The Tiger squeak and other shortages

[Sanjuro]

When the US entered WW2, the USAF planned to cripple German war production by targetting key components- notably, ball-bearing production.
While these attacks were eventually successful (albeit at a horrific cost), many German products were simply built without ball-bearings, accepting the shorter service life this would bring. This in turn explains the characteristic squeak of approaching Tiger tanks in every WW2 movie!
Are there any other components which, while their loss might seem to be a show-stopper, can be done without in the short to medium term?

[HorseSoldier]

Interesting question.

I've also read accounts from late in the war where the Germans had a shortage of lug nuts for wheels. So in some cases, they just issued trucks without the normal (and safe) number of lug nuts, and the end users would have to keep speeds below some number and stop every 20 km or so to tighten up the lug nuts they did have on the vehicle.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Sanjuro

This in turn explains the characteristic squeak of approaching Tiger tanks in every WW2 movie!

Groan!

Every tank, regardless of when or who produces it, creaks, squeaks, groans. Ball-bearings, or the lack thereof, are not built into tank tracks.

[Grimace]

Yeah, I was under the impression that tank "squeak" came from a combination of either "live" or "dead" return track and what sort of material was stuck in the wheels. Get mud/dust in the wheels and you'll get squeak.

As far as other things that might seem to be a show stopper....it all depends on the development of synthetics. Hydraulics, rubber...that sort of thing that might be able to have a synthetic alternative might be something that would qualify as a potential show-stopper.

[dragoon500ly]

It all boils down to oil and oil refineries...if you don't have either then you have no capacity to make war, produce most of what makes the 20th/21st Centuries go.

USAAF bombed the ball bearing plants to pieces, the Germans simply decentralized and went under ground. Even the Strategic Bombing Survey stated that going after ball bearings caused needless losses for little gain. But after Ike finally convinced 8th Air Force/Bomber Command to go after the oil fields and refineries, it crippled Germany on so many levels. At one point Hitler ordered all of the 1944 potato crop in order to make alky-based fuel for the Wehrmacht, part of the reason for the famine of 1945.

[Adm.Lee]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

USAAF bombed the ball bearing plants to pieces, the Germans simply decentralized and went under ground. Even the Strategic Bombing Survey stated that going after ball bearings caused needless losses for little gain.

That's even a bit optimistic, from what I've read.

But after Ike finally convinced 8th Air Force/Bomber Command to go after the oil fields and refineries, it crippled Germany on so many levels. At one point Hitler ordered all of the 1944 potato crop in order to make alky-based fuel for the Wehrmacht, part of the reason for the famine of 1945.

Oil was always on the list, it was just that it was much better defended, and harder to get to.

As I read it, the real keystones that collapsed the German war machine was the transportation infrastructure and power grid. Once the fighters were turned loose on the railnet and the Rhine River barges (used to move coal and iron ore to the Ruhr) were attacked, that's when the wheels came off. To avoid the factories getting bombed, the Germans dispersed them. That came back to bite them when the rail & barge net went down, and whatever pieces couldn't be assembled.

Modern bombing analysis has found that the power grid is an easy soft-kill, as the Serbs and Iraqis found out in the 1990s.

A really good book on this is Stephen Budiansky, Air Power. In there, it's related that the easiest-attacked link in the supply chain is between factory and supply depot, not depot to unit or at the factory. Of course, wars are always different, as this is why the USAF spent a lot of time working over the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Adm.Lee

As I read it, the real keystones that collapsed the German war machine was the transportation infrastructure and power grid. Once the fighters were turned loose on the railnet and the Rhine River barges (used to move coal and iron ore to the Ruhr) were attacked, that's when the wheels came off. To avoid the factories getting bombed, the Germans dispersed them. That came back to bite them when the rail & barge net went down, and whatever pieces couldn't be assembled.

Modern bombing analysis has found that the power grid is an easy soft-kill, as the Serbs and Iraqis found out in the 1990s.

A really good book on this is Stephen Budiansky, Air Power. In there, it's related that the easiest-attacked link in the supply chain is between factory and supply depot, not depot to unit or at the factory. Of course, wars are always different, as this is why the USAF spent a lot of time working over the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Never said going after oil would not be easy...but going after the refineries, the storage depots and yes even the trains and barges hauling the stuff (not to mention the coal) had a dramatic effect on the Nazi war machine.

The failure of the Allied bombing campaign lay in the stuipid, silly and out right lunatic pre-war ideas on the conduct of strategic bombing. "The bombers will always get through", "speed is safety", "no fighter can stop a well armed heavy bomber", "bombing the cities will end the war"....

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by Adm.Lee

That's even a bit optimistic, from what I've read.



Oil was always on the list, it was just that it was much better defended, and harder to get to.

As I read it, the real keystones that collapsed the German war machine was the transportation infrastructure and power grid. Once the fighters were turned loose on the railnet and the Rhine River barges (used to move coal and iron ore to the Ruhr) were attacked, that's when the wheels came off. To avoid the factories getting bombed, the Germans dispersed them. That came back to bite them when the rail & barge net went down, and whatever pieces couldn't be assembled.

Modern bombing analysis has found that the power grid is an easy soft-kill, as the Serbs and Iraqis found out in the 1990s.

A really good book on this is Stephen Budiansky, Air Power. In there, it's related that the easiest-attacked link in the supply chain is between factory and supply depot, not depot to unit or at the factory. Of course, wars are always different, as this is why the USAF spent a lot of time working over the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Dispite the tonnage of bombs dropped on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, they still manage to get fair amount of supplies through to the troops they were supporting.