Why would (multiple) divisional levels continue to exist?

[raketenjagdpanzer]

This is one that always made me go hmm...

There's instances of US tank divisions that consist of 2500 men and 30 vehicles (which can be TOW equipped humvees, M109 SP guns, M60s, captured PT-76's, etc. etc.; it's never really specified, is it?), or infantry divisions of 900 men and no vehicles (or worse yet armored divisions with no vehicles, etc.)

Why wouldn't (what was left of) theater command just regroup all of the units under a single prewar divisional size broken down into brigades, companies, platoons etc.

It would seem to make a hell of a lot more sense than the piecemeal units scattered hither and yon.

Of course I understand that after the failed summer offensive a lot of those units are scattered for a reason, and it's not like you can just pick up the satellite phone and ring up Brussels for guidance, or check the GPS to locate those other scattered units!

But really, if you assume a couple of things: one that OpOrd Omega doesn't go down until after Christmas or later and that two whatever orders DO come down from MilGov and CivGov don't conflict, I can't see a reason why you wouldn't just reform under a divisional banner.

Just say: Okay, this is now the 999th Armored Division, create your TO&E based on what you do have, refuse your ranks, base out of a surviving POMCUS location (or REFORGER location, maybe Bremen) to keep a supply line going and put an end to the Mad Max stuff before it starts.

Assuming that it worked, and that likewise you could build a German Panzergrenadier division...I mean, that's two full-strength divisions. Real divisions, too, not 6 tanks here, 10 APCs there, etc.

[pmulcahy11b]

I think the idea is to illustrate the incredibly fragmented nature of military forces in general, and secondarily illustrate that these fragmented military units regard themselves as separate entities with their own aims and goals.

[raketenjagdpanzer]

Originally Posted by pmulcahy11b

I think the idea is to illustrate the incredibly fragmented nature of military forces in general, and secondarily illustrate that these fragmented military units regard themselves as separate entities with their own aims and goals.

You know I thought about it a bit after I'd posted and that dovetails into another (few) thoughts I'd had, to sort of answer my own questions:

Firstly, as you say, differing goals. A commander in charge of the "901st AD brigade" might believe fully in prosecuting the war, while the CO of the "2nd Armored Company" (and all 1 of their tanks) might be more interested in being friendly to Polish civilians and neutral to Soviets.

Second: the civil war. Getting an order from CivGov to stay put and another from MilGov to go somewhere would be a surefire way to create real confusion at higher ranks which brings us to point three...

Thirdly: big fish, little pond. While it can't be overlooked that every rank has suffered horrendous casualties - I mean, 11 generals or admirals died in WWII as a direct result of combat - there's probably going to be a lot of top-heavy organizations out there. Imagine being a general and surviving from 1997 to late 2000, pulling your "division's" ass out of the fire (probably winding up engaged in direct combat yourself, repeatedly) and making it back to Germany only to be told that some other general was now in command, making you a line trooper!

Yeah...I think it'd be way, way more difficult than I thought. If not impossible.

[James Langham]

Originally Posted by raketenjagdpanzer

This is one that always made me go hmm...

There's instances of US tank divisions that consist of 2500 men and 30 vehicles (which can be TOW equipped humvees, M109 SP guns, M60s, captured PT-76's, etc. etc.; it's never really specified, is it?), or infantry divisions of 900 men and no vehicles (or worse yet armored divisions with no vehicles, etc.)

Why wouldn't (what was left of) theater command just regroup all of the units under a single prewar divisional size broken down into brigades, companies, platoons etc.

It would seem to make a hell of a lot more sense than the piecemeal units scattered hither and yon.

Of course I understand that after the failed summer offensive a lot of those units are scattered for a reason, and it's not like you can just pick up the satellite phone and ring up Brussels for guidance, or check the GPS to locate those other scattered units!

But really, if you assume a couple of things: one that OpOrd Omega doesn't go down until after Christmas or later and that two whatever orders DO come down from MilGov and CivGov don't conflict, I can't see a reason why you wouldn't just reform under a divisional banner.

Just say: Okay, this is now the 999th Armored Division, create your TO&E based on what you do have, refuse your ranks, base out of a surviving POMCUS location (or REFORGER location, maybe Bremen) to keep a supply line going and put an end to the Mad Max stuff before it starts.

Assuming that it worked, and that likewise you could build a German Panzergrenadier division...I mean, that's two full-strength divisions. Real divisions, too, not 6 tanks here, 10 APCs there, etc.

