Summer 2000 [Poland] Offensive Revisited

[Raellus]

I know we've discussed this topic quite a bit here, but the discussion has been scattered amongst various threads and I thought it might be a good idea to dedicate a thread solely to this issue. I would also like to present a new take on the strategic thinking behind Summer 2000 offensive.

I've been studying the [American] Vietnam War quite a bit lately and my understanding of this conflict has significantly coloured my interpretation of events in Europe of the v1.0 Twilight 2000 timeline. The invasion of Cambodia in 1970 especially influenced my thinking. After campaigning behind a promise of securing "Peace with Honor" and his later "Vietnamization" initiative, Nixon was looking to strengthen the U.S./RVN hand prior to an eventual U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam. I've taken this strategic thinking and applied it to the U.S.' position in Poland, c. 2000.

This alternative explanation presupposes that U.S. MilGov was already seriously considering (if not actively planning) to pull the bulk of its forces out of Europe in the fall of 2000 prior to the Summer 2000 offensive.


Summer 2000 [Poland] Offensive Revisited

By the early spring of 2000, it was clear to the JCS that the war in Europe had reached a stalemate- neither side appeared to be strong enough to achieve a decisive strategic victory in Europe and American troops were needed elsewhere, where decisive results were thought possible. Furthermore, field reports were revealing an alarming dip in morale amongst the troops in Europe- cantonment life was proving quite frustrating to some. The endless cycle of garrison duty, patrols, raids, and counteraids was wearing on a lot of the troops. Many field commanders believed that a large-scale offensive would inject some fighting spirit and lift morale, preventing any large-scale mutinies and making the news of an impending large-scale withdrawal from Europe in the fall of 2000 easier to stomach.

It was decided at this time to pursue "Peace with Honor" (a term coined by former President Richard Nixon during the later years of the Vietnam War) in Europe, immediately prior to withdrawing the bulk of American troops back to CONUS for domestic use or redeployment elsewhere overseas (the Middle East or Korea). To claim "Peace with Honor" would require a clear-cut military victory on the decisive front of the European theatre of operations, Poland. Feelers were put out to America's NATO allies, especially Germany. Germany, suffering from serious war fatigue, was found to be quite ammenable to the idea of a U.S. pullout, despite some innitial relservations. When the JCS sweetened the pot by offering Germany a significant quantity of American heavy weapons and equipment, the German government quickly acquiesced. This hand was strengthened when contacts in the pro-Western Polish Free Congress reported that several high-ranking officers in several significant Polish military units were strongly considering either turning coats or, at the bare minimum, refusing to fight attacking American and German units. The case for a large-scale summer NATO offensive in Poland would never be stronger.

The elephant in the room was the possibility that a large-scale, successful NATO offensive in Europe would result in the Soviets unleashing its remaining tactical nuclear weapons, and, in a chilling worst-case scenario, launching a final, strategic gotterdammerung. DIA operatives in Soviet-controlled territory present reassuring reports indicating that the Soviet leadership would be unwilling to use its remaining nuclear arsenal so long as the fighting remained west of the Vistula.

Joint planning began to launch a large scale U.S.-German raid into WTO-held territory in the early summer of 2000. This raid would seriously disrupt WTO military capabilities and logistical capacities and would, if successful, give the appearance of a resounding U.S. military victory. U.S. MilGov could thenceforth claim to be leaving Europe on its own terms, thereby allaying the appearance of having retreated from the European continent with its tail between its legs.

In effect, the essential concept for the offensive was basically that of a massive spoiling attack. If successful, any potential WTO offensive operations would certainly be put off until the spring of 2001. In the interim, Germany would reorganize and strengthen its forces and diplomatic attempts would be made to secure an armistice with the Soviets.

As history would have it, the plan fell apart when a carefully masked Soviet/WTO summer offensive smashed into the spearheads of the NATO one. It was later discovered that NATO's PFC contacts had overstated their case, as had DIA agents working in Soviet-controlled territory. The ensuing battles would seriously weaken the Soviet military in Poland, leading to an eventual Soviet withdrawal from Poland.

