Collected Works of the DC Group

[chico20854]

CStock88 (and many of the other new members here) may not know what a bunch of use based in DC have been working on for the v1 timeline over the past couple years.

But first, the inspiration for this effort was Webstral's "The Storm in Germany" series. Antenna maintains a consolidated collection of this work at http://www.ludd.ltu.se/~antenna/webs...y_webstral.pdf

From this effort, we set out to flesh out many of the skeletal elements of the v1 timeline. Our goal is to issue several new background modules - an improved US Army Vehicle Guide, NATO Vehicle Guide and Soviet Vehicle Guide, a Survivor's Guide to the USA (that replaces Howling Wilderness), and a new Warsaw Pact Vehicle Guide (incorporating the non-Soviet Pact armies) and a new US Maritime Guide (the US Navy and Marine Corps) - using the vast amount of information that has been declassified since the Cold War or made available over the internet. As amateurs, we have the freedom of unlimited time to keep writing and researching, without hard deadlines and a need for this effort to feed our families. An additional resource, of course, is this group, which has been discussing many elements of the timeline for years.

Given the scale of a WWIII and the level of detail available, we decided that writing up unit histories would best be done by wargaming much of the war in Europe (rather than a seat-of-the-pants approach). We decided to use GDW's Third World War wargame series for this effort and have described almost all of the NATO armies and much of the Pact in those terms. Attached to this post is the supplement to the Third World War rules we will be using. (The rest of the supporting files are in the Yahoo Third World War Group at http://games.groups.yahoo.com/group/ThirdWW_discussion/ )

My website, http://mysite.verizon.net/vzeedox4/index.html has many of the orbats we're using for this effort. It also has:
- the results of our first wargaming session, which used Harpoon 4 to model a US raid on Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, at the outbreak of the war (http://mysite.verizon.net/vzeedox4/cam_rahn_raid/);
- two documents laying out the strategy used by both the Pact and NATO in fighting the war at sea (http://mysite.verizon.net/vzeedox4/s...ilight_war.rtf and http://mysite.verizon.net/vzeedox4/s...ilight_war.doc);
- our first (and only) finished module, the Czechoslovak Vehicle Guide (at http://mysite.verizon.net/vzeedox4/s...icle_guide.pdf);
- a couple ship designs for GM's to use;
- "The Illustrated Guide to the Free City of Krakow" - tourist pictures of many of the sites mentioned in the module (http://mysite.verizon.net/vzeedox4/krakow.html), and
- a link page (that needs to be updated ) of other sites that we pull a lot of detail from.

Some of the other items we've written up are attached here. Others I will have to post as text, since they are too large to include as attachments. The items attached below are a history of the media during the war, a document on some more of the how and why of German reunification, a history of a US Air Force Cruise Missile Wing and a future history of the reconciliation between Civgov and Milgov.

Enjoy!

[chico20854]

and here's another couple documents, outlining Operation Carthaginian (the NATO invasion of Sicily) and one detailing the destruction of a Soviet Tank Division at the outbreak of war...

[chico20854]

here is a piece Flamingo developed on the US Army during the war:

Continued Build-up & Mobilization for War

The US Department of Defense during the Twilight War was composed of five distinct regular military services (and 7 separate reserve components); the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, all of which had recent combat and deployment experience in the 2nd Persian Gulf War (1990-1991). As a result of the lessons learned during that conflict, significant changes were made to the relationship between the reserve and active components, to better integrate the two for their wartime missions, and enhance the deployment of regular forces in times of crisis, while the reserve forces mobilized.

The Army
As a result of recent experience, it was decided to eliminate the National Guard round-out brigades in the 6th Infantry (Light), 10th Mountain (Light), and 24th Infantry (Mechanized) Divisions. In place of the National Guard Brigades, each division stood up a regular 3rd maneuver brigade, a process that had been completed by March 1995. Discussions were then underway to further eliminate roundout brigades in the 5th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions, but these were not undertaken due to fiscal considerations, and were put off for consideration by the defense appropriations committee for FY1997 (additionally, at that time there were no vehicles to equip said brigades without depleting the nations war reserve vehicles).

Additionally, each division in the army formed an engineer brigade as part of its organic complement. The divisional engineer brigade was formed by raising an additional combat engineer battalion and an assault bridging company in each division.

The National Guard brigades then released from assignment to regular formations were reclassified as separate brigades. Eventually, several would from the core of new divisions formed after the United States entered the War.

On the whole, modernization continued in the Army Reserve and National Guard. Retirement of the M48 & M60 series continued and these vehicles were placed in war reserve. The M113 family, many having been replaced in the active component, would continue to be utilized by the National Guard and Reserve, with two National Guard Infantry Divisions (28th & 42nd) converting to mechanized divisions with M113s and M60A4s cast off from the regular army (some units received the M60A3, with the intention of upgrading all M60s remaining in the inventory to the A4 standard).

Mobilization
Immediately following the invasion of China by the Soviet Union, the US Secretary of Defense enacted a stop-loss of all active component personnel and received presidential authorization to recall recently discharged personnel (those released from active duty in the preceding 180 days) back into the force. This served to make up personnel shortfalls in active component units, with priority to those assigned to PACOM, which went to a heightened state of alert following the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet War.

