References and Issues with the T2k Chronology

[kato13]

Webstral 06-17-2004, 10:51 PM Guys,


Okay, my system is finally back on-line. I have my material and a little bit of time (very little bit). I'm starting to look at the Sino-Soviet War again.


I've just been to http://www.d20.demon.nl/t2k/t2ktime.html and read some of the early history of the Twilight: 2000 chronology. The site notes that the Soviets capture Shenyang in 1995, before the main Chinese counteroffensive. Can anybody point me in the right direction for this tidbit? As some of you may remember, the Soviets bog down short of Shenyang in my chronology, then are forced back to the Sungari River as a result of RED WILLOW. This matches better with my sensibilities, but my effort in writing details of the Twilight: 2000 chronology was to support the official version of events while fleshing them out.


There's another issue with the timeline, and this gets back to the matter of mobilization. I've read in a couple of places that the Soviets decide to go to full mobilization at the end of 1996. And yet we don't see anything like full mobilization until 1998. Dozens of Category 2 and Category 3 divisions aren't called up until 1997. I've been struggling to find a way to make this work, but I'm at a loss. Full mobilization ought to put four million troops into the field within 120 days of the announcement (including the troops already on active duty). Losses during the Sino-Soviet War through the end of 1995 can't possibly account for a million troops. There would be nobody left in the Far Eastern TVD. So where is everybody? And if I can't explain where the extra Soviet troops are, do I hedge on the general mobilization clause? This has been my instinct, given the character I've developed in Dmitri Danilov and the picture I've drawn of the USSR between 1989 and 1995. Still, I want to go against canon as little as possible.


Any thoughts on the mobilization issue?


There's another thorn in my side. According to "Boomer", the USSR invades Norway in November, 1996. I noticed that the 10th Mountain Division ends up in Norway in 1996, but this makes no sense at all to me. The Soviets are already straining badly under the effort of controlling the West German invasion. An invasion of Norway solves none of the problems associated with an ongoing war and brings in new ones. Now the Soviets will have to support more troops on foreign soil. Worse, where they might have hoped to keep the US and other NATO powers on the sideline during the Soviet-German conflict, by invading Norway the Soviets bring the hitherto-uncommitted NATO powers right into the battle. No matter how well the Soviets perform in the invasion, they can't possibly think they're going to hold Norway against a concerted NATO effort to liberate a NATO member--not while the US, UK, and Canadian Armies, Navies, and Air Forces are not involved in fighting in Central Europe. It's insanity.


Now if we delay the invasion of Norway by a single month, the whole thing makes sense. If the US gets involved in Germany at the beginning of December, the USSR has no reason to hold off in Norway. Since there's no longer any hope of keeping the US on the sidelines, all bets are off. The Northern Fleet tries to sortie, and the Soviet Army tries to capture Norway to improve its acess to the North Atlantic, the North Sea, and the United Kingdom (as well as diverting NATO troops).


That's all for now. I'm sure I'll have more later, though.


Webstral

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shrike6 06-18-2004, 08:18 AM Originally posted by Webstral

Guys,


Okay, my system is finally back on-line. I have my material and a little bit of time (very little bit). I'm starting to look at the Sino-Soviet War again.


I've just been to http://www.d20.demon.nl/t2k/t2ktime.html and read some of the early history of the Twilight: 2000 chronology. The site notes that the Soviets capture Shenyang in 1995, before the main Chinese counteroffensive. Can anybody point me in the right direction for this tidbit?

page 4, NATO Vehicle Guide (version 1.0) (#526)


Originally posted by Webstral

There's another issue with the timeline, and this gets back to the matter of mobilization. I've read in a couple of places that the Soviets decide to go to full mobilization at the end of 1996. And yet we don't see anything like full mobilization until 1998. Dozens of Category 2 and Category 3 divisions aren't called up until 1997. I've been struggling to find a way to make this work, but I'm at a loss. Full mobilization ought to put four million troops into the field within 120 days of the announcement (including the troops already on active duty). Losses during the Sino-Soviet War through the end of 1995 can't possibly account for a million troops. There would be nobody left in the Far Eastern TVD. So where is everybody? And if I can't explain where the extra Soviet troops are, do I hedge on the general mobilization clause? This has been my instinct, given the character I've developed in Dmitri Danilov and the picture I've drawn of the USSR between 1989 and 1995. Still, I want to go against canon as little as possible.


Any thoughts on the mobilization issue?

I would have to know for sure what "General Mobilization" meant to the Soviets. It could mean they put all units on alert for possible deployment. It could also mean just cat 1 and 2 and not cat 3 forces are fully mobilized. Also just because a unit is supposed to be fully mobilized within x number of days, doesn't necessarily mean they will be availbable within that time. Its also possible the Soviets were pulling men from category 3 units to use as replacements in units already in the fight thus taking longer for the cat 3 units to mobilize. Also it may mean just General mobilization of the affected Military Districts, as well.


