Intresting Facts about 1980s Soviet Equipment

[dragoon500ly]

Soviet Tanks

Soviet tanks are often discribed as being very simple to operate and maintain. For all of their simplicity, however, Soviet tanks have often been superior to those used by the US and its allies. For example, Soviet tanks outgun NATO tanks by at least 10mm; in the 1940s 85mm vs 76mm, 100mm vs 90mm or 84mm in the 1950s, 115mm vs 105mm in the 1960s, and 125mm vs 105mm in the 1970s. Larger caliber guns give high velocity and better armor penetration.

However, other factors undercut the Soviet armament advantage, including fewer rounds stored, primitive optics, low rate of fire and inferior ammunition.

Until the appearance of the T-64/72, the NATO superiority in optics and fire control was a tremendous advantage in combat. Not only did this mean that NATO would hit their targets more often, it often meant that NATO tanks would get the first shot in.

There are three types of rangefinders used on tanks: the stadia reticle (the range finder is incorporated in the gunner's sight, primary method used in WWII); the stereo coincidence (this range finder has the commander lay on target and then superimpose two images into one, the mirrors project on either side of the turret and provide the base for a calculation as to range, used in the 1950s-1970s); and the final type is the laser rangefinder (which projects an invisible beam towards a target and reads the elapsed time for the beam to be reflected back to the rangefinder). The following chart shows the average accuracy of each type:

Rangefinder (Range) 500m 1,000m 2,000m

Laser 98% 86% 34%
Stero Coincidence 97% 70% 14%
Stadia Reticle 98% 35% 4%

As you can see, at short ranges there is very little difference in the performance of the various systems, since short range is also the range where armor is most vulnerable to penetration, the advantage goes to the crew that gets the first shot off. At longer ranges, the differences become more marked, this is the reason why NATO crews are trained to engage at long range and why Soviet doctrine stresses closeing and engaging enemy armor as quickly as possible.

Because of their small size, Soviet tanks carry less ammunition than NATO tanks. Due to this, the Soviets are much more dependent upon the second echelon bringing up reserve ammunition to a much higher degree than NATO. This difference was felt by the Syrian T-55s in the 1973 War when many of their tanks were running out of ammunition by the second day, while Israeli Centurions still had adequate supplies of main gun ammunition onboard.

The turrets of NATO tanks often rotate at a much higher rate than a Soviet tank. For example, a M-60A1 tank rotates at 24 degrees per second, the T-55/T-62 rotates at 17 degrees per second.

The lightness of Soviet tanks allows them to use bridges impassable to NATO tanks.

Soviet tanks have much more effective NBC systems than NATO tanks.

Soviet tank engines also take much longer to remove and change out than NATO Tanks. An M-60A1 engine pack can be remove within 30 minutes, a T-62 can take up to 2 hours.

Compared to NATO designs, Soviet tanks have much better cross-country mobility. This is due to their lightweight and high horsepower to weight ratio.

The human engineering of Soviet tanks is widely acknowledged to be inferior, as is their mechanical reliability. T-62s average a breakdown every 160-200km while a M-60A1 averages a breakdown every 240-320km.

The small dimensions of Soviet tanks reduces their vulnerability by presenting a smaller target and allows greater strategic mobility by allowing the use of railway rolling stonck that the larger NATO tanks cannot use. A smaller tank also allows the use of positions that larger tanks cannot use. But the Soviets pay for this advantage with a cramped and vulnerable interior, and, more importantly, the low silhouette limits gun depression to 4 degrees sd opposed to the 10+ degrees of NATO tanks. This forces Soviet tanks to expose much more of their hull than NATO tanks when firing from defilade positions.

[dragoon500ly]

Came across this intresting bit of info.

The SA-2 Guideline has been the premier Soviet SAM since its introduction in 1957. Its greatest moment of fame was on May 1, 1960 when it downed Francis Powers U-2, proving the ability of the SAM to strike even the highest flying aircraft....

Or did it?

During the India-Pakistani 1965 War, the Indians fired an unnumber of SA-2s but only damaged one Pakistani aircraft. The threat of the SA-2s, however, reduced the accuracy and effectiveness of the Pakistani air strikes.

The Eqyptians fired 22 SA-2s during the 1967 War. All missed and the Israelis captured one SA-2 battery.