Additionally, PACOM deployed I Corps tactical headquarters from Ft. Lewis, WA, to South Korea, orders were given to IX Corps in Japan and III MEF in Okinawa to prepare to move to Korea on order, in response to the war going on nearby in Manchuria and correspondingly heightened tensions along the Korean DMZ.

As the Sino-Soviet War progressed it seemed from the western perspective that the Soviet Union was pursuing the wholesale collapse of the People’s Republic of China. Collapse of the PRC was not something the West was willing to accept as it would likely result in the transfer of enormous amounts of government debt securities (particularly US Government Securities) from the PRC to the USSR. The result of such a transfer could conceivably jeopardize the US (and as a result the whole Western) Economy. Consequently, the National Security Council advised the President of the United States to take the following actions to send a message to the leadership of the Soviet Union:

1. A Presidential Call-Up of 200,000 Reservists from all branches of the US military.
2. Reactivation of the Selective Service System, with an expansion of the Regular Army to 22 Divisions.
3. Deployment of the remainder of I Corps and III MEF to Korea.
4. Sales of military equipment to China must be paid by transfer of US Government Securities.

The Chinese, desperate for American military hardware, readily agreed to the transfer of the securities. As a consequence, there was a rapid correction in the Sino-American trade imbalance.

For political reasons, the President could only enact fully the first of the NSC’s recommendations. However, he wasn’t deaf to the need to show the Soviet Union that he would not allow US interests to be threatened. The Team Spirit 96 exercise in 1996 saw huge participation from US Forces (3rd Marine Division and 1 brigade each from 7th Infantry, 25th Infantry, and 82nd Airborne Divisions).

An additional compromise was the submission to Congress of the Reserve Selective Service Act, which would draft men into the reserve components of the military and provide massive education benefits (tuition waivers equivalent to home of record in-state public university tuition, complete student loan forgiveness if mobilized and deployed overseas), with the intention of fully staffing the authorized reserve component. Although it languished in Congress for several months, it was eventually passed in a closed session in April 1996, just prior to the start of the Leipzig uprising.

Finally, beginning in January 1996, the Army Reserve began its first steps towards mobilization, with the redesignation of the numbered Army Reserve Commands into Corps Headquarters. The Corps Headquarters were given direct control of reserve component units within their geographic areas, each corps then reported to their respective numbered armies.

Following the Leipzig Uprising, the US Congress in joint session declared a State of Emergency, allowing for a partial mobilization of US Forces. High priority reservists were recalled, and the USAR training divisions began to activate (to support BCT for the Reserve Draftees and to expand the training base to include facilities formally controlled by the National Guard). Mobilization of reserves now went beyond mobilizing only those forces which prewar planning had previously allotted to PACOM. With things heating up in Central Europe, those forces dedicated to the defense of Germany began to mobilize (some of which were the highest priority and best equipped units in the reserve structure). Advanced elements of CENTCOM also began deploying to bases in Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.

Full mobilization and a reintroduction of the active duty draft were announced on 10 October 1996, with the first inductees reporting 7 December 1996 for training (a publicity stunt, as most of that years available manpower had already been inducted as part of the Reserve Selective Service System and would be released to their units upon completion of initial entry training, and would be mobilized). Those found unfit for federal service were often relegated to the State Defense Force of their home state (the federal government funneled money to the states through FEMA to support the establishment and maintenance of the State Militias as part of the National Emergency Supplemental Funding Act of 1996). All remaining Reserve and National Guard units were brought into Federal Service, along with the State Defense Forces of Hawaii, and Alaska (Federal Law prohibits their induction into the Army, but federal control is allowed provided the units do not deploy outside their home state).

With the entry of the Bundeswehr into the DDR, all forward deployed army units in Europe went on their highest state of alert. 7th Army immediately moved its component units to their General Defense Plan (GDP) positions. Immediately, as prewar planning dictated, an air bridge was established between North America and Europe by activation of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet and CONUS based units dedicated to the defense of Germany were rapidly moved to Europe where they drew pre-positioned equipment and immediately moved into their own GDP positions.

With the November 1996 invasion of Norway by the Soviet Union, American and Soviet forces entered direct combat against each other for the first time. Initially, it was hoped that this direct conflict between the two superpowers could be contained to Scandinavia, however, as the campaign in Norway and its surrounding waters ground on, it escalated as well. After several weeks of intense but localized fighting and repeated demands that the Soviet Forces withdraw from Norwegian territory, the American president had had enough and ordered American forces in Germany forward to assist the Bundeswehr and NVA in ejecting the GSFG and WP forces from the DDR.

On December 10, 1996 the President addressed the nation on national television, confirming that American, British and Canadian troops had entered into combat against Warsaw Pact Troops in both Germany and Norway as a direct result of the Soviet Union’s invasion of Norway. Further he announced the “Total Mobilization of our nation’s strength to repel naked and unprovoked Soviet aggression.”

[chico20854]

part 2...