[Legbreaker]

I think the "honour" idea just doesn't work in T2K.
By 2000 nobody is going to care any more. There's no longer any allies to try impressing, the people at home don't have a clue about what's happening over the next hill, let alone care about Europe because they're too busy trying to survive, and for the soldiers themselves there's not a lot of meaning left either - they're even serving in units alongside former enemies.

A comparison to Vietnam doesn't work either - Vietnam was a war of public relations and the media. T2K doesn't have very much of either left.
Diplomacy no longer has any meaning by 2000. There's no governments left, at least none that are all that relevant any more. The new power is in the hands of the Generals and petty kingdoms that have sprung up everywhere. Not too many of them are going to care for an instant about a diplomatic "solution".

[Targan]

Some of those points may be true, Leg, but it's also likely that in the face of such a global disaster the generals who are left in charge may not adapt their thinking to the new state of affairs as quickly as might be hoped. They are, after all, heavily institutionalised (and mostly fairly old) men. They may, for the first few years of the global collapse, be locked into ways of thinking that are no longer 100% appropriate for the Twilight War new reality.

[Panther Al]

Originally Posted by Targan

Some of those points may be true, Leg, but it's also likely that in the face of such a global disaster the generals who are left in charge may not adapt their thinking to the new state of affairs as quickly as might be hoped. They are, after all, heavily institutionalised (and mostly fairly old) men. They may, for the first few years of the global collapse, be locked into ways of thinking that are no longer 100% appropriate for the Twilight War new reality.

Or they may be thinking to the future as well. After all, it might not matter *now*, but 15, 30 years down the road when all the vets are older and in positions of power and influence, the last thing anyone wants is a nationwide sense of "We got to get them, those stinking commies can't be left alone thinking they beat us" mentality mucking things up and setting the stage for another go around.

After all, a good General Staff will look at the near, short, and *long* term effects of the choices they make - and plan accordingly.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

I think the "honour" idea just doesn't work in T2K.
By 2000 nobody is going to care any more. There's no longer any allies to try impressing, the people at home don't have a clue about what's happening over the next hill, let alone care about Europe because they're too busy trying to survive, and for the soldiers themselves there's not a lot of meaning left either - they're even serving in units alongside former enemies.

A comparison to Vietnam doesn't work either - Vietnam was a war of public relations and the media. T2K doesn't have very much of either left.
Diplomacy no longer has any meaning by 2000. There's no governments left, at least none that are all that relevant any more. The new power is in the hands of the Generals and petty kingdoms that have sprung up everywhere. Not too many of them are going to care for an instant about a diplomatic "solution".

Don't get too hung up on the political and PR aspects of the plan or assume that what I've proposed is a mirror image of the Vietnam situation.

I was looking at the summer offensive as being more of a psychological sop for the JCS and senior brass in Europe. Leaving Poland without a big victory to clean the palette would leave a sour taste in a lot of soldiers' mouths. The spectre of Vietnam and the psychological beating the military took both in Vietnam and at home in the States has still not quite been forgotten by the military establishment, even today. Returning home as losers would not sit well and the senior brass may have feared what would happen when the troops got home if they weren't feeling good about themselves and what they'd done in Europe.

In addition, the political side I was trying to emphasize (and apparently did a crummy job at) was the bit about the U.S. trying to convice Germany that an American withdrawal was in everyone's best interest. I think this would be a lot easier by guaranteeing the delivery of a crippling blow to the Soviet military in Poland before such a withdrawal would take place. Throwing in all of their heavy gear as part of the arrangement would only sweeten the pot. The U.S. would need the Germans' cooperation to pull it off. I can't see a "we're leaving now; good luck with the half-million Red Army troops hanging around on your doorstep..." approach going over very well with the Germans either.

Also, if MilGov pulled the troops out with nothing to show for it, CigGov could use it as a propaganda coup at home or in appealing to military units whose leadership was on the fence regarding MilGov and CivGov. No, the media and domestic communications networks are in very bad shape c.2000 but I'm sure that both political factions would be slagging their rivals at every opportunity in order to win public support or look more legitimate.