In a British context the morale effects of rebadging everybody would be massive. In the UK there is an immense tribal loyalty to units.

There is also the factor of inertia. Until someone higher up organises, nobody at a lower level will action.

[Mohoender]

Looking at the situation, I would expect to see the formations of units similar to the German's Kampfgruppe. Local commanders could effectivly improvised combat units from they have at hand in order to carry out certain missions.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kampfgruppe

[Rainbow Six]

Part of the reason for not merging might also be for disinformation / deception purposes.

For example, with things as they are, Soviet Intel officers might be able to ascertain that a certain area is occupied by (for example) 1st UK Armoured Dvn, 4th UK Armoured Dvn, and 5th UK Mech Dvn so think that any thrust towards that area will bring them up against 3 Divisions but they are unable to establish exactly how strong those Divisions are in terms of manpower and AFV's. So they decide not to take offensive action.

If, on the other hand, the 3 Divisions are consolidated into 1, the Soviets think they are only facing one Division. They think an offensive would be more likely to succeed and make their plans accordingly...

Just a thought....

[Legbreaker]

Reorganising units requires resources too, lots and lots of resources, especially fuel.

In the chaos of the second half of 1997, while NATO are being pushed back on all fronts, the resource of "time" isn't available (the reality of no more reinforcements from home also hasn't hit yet either). US units particularly were in disarray being down to approximately 1/4 of their prewar strength (half that of other NATO nations). This massive loss of manpower certainly equates to an almost complete lost of unit structure which makes it extremely difficult for a commander to even begin to work out what he's got let alone send orders through the shattered command structure.

In 1998 combat is still raging, although in the first half both sides are still reeling from the nukes, and focusing more on surviving the next few days and being prepared for the next enemy onslaught (which didn't come until June 98). Digging in and holding on to the scraps of organisation left while scrounging for diminishing supplies was likely the priority. Note that in this period, fuel, food and the other necessities of life would be limited - the supply chain had been nuked to obliteration and using alcohol as fuel was likely still a pipe dream.

Later 1998 as mentioned brought a Pact offensive into southern Germany against which NATO flung anything and everything available (burning up carefully hoarded supplies of fuel and ammo). The following counter-offensive to drive back the PACT units would have pretty much exhausted the supplies. At the end of the year, there's no supplies left (namely fuel) for reallocation of heavy equipment and the manpower basically puts down roots where they ceased fighting.

1999 is a year of rebuilding the expended stockpiles. It's also a time where the full realisation that help from home isn't coming really bites. A commander at any level isn't going to assist the various Theatre, Army even Divisional and Brigade commanders by handing over what they have managed to hang onto for so long without a fight. This isn't to say reorganisation wouldn't occur, just that there would have to be a lot of negotiations and politics would play a big role ("I'll hand over my last M60 tank if you give me 25 TOW missiles and an M-901A1 in return").

What it all boils down to though is fuel and communications. Without fuel, it's impossible to shift anything. Without effective communications and command structure, it's impossible to organise...

[Adm.Lee]

Repeating the bit about command structures, training effective staffs and leaders is one of the hardest and most time-consuming elements of creating an army. Why throw away all those effective HQs? Now, I'm betting some of them go away, as some intermediate level HQs are folded into other structures. Maybe there aren't platoons in the companies, or squads in the platoons?

The flip side to this is that if I am a corps commander with three weak divisions, I have three (presumably) effective subordinates who can control their own portion of the field for me. If I concentrate them all into one division, I've probably still got the same area of operations, so I have to parcel it out into three brigade sectors, with the same number of troops. I haven't been able to concentrate anything at all.

That said, I'd be a supporter of the concept of concentrating some assets like artillery and armor. Say, in a given division, locating all of the remaining tanks in one battalion/regiment/brigade, to simplify the maintenance and control, as well as to concentrate for battlefield effect.

[Raellus]

In addition to the excellent points already raised:

It might also have something to do with trying to cover a lot of frontage with far fewer troops and combat vehicles than the textbooks or common sense calls for (this is part of the cantonment system as well).

Look at one of the campaign maps. If all of those late-war units designated as "divisions" were consolidated into true divisions of close to pre-war size, there'd be huge gaps on the map. Break up each true division into smaller chunks to cover the space, and you basically end up with what T2K calls a division.

With units so spread out, and modern communications systems severely compromised, it might make logistical and command & control sense to keep the existing divisional structure even though the units that you are calling divisions are much weaker than they should be.

Furthermore, it would be much harder for a proper division to sustain itself. Smaller "divisions" would have an easier time feeding and fueling themselves.