Wartime Initial Entry Training Centers of the US Army

• Ft. Benning, GA (Infantry One Station Unit Training) Infantry Training Brigade, 122nd Regiment (RTI)
• Ft. Belvoir, VA (Engineer One Station Unit Training) 1st Brigade, 80th Division (Training), 164th Regiment (RTI)
• Ft. Bliss, TX (ADA One Station Unit Training) ADA Training Brigade, 211th Regiment (RTI)
• Ft. Bragg, NC (Basic Combat Training) (after March, 1997) 108th Division (Training), 218th Regiment (RTI)
• Ft. Campbell, KY (Infantry One Station Unit Training, Basic Combat Training) 100th Division (Training) (Less 2nd & 4th Brigades), 129th Regiment (RTI)
• Ft. Carson, CO (Armor & Artillery One Station Unit Training, Basic Combat Training) 2nd & 4th Brigades 100th Division (Training), 168th Regiment (RTI), 213th Regiment (RTI)
• Ft. Devens, MA 76th Division (Training), 101st Regiment (RTI), 240th Regiment (RTI)
• Ft. Dix, NJ (Basic Combat Training) 3rd Basic Combat Training Brigade, 140th Regiment (RTI), 208th Regiment (RTI), 249th Regiment (RTI)
• Ft. Drum, NY (Infantry One Station Unit Training, Basic Combat Training) 98th Division (Training) (less 1st Brigade), 124th Regiment (RTI), 136th Regiment (RTI)
• Ft. Hood, TX (Armor & Cavalry One Station Unit Training, Basic Combat Training) 95th Division (Training), 145th Regiment (RTI), 254th Regiment (RTI)
• Ft. Hunter-Liggett, CA (Artillery One Station Unit Training, Basic Combat Training) 91st Division (Training)(less 2nd Brigade), 158th Regiment (RTI)
• Ft. Indiantown Gap, PA (Infantry One Station Unit Training) 78th Division (Training), 166th Regiment (RTI)
• Ft. Jackson, SC (Basic Combat Training, Primary BCT training site for female soldiers) 4th Basic Combat Training Brigade, 206th Regiment (RTI)
• Ft. Knox, KY (Armor & Cavalry One Station Unit Training, Basic Combat Training) Armor Training Brigade, 238th Regiment (RTI)
• Ft. Leonard Wood, MO (Engineer One Station Unit Training, Basic Combat Training) 1st Engineer Brigade; 2nd Basic Combat Training Brigade, 140th Regiment (RTI)
• Ft. Lewis, WA (Basic Combat Training, Infantry One Station Unit Training) 104th Division (Training), 205th Regiment (RTI)
• Ft. McClellan, AL 2nd Brigade, 85th Division (Training)
• Ft. McCoy, WI (Basic Combat Training) 84th Division (Training), 426th Regiment (RTI), 196th Regiment (RTI)
• Ft. Ord, CA 2nd Brigade 91st Division (Training), 203rd Regiment (RTI), 221st Regiment (RTI)
• Ft. Pickett, VA (Infantry One Station Unit Training) 80th Division (Training) (Less 1st Brigade), 183rd Regiment (RTI)
• Ft. Polk, LA 85th Division (Training) (less 2nd & 3rd Brigade)
• Ft. Riley, KS (Basic Combat Training) 402nd Brigade (Training), 189th Regiment (RTI)
• Camp Ripley, MN (Armor & Cavalry One Station Unit Training) 70th Division (Training)
• Camp Roberts, CA (Armor & Cavalry One Station Unit Training) 2nd Brigade 91st Division (Training), 204th Regiment (RTI), 289th Regiment (RTI)
• Camp Robinson, AR (Infantry One Station Unit Training) 5th Brigade (Training), 253rd Regiment (RTI)
• Camp Shelby, MS (Artillery, One Station Unit Training) 3rd Brigade 85th Division (Training), 108th Regiment (RTI), 139th Regiment (RTI)
• Ft. Sill, OK (Artillery One Station Unit Training, Basic Combat Training) Field Artillery Training Brigade, 210th Regiment (RTI), 185th Regiment (RTI)
• Camp Smith, NY (Basic Combat Training) (secondary female training facility) 1st Brigade, 98th Division (Training), 169th Regiment (RTI)

(RTI is Regional Training Institute; these units previously conducted MOS reclassification training for members of the Army National Guard.)

Wartime Advanced Technical Training Centers of the US Army

• Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD (Ordnance) 70th Regiment (RTI), 261st Regiment (RTI)
• Ft. Benjamin Harrison, IN (Administrative) 106th Regiment (RTI), 138th Regiment (RTI)
• Ft. Eustis, VA (Aviation Logistical Support, Transportation) 260th Regiment (RTI), 197th Regiment (RTI)
• Ft. Gordon, GA (Signal) 117th Regiment (RTI)
• Ft. Huachuca, AZ (Intelligence) 111th Military Intelligence Brigade, 515th Regiment (RTI)
• Ft. Lee, VA (Quartermaster) 210th Regiment (RTI)
• Ft. McClellan, AL (Chemical, Military Police) 200th Regiment (RTI), 209th Regiment (RTI)
• Ft. Rucker, AL (Aviation) 1st Aviation Brigade, 166th Regiment (RTI)
• Ft. Sam Houston, TX (Medical), 243rd Regiment (RTI)
• Ft. Story, VA (Logistics) 261st Regiment (RTI)

Specialty Skill Training Centers

• Ft. Benning, GA (Airborne, Ranger)
• Ft. Bragg, NC (Special Forces)
• Ft. Campbell, KY (Air Assault)
• Ft. Greenly, AK (Northern Warfare)
• Camp Gruber, OK (Airborne)
• Jericho Firing Range, VT (Mountain)
• Ft. McCoy, WI (Air Assault)