The SA-2 was used most intensively in the Vietnam War. Its accuracy rate (as a percentage of missiles fired yielding kills) was:

1965: 194 fired, 11 kills = 5.7% accuracy
1966: 1,096 fired, 31 kills = 2.8% accuracy
1967: 3,202 fired, 56 kills = 1.75% accuracy
1968 (Jan-Mar): 322 fired, 3 kills = 0.9% accuracy
1972: 4,244 fired, 49 kills = 1.15% accuracy

Overall: 9,058 SA-2s were fired, resulting in 150 aircraft shotdown. A rather poor 1.7% accuracy.

The SA-3 Goa was also used in the Vietnam War and it is known that at least one F-4 Phantom was shot down. There is no exact infomation as to how many Goas were fired or how many US aircraft fell victim.

The SA-4 Ganef has never served outside the USSR. It is believed that this is due to its secondary role as a SSM (similar to the US Nike-Hercules).

The SA-6 Gainful saw combat service in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. It shot down large numbers of Israeli aircraft within the first two hours of the war due to technological surprise. The Israelis had developed effective countermeasures against the SA-2 and SA-3 missiles. The SA-6 replaced the "flying telegraph pole" with a highly manoeuvrable, low-altitude capability coupled with terminal radar guidance. Once the surprise wore off, the Israelis rapidly developed countermeasures and the effectiveness of the SA-6 wore off. The Israelis claimed that 1,100 SA-6s were fired for 20 kills, an accuracy rate of 1.8%. Egyptian and Syrian claims are that 840 SA-6s were fired for 20 kills, a 2.3% accuracy rating.

The SA-7 Grail first saw use in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and in Vietnam in 1972. Its initial accuracy was very high, a 33% accuracy rating being achieved against US gunships and transport helicopters. The SA-7 also shot down several slow-moving aircraft such as O-2Es, A-1s and C-130s, which were then forced to operate above 6,000ft. After this step was taken and the surprise wore off, SA-7 effectiveness wore off. Many SA-7s were observed to porpoise and miss. During the 1973 War, some 4,356 SA-7s were fired, with very disappointing results: two Israeli aircraft were definitely destroyed, four were possibles, 28 suffered tailplane damge and were out of action for a few hours, and 12 suffered engine damage and were grounded for a few days. This results in a accuracy rating of 0.05% for confirmed destruction and 0.1% if the possibles are added in.

From our previous examples, a total of 14,537 SAMs were fired, resulting in the loss of 172 aircraft. The accuracy of SAMs is 1.2% These are pretty low to hit odds! The typical AA gun requires the firing of 8,500 rounds per aircraft kill, or to kill 172 aircraft would require the firing of 1,462,000 rounds. This is an accuracy rating of 0.0001176%!!!

[dragoon500ly]

To say that the Soviets love artillery is sort of like saying that Gene Simmons is a shameless self promoter. Over 15% of the Red Army wears the red piping of Artillery. The weapons themselves are greatly improved and their numbers have doubled since 1968. Artillery is the backbone of any Soviet action.

This is a listing of the equipment:

MORTARS
Mortars are simple and effective, the give Soviet infantry their own jacket-pocket artillery, available when and where they are needed and can go anywhere an infantryman or a pack animal can go. Mortar bombs, with their thin casings, large explosive charges and plunging trajectories are more effective than howitzer shells, even if the mortars lack the range and accuracy of howitzers. The Soviets use four different mortars:

The M-1937 82mm mortar can be found in the airborne and naval infantry battalions. It weighs in at 56kg in firing condition, has a maximum rate of fire of up to 25rpm. Its minimum range is 100m and it has a maximum range of 3,040m. It can fire HE (3.05kg) and WP (3.41kg) rounds.

The M-1943 120mm mortar is the standard weapon of the motor rifle battalion (6 tubes per battalion). In firing position, it weighs 274.8kg and has a maximum rate of fire of up to 15rpm. Its minimum range is 460m and its maximum range is 5,700km. It can fire HE (15.4kg) and WP (16.7kg).

The M-1953 160mm mortar is normally seen in either the artillery division or in front-level heavy artillery brigades. In firing position, it weighs 1,300kg and has a maximum rate of fire of 3rpm. Its minimum range is 750m and its maximum range is 8,040m. It can fire HE (41.5kg) and WP (43.5kg).

