Soviet Air Defense or "It really sucks to be an airdale over Russia!"

[dragoon500ly]

FM 100-2-1...what would I do without you!

The goal of the Soviet tactical air defense system is to reduce the effectiveness of enemy air attacks. This is achieved by forcing enemy aircraft to expend their ordnance while still beyond the effective range of their weaponry or by destroying the aircraft when they come within effective range of Soviet air defense weapons.

There are two important concepts in Soviet tactical air defense. First, air defense is considered to be an integral element of the combined arms concept. Secondly, air defense of the ground forces is achieved by a variety of weapons and equipment that together form a system of air defense.

Soviet air defense does not consider it to be necessary to destroy enemy aircraft. The Soviets realize the value of preventing enemy air crews from pressing their attacks or to force them to prematurely expend their ordnance. If their air defense can prevent NATO airpower from from delivering their ordnance on target, then the Soviets consider their mission to have been accomplished.

A Motor Rifle Battalion (BMP) has an air defense platoon equipped with 9 SA-7/-14 MPADS. A Motor Rifle Company (BTR) has three SA-7/-14 MPADS. Tank Companies do not have MPADS, but are equipped with turret-mounted antiaircraft machine guns.

Soviet tank and motor rifle regiments have an organic air defense battery made up of a headquarters, a platoon of four ZSU-23-4 SP AA guns, a platoon of four SA-9 SP SAM launchers (being replaced by SA-13 SP SAM launchers) as well as support and service elements. The regimental headquarters has a air defense squad with three SA-7/-14 MPADS.

Soviet tank and motor rifle divisions have a SAM Regiment made up of a headquarters, support and service elements and five SAM batteries each equipped with 4 SA-6 or SA-11 TEL and 3 SA-7/-14 MPADS, a further 6 SA-7/-14 MPADS are assigned to the regimental headquarters/service elements.

A combined arms and tank armies are supported by 1-2 SAM Brigades made up of a 3 SAM battalions (each with 3 batteries) with a total of 27 SA-4/SA-12 TELs.

A front will have a further 2 SAM brigades (organized as the army brigades).

[95th Rifleman]

Don't forget the Tunguska, it was available in the late 90's and was (and still is in the newer variants) one of the most lethal mobile ADA platforms.

[dragoon500ly]

The ZU-23-2 mounts twin 23mm cannons on a towed, two wheeled carriage. The cannons are mounted side by side between large ring-type trunnions. In appearance the ZU-23-2 can be confused with the older ZPU-2 14.5mm mount; however the shape and placement of the ZU-23's ammunition boxes (at right angles to the carriage) and its prominent muzzle flash suppressors are distinguishing features.

The ZU-23-2 is a highly mobile, air droppable weapon. A battalion of 18 is organic to the Soviet paratroop division and it is the division's principal AAA weapon. It has an effective engagement range of 2,500m, a max horizontal range of 7,000m. Max cyclic rate of fire is 800-1,000rds per barrel and a basic load of 2,400rds is standard.

In its firing position, the ZU-23 is leveled by jacks and stabilized on a three-point base. An optical-mechanical computing sight is used for anti-aircraft fire and a straight-tube telescope for ground targets. Ammunition is fed from box magazines, holding a 50rd belt, mounted on the outside of each trunnion. Reloading is fast and uncomplicated. The magazines are easily accessible and the beginning link of the new belt attaches to the ending link of the last old cartridge which automatically interrupts the firing cycle when it reaches the feedway and signals the bolt to remain open.

In the tank and motor rifle divisions, the ZU-23-2 is used to provide close-in air defense for the SA-4/SA-6 brigade (two ZU-23-2s per firing battery).

[Tegyrius]

Did the ZSU-30-6 exist anywhere beyond the Soviet Vehicle Guide and Red Storm Rising?

- C.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Tegyrius

Did the ZSU-30-6 exist anywhere beyond the Soviet Vehicle Guide and Red Storm Rising?

- C.

Nope....although there are photos of a ZSU-23-4 chassis fitted with a Red Navy AK-630 mount, but those photos....hmmmm...have a photoshop feel.

[dragoon500ly]

The ZSU-23-4 is a self-propelled antiaircraft system with four liquid-cooled 23mm cannons mounted on the front of a large, flat, armored turret. The chassis borrows from other Soviet armored vehicles and the suspension system resembles that of the PT-76 and ASU-85. The driver sits on the left front of the hull and the rest of the crew (commander, gunner and radar operator) are located in the turret. The GUN DISH fire control radar is mounted on the rear of the turret and can be folded down during travel.