National Maneuver Training Centers

• NTC-A Ft. Irwin, CA 177th Armored Brigade
• NTC-B Yakima Firing Range, WA 207th Regiment (RTI)
• NTC-C Orchard Training Area, ID 223rd Regiment (RTI)
• JRTC Ft. Chaffee, AR 177th Regiment (RTI)
• JRTC Ft. Polk, LA 199th Regiment (RTI)

Prewar training amounted to about 150,000 recruits a year, and expanded to a rate of 550,000 to 600,000 troops per year by July 1997. This was done through both the expansion of the existing prewar training base, and the implementation of mobilization courses of instruction. Basic Combat Training was cut to six weeks, and on average Advanced Individual Training courses were reduced in length by 25%. This was accomplished by the elimination of nonessential training, longer training hours, and elimination of all non-training days. At the same time that training was being accelerated, the combat readiness of IET (Initial Entry Training) graduates did not decline - in fact the soldiers were more prepared for the stress of combat than their prewar counterparts; also, as convalescent NCOs (combat veterans with prior drill instructor experience) began to fill training cadre positions, trainees were able to learn hard-won combat survival skills that would serve them will in the various theatres of ongoing combat.

Training continued throughout the war and reconstruction period. However, following the civil unrest that followed the nuclear exchange of 1997-8, most units could only continue to conscript locally, and then with substantial aid from surviving State Defense Forces. Consequently, the numbers of trained troops provided to field units as replacements plummeted. As the situation became more desperate, the training divisions were redesignated as field formations (Infantry). Some training continued at posts that were able to maintain their training missions, as well as in the redesignated training divisions (previously composed of drill sergeant units), albeit at a significantly reduced rate. It is estimated that 75,000 replacements were trained at an annual rate from June 1998 through January 2000. 2000 was the nadir of training in the US. Following reconstruction efforts of returning US troops from overseas, starting in 2002 the number of recruits trained would steadily increase back to prewar levels (over many years).

Of special note should be the training of female soldiers. Prewar, basic combat training of female soldiers was conducted exclusively at Ft. Jackson, NC. As the war progressed, a secondary site for the training of female soldiers was operated at Camp Smith, NY. The Army maintained these two sites as the exclusive training sites for women until the Thanksgiving Day Massacre of 1997, following which training centers began local conscription and women were integrated into the training at virtually all of the surviving training stations and integrated into Military Occupational Specialties from which they had previously be excluded (i.e. Infantry, Armor, etc.).

Additionally, civilians drafted into the Army were sometimes given direct commissions or promotion to NCO ranks based on their civilian education and employment. Doctors were frequently given direct commissions as Captains, while many engineer construction battalions had draftee NCOs who had held civilian jobs as construction foremen.

NCO and Officer Training

As the United States Army prepared for war, it underwent rapid growth, creating an immediate need for additional NCOs and officers to maintain discipline in the new force.

NCOs were the need felt most immediately by the growing army. To fill this need roughly half of the Specialists (E-4) in the army were laterally promoted to Corporal (E-4), and send to NCO academies as space became available. Every major post in CONUS operated NCO academies, some were general and others branch specific. Branch specific academies were limited to the combat arms, and were located at the combat arms training centers. Generic NCO academies were located through out the training system. Failure to satisfactory complete the course would result in lateral reduction back to specialist (E-4), while successful completion resulted in immediate promotion to Sergeant (E-5). Advanced NCO courses were held for each subsequent rank through E-9. However, following US entry into the war advanced courses were suspended and promotion was based on merit and the approval of the battalion commander (E-6, E-7) and the major command commander (E-8, E-9).

Additionally, junior officers were in high demand throughout the course of the war and for some time after. Initially, all ROTC cadets whom had successfully completed ROTC advanced camp were immediately commissioned as second lieutenants along with the senior class at the United States Military Academy, and ordered to attend their assigned branch Officer Basic Course immediately. West Point and other Military Colleges in the United States immediately went to an accelerated 3-year program. ROTC cadets not attending a military college, whom had not completed Advanced Camp, were inducted into the Army. Students who were in their third year of ROTC were immediately sent to OCS and all other ROTC cadets entered the army as ordinary enlisted soldiers, able to attend OCS if they showed sufficient leadership potential.

The National Guard also provided direct commissions to those in pay grades E-6 and above who had completed their NCOES and had completed at least 90 college credits. Further, OCS was opened up to all enlisted soldiers whom had completed 60 college credits in all components of the Army. The reserve component OCS courses were accelerated to commission the current class then disbanded. Their cadres were then assigned to provide OCS cadres at the Initial Entry Training Centers. Combat Arms branch specific OCS programs were established (similar to the NCO courses) and generic OCS courses for non-combat arms.

West Point continued to operate as a 3-year program until 1998, when conditions in the lower Hudson Valley required evacuation of the faculty, staff, and corps of cadets to Ft. Dix, NJ. Once the Corps of Cadets was reconstituted in the fall of 1999, it further accelerated its program to two years and its academic program focused exclusively on civil engineering.

Unit Formation

For a time in early 1997 as the training base dramatically expanded, the availability of newly trained soldiers far outpaced the need for replacements in deployed units and the Army undertook a program intended to expand the number of deployable combat divisions.

