Why would (multiple) divisional levels continue to exist?

[raketenjagdpanzer]

This is one that always made me go hmm...

There's instances of US tank divisions that consist of 2500 men and 30 vehicles (which can be TOW equipped humvees, M109 SP guns, M60s, captured PT-76's, etc. etc.; it's never really specified, is it?), or infantry divisions of 900 men and no vehicles (or worse yet armored divisions with no vehicles, etc.)

Why wouldn't (what was left of) theater command just regroup all of the units under a single prewar divisional size broken down into brigades, companies, platoons etc.

It would seem to make a hell of a lot more sense than the piecemeal units scattered hither and yon.

Of course I understand that after the failed summer offensive a lot of those units are scattered for a reason, and it's not like you can just pick up the satellite phone and ring up Brussels for guidance, or check the GPS to locate those other scattered units!

But really, if you assume a couple of things: one that OpOrd Omega doesn't go down until after Christmas or later and that two whatever orders DO come down from MilGov and CivGov don't conflict, I can't see a reason why you wouldn't just reform under a divisional banner.

Just say: Okay, this is now the 999th Armored Division, create your TO&E based on what you do have, refuse your ranks, base out of a surviving POMCUS location (or REFORGER location, maybe Bremen) to keep a supply line going and put an end to the Mad Max stuff before it starts.

Assuming that it worked, and that likewise you could build a German Panzergrenadier division...I mean, that's two full-strength divisions. Real divisions, too, not 6 tanks here, 10 APCs there, etc.

[pmulcahy11b]

I think the idea is to illustrate the incredibly fragmented nature of military forces in general, and secondarily illustrate that these fragmented military units regard themselves as separate entities with their own aims and goals.

[raketenjagdpanzer]

Originally Posted by pmulcahy11b

I think the idea is to illustrate the incredibly fragmented nature of military forces in general, and secondarily illustrate that these fragmented military units regard themselves as separate entities with their own aims and goals.

You know I thought about it a bit after I'd posted and that dovetails into another (few) thoughts I'd had, to sort of answer my own questions:

Firstly, as you say, differing goals. A commander in charge of the "901st AD brigade" might believe fully in prosecuting the war, while the CO of the "2nd Armored Company" (and all 1 of their tanks) might be more interested in being friendly to Polish civilians and neutral to Soviets.

Second: the civil war. Getting an order from CivGov to stay put and another from MilGov to go somewhere would be a surefire way to create real confusion at higher ranks which brings us to point three...

Thirdly: big fish, little pond. While it can't be overlooked that every rank has suffered horrendous casualties - I mean, 11 generals or admirals died in WWII as a direct result of combat - there's probably going to be a lot of top-heavy organizations out there. Imagine being a general and surviving from 1997 to late 2000, pulling your "division's" ass out of the fire (probably winding up engaged in direct combat yourself, repeatedly) and making it back to Germany only to be told that some other general was now in command, making you a line trooper!

Yeah...I think it'd be way, way more difficult than I thought. If not impossible.

[Mohoender]

Looking at the situation, I would expect to see the formations of units similar to the German's Kampfgruppe. Local commanders could effectivly improvised combat units from they have at hand in order to carry out certain missions.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kampfgruppe

[Rainbow Six]

Part of the reason for not merging might also be for disinformation / deception purposes.

For example, with things as they are, Soviet Intel officers might be able to ascertain that a certain area is occupied by (for example) 1st UK Armoured Dvn, 4th UK Armoured Dvn, and 5th UK Mech Dvn so think that any thrust towards that area will bring them up against 3 Divisions but they are unable to establish exactly how strong those Divisions are in terms of manpower and AFV's. So they decide not to take offensive action.

If, on the other hand, the 3 Divisions are consolidated into 1, the Soviets think they are only facing one Division. They think an offensive would be more likely to succeed and make their plans accordingly...

Just a thought....

[Legbreaker]

Reorganising units requires resources too, lots and lots of resources, especially fuel.