A number of different variations exist of the basic ZSU-23-4, these are primarily distinguished externally be the types of stowage boxes on the turret and minor modifications in the mounting of the guns.

A platoon of four ZSU-23-4s are assigned along with four SA-9 SAM launchers to the antiaircraft battery of tank and motor rifle regiments to cover the deadspace of the SA-6 SAM TEL in the division air defense umbrella. Two ZSU-23-4s are usually assigned to support of each of the two first echelon battalions, each weapon normally separated by 200 meters and typically travelling about 400 meters behind the battalion's leading element.

The ZSU-23-4 is not amphibious, but it can ford depths of up to one meter. During river assault operations, the ZSU-23-4 would be ferried to the far bank immediately after the leading companies.

The ZSU-23-4 has the capability to both acquire and track low-flying aircraft and helicopters with an effective AA engagement range of 2,500 meters. It is also capable of firing on the move due to its integrated radar/gun stablization system. The high frequency operation of the GUN DISH radar emits a very narrow beam that provides for excellent aircraft tracking while being difficult to detect or evade. However, such a narrow frequency also dictates a limited range (max range of 20km), this can be compensated by linking the system to other long range acquisition radars in the area. The 23mm cannons can also be used against lightly armored ground vehicles.

The four guns are water cooled and have a maximum cyclic rate of 800-1,000 rounds per barrel. However, the guns are normally fired in 2-3 round bursts in order to reduce ammunition expenditure and prolong barrel life. Each barrel has a ammunition box holding a 500 round belt and 2,000 rounds are stored on board. Supply trucks follow the ZSU-23-4 at a distance of 1.5-2.5km behind and carry an additional 3,000 rounds per ZSU-23-4. Two types of ammunition normally mixed at a ratio of three Frag-HE-T rounds per one API-T round. An HEI-T round is also available.

Electronic target acquisition, tracking and ranging are automated and an on board computer determines superelevation and azimuth lead. Conventional optical sights are also available.

The ZSU-23-4 is air transportable by the An-22 or Il-76. The ZSU-23-4 is afforded a degree of protection by the thin armor (8.9-9.4mm thickness). Collective NBC protection is provided by a radiation detection and warning system and an air filtration and overpressure system.

Heavy machine gun fire can penetrate the hull and turret. Tread and road wheels are vulnerable to artillery fire. HE fragmentation can penetrate the armor, destroy the radar dish or rupture the liquid coolant sleeves on the cannons. The system is also vulnerable to ECM.

[Tegyrius]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

Nope....although there are photos of a ZSU-23-4 chassis fitted with a Red Navy AK-630 mount, but those photos....hmmmm...have a photoshop feel.

Thought so. Just checkin'.

Hm. Speaking of ADA, does anyone remember reports from Chechnya that the Russians were deploying AAA assets in the infantry support role because tank and IFV guns didn't have the elevation to engage Chechen troops on the upper floors of buildings? Or am I imagining that?

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Tegyrius

Thought so. Just checkin'.

Hm. Speaking of ADA, does anyone remember reports from Chechnya that the Russians were deploying AAA assets in the infantry support role because tank and IFV guns didn't have the elevation to engage Chechen troops on the upper floors of buildings? Or am I imagining that?

Dates back to WWII, the Germans would deploy their AA guns as far forward as possible, not only provide ADA, but they use their guns in the anti infantry/anti tank role.

Remember the scene in Saving Private Ryan, when the SS deployed a 20mm gun against the rangers/paratroopers? That little snapshot happened on every front. If you ever get the chance to look over the combat logs of various US units, you will see numerous references to a kampfgruppe made up of a platoon or two of infantry, maybe a antitank gun and 2-3 AA guns that would hold up the advance and force troops to deploy, only to see them withdraw 5-6 miles and repeat, every time causing a few dozen personnel/vehicle losses.

Its a lesson that cost the Red Army dearly in WWII and its one that they took to heart. Every Soviet ADA has armor piercing and fragmentation rounds as part of their basic load. Their doctrine stresses not only engagement of aircraft and helicopters, but also direct fire against enemy positions.

The Chechyans (and Afghans) tell stories of platoons of ZSU-23-4s engaging their troops in buildings or in field fortifications.