Initially, additional divisions were formed by the amalgamation of separate brigades that were preexisting in the reserve force structure. As the Army looked to expand its force structure further it activated one additional armored division, two airborne divisions, and one light infantry division. Additionally, several armored cavalry regiments and separate brigades were formed to fill out corps structures and to perform special missions or test concepts. These units were to be fitted out as the United States industrial capacity converted fully over to a wartime footing. Some units received their equipment only after meeting it in theatre, prior to commitment to combat.

As the war transitioned to from a conventional conflict to a tactical nuclear one, the decision was made to halt replacement of losses to units which were within range of Soviet IRBMs or air attack. Instead, replacement vehicles were held for new units forming up so that they could be committed to battle with their entire allotment of equipment. It was intended that units then in contact would be withdrawn to western Germany, rebuilt, and then recommitted to battle; however the further escalation of the war to include a limited strategic nuclear exchange destroyed the industrial capacity to support this plan. It was intended that the Army would field additional divisions based on the ROAD concept, however they were never formed as a result of the escalating nuclear exchanges.

The final field units formed by the United States Army were created by conversion of the training divisions and Brigades into infantry units. Few of these would deploy OCONUS and most would be relegated to internal security and disaster relief missions throughout the remainder of the war and subsequent reconstruction. These units were always chronically short of authorized personnel and equipment and their commitment marked a low point for the United States Army.

Unit Training

As Reserve Component Units were activated, it was necessary that they conduct large unit exercises prior to deployment. These exercises built up during the mobilization process from company and battalion exercises to full brigade exercises. Immediately prior to overseas deployment each brigade would do a rotation at one of the large training areas across the country. Heavy Brigades would complete 30-day rotations at one of the three NTC facilities, and Light Brigades would perform a similar pre-deployment rotation at one of the two JRTC facilities.

OPFOR units operated against training units using Warsaw Pact doctrine and unit organization. This was most helpful as the deploying units got their first taste of how the enemy would operate against them. To increase the training value of the OPFOR and to maintain their currency, doctrine and tactics were continually updated and changed based on observed enemy activity in the Far East, Iran, and Europe. This was further accomplished by replacing soldiers fit for overseas deployment with soldiers recovering from wounds received overseas, in the OC/TAC Officer positions. Originally the National Training Centers used US vehicles called VISMODs to simulate Warsaw Pact vehicles during exercises; however during the spring of 1997 OPFOR units we able to use small amounts of Warsaw Pact equipment during pre-deployment exercises. Eventually, however, this practice had to be discontinued due to a lack of sufficient spare parts. Following the Thanksgiving Day Massacre, brigade rotations to the training centers ceased for those few remaining units that would deploy overseas.

Equipment Holdings

Following the Black Winter of 1989-90, the United States continued to modernize its military forces. Although it possessed less combat equipment than the Soviet Union overall, on the whole much of it was superior and more modern, particularly in the area of MBT’s and SP artillery.

• 1,300+ M551 Light Tanks
• 1,725 Armored Gun Systems
• 1,000 M48A5 MBT
• 7,900+ M60 MBT (all variants)
• 11,000 M1 MBT (all variants)
• 14,000 M113 APC
• 8,800 M2/M3 (all variants)
• 1,900 LAV-25 (all variants)
• 1,600 SP Mortar (Tracked)
• 8,400 SP Anti-Armor Missile Systems
• 1,300+ Self Propelled ADA guns systems
• 200 towed ADA guns
• 1,800 SAM systems
• 2,500 Attack Helicopters (AH-1, AH-64)
• 3,900 Utility Helicopters (UH-1, UH-60)
• 500 CH-47
• 380+ OH-6/AH-6
• 1,800 OH-58
• 300 M728 CEV
• 1,500 towed 105mm
• 1,100 towed 155mm
• 4,900 SP 155mm M109
• 1,000 M110 203mm
• 1,100 MLRS
• 7,700 M47 Dragon ATGM
• 5,500 Javelin ATGM
• 3,600 Recoilless Rifles

In addition to the above listed items, the United States maintained an enormous reserve of small arms to equip its armed forces should expansion become needed. Although not outlined below, in 1995-96 large numbers of M1 Garand rifles were transferred to the defense forces of many states (State Militias or State Defense Forces)

• 400,000 M1 Rifles
• 125,000 M2 Carbines
• 575,000 M14 Rifles
• 650,000 M16 Rifles
• 115,000 M4 Carbines
• 75,000 M1903 Rifles
• 100,000 M1911 Pistols
• 62,000 Browning Automatic Rifles
• 35,000 M3 Sub-machineguns
• 14,000 M177 Carbines
• 12,000 M2 Machine Guns
• 21,000 M1919 Machine Guns

Although significant numbers of the above listed types would be transferred to forces under the states control, as the war progressed and industrial capacity was diminished as a result of the strategic nuclear exchange regular units of the army began to field some of the older arms listed above.

[chico20854]

and now one on the State Guards:

Thoughts on the State Guards in US

As Flamingo noted, local draft boards directed those found unfit for military service for family or mild medical reasons (dietary restrictions, color blindness and the like) to join local state guard units. The federal government planned, in the fall of 1996 (following the initiation of REFORGER, general mobilization of the National Guard and Reserves and the determination to expand the Army) to provide limited support to state guard units, as it became available.