The M-1952 240mm mortar, like the M-1953, is normally seen in either the artillery division or in front-level heavy artillery brigades. In firing position, it weighs 3,610kg and it has a maximum rate of fire of 1rpm. Its minimum range is 1,500m and its maximum range of 9,700m. It fires a HE bomb weighing 100kg.

[dragoon500ly]

During the T2000 time frame, the Soviet Artillery would equip the front-line Category I and II divisions.

M-1969 76.2mm Mountain Gun. Approximately eight motor rifle divisions are equipped with this piece, in place of the normal 122mm howitzers. This is a lightweight piece, weighing in at 815kg and able to be disassembled into nine loads. It has a maximum range of 11,000m and can fire HE and HEAT ammunition. It requires a crew of 6.

D-30 122mm Howitzer. This is the standard divisional and regimental howitzer. Introduced in 1967 it replaced the M-30 and other World War II pieces. It is a highly successful design, combining simplicity and ruggedness with effectiveness. While it lacks the range and destructive power of the NATO 155mm howitzers, the Soviets believe that deploying the D-30 further forward than NATO doctrine requires will negate the range advantage and that the numbers of these weapons made possible by their simplicity and ease of production will compensate for any individual limitations. Quantity has a quality all its own. The D-30 weighs in at 3,150kg in its firing position. It has a maximum rate of fire of 8rpm (sustained rate of 4rpm) and a maximum range of 15,300m. It can fire HE (21.8kg), HEAT (14.1kg), Smoke (22.4kg), Illum (22.4kg) and Chemical (22.4kg) rounds. It uses a 7 man crew. Basic Load for the D-30 is 80 rounds broken down into 64 HE, 12 smoke and 4 HEAT.

D-74 122mm Gun. This is found in the heavy artillery regiment of some Category II and III divisions. It weighs in at 5,568kg in firing position. Has a maximum rate of fire of 7rpm (sustained is 3rpm), and a maximum range of 24,000m. It can fire HE (27.5kg), APHE (25kg), Smoke (21.7kg), Illum (21.7kg) and Chem (21.7kg). Basic Load for the D-74 is 80 rounds broken down into 64 HE, 12 Smoke and 4 APHE.

D-20 152mm Gun-Howitzer. This is the standard heavy howitzer, equipping the army-level artillery brigades and artillery divisions. Introduced in 1955 and now being replaced by the 152mm SP howitzer. It weighs 5,650kg in firing position. It has a maximum rate of fire of 6rpm; a sustained rate of fire of 2rpm. The maximum range is 18,500m. It can fire HE (43.6kg), APHE (48.8kg), Smoke (52kg), Illum (52kg) and Chem (52kg). Basic Load is 60 rounds broken down into 48 HE, 9 Smoke and 3 APHE.

M-46 130mm Field Gun. Introduced in 1954, the M-46 is organic to each artillery division and a battalion is in each army-level artillery brigade. Often assigned to counterbattery missions due to its long range and accuracy. In firing position, it weighs 7,700kg. Maximum rate of fire is 6rpm; sustained is 3rpm. It has a maximum range of 27,500m. It fires HE (33.4kg), APHE (33.6kg), and Illum (25.8kg). The Basic Load is 70 rounds broken down into 65 HE and 5 APHE.

[pmulcahy11b]

When the Soviets shot down Francis Gary Powers' U-2, they did it by ripple-firing all of their SA-2s at that site, without having a solid lock-on, and hoped that one of them would get a lock just long enough to guide the missile. It was basically a lucky shot. It only damaged one of the horizontal stabilizers, but the U-2 is such a tricky plane to fly (especially back then) that even that small amount of damage was enough to tear the stabilizer off and bring the plane down.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by pmulcahy11b

When the Soviets shot down Francis Gary Powers' U-2, they did it by ripple-firing all of their SA-2s at that site, without having a solid lock-on, and hoped that one of them would get a lock just long enough to guide the missile. It was basically a lucky shot. It only damaged one of the horizontal stabilizers, but the U-2 is such a tricky plane to fly (especially back then) that even that small amount of damage was enough to tear the stabilizer off and bring the plane down.

True, but that shot, coupled with some creative reporting by Tass, is what made the reputation of the SA-2.

I was going through some old manuals and found this block of info on missile accuracy, thought it would be intresting to post.