Just how much hurt Soviet Artillery will bring to bear....

[dragoon500ly]

Going through a copy of FM 100-2-1 Soviet Army Operations and Tactics and found a table that may be of interest...

Norms governing ammunition expenditure for the destruction or suppression of stationary, unobserved targets at ranges of 10km or less.

Fire coverage is calculated in number of rounds per hectare (a hectare is 10,000 square meters, the equivalent of 2.47 acres).

Target is a battery of SP howitzers, effect is target destruction; rounds fired:
122mm = 450; 130mm = 360; 152mm = 270; 203mm = 120; 120mm mortar = 450; 160mm mortar = 220; 240mm mortar = 120; 122mm MRL = 560

Target is battery of towed artillery in dug-in positions, effect is target suppression; rounds fired: 122mm = 240; 130mm = 220; 152mm = 180; 203mm = 100; 120mm mortar = 240; 160mm mortar = 160; 240mm mortar = 100l 122mm MRL = 400

Target is dug-in troops & weapons, tanks, IFVs & APCs in hasty prepared positions, effect is target suppression; rounds fired: 122mm = 150; 130mm = 150; 152mm = 110; 203mm = 45; 120mm mortar = 140; 160mm mortar = 85; 240mm mortar = 45; 122mm MRL = 240

target suppression has a high probability (90%+) that 25-30% of the elements in the target group or no longer combat effective and/or that 25-30% of the elements in the target area.

target destruction has a high probability (90%+) that at least 50% of the target area has been destroyed or rendered combat ineffective.

The above examples are based on number of rounds fired by a battalion and should be read as a battalion of 122mm OR a battalion of 130mm....any target that would require eight battalions worth of artillery, mortar and MRL would also be a likely target for a tacnuke.

[dragoon500ly]

There are a couple of terms floating around in describing the Soviet organization of artillery for wartime missions. Source is FM 100-2-1 Soviet Operations and Tactics.

Army Artillery Group (AAG): Front artillery assets are normally allocated among committed armies, proportionate to the importance of the assigned tasks. When an army commander receives front artillery assets, he decides, based on his concept of the operation, what artillery will be allocated to his first echelon divisions. Any remaining artillery formations would then be formed into the AAG and charged with the counterbattery role for the army.

Division Artillery Group (DAG): The division commander also allocates artillery, resulting in the formation of the DAG and several RAGs. The division may also organize more than one DAG if necessary, due to span of control, number of battalions and assigned missions. The DAG varies in size from two to four battalions and is employed in general support of the division. The DAG also assists the AAG with the counterbattery mission.

Regimental Artillery Group (RAG): RAGs are formed from organic and attached artillery and reinforcing nondivisional artillery battalions assigned to provide support to the first echelon regiments. RAGS are normally made up from two to four battalions. RAGs are responsible for the engagement of targets that hinder the advance of the attacking force. In addition, a battalion or battery from the RAG may be assigned to direct support of a specific battalion.

[dragoon500ly]

Source is FM 100-2-3 Soviet Troops, Organization and Equipment

A Soviet Front consists of a headquarters, several subordinate armies and supporting elements. A typical front will have 3-4 combined arms armies and 1-2 tank armies assigned.

Artillery support assigned to the front comes in the form of an artillery division and an attached heavy artillery brigade (from RVGK-Reserve of Supreme High Command).

The artillery division consists of 2 gun regts/bdes, 2 how regts/bdes, 1-2 antitank regts/bdes and a MRL brigade, in addition, these units may be made up of either 18-gun bns or 24-gun battalions, resulting in the following equipment totals:

130mm Field Guns M-46 or 152mm Field Guns M-1976 or 152mm SP Guns 2S5:
Regiment: 108-144
Brigade: 144-192
152mm Howitzer D-20 or 152mm SP Howitzer 2S3:
Regiment: 108-144
Brigade: 144-192
100mm Antitank Gun T-12/MT-12 or 125mm Antitank Gun:
Regiment: 36
Brigade: 48
ATGM Launcher Vehicle, BRDM-2/AT-3 or BRDM-2/AT-5
Regiment: 27
Brigade: 36
122mm MRL, BM-21 or 220 MRL, BM-27:
Brigade: 72

The Heavy Artillery Brigade consists of 2 battalions of heavy artillery and 2 battalions of heavy mortars, resulting in the following equipment totals:

203mm Howitzer B-4M or 203mm SP Gun M-1975: 24
240mm Mortar M-204 or 240mm SP Mortar M-1975: 24

The Combined Arms Army artillery assets consists of a Artillery Regiment/Brigade and a MRL Regiment. The Tank Army normally has no additional artillery attached, although (depending on its mission) it may have a artillery regiment and a MRL regiment attached.