In many places the State Guards had an existing but woefully undermanned structure. Composed of volunteers, equipment and training standards varied but were generally poor. The Federal Government authorized state governors to call back to active duty, using federal funds, retired National Guardsmen, under age 60, who were fit for duty but ineligible for overseas deployment to act as cadre and trainers for expanding State Guard units. In addition, State Guards were provided with limited material support from the Army – surplus steel helmets from warehouses around the U.S., M-1 and M-14 rifles (M-14s were issued to units in Alaska and Hawaii and units that had a beach patrol or port security role) and CUCV pick-up trucks and utility vehicles turned in by National Guard units upgrading to HMMWVs prior to deployment.

The retirees, many of who had served for many years together in the insular world of a single state’s National Guard, formed a solid backbone for the State Guards. The administration, logistics and operational planning of State Guard units in the first half of 1997 were superb thanks to the experienced NCOs and field grade officers filling the staffs of State Guard battalions and regiments.

Members were expected to report for training two weekends a month (after an initial training, generally lasting two weeks, conducted at Job Corps or juvenile delinquent boot camp facilities). Training facilities and materials were generally scarce, as the National Guard was exerting maximum effort to deploy combat units overseas and had few resources to spare. Funds were often short to pay guardsmen for their attendance, and absenteeism was high as a result (in addition to the difficulties imposed by spending so many weekends away from home). Training focused on individual skills such as marksmanship and first aid, riot control and civil defense/disaster relief.

At the state level planning for State Guard units envisioned missions guarding National Guard armories and facilities, critical infrastructure (power plants, railroad yards full of war material, ports, refineries and major defense plants) and state buildings, performing disaster relief missions normally undertaken by National Guard units, and assisting the State Police and FEMA in execution of urban evacuation plans. Primary responsibility for execution of the security and disaster relief missions shifted to SGUS units as National Guard units were called to federal service.

Despite the high quality of the staff, the actual conduct of operations was spotty. Many of the recruits referred to the State Guards were unfit for service or generally reluctant to serve. The quantity of new recruits referred to the State Guards far exceeded the organization’s ability to evaluate, train and absorb. Much effort was wasted screening out the criminal, addicted and unsuitable. Organizations were in constant turmoil as new recruits reported and had to be absorbed and given further training while units were actively undertaking operational missions. While there was a solid cadre of mid and high grade NCOs and officers in the recalled retirees, there was a dearth of lower grade NCOs and officers to execute the plans developed by the staffs (who were themselves of only marginal ability to operate in the field).

The final limitation of the SGUS units was their limited size. In a climate of paranoia fed by the war (and heightened by the operations early in the war of Spetsnaz units operating out of the Soviet diplomatic missions in the U.S. or slipped across the Mexican border) there was vast demand for State Guard troops to provide guard forces for universities, grain elevators and state parks (in addition to the critical infrastructure identified above). The result was usually consternation when guard leaders turned down the most outrageous requests or dilution of effort to such an extent that the State Guard’s presence was purely for effect - a pair of guardsmen guarding a power plant rather than the company-sized element required to do the job correctly. This failing showed clearly in the evacuation scares that occurred throughout late 1996 and 1997, when disorderly crowds of city dwellers nearly overran bus and train stations and the roads became hopelessly clogged with cars fleeing cities, each potentially the target of a no-warning Soviet nuclear strike. The State Guards were simply outnumbered by panicked civilians and their effectiveness depended on calm, cooperative and orderly evacuees, a tragically uncommon commodity.

Morale of the State Guards suffered as the war went on. The enthusiastic prewar volunteers that remained (many of the fit volunteered for active military service) were promoted to leadership positions, and bereft of decent leadership training, had a tendency to lord over the “draftees”. The late pay, frequent training sessions and lack of adequate material and facilities drove morale down. Issuing Second World War vintage M-1 rifles to guardsmen was perceived as an indication that their expected contribution was so low that issuing modern rifles were a waste. The fiasco of the early evacuation scares (especially the one that followed the initiation of tactical nuclear warfare overseas in the hot summer of 1997) drove morale down even further as guardsmen saw their ineffectiveness (and the danger involved in trying to control a panicked mob with a handful of guardsmen – with over two dozen instances of small detachments of guardsmen being overrun, injured and even killed during the July 1997 evacuation scare alone).

The low morale and perception of ineffectiveness drove absenteeism up as 1997 grew later. Guardsmen were expected not only to report for training two weekends a month but to report for regularly scheduled security duties (usually a week each month) and to be available for additional callups (such as for evacuations and disaster relief duties). As absenteeism grew the remaining members were tasked with more duties in a rapidly accelerating downward spiral.

Naturally, the nuclear attacks on CONUS changed the SGUS dramatically. All of the early war plans for multiple missions were to be immediately implemented. In the days and weeks following the Thanksgiving Day Massacre, FEMA and state governors ordered the evacuation of all cities over 500,000 with potential targets. The massive evacuation was to be undertaken by bus convoys or trains, with private cars left at home, escorted by State policemen and guardsmen. Security details for existing critical locations were to be maintained (despite their status as possible nuclear targets). Simultaneously, guardsmen were to establish security over food storage and distribution sites and assist state police and local authorities with maintaining public order. Some detachments were tasked to provide security for semi-isolated National Guard headquarters installations (such as Camp Fretterd, MD, Camp Shelby, MS and Ft. Indiantown Gap, PA) that also served as state government evacuation sites.

