TSiG: Soviet/Warpac Reaction to the Winter War

[kato13]

Jason Weiser

Continuing Web's Work (TSiG: Soviet/Warpac Reaction to the Winter War)

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Hope Web likes this, as I asked and he said we can pick up where he left off, so long as we allow him veto. Matt, if you wanna split some of the work with me here, I would appreicate it.

As the Chinese Ambassador to Canada told his Soviet counterpart “nyet” there was some debate among the Soviet General Staff over the shape of the war to come. The Soviets had more than a feeling that the Chinese would rebuff their offer. The KGB’s assets had noticed just how heavily invested the West was becoming in the fate of China, and it’s analysts were becoming concerned, to put it lightly. Short of asking the Pacific Fleet to begin to sink NATO and non-aligned merchants, an impossible idea, the Soviets could do little but launch a “charm offensive” that did little more than convince the West that the Soviets had bitten off more than they could chew in China.

As blame began to circulate over who was responsible for the “disaster” of Red Willow, the Far East Front Commander became an early casualty and was ‘retired for reasons of ill health”. His deputy was soon promoted in his place, and STAVKA, chastened by the depths to which they had underestimated the PLA, accelerated troop movements east from the Western Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The facts were, even with the success of Tchaikovsky, the Soviet war effort needed reinforcement, and so the first half-dozen divisions were unceremoniously pulled from GFSG and sent east as fast as the Soviet State rail system could manage. Reserve call ups accelerated, and the further disbandment of the “Mobilization Only” divisions was ceased, in fact, ten such divisions in the Central Asian and Siberian districts began to train.

What was more troubling was the word coming out of the various capitals of the Warsaw Pact over the idea of sending “internationalist detachments” to China. Simply put, many of the Soviet allies were getting cold feet at the very suggestion. In one exchange with the Hungarian ambassador to Moscow, the Soviet Foreign Minister was told, “The very suggestion you make is laughable. Were we to send troops to China, it would trigger the eventual end of socialism in my country.” But, soon, the Czechs, East Germans and Poles agreed, and each sent a division east. Soon, the Hungarian and Bulgarians acquiesced, but they managed to at least get the Soviets to foot the bill to equip their troops to a standard capable of facing the PLA. This triggered massive protests, to which the hard-line regimes, ever mindful of their Soviet masters, cracked down brutally upon. In East Germany, a cabal formed by Army officers disgusted at their own government began to plan the unthinkable; Unity with the west, and kicking the Soviets out. Such planning would have wider, more dire consequences.

Such comments were causing disquiet in the very halls of the Politburo, but Sauronski and his allies pressured the rest of the voting members, citing the fact that a defeat for Soviet arms in this conflict, even a negotiated one, would mean the end of the Soviet Union. In short, the war was reaching a desperation phase. Danilov himself was averaging some 4 hours of sleep a night, and was drafting diplomatic proposal after proposal, all in an attempt to avoid the inevitable, that the war would continue into 1996 at the least.

As more and more of the economy was re-tooled to produce military goods, commercial production dwindled and luxuries, such as they were in the Soviet Union, disappeared. The reaction was understandably negative among the masses, especially as it became clear the war and the attending casualties would not cease in time for Christmas. In some cities, there was some scattered riots and civil disorder, but the MVD and KGB OMON soon crushed these. Draft resistance, however, soon became somewhat widespread, and a full 10% of the 1996 Draft class failed to show up.