In the chaos of the second half of 1997, while NATO are being pushed back on all fronts, the resource of "time" isn't available (the reality of no more reinforcements from home also hasn't hit yet either). US units particularly were in disarray being down to approximately 1/4 of their prewar strength (half that of other NATO nations). This massive loss of manpower certainly equates to an almost complete lost of unit structure which makes it extremely difficult for a commander to even begin to work out what he's got let alone send orders through the shattered command structure.

In 1998 combat is still raging, although in the first half both sides are still reeling from the nukes, and focusing more on surviving the next few days and being prepared for the next enemy onslaught (which didn't come until June 98). Digging in and holding on to the scraps of organisation left while scrounging for diminishing supplies was likely the priority. Note that in this period, fuel, food and the other necessities of life would be limited - the supply chain had been nuked to obliteration and using alcohol as fuel was likely still a pipe dream.

Later 1998 as mentioned brought a Pact offensive into southern Germany against which NATO flung anything and everything available (burning up carefully hoarded supplies of fuel and ammo). The following counter-offensive to drive back the PACT units would have pretty much exhausted the supplies. At the end of the year, there's no supplies left (namely fuel) for reallocation of heavy equipment and the manpower basically puts down roots where they ceased fighting.

1999 is a year of rebuilding the expended stockpiles. It's also a time where the full realisation that help from home isn't coming really bites. A commander at any level isn't going to assist the various Theatre, Army even Divisional and Brigade commanders by handing over what they have managed to hang onto for so long without a fight. This isn't to say reorganisation wouldn't occur, just that there would have to be a lot of negotiations and politics would play a big role ("I'll hand over my last M60 tank if you give me 25 TOW missiles and an M-901A1 in return").

What it all boils down to though is fuel and communications. Without fuel, it's impossible to shift anything. Without effective communications and command structure, it's impossible to organise...

[Adm.Lee]

Repeating the bit about command structures, training effective staffs and leaders is one of the hardest and most time-consuming elements of creating an army. Why throw away all those effective HQs? Now, I'm betting some of them go away, as some intermediate level HQs are folded into other structures. Maybe there aren't platoons in the companies, or squads in the platoons?

The flip side to this is that if I am a corps commander with three weak divisions, I have three (presumably) effective subordinates who can control their own portion of the field for me. If I concentrate them all into one division, I've probably still got the same area of operations, so I have to parcel it out into three brigade sectors, with the same number of troops. I haven't been able to concentrate anything at all.

That said, I'd be a supporter of the concept of concentrating some assets like artillery and armor. Say, in a given division, locating all of the remaining tanks in one battalion/regiment/brigade, to simplify the maintenance and control, as well as to concentrate for battlefield effect.

[James Langham]

Originally Posted by raketenjagdpanzer

This is one that always made me go hmm...

There's instances of US tank divisions that consist of 2500 men and 30 vehicles (which can be TOW equipped humvees, M109 SP guns, M60s, captured PT-76's, etc. etc.; it's never really specified, is it?), or infantry divisions of 900 men and no vehicles (or worse yet armored divisions with no vehicles, etc.)

Why wouldn't (what was left of) theater command just regroup all of the units under a single prewar divisional size broken down into brigades, companies, platoons etc.

It would seem to make a hell of a lot more sense than the piecemeal units scattered hither and yon.

Of course I understand that after the failed summer offensive a lot of those units are scattered for a reason, and it's not like you can just pick up the satellite phone and ring up Brussels for guidance, or check the GPS to locate those other scattered units!

But really, if you assume a couple of things: one that OpOrd Omega doesn't go down until after Christmas or later and that two whatever orders DO come down from MilGov and CivGov don't conflict, I can't see a reason why you wouldn't just reform under a divisional banner.

Just say: Okay, this is now the 999th Armored Division, create your TO&E based on what you do have, refuse your ranks, base out of a surviving POMCUS location (or REFORGER location, maybe Bremen) to keep a supply line going and put an end to the Mad Max stuff before it starts.

Assuming that it worked, and that likewise you could build a German Panzergrenadier division...I mean, that's two full-strength divisions. Real divisions, too, not 6 tanks here, 10 APCs there, etc.

In a British context the morale effects of rebadging everybody would be massive. In the UK there is an immense tribal loyalty to units.

There is also the factor of inertia. Until someone higher up organises, nobody at a lower level will action.