
Trident C4 192 8x 100kt W76 ea

Bombers: total aircraft available for combat, not training/maintenance.
173 B-52 Stratofortress - 8 bombs or 12 SRAMs/ALCMs and 4 bombs ea.
48 FB-111A - 6 SRAMs or 6 bombs ea.
90 B-1 Lancer - 8 bombs ea.

1100 AGM-69A SRAMs: W69 170kt
1600 AGM-86B ALCMs: W80-1, 5-150kt

Bombs: 2400 immediately accessible from following:
B28 380 70-1450kt
B43 500 <1Mt
B53 50 9Mt
B57 825 <1 to 20kt
B61 900 (var 0,1,7) <1 to 500kt
B61 2025 (var 2-5) <1 to 345kt
B83 1000 up to 1200kt

Matt,

But that does lead to a potentially "interesting problem" for international relations: any surviving states know that the USA started WW3.

That's easy. All the explosions (12000+MT) push us well over the nuclear winter threshold. There won't be any surviving states.