Originally posted by Webstral


There's another thorn in my side. According to "Boomer", the USSR invades Norway in November, 1996. I noticed that the 10th Mountain Division ends up in Norway in 1996, but this makes no sense at all to me. The Soviets are already straining badly under the effort of controlling the West German invasion. An invasion of Norway solves none of the problems associated with an ongoing war and brings in new ones. Now the Soviets will have to support more troops on foreign soil. Worse, where they might have hoped to keep the US and other NATO powers on the sideline during the Soviet-German conflict, by invading Norway the Soviets bring the hitherto-uncommitted NATO powers right into the battle. No matter how well the Soviets perform in the invasion, they can't possibly think they're going to hold Norway against a concerted NATO effort to liberate a NATO member--not while the US, UK, and Canadian Armies, Navies, and Air Forces are not involved in fighting in Central Europe. It's insanity.


Now if we delay the invasion of Norway by a single month, the whole thing makes sense. If the US gets involved in Germany at the beginning of December, the USSR has no reason to hold off in Norway. Since there's no longer any hope of keeping the US on the sidelines, all bets are off. The Northern Fleet tries to sortie, and the Soviet Army tries to capture Norway to improve its acess to the North Atlantic, the North Sea, and the United Kingdom (as well as diverting NATO troops).



I'm not so sure your thinking is right here. NATO is already begining to surge forces forward to Europe by this time. 4th ID has already deployed to Germany. The 1st Canadian Brigade, and the Dutch RM 1st Commando Group have already deployed to Norway as well. Also all the NATO nations have mobilized at least some part of their reserves at this point as well. If I'm the Soviets, what I am looking at here is some form of Mobilization of NATO while I am at war with a member of that alliance. I see two options here A. I can wait for NATO to fully deploy their forces forward and hope they don't attack or B. Hit them before they are ready.

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graebarde 06-18-2004, 06:22 PM I agree with Web.. it made no sense, and it is the catalyst that I have used in my campaign to bring the US into the fray. I moved the Norway actions to right after Thanksgiving in 96, which coincides with US/UK/CDN forces crossing into eastern Germany during the first week in December.


I did not surge the 10th until the WP crosses into Norwegian territory. The unit I have following the 10th in addition to the MEB, is 34th ID (MN, WI, IL, ND, SD). They were slated for Alaska, but it makes no sense to send a unit to Alaska then a unit from Alaska.. too much logistics wasted, and time. Plus the 34th historically has trained in Norway (when they were the Viking division (47th??))


The generals in Moscow did the pooch when they broke the camels back IMO.


So Web, when is the next installment coming out?

Anxiously awaiting the next one, two, three, four, and more chapters.


Grae

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Grimace 06-18-2004, 09:52 PM I'm in the same line of thinking that shrike is. Perhaps the Soviets thought that hitting the NATO forces before they were fully prepared. Yes, the essentially screwed the pooch when they did, but I'm sure some generals somewhere were pushing for a preemptive strike to eliminate units and "deflate the desire of the lazy westerners to make war".


I'd also be inclined to believe the mobilization along the lines of what shrike mentions. Using the initial "active" category III members as replacements in the units that had previously suffered losses makes sense, and then also goes towards making it so that the official Category III unit doesn't become fully active until it gets replenished itself.


Those are my two cents, even if they are to simply say "me too".

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Webstral 06-19-2004, 03:18 AM I have thought about the argument put forth by shrike6 and Grimace. In fact, this is essentially the argument I intend for Sauronski & Co to make once the US starts to get active about getting forces into Western Europe. It's obvious that NATO is in the process of moving its war-making potential to Europe. It's equally obvious that the balance of forces in Europe is only going to tip away from the Soviet Union as time goes by.


Moreover, since the early 1970's the Red Banner Northern Fleet has been developed to move into the North Atlantic and interdict exactly the kind of sealift that is occurring in November 1996. The submarine capability has been in place much longer, but now the Soviet Navy has aircraft carriers, cruisers, and other ships capable of staying at sea for extended periods. All this capability was developed at tremendous expense. All of it will be wasted if the Americans (and Canadians) are allowed to conduct trans-Atlantic movement at will and unhindered.


Danilov replies that it would indeed be a national tragedy for the potential of the Red Banner Northern Fleet go to waste by sitting in port while the Americans send convoys across the Atlantic unmolested. However, he also points out that the last thing the Soviet Union wants is a war on two fronts. Granted, in November 1996 the USSR is already fighting a two-front war against China and Germany. This is as much as the Soviet Union can handle right now. A break-out attempt by the Northern Fleet would indeed cause problems for the US. An invasion of Norway by Soviet forces in and around the Kola Peninsula would help divert Western attention from Germany. However, the fact remains, Danilov says, that nothing can be done about the presence of a large number of heavy NATO divisions in the FRG that are not currently engaged in East Germany. If the Soviet Union attacks Norway and attempts to move the Northern Fleet through the BIG Gap, the United States and the rest of NATO will be drawn into the war. As long as there is a reasonable chance that the remainder of NATO can be kept on the sidelines, let them move as much materiel to Europe as they want.