In general, SGUS units met one of three fates in the aftermath of the nuclear strikes on the Untied States. First, many units were overrun or disintegrated in the chaos that followed the nuclear strikes. An example of this is the Manhattan Battalion of the New York Militia, which had but 500 troops to evacuate the over 1.5 million residents of the island. The fifteen guardsmen responsible for maintaining the orderly loading of eight platforms of passenger trains in Penn Station were killed by the mob within two hours of the issuance of the evacuation order, and the remainder simply drifted away. Likewise, a detachment of guardsmen escorting a convoy of school busses from New Orleans was wiped out in an ambush outside Opelousas, Louisiana by locals who objected to further refugees (mostly ethnic minorities) being relocated to the small town. The second fate of SGUS unties was that they remained intact but abandoned their assigned duties. Faced with impossible demands for numerous missions, the commanders decided to use their resources for self-preservation. In several cases, guardsmen evacuated their families using SGUS materials and authority and established themselves as guard forces for refugee camps or relocation sites upon their arrival. Finally, a number of units remained loyal to surviving legal authorities. These were usually units in close contact with state governments (especially units guarding remote evacuation sites). A key factor in these units’ survival and continued effectiveness was their location outside major urban areas and reserves of material or extensive prior preparation.

Following the general breakdown of law in order in the United States in 1998 and 1999, SGUS units evolved in several ways. Many local militias (and marauder bands) formed around small detachments of guardsmen (the marauders often formed when evacuees resorted to force to secure adequate supplies of food and fuel from host communities). Others, after seeing to the safety of their families and local cantonments, sought out surviving legal authorities and made part of their forces (those not required for local security) available to state governments. In areas where federal troops were active, many guardsmen were incorporated into federal units, the legal restriction from deployment outside the home state either irrelevant or ignored. Finally, units that had provided protection to surviving state governments (such as in New Jersey and Vermont) formed the core for those state’s reconstruction and recovery efforts from 2000 onward.

[chico20854]

this is an early piece. We have since developed it much farther, but not to a point that is publishable...

United States Marine Corps in Cent COM

I Marine Expeditionary Force

1st Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters Group (1205 Men)

HQ Co (75 men)
1st Intel Bn (210 Men)
1st ANGLCO (60 men)
9th COMM Bn (200 men)
1st Force Recon Co (50 men)
1st Radio Bn (210 men)
MCSFCo Diego Garcia (200 Men) (4 M750AC,4 Peacekeeper AC)
1st Small Craft Co (200 Men) (4 36' RPC,4 28' RPC,4 46' HPC)
1st Marine Logistics Group (1050 Men)

Combat logistics Regiment 1 (350 Men)
Combat logistics Regiment 15 (350 Men)
Combat logistics Regiment 17 (350 Men)

1st Marine Division (3900 Men)

HQ Co (75 men)
1st LAR Bn (175 men) (12 Lav25, 4 Lav90, 10 Lav supp)
3rd AAV Bn (175 Men) (12 AAV’s)
1st CEB Bn (200 men)
1st Tank Bn (200 Men) (12 M-1)
1st Recon Bn (109 men)

1st Marine Regimental Combat Team
1/1 (300 Men)
2/1 (300 Men)
3/1 (300 Men)

5th Marine Regimental Combat Team
1/5 (300 Men)
2/5 (325 Men)
3/5 (300 Men)

7th Marine Regimental Combat Team
1/7 (325 Men)
2/7 (300 Men)
3/7 (300 Men)

11th Marines
1/11 (225 Men) (12 M198)



3rd Marine Division (4410 Men)

HQ Co (75 Men)
3rd LAR Bn (175 Men) 11 Lav25, 5 Lav90, 9 Lav supp)
1st AAV Bn (175 Men) (12 AAV’s)
3rd CEB Bn (200 Men)
3rd Tank Bn (200 Men) (13 M-1)
1st Recon Bn (110 Men)

3rd Marine Regimental Combat Team
1/3 (350 Men)
2/3 (400 Men)
3/3 (375 Men)

4th Marine Regimental Combat Team
1/4 (350 Men)
2/4 (350 Men)
3/4 (350 Men)

9th Marine Regimental Combat Team
1/9 (350 Men)
2/9 (375 Men)
3/9 (350 Men)

12th Marines
1/12 (225 Men) (12 M198)


5th Marine Division (4660 Men)

HQ Co (75 Men)
5th LAR Bn (100 Men) (8 Lav25, 2 Lav90, 6 Lav supp)
5th AAV Bn (125 Men) (8 AAV’s)
5th CEB Bn (200 Men)
5th Tank Bn (400 Men) (20 M60A4)
5th Recon Bn (110 Men)

26th Marine Regimental Combat Team
1/26 (350 Men)
2/26 (350 Men)
3/26 (350 Men)

27th Marine Regimental Combat Team
1/27 (350 Men)
2/27 (350 Men)
3/27 (350 Men)

28th Marine Regimental Combat Team
1/28 (400 Men)
2/28 (350 Men)
3/28 (400 Men)

13th Marine Regiment
1/13 (400 Men) (8 M110A2)


3rd Marine Aircraft Wing

MAG-16 (1390 Men)