The Artillery Regiment consists of 2 gun and 1 howitzer battalions, the Artillery brigade consists of 2 gun and 2 howitzer battalions. Like the artillery divisions, 18 and 24-tube battalions are available, resulting in the following equipment:
130mm Field Gun M-46 or 152mm Field Gun M-1976 or 152mm SP Gun 2S5:
Regiment: 36-48
Brigade: 36-48
152mm Howitzer D-20 or 152mm SP Howitzer 2S3: 18-24 or 36-48

The MRL Regiment consists of 3 MRL battalions, equipped as follows:
122mm MRL BM-21 or 220mm MRL BM-27: 54

The combined arms army consists of 2-4 Motor Rifle Divisions and 1-2 Tank Divisions. A Tank Army consists of 2-4 Tank Divisions and 1-2 Motor Rifle Divisions.

The Motor Rifle/Tank Division has an Artillery Regiment, consisting of 2 towed and 1 SP howitzer battalions and a MRL battalion.

The towed howitzer battalions each consist of 18 122mm Howitzer D-30.

The SP howitzer battalion consists of 18 152mm SP Howitzer 2S3.

The MRL battalion consists of 18 122mm MRL BM-21

The Motor Rifle Division also has 1 BMP and 2 BTR-equipped Motor Rifle and 1 Tank Regiments, each has a organic howitzer battalion. The BMP/Tank battalions have each 18 122mm SP Howitzers 2S1, the BTR battalions each have 18 122mm Howitzer D-30.

The Tank Division has 3 Tank and 1 BMP regiments, each with an organiz battalion of 18 122mm SP Howitzer 2S1.

There is a saying in the Red Army, that the only God it worships is Artillery and as you can see from the above, it posses a lot of Artillery!

[schnickelfritz]

The questions that come to my mind are:
1) This seems like a huge requirement for ammunition; could ammunition useage of this scale be sustained for more than a few weeks?
2) What would the effect of US/Allied/NATO counterbattery fire and aerial interdiction on firing positions and fire control?
3) What would the effect of said interdiction on supply lines be?
4) Wear and tear on gun tubes, especially on lower-echelon formations?
5) The effect of the needs of the China campaign on pact artillery and ammunition supplies?

My guess is that for the above reasons, artillery fire on this scale would only occur for the first few weeks of the war with any regularity, and then be restricted to important engagements therafter until ammo and replacement parts dwindle after TDM.

Most of the fiction that I've ever seen (Harold Coyle, Clancy, etc) seems to paint a picture that despite heavy losses, NATO is able to make a significant impact interdicting Pact artillery and supplies from the air. What I get is that for the first year or so, towed artillery in Europe is generally useless...things are so fluid and counterbattery/interdiction so effective that losses amongst towed pact artillery will eventually render them ineffective. Then, as the war enters 1998, towed artillery makes a significant comeback on both sides.

Firing 20+ rounds per gun tube in a battalion seems like an open invitation for MLRS units to "rain your grid square." That seems like a very bad day to me, although I'd really be interested to see what the post-strike images would look like...my guess is like a charred junkyard.

I'd think that strikes like these would take several minutes to complete, making it likely that counterbattery of a variety of forms would occur.

With all that said, I'd sure not like to be on the receiving end of any of this!

Thanks-
Dave

[DCausey]

Dave brought up the questions I had pretty much. I was especially going to ask about the possible effects of the war in China and about NATO air interdiction.

I'm looking forwards to seeing more people weigh in on this subject.

- DaveC

[Adm.Lee]

Originally Posted by schnickelfritz

Firing 20+ rounds per gun tube in a battalion seems like an open invitation for MLRS units to "rain your grid square." That seems like a very bad day to me, although I'd really be interested to see what the post-strike images would look like...my guess is like a charred junkyard.

I'd think that strikes like these would take several minutes to complete, making it likely that counterbattery of a variety of forms would occur.

IMO, the Soviets are fiendish enough to have their own counter-counterbattery held ready to see if any NATO guns shoot back. Also, artillery batteries are the primary target of "forward detachments" and a tertiary target of Spetsnaz teams.

There is a saying in the Red Army, that the only God it worships is Artillery and as you can see from the above, it posses a lot of Artillery!

Suvorov brought that home to me by pointing out that a motor rifle regiment has 9 companies of mechanized infantry, but 10 batteries of artillery (including mortars and rockets).

I've just been looking at two of my old WW3 games (GDW's Third World War and VG's NATO), and noting again, that neither side's corps or army level artillery assets are represented. I think they do Not cancel each other out.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by schnickelfritz

The questions that come to my mind are:
1) This seems like a huge requirement for ammunition; could ammunition useage of this scale be sustained for more than a few weeks?
2) What would the effect of US/Allied/NATO counterbattery fire and aerial interdiction on firing positions and fire control?
3) What would the effect of said interdiction on supply lines be?
4) Wear and tear on gun tubes, especially on lower-echelon formations?
5) The effect of the needs of the China campaign on pact artillery and ammunition supplies?

My guess is that for the above reasons, artillery fire on this scale would only occur for the first few weeks of the war with any regularity, and then be restricted to important engagements therafter until ammo and replacement parts dwindle after TDM.