There is even a report of a regiment of S-60s being deployed against a Afghan village.

[dragoon500ly]

The S-60 is a towed, road-transportable, short to medium-range, single barrel 57mm antiaircraft gun system. It is easily recognized by its four-wheel carriage; long thin tube with multiperforated muzzle brake and its gun shield. The prime mover for the S-60 is the Ural-375 cargo truck, which not only carries the seven man crew as well as its 200 round unit of fire. In additional to its on-carriage optical fire control, the S-60 also employs an off-carriage FLAP WHEEL (max range of 35km) fire control radar, mounted on a separate van.

The S-60 is found in the divisional antiaircraft regiment of Category III tank and motor rifle divisions. However, it is being replaced by the SA-6/SA-8 SAM TELs. It is also found in territorial defense units, especially around airfields. An S-60 regiment consists of four firing batteries, each with six guns and a fire control center.

Tactical AA engagement range is 4,000m with optical guidance and 6,000m with radar guidance. This weapon, while designed to provide defense against aircraft and helicopters, can also be used against lightly armored vehicles.

The four wheel carriage can be leveled and stabilized on jacks to form a point firing base. Loading is accomplished by 4-round horizontally fed clips.

In additions to the single-barreled S-60, a self-propelled version, the ZSU-57-2 (twin S-60s mounted on a T-54 chassis) was deployed in 1957. The ZSU-57-2 is identical, although it cannot be radar controlled. It is now considered obsolete.

[Targan]

Originally Posted by Tegyrius

Speaking of ADA, does anyone remember reports from Chechnya that the Russians were deploying AAA assets in the infantry support role because tank and IFV guns didn't have the elevation to engage Chechen troops on the upper floors of buildings? Or am I imagining that?

I've heard of that tactic being used too and it makes a lot of sense but, as with a great deal of stories about operations in Chechnya, it's anecdotal at best. It's rare to get anything better than 2nd, 3rd or 4th hand accounts of what goes on there.

I know one thing for sure, judging by the photos I've seen of Grozny it would suck hard to live there. Rolling vistas of rubble dunes and building skeletons across significant parts of the city. Bummer.

[Raellus]

I've read at least a couple of credible sources that asserted that the Shilka and Tunguska were favored by the Russians and feared by the Chechen rebels because of their effectiveness in engaging tall structures with accurate and devastating fire.

[ArmySGT.]

I have a Paper written by a Ft Leavenworth Student on the subject.

The Chechen operations. Not very flattering for the Russians. Claims they resurrected from experience in Afghanistan using ADA vehicle because of the Guns elevation of up to +80 degrees. The also learned all over again that the "Zoo" is lightly armored and the T54 chassis not up to contemporary standards.

[Webstral]

The Soviet attitude towards ground-based air defense is a reflection of their ideas about how things get done on the battlefield. Although both Soviet and Western models contained ADA, SAM, and fighters, the emphasis differed. The Soviets put a relatively greater emphasis on ground-based defenses, the numerical superiority of the Soviet air arm notwithstanding. I suspect, though I cannot prove, that the Soviets understood that "positive ground control" hampers effectiveness. The Western powers, on the other hand, laid much greater emphasis on counter-air operations in the enemy's airspace. Great importance was attached to redressing the Soviet numerical advantage by rendering runways unusable. The Soviets seem to have accepted that the Western air forces would achieve a certain amount of success in this regard in that many Soviet aircraft are capable of sucking debris into the intakes and surviving.

The Soviet attitude towards killing versus driving off enemy aircraft is coldly practical. Who cares if he dies, so long as his mission fails? Someone else may get him on the way home. In any event, an aircraft driven off represents a wasted sortie. The Soviets would have said that they could drive to the Channel as long as they were not prevented from executing their operations by NATO interference.

[95th Rifleman]

Originally Posted by Tegyrius

Thought so. Just checkin'.

Hm. Speaking of ADA, does anyone remember reports from Chechnya that the Russians were deploying AAA assets in the infantry support role because tank and IFV guns didn't have the elevation to engage Chechen troops on the upper floors of buildings? Or am I imagining that?

The Israelis used the same tactic with their Vulcans back in lebanon. They took some flak (pardon the pun) for it in the UN but America used her veto to stop any action (not that the israelis listen to the UN anyway).

I think it's technicly ilegal under some treaty but that kind of thing means nothing in war, you use what you have to do the job.