Militarily, I think the parallels between Poland in the summer of 2000 and S.E. Asia in 1970 are there. The idea behind the Cambodian invasion was to disrupt NVA supply networks running through Cambodia to disrupt and delay any future NVA offensive operations vs. the RVN., with an eye on a future U.S. pull-out from South Vietnam. I think this applies equally well to Poland- a strong attack on Soviet/WTO forces in western and central Polands to disrupt/delay any near-future Soviet offensive operations vs. Germany, giving the Germans time to find their own feet and adapt to the absence of strong American forces.

I think taken all together, it's a reasonably plausible scenario but thanks for your feedback.

[B.T.]

Rae, I have a question here:

If the high ranking officers and the General-staffs know about the idea to leave Europe in the near future, would those ideas be communicated to the lower ranks? And if not: I can imagine, that at least some rumours may occur amongst the troops.

Do you think, the American forces in Europe would do a good job on their "Poland Summer Tour", or would, at least a major part of the units, try to avoid sincere fighting. If the soldiers know about the plan to withdraw the troops from Europe, I can imagine, that a lot of individuals (and even some of the higher rankig officers) try to:
1. survive and
2. try to keep the troops in shape for the return to the American Civil War. And that means: If I (General XY) perform well in the raid into Poland, I might loose a lot of my battle-experienced veterans, who could be a high valued asset, when I come back to the States (where I might end up as one of the movers, and may become a lot more influential!).

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by B.T.

Rae, I have a question here:

If the high ranking officers and the General-staffs know about the idea to leave Europe in the near future, would those ideas be communicated to the lower ranks? And if not: I can imagine, that at least some rumours may occur amongst the troops.

Do you think, the American forces in Europe would do a good job on their "Poland Summer Tour", or would, at least a major part of the units, try to avoid sincere fighting. If the soldiers know about the plan to withdraw the troops from Europe, I can imagine, that a lot of individuals (and even some of the higher rankig officers) try to:
1. survive and
2. try to keep the troops in shape for the return to the American Civil War. And that means: If I (General XY) perform well in the raid into Poland, I might loose a lot of my battle-experienced veterans, who could be a high valued asset, when I come back to the States (where I might end up as one of the movers, and may become a lot more influential!).

Those are some really good questions, B.T.

I'm not sure if word would be passed down to the troops. Perhaps. I've heard from quite a few veterans of the '70 Cambodia operation who were really happy to be finally going after the NVA, even though most folks at the time were taking Nixon's promises of a an American withdrawal from Vietnam in the not-so-distant future pretty seriously. By most accounts, the American troops that took part in the invasion performed quite well. We're talking about a good percentage of these troops being draftees fighting in a war at the apex of its unpopularity back home. In one incident, an American unit was only 5-10km from a major NVA HQ area but were told to stop short of this high-value target so as not to cross over an invisible stop line Nixon threw in after the invasion kicked off due to public outcry over what most Americans saw as an escalation in a war he'd promised to wind down. Most of the troops were still raring to go, despite the risks such aggressiveness usually entails.

I'm sure that a lot of American soldiers in Poland wouldn't be too keen on risking their lives in what would likely be America's last big battle in Poland, but I also think the majority would fight hard when asked. In a lot of cases, I think an offensive operation would actually be welcome to most of the troops. Many of them would have been sitting in cantonments since the previous summer. If met with initial success, I think enthusiasm would grow. There's a kind of euphoria that occurs when an army starts pushing forward again after a long stalemate. I think of the Allied breakout from Normandy, or the Soviet Bagration offensive in the summer of '44. In every account I've read, soldiers were happy to be on the move, pushing back their enemies.

I think that when given the option of sitting around in a firebase getting pecked to death by little raids and random rocketing, and being out in the field trying to take it to the enemy, the majority of troops would pick the latter. Yes, you'd lose some experienced troops, but, the lift in morale among the survivors (also, by now, experienced troops) would hopefully carry over back to the States. The alternative would be to return with a downtrodden group, one more likely to succumb to large scale desertions and perhaps even mutinies.

[Targan]

I can't point to any specific text but my impression from the Going Home module is that the planned withdrawal of US troops from Europe was not known of by the general US soldiery prior to the 2000 NATO summer offensive. And that makes sense in a whole lot of ways. Such a plan would have been highly sensitive, both politically and militarilly. Leaks would have occurred but the specifics and the levels of accuracy of the rumors would have degraded the further from the source they became.