VMFA (AW)-121 (100 Men) (6 F/A18D)
VMF-214 (105 Men) (6 AV8B)
HMM-161 (130 Men) (8 CH-46)
HMM-163 (130 Men) (8 CH-46)
HMH-466 (150 Men) (8 CH-53E)
HMLA-367 (200 Men) (6AH-1W, 6 UH-1)
VMGR-325 (75 Men) (4 C-130J)
3rd LAAD Bn Co C (200 Men) (4 Lav-PIVAD)
MALS-16 (100 Men)
MWSS-371 (200 Men)

Total Forces 16,615 Men


Combat History of I MEF DEC 2000- JULY 2001


1st Marine Expeditionary Force

This unit has been the corps size command unit for the marines in the gulf since day one. They were transported by air to the area in February of 1997 to be the advance party for the force. They were in the major combat of the last 3 years and are now Headquarted at the International Airport in the port city of Bandar abbas. During the last 6 months I MEF as been re-supplied and reinforced by two fronts. In December of 2000 they were reinforced with 2000 new personnel from Europe who were spread out to the MEF’s subunits. In February of 2001 the MEF was reinforced again with III Mef from Korea. III MEF Was disbanded Minus 5th Marine Division who was re-supplied and reinforced in the city of Bandar abbas for the last 3 months. I MEF Now Runs Security and stability Operations in the Bandar Abbas Sector. The Commanding Officer is Major General Raymond P. Ayres JR.


1st Marine Headquarters Group

This unit is the higher supporting Forces unit for the MEF. It has been involved in every major combat action of the war and has just recently received reinforcements in February of 2001 from the now disbanded III MEF. This unit is set up in the area surrounding the Airport in Bandar Abbas. These units are routinely attached out to Subordinate units as support. 1st ANGLOCO and 1st Force Recon Co routinely do direct action missions to disrupt and eliminate forces in the Bandar Abbas area. The MEF Headquarter is Guarded by the MCSFCo Diego Garcia this unit used to guard the navy assets in Diego Garcia But was withdrawn in 1998 and now provide security for the Headquarters area and its high risk personnel. This unit was merged with 1st Fast Company in 1997 after they were stranded in the India Ocean when the ship they were to return home on was sunk.1st Small craft Co actively patrols the Bandar Abbas Harbor and the Shoor River. Commanding officer is Col James Emerson.


1st Marine Logistics Group

This unit is the higher Support unit for the MEF. This Unit doses all the motor transport, supply and engineer assets for the MEF. This unit has seen combat on all fronts during the war. Right now the 3 regiments are doing SASO Operations in the town of Bandar Abbas. 1st regiment is tasked with the operation of the natural gas fields in the port area and the operation of the gas powered power plant that powers the city. The 15th regiment is tasked with the operation of the fishery and the food cannery on the dock area. The 17th regiment is tasked with operation of the date and fig fields east of town and the citrus groves north of town and the tobacco fields south of town. This unit is essential to the daily operations of the Mef it feeds and powers the city and the MEF.The Commanding officer and his staff are responsible for the supervision of the contracts for the small fishing fleet and the large goat herd that supply meat to the cannery. The commanding officer is Col Brad Aiello.


3rd Marine Aircraft Wing

This unit is the Aircraft Supporting unit for the MEF. Most of its aircraft groups have been disbanded and merged with Marine Aircraft Group-16. This unit fought in all the major battles of the war and was re-supplied with personnel and gear in February when 1st marine aircraft group was sent over from Korea and disbanded. This unit is now stationed at the International airport and the 3rd LAAD Bn Co C now provides flight line and airport security. Flight operations are limited due to parts and fuel. Few parts and aircraft came from Korea the main influx was personnel. The commanding officer is Brigadier General Dennis T. Krupp.


1st Marine Division

This unit has seen the most combat of any marine division in the gulf. The Unit has recently just returned from here amphibious operations in the Chah Bahar area where they were highly successful. They have now returned and have spent the last two months resting and rearming its forces in Bandar Abbas. 2 weeks ago they replaced 3rd marine division on security duty and have 1st marine regiment on Mt. Geno 17km to the north. 5th Marines are on Mt. Poolad 16 miles to the Northwest and 7th marines patrolling the Shoor River area. The Division Headquarters is located in the northern part of the city of Bandar Abbas. The division supporting assets are split up among the regiments. The division will remain on this duty for the next 6 months. The commanding officer is Brigadier General James R Battagllini.


3rd Marine Division

This unit has seen combat on every front from the start of the war. The unit has just spent the last 6 months on security duty for the Bandar Abbas Area. Right before they went on security duty they were reinforced by the marines coming over from Europe when the first division was on operation to the south. Morale is high due to good food and fresh water and power the division is now set up in the once abandoned southern part of the city and has been rebuilding the area for themselves to live in. they will be here for the next 6 months refitting and resting as the MEF reserve. There commanding officer is Brigadier general Frank Libutti.


5th Marine Division

This Unit has spent the last 30 months in active combat in Korea and was withdrawn from Korea in February 2001 with the rest with III MEF. When III MEF came to the Cent Com AOR 4th marine division and 6th marine division were merged into the 5th marine division with support personnel and air wing personnel with out units. 5th Marine Division is now spending the next 6 month re-supplying and retraining its personnel to form a combat ready unit. Its forces occupy the deserted east end of the city and has made the place back into a city with there clean up and restoration of that part of the city. The unit has older gear but is still just as hard as any marine unit. The commanding officer is Brigadier general Bradley M. Lott