[Matt Wiser]

U.S. Army ADA units in WW II, Korea, and Vietnam used their guns in direct-fire roles against enemy infantry on many occasions. Especially in the Pacific and in Korea. M-42 Dusters in Vietnam broke up many a VC charge on a firebase, and were also used in convoy escort duty.

[dragoon500ly]

When discussing ADA, the argument of which is better SAMs or Guns always pops up. Missile freaks always point out that it takes several thousand rounds to destroy each aircraft, but are missiles really better?

Info is pulled from Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army...

Flipping through peacetime journals and manuals one gets the impression that when a SAM is fired, there is at least a 80% chance of its target being destroyed. But combat is the true test of any weapon system and SAMs.....

In the 1965 Indian-Pakistan War, India fired some 30 SA-2 SAMs and damaged a single Pakistan aircraft.

In the 1967 Six-Day War, Egypt fired 22 SA-2 SAMs and missed with every one.

Vietnam was the acid test of the SA-2 and the results are interesting:
In 1965, 194 SA-2 were fired scoring 11 kills for a 5.7% accuracy rating.
In 1966, 1,096 SA-2s were fired, scoring 31 kills, for a 2.8% accuracy.
In 1967, 3,202 SA-2s were fired, scoring 56 kills, for a 1.75% accuracy.
In 1968 (Jan-Mar), 322 SA-2s were fired, scoring 3 kills for a 0.9% accuracy.
In 1972, 4,244 SA-2s (this may include some SA-3s) were fired, scoring 49 kills for a 1.15% accuracy.

All told, an estimated 9,058 SA-2s were fired, destroying 150 aircraft and achieving a 1.7% accuracy rating.

SA-3s are listed as having seen some service in Vietnam in 1972, I have not been able to find any sources listing number that were fired nor confirmation of the aircraft they shot down.

The SA-6 is the next SAM to have seen combat service in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Egypt fired 840 SA-6s, scoring 20 kills for a 2.3% accuracy rating. Syria also fired a large number of SA-6s, but claim that every missile fired destroyed a Israeli aircraft.

Syria is to be congratulated for destroying every aircraft in the Israeli Air Force (including all training aircraft) within the first three days.

The SA-7 was used in both Vietnam and in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In Vietnam an estimated 2,400 SA-7s were fired scoring 13 kills for a 0.5% accuracy rating. In the Middle East, 4,356 SA-7s were fired, scoring 2 kills for a 0.04% accuracy rating. The chief advantage of the SA-7 was not in its kills, but in the number of aircraft that were damaged; there is no information for the Vietnam War, but in the 1973 War, Israel reported 28 aircraft damaged.

As you can see, the best SAM performance was in 1965 during the Vietnam War, the USAF/USN rapidly modified ECM pods to degrade missile performance and later developed Wild Weasel tactics to engage the missile sites themselves.

So much for the 80% chance of destroying an enemy aircraft.

[Webstral]

Also, ADA and SAM are not an either-or proposition. Each supports the other as part of an integrated air defense that (ideally) includes interceptors.

[Panther Al]

Originally Posted by Webstral

Also, ADA and SAM are not an either-or proposition. Each supports the other as part of an integrated air defense that (ideally) includes interceptors.

I've always called Soviet Air Defense Doctrine to be pretty much a lot like Zone Defense on a theatre scale:

Layered defenses, in depth, with assets in place to cover all possible attack vectors - with the understanding that at the front line itself it is impossible to keep track of who is who, so shoot them *all* down.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Webstral

Also, ADA and SAM are not an either-or proposition. Each supports the other as part of an integrated air defense that (ideally) includes interceptors.

And only an integrated air defense system provides your troops with friendly skies.

I find it interesting that, in spite of all the claims, SAMs really are not as good as a decent fighter.

[Legbreaker]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

So much for the 80% chance of destroying an enemy aircraft.

It's obviously a typo. Should read 80% of all hits.

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

So much for the 80% chance of destroying an enemy aircraft.

It wouldn’t surprise me in the least if there were manufacturers out there claiming an 80% success rate.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

I find it interesting that, in spite of all the claims, SAMs really are not as good as a decent fighter.

True. But, per unit, they are cheaper. That might be one of the reasons the Soviets made some many of them.