Think about what the Wehrmacht had to do in the last few months of WWII. Many German divisions were divisions in name only and yet quite a few of them managed to put up quite a fight. If Allied armies had been in the same shape, the war could have gone on for years. This is kind of what the situation is in the T2K 'verse.

[Webstral]

I support most of what has been said already.

Webstral

[Abbott Shaull]

It is the same situation that affected many units in the Civil War in the US and German and Soviet units during WWII.

In the Civil War there plenty of Regiments that had been so badly depleted they were just a shell of what they started out with. The answer was to add more Regiments to Brigade when the overall strength of a Regiment fell to low. That not to say that a Regiment would fall so low that they wouldn't be combined, which seemed to happen on the Confederate side more than Union side. It did happen, but at this time Regiments in the US and Confederate Armies were largely raised at State level and then sent to where ever the respective War Department told them to be deployed.

Where in WWII the German Army started the war where a Regiment would have HQ, Support elements, and up to 4 combat battalions. As the war progress many of the Regiments/Brigades would slowly be reorganized and reduced until in the late stages of the war there were some Regiments that little more battalion strength....

On the Soviet side it is tradition of take broken and spent units and using them to bring up one unit to strength as the flag(s) of the other units would be sent to where ever and used for the next version of the unit. Why GDW didn't use this system to bring Soviet and Pact Divisions back up to strength I am not sure. I think it was either an oversights, or ignored because it was too hard to explain, and wanted to keep both sides on the same footing.

Before 1998 the 40th Mechanized had been badly damaged and the remain force was consolidated into a Brigade. Excess personnel was sent back to California to raise the rest of the Division which got caught up in the Mexican invasion. Same thing happen to the 2nd Armored with the exception here the excess personnel were disperse through out the unit in Europe. There were ACR where this had happen where they consolidated into Squadron where the excess personnel was transferred to other units. I personally don't believe that the excess personnel of the 40th would of been returned to the US, but since it was NG Division and made good excuse to have new heavy unit still in California not caught up in Pacific Northwest.

With that said, I think there were two reasons why consolidation of units didn't take place in NATO. Some Corps and Division were multi-national. Next by 1999 no matter if it was Army Commander, Corps Commander, Division Commander or Brigade Commander. You knew what you had and what worked, any unit that you are order to trade or would like trade with, their equipment was a wild card. Next none of these people and their staff would like to be out of job. It is kinda of the reverse logic why when the US Army went from 33 combat brigade to todays 48 - 52 Brigade why at least 2 new Divisional HQs weren't stood up. It was cheaper to add Brigades to existing Division HQ which in most cases was only one Brigade and 10th Mountain and 25th Infantry gained two brigades, then build new Division HQ, Division support units and what not.

So at the time, while 'Division HQ', 'Corps HQ', and 'Army HQ' were still operating and claiming they were still functional but the units were known to be understrength. It was economical and cheaper to keep them where they were at. The reality that there would no longer be any reinforcement/replacement was starting to set in. Then like others have pointed out such in the British/Canadian units to large extent and to German and US unit to lesser degree would hate to lose their identity. Even though realistically the German units should be able to raise new troops locally, even the other NATO units would start to raise fresh troops local on small scale too, going to the point where they allow Pact troops that haven't active taken action with them to attached themselves to the unit without much fuss and/or recruiting POWs.

One the Pact side you can almost tell with some of the Divisions were 5000-8000 men strong that they were consolidating where the local Army and Front Commanders still had some control. Look at the overall strength of these Fronts and Armies show they were minus at least a Division or two. The 3rd Shock Army which should of had 4 - 5 Division was down to 3 Division and I believe they had one decent size Division and the other two were still really weak. Even the 4th Tank Army and 22nd Cavalry Army their Division after their movement had seemed to be still quite small, but this could be explained by almost constant fighting with marauders and partisans on their way to hit the XI US Corps and 5th US Mechanized Division.

The next thing with the Pact Forces you run into similar problems where units histories and what not where their Commanders may be unwilling to consolidate units. Yet again many of these units were in their home country by the end of 1999. One thing I don't remember seeing in Germany is any mention of Hungarian Army units. Don't know if these units had been sent elsewhere in Europe, or if any Soviet Group of Force in Hungary were used in Germany/Austria area. Then again it seems like much the German units of NATO it was dependent on the Commander if they did active local recruitment or not.

By 2000 it would probably be standard practice that whatever Divisional and higher HQ would try to recruit locally.

Just some thoughts.