The Sauronskiites are far from convinced that Danilov has a good read on the Americans. As it turns out, Sauronski is right. The United States does get involved. However, Danilov is correct in believing that the Soviet Army cannot prevail in a conventional war in the DDR in late 1996 once the United States gets involved.


There's another reason for the Soviets to delay any invasion of Norway until after US forces cross the Inter-German border: France. Well, it's more like the uncommitted members of NATO. We know France, Italy, Greece, and Belgium (and presumably Portugal and Spain) are all horrified by the West German invasion of the DDR. However, Norway doesn't have anything to do with events in Germany. There's no justification for a Soviet invasion of Norway, except for military needs. While the French and Italians obviously have their issues with the West Germans, the Norwegians are another matter entirely. From the Soviet standpoint, there's every reason to fear that an invasion of Norway will drive the Romance-speaking members of NATO (and Greece) back into the fold. No doubt the KGB will be sounding this matter out throughout October and November. Danilov would not waste any time reminding his comrades that it's hardly worthwhile to stop a half-dozen US divisions from getting across the Atlantic at the price of bringing forty Western European divisions into the fray.


For what it's worth, I'm going to have Danilov meet an unhappy end after the US enters the war in Germany. Sauronski takes the Kremlin, and the Soviet Union throws everything it has into the war in an effort to win before the West can get any further in its mobilization efforts.


As for the speed of mobilization, I guess there are so many variables that one might believe almost anything. As some of you may remember, I have Sorveyev drawing on troops from all over the western Soviet Union to refill the ranks of his divisions in Germany. If memory serves, I have accounted for about 150,000 troops pulled out of the western Military Districts through mid-November. Looking at what I have done for the Sino-Soviet War up through the end of RED WILLOW, I have accounted for another 105,000 Soviet casualties in the Far East. Obviously, there will be more throughout the Winter War and in 1996. Getting back to the mobilization order in question (12/31/95, let's say), let us imagine that the Soviets have lost 150,000 troops in the Far East by the start of 1996. That's a fair amount of people, to be sure. However, this total represents a fairly small fraction of the Soviet military. If "general mobilization" means "full mobilization", we've barely scratched the surface of the raw manpower available to the Soviets. Against a force of four million, 150,000 losses is a matter of re-shuffling personnel. There's no reason why the Soviets couldn't get a million more men into the field fairly quickly, provided the only thing preventing them from doing so is getting the manpower activated regardless of cost.


There are plenty of reasons not to bring all the units available to the Soviet Union on-line, however. At the risk of stating the obvious, it would be terrible for the economy. This is Danilov's position. This is one of the main reasons why the Soviets get the Eastern European satellites involved.


So I feel like we're stuck with the question of what "general mobilization" means. If we're forced to believe that it means the Soviet Union calls up as many divisions as possible as quickly as possible to bring the Sino-Soviet War to a speedy conclusion, then I'm hard-pressed to figure out where all the manpower has gone. According to the Soviet Vehicle Guide, only nine new divisions are committed to China in preparation for the Spring 1996 offensive. Granted, we must put in several Warsaw Pact divisions (I have set this number at nine), and there may be 175,000 replacements required to fill vacancies in the formations already in the Far Eastern TVD. Still, this does not seem like that big a draw on Soviet manpower if the sole consideration is the number of men fit for military service.


On the other hand, shrike6 may have the best answer. If "general mobilization" means that the Kremlin tells everyone on the reserves list to start attending training 'cuz they may get called up any day now, we don't have to figure out where all the men are. The Kremlin is trying to strike a balance between meeting the needs of the economy and meeting the needs of the commanders in-theater. This has been my thinking all along. Okay, so maybe I'm over-thinking this one and just need to stick with what I've settled on.


One more note: the sheer shortage of men in the Category 3 and Mobilization Only units starts to mean much more towards the end of 1996, I believe. The hard campaigning in China in 1996 and the demands of war in Germany have taken a big bite of Soviet manpower by this point, so I can buy the argument that Category 3 and Mobilization Only units have given up a lot of personnel to fill gaps in the units at the front. If the annual loss rate exceeds the number of men reaching the draft age every year, then the difference is going to have to come from somewhere.


I don't have the NATO Vehicle Guide. If someone can e-mail me the relevant page(s) [RE: the Soviet capture of Shenyang], I'd be most appreciative. What I've been writing in The Sino-Soviet War is just the first draft, really. I figured I'd have to make some updates. I'll be doing to same for The Storm in Germany when I get that far.


Webstral

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