[Matt Wiser]

I remember reading in Zaloga's book on Soviet SAMs that the Yugoslavs were angry with the Russians in the '60s after the Soviets sold them the SA-2, claiming an 80% kill rate. They found out via North Vietnam what the real kill rate was and felt the Russians had cheated them.

[raketenjagdpanzer]

Originally Posted by Raellus

I've read at least a couple of credible sources that asserted that the Shilka and Tunguska were favored by the Russians and feared by the Chechen rebels because of their effectiveness in engaging tall structures with accurate and devastating fire.

The Russians have a few "Tank defense vehicles" nowadays (like 4 or 5 for evaluation) that are basically rebuilt T72 hulls with dual autocannon and so forth.

The BMPT

The West Germans also looked at the concept earlier in the mid 70s:

Begleitpanzer 57 AIFSV (Sorry! Link's in German)

(Hee...oh, lookee here! )

[Schone23666]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

When discussing ADA, the argument of which is better SAMs or Guns always pops up. Missile freaks always point out that it takes several thousand rounds to destroy each aircraft, but are missiles really better?

Info is pulled from Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army...

Flipping through peacetime journals and manuals one gets the impression that when a SAM is fired, there is at least a 80% chance of its target being destroyed. But combat is the true test of any weapon system and SAMs.....

In the 1965 Indian-Pakistan War, India fired some 30 SA-2 SAMs and damaged a single Pakistan aircraft.

In the 1967 Six-Day War, Egypt fired 22 SA-2 SAMs and missed with every one.

Vietnam was the acid test of the SA-2 and the results are interesting:
In 1965, 194 SA-2 were fired scoring 11 kills for a 5.7% accuracy rating.
In 1966, 1,096 SA-2s were fired, scoring 31 kills, for a 2.8% accuracy.
In 1967, 3,202 SA-2s were fired, scoring 56 kills, for a 1.75% accuracy.
In 1968 (Jan-Mar), 322 SA-2s were fired, scoring 3 kills for a 0.9% accuracy.
In 1972, 4,244 SA-2s (this may include some SA-3s) were fired, scoring 49 kills for a 1.15% accuracy.

All told, an estimated 9,058 SA-2s were fired, destroying 150 aircraft and achieving a 1.7% accuracy rating.

SA-3s are listed as having seen some service in Vietnam in 1972, I have not been able to find any sources listing number that were fired nor confirmation of the aircraft they shot down.

The SA-6 is the next SAM to have seen combat service in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Egypt fired 840 SA-6s, scoring 20 kills for a 2.3% accuracy rating. Syria also fired a large number of SA-6s, but claim that every missile fired destroyed a Israeli aircraft.

Syria is to be congratulated for destroying every aircraft in the Israeli Air Force (including all training aircraft) within the first three days.

The SA-7 was used in both Vietnam and in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In Vietnam an estimated 2,400 SA-7s were fired scoring 13 kills for a 0.5% accuracy rating. In the Middle East, 4,356 SA-7s were fired, scoring 2 kills for a 0.04% accuracy rating. The chief advantage of the SA-7 was not in its kills, but in the number of aircraft that were damaged; there is no information for the Vietnam War, but in the 1973 War, Israel reported 28 aircraft damaged.

As you can see, the best SAM performance was in 1965 during the Vietnam War, the USAF/USN rapidly modified ECM pods to degrade missile performance and later developed Wild Weasel tactics to engage the missile sites themselves.

So much for the 80% chance of destroying an enemy aircraft.

Does anyone have information on the overall stats on the Iraqi air defense network during the first Gulf War? I know, I should research it myself but I'm feeling lazy. But just offhand, are there any stats or info out there what their overall accuracy and effectiveness was in regards to their SAM and ADA systems?

[dragoon500ly]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature...&v=HaYCjfvHIsQ

[dragoon500ly]

Here's one of a US Quad.50 firing

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature...&v=aczpm9r-K18

[dragoon500ly]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature...&v=o1NHzjz104s

[dragoon500ly]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature...&v=dgB0XGV_xZc

[Matt Wiser]

Find the Gulf War Air Power Survey: it should have what you're looking for. It should be in any decent college library. A couple things are worth mentioning: Baghdad was more heavily defended than Murmansk was, and had twice the density of SAMs and AAA than the most heavily defended targets in Eastern Europe. And yet, total losses to all Iraqi air defense (SAMs/AAA) and MiGs (Scott Speicher) were 49; both fixed-wing and helos.