Most of the fiction that I've ever seen (Harold Coyle, Clancy, etc) seems to paint a picture that despite heavy losses, NATO is able to make a significant impact interdicting Pact artillery and supplies from the air. What I get is that for the first year or so, towed artillery in Europe is generally useless...things are so fluid and counterbattery/interdiction so effective that losses amongst towed pact artillery will eventually render them ineffective. Then, as the war enters 1998, towed artillery makes a significant comeback on both sides.

Firing 20+ rounds per gun tube in a battalion seems like an open invitation for MLRS units to "rain your grid square." That seems like a very bad day to me, although I'd really be interested to see what the post-strike images would look like...my guess is like a charred junkyard.

I'd think that strikes like these would take several minutes to complete, making it likely that counterbattery of a variety of forms would occur.

With all that said, I'd sure not like to be on the receiving end of any of this!

Thanks-
Dave

To be sure, the ammo counts are very heavy, but the first example represents an all out attempt to destroy an battery of SPs dispersed in their firing position, its unobserved, and is targeting a hectare of ground, this would be the sort of mission called on a battery that is in a position to interdict an attacking regiment. According to their doctrine, this target would require the maximum effort from at least 1 RAG, and more likely to be hit with a RAG/DAG.

The target suppression examples are not much different from US Army Artillery doctrine, at least when firing HE. Switching to ICM/DPICM should drop the ammo requirements by roughly a third.

As to just how much ammo is stockpiled, I've never seen any firm lists on any sort of count beyond 120 days stockpile....as has been mentioned by a variety of authors, modern ammo usage is much, much higher than pre-war planning takes into account.

NATO doesn't field as many artillery tubes as the WP does, and every battery committed to counterbattery, is that much less support for the troops. This is the real reason beyond the development of "shoot-n-scoot" as well as the increasing computerization of the FDCs, all of it designed to enable NATO to put as many rounds as possible, on target, in the shortest possible time.

[dragoon500ly]

A unit of fire is (ROFLMAO!) the planned expenditure of rounds for one tube for one day of combat. Here are the units of fire for the Soviet artillery.

122mm Howitzer D-30 = 80rds
122mm SP Howitzer 2S1 = 80rds
130mm Field Gun M-46 = 80rds
152mm Howitzer D-20 = 60rds
152mm SP Howitzer 2S3 = 60rds
152mm Field Gun M-1976 = 60rds
152mm SP Gun 2S5 = 60rds
203mm Howitzer B-4M = 40rds
203mm SP Gun M-1975 = 40rds
82mm Mortar M-1937 = 120rds
120mm Mortar M-1943 = 80rds
160mm Mortar M-160 = 60rds
240mm Mortar M-240 = 40rds
240mm SP Mortar M-1975 = 40rds
122mm MRL BM-21 = 120rds
140mm MRL BM-14-16 = 48rds
140mm MRL BM-14-17 = 51rds
140mm MRL RPU-14 = 48rds
220mm MRL BM-27 = 32rds

[95th Rifleman]

Allot has been made of NATO avation and it being used to interdict soviet artillery.

I think this is being overestimated. NATO had a qualitive advantage over the WP in almost all areas but one of the few things the Soviets had the edge in was ADA.

I think NATO aircraft would soon find artillery interdiction missions to be near-suicidal when they walk into the superior ADA systems defending them.

[dragoon500ly]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature...&v=dgB0XGV_xZc

[Webstral]

The above link goes to 57mm ADA guns firing. Still, it's easy enough to find BM-21 footage.

I’ve always felt that the US pays too little attention to MRL. The MLRS is a fine system, but there aren’t enough launchers. A division commander should have a full battalion of these bad boys at his beck and call. I can’t remember where I when I read that on average it takes an infantryman 30 seconds to find adequate cover. Once he’s under cover, the radius at which a given round causes casualties decreases dramatically, since concussion becomes the problem for the rifleman. Sustained fire is a thing of the past. Therefore, if one wishes to take out targets of opportunity, a large number of rounds need to arrive in a short period of time. Light mortars and MRL are the weapons of choice for this.

[raketenjagdpanzer]

Originally Posted by Webstral

The above link goes to 57mm ADA guns firing. Still, it's easy enough to find BM-21 footage.

I’ve always felt that the US pays too little attention to MRL. The MLRS is a fine system, but there aren’t enough launchers. A division commander should have a full battalion of these bad boys at his beck and call. I can’t remember where I when I read that on average it takes an infantryman 30 seconds to find adequate cover. Once he’s under cover, the radius at which a given round causes casualties decreases dramatically, since concussion becomes the problem for the rifleman. Sustained fire is a thing of the past. Therefore, if one wishes to take out targets of opportunity, a large number of rounds need to arrive in a short period of time. Light mortars and MRL are the weapons of choice for this.

Well, there's the truck-mounted one they have now. The HiMARS I believe it is?

EDIT :Yeah, HIMARS