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Thunder Empire Thumbnail
Webstral 10-19-2005, 05:46 AM 111th Infantry Brigade (formerly 111th Military Intelligence Brigade)
Location: Southeastern Arizona Manpower: 5600 AFV: 37 (5 Stingray, 8 Lynx, 14 M113, 3 M577, 11 VAB, et al) A pre-war training brigade assigned to the US Army Military Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, the 111th Military Intelligence Brigade was assigned a variety of disaster relief duties throughout southeastern Arizona following the Thanksgiving Day nuclear attacks on the continental United States. Following the outbreak of hostilities with Mexico in June 1998, the 111th MI Brigade participated in fierce fighting throughout southern Arizona and succeeded in holding its cantonment area based on Fort Huachuca and Tucson. This success was due largely to the pre-Thanksgiving supply of light infantry equipment, a few AFVs, and recovering veterans to Huachuca by the Pentagon in an effort to make the training posts viable cantonments in the event of a nuclear exchange. As local fighting died to skirmishing, raids, and patrols by late August 1998, the Fort Huachuca commanding general took steps to consolidate his position in southeastern Arizona. All military units in southeastern Arizona and all federal, state, and municipal police were formally absorbed into the Fort Huachuca command structure; Santa Cruz, Cochise, and Pima Counties were reorganized into the Southern Arizona Military Administrative District (SAMAD); and Fort Huachuca and the 111th MI Brigade effectively removed themselves from MilGov control by refusing orders to move to California in support of 6th US Army. In 1999, the 111th MI Brigade was reflagged as the 111th Infantry Brigade and defeated a Mexican incursion into SAMAD in conjunction with the upsurge in fighting throughout the Southwest. In 2000, the 111th Brigade smashed a motorized marauder army moving south from the Phoenix area. Like all the histories of the US Army Vehicle Guide, this is just a thumbnail sketch. What it doesn't tell is how much work went into making Fort Huachuca a viable cantonment long before the bombs fell. What it doesn't tell is how what would become SAMAD skated the razor's edge of collapse in the months following the Thanksgiving Day Massacre. Nor does this summary tell how many young MI soldiers died trying to control crowds in and around Tucson and in the winter fighting in the towns along the Gila River southeast of Phoenix. What isn't told here is how close the 111th came to folding in June 1998 or how most of the line companies were at half their authorized strength by August 1998. What isn't told is the incredible heroism of a relative handful of veterans from the conventional war in showing the MI soldiers how this business was done; nor does this summary talk about the heroism of a few MI lieutenants, former MI drill sergeants, and former AIT students who embraced their new infantry role and gave their lives to buy the 111th the time and experience it needed to survive. What isn't told above is the struggle to rebuild the battalions using local recruits, Air Force personnel remade into riflemen, and EPW (Enemy Prisoners of War) from every Pact and Communist nation in the war. What isn't told is the story of the abandonment of every town outside the SAMAD area, save those along the Gila River which the 111th fought to control during the Winter 1997-1998 fighting. The thumbnail sketch tells us nothing of the fate of wretched Phoenix, except that in 2000 a motorized marauder band which had been pillaging the surviving towns throughout eastern California and northern Arizona passed through Phoenix on its way toward the rumored land of plenty in southeastern Arizona. Long before the arrival of the road pirates, Phoenix had become a desert replica of Manhattan, with a small local food-producing populace owned by rival gangs. What isn't told is the miraculous ingenuity of the survivors in SAMAD in keeping equipment functioning, keeping the people fed, and keeping ammunition in the weapons. We hear nothing yet of the tens of thousands of survivors reduced to virtual serfdom to till the desert in an effort to wrest subsistence agriculture from the dry land and sparse rains using methods similar to those of Third World peasants south of the Sahara and in India. The story of the survival and eventual prosperity of SAMAD is one fraught with near-misses for the many and ultimate sacrifice for the few. Attached is a rough estimate of the manpower of the various military units in SAMAD in early 2001. One of the first things T2k players will notice is the size of the battalions of the 111th MI, the Huachuca garrison troops, and the 3rd Brigade of the Arizona State Guard (AZSTAG). The battalions of SAMAD are pretty large compared to a lot of battalions of light infantry--especially in the year 2001. There are a couple of reasons for this. The first is that SAMAD has the manpower to support such a force structure. The population of SAMAD is 400,000, which is quite nearly the pre-war population of the area. The aged and the infirm have died, along with a fair number of the young and fit. However, for every person who died in the 1997-2001 timeframe, a refugee from Phoenix or elsewhere has arrived in SAMAD. A total mobilized manpower of 12,000 soldiers represents three percent of the population. [Of course, the rest of the people are working hard. There is plenty to do to support the troops and the rest of the economy. In addition to food growing and gathering, there is the whole industrial base to man. There is construction, and there are craft industries. There is admin and there is salvage. There is even some education. In short, there is less of a surplus of labor than the numbers might otherwise indicate. SAMAD is not quite straining for manpower, but the leadership is watching the numbers with concern.] The other reason for large battalions is that the subordinate organizations are large. Rifle platoons in the 111th Brigade are authorized 47 men in three rifle squads, a weapons squad, and a command team. Huachuca wants platoons that are capable of taking care of themselves on extended patrols. The same is true of companies and battalions. Experience has shown that the most effective battalions are those which can stay in the fight for an extended period and which have the manpower to overwhelm their Mexican rivals and/or encamped marauder bands. By 1999, SAMAD had sorted out most of its leadership problems; the lieutenants in charge of the platoons are almost all former enlisted riflemen veterans of the campaigns fought over the last two years. They are hard and competent, and they have the trust of their subordinates. Sadly, I just don't have the time to do much more with this right now. But I have been frustrated that my T2k work has been on hold for more than a year now. I find doing a little writing is very therapeutic. Once I get home sometime in January 2006, I will get back into the swing of things. I have been thinking seriously about trying to turn "Thunder Empire" into a novel with a narrative flavor and technique similar to Kim Stanley Robinson's Mars trilogy. Webstral ******************** Webstral 10-19-2005, 05:51 AM It looks like the spreadsheet didn't take. The numbers are below. Battallion Type Manpower AFV 305th infantry, light 700 306th forward support battalion 600 309th infantry, light 700 322nd engineers 800 326th infantry, light 700 344th field artillery 550 355th infantry, light 700 367th infantry, heavy motorized 700 37 HHC 100 Total 111th Brigade 5550 37 304th MI 600 317th schools & training 250 1012th MP 700 5 Gar Cmd Admin & Spt 300 Total Huachuca Troops 1850 5 414th MP 700 428th MP 600 431st infantry, light 750 3 459th MP 600 462nd infantry, light 750 3 475th infantry, light 750 3 483rd forward support 600 HHC 125 Total 3rd AZSTAG Brigade 4875 9 Total 12275 51 ******************** DeaconR 10-19-2005, 10:40 AM Very interesting background, as far as the basic historical and personal aspects go. I can see why you are somewhat frustrated though. The very thoroughness of your opening suggests that you would probably want to write more about specific leadership for instance. Also I wonder what kind of equipment they have access to. I know that you mention this among the 'stories not told' parts but it would be something I'd be curious about if I were looking at this as a sourcebook. Anyway I encourage you to continue, it looks like an intriguing setting for an area that TW2000 canon just sort of brushes past. ******************** thefusilier 10-29-2005, 09:10 AM Well done. I saved your old post on the history on the unit and region and now I have this to top it off. I applaud you for keeping twilight going with good fresh material. ******************** |
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