Somewhat OT: Harriers and Helicopters

[Webstral]

For several years, I have been thinking about some highly speculative military fiction. I want one of the themes to be creativity in problem solving and using the tools at hand. In 2002, several of the European allies had escort carriers that could operate a combination of Harriers and helicopters. France had Jeanne d’Arc, a specialized helicopter carrier, as well as a fleet carrier. I started thinking about whether European light carriers operating Harriers and helicopters could operate against strategic targets ashore. I know the Harriers can carry weapons that would be effective against factories, but naval helicopters are an unknown for me. I know Canada manufactures a type of powerful pod rocket firing on a flat trajectory, but I don’t know how easily the helicopters one would find aboard Jeanne d’Arc, Giuseppe Garibaldi, and other European light carriers could be refitted to carry them. There are many, many unknowns for me about the idea of using Harriers and helicopters to attack industrial and other strategic targets ashore. Any feedback?

[Raellus]

If the enemy is short on local AA defenses (interceptors, SAMs, & AAA) then sure, no problem. If the enemy has a few on MiG-29s on CAP or something like that, then those Harriers would likely be dead meat.

Most naval ASW helicopters can be armed with unguided rockets in a pinch. If they have a land-based counterpart (eg. Seahawk/Blackhawk or Lynx/Sea Lynx), they can likely be fitted to use ATGMs. I mean, if a Blackhawk can carry RAK 052 Oerliken/SURA 81mm rockets, Hughes M-261 19x70mm FFARs, quadruple HOT, TOW, or Hellfires, a Seahawk probably could too. I wonder if SSM like the Penguin or Sea Skua could be modified to attack shore-based targets? That would probably take a lot of doing, if it was possible at all.

According to my copy of Modern Fighting Helicopters* (thank God I didn't get rid of all my Cold War "kid" books), the SA 316B Alouette III, Puma/Super Puma, SA 341/342 Gazelle, AS 250/AS 355 Ecureuil, SA 365 Dauphin/Panther, and Agusta A109A can all carry various rocket pods, gun pods, and ATGMs, as well as several types of ASMs.

*MCH, Bill Gunston & Mike Spick, Salamander Books, c. 1986

[Badbru]

I'd be thinking generally, if it flys then it can drop bombs. From thinking old school WW1 style, Sopwith Camel pilots dropping 60mm mortar rounds out the cockpit to CH46/CH47/CH53 cargo helo's dropping Daisy Cutter FAE bombs down the rear cargo ramp! It'll all depend upon the defence at the target as to success. Most Industrial targets dont respond well to fire and an FAE bomb creates massive fire.

I also rate the Sea Harriers. In the Falklands war the Brits creamed the Argies and the Argies were good pilots with sometimes better weapons. I vaguely recall the Argies using a newer verion of the sidewinder than the Brits were.

Atlantic Conveyer was a Container Cargo ship they flew a Sea Harrier and a CH47 Chinook off of. You don't even need your pocket carrier Webstral.

[95th Rifleman]

If Vietnam proved anything, it proved that you can put almost anything on a helicopter.

Transports can readily do double duty as gunships with a bit of shop time and the Americans have experimented with Chinook gunship concepts similar to the C130.

It's viable, in theory, to mount an artillery piece in the back of a Chinook!

[TicToc]

Professionally I work with military aircraft and utilize them in an attack role. That being said helicopters are not really designed or capable of engaging "strategic" targets. They simply cannot carry the needed ordnance required to really make a distinct effect on that type of target. In addition Strategic targets typically have the highest level of AA defense, and even the most modest AA system can be exceptionally lethal to rotary wing aviation. Helos are best used in a support role, or in attacking tactical targets.

Harriers are great fixed wing birds but have some major limitations. They are incredible small which has a couple of effects. First their fuel capacity is not really very large which translates to a small combat radius and limited playtime. It also is important to note that if they Harrier is conducting VSTOL operations its combat radius is dropped by a significant margin. VSTOL operations burns though fuel in a nearly unbelievable way. The second effect of a small frame bird is limited ordnance. Not only in the number of weapons that it can carry but in the overall weight. Now none of this says that the Harrier cant be used to attack strategic targets it simply means that it isnt really the best option to do it.

[Canadian Army]

Here are a couple things to take in account:

I know Canada manufactures a type of powerful pod rocket firing on a flat trajectory

1.) The rocket pod in question is the CRV7 and here what I found out about the pod: The CRV-7 is a multiple-function rocket weapon. Each pod contains 17 rockets, which are ripple launched together at the target. The rockets are fitted with a high-explosive Armour-piercing warhead for attack on lightly protected installations and ships, or a Kinetic Energy Penetrator, which contains no explosives, but relies on its kinetic energy to destroy armored targets.

2.) There is also a new version the CRV7-PG (Precision Guided); meets the requirement for a low-cost precision weapon the fills the gap between unguided 2.75 inch rockets and more expensive precision weapons such as Hellfire.
Here is a picture of the CRV7-PG:


Uploaded with ImageShack.us

I also found this story on wikipedia:

"The CRV7 had just been introduced into Canadian Air Force service when it was entered as a part of a general competition in France. One part of the competition required the contestants to hit a tower with unarmed rockets. The Canadian pilot hit it on his first try, but aimed as if firing the much lower-powered Mk 40 and was therefore close enough that the rocket motor was still firing. The motor shattered and destroyed the tower, and the pilot was disqualified because the judges refused to believe it was unarmed." (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CRV7)

[Webstral]

Thanks for the feedback, guys.

The limitations on the Harriers’ combat radii and ordnance would be one of the themes of planning creatively. They have shorter legs and carry a lighter load than bomber/attack aircraft of the USN. The USN isn’t available in my make-believe scenario because other operations have soaked up the available fleet carriers. The Europeans are on their own for this one in terms of carriers.

I absolutely agree that ADA would be a serious problem for rotary wing assets. Getting around this problem would be one of the themes of the story. How do you plan your missions and use your assets such that risks are minimized while important targets are damaged, neutralized, or destroyed when the weapons you have available for the job are not at all the ones you’d like to be using?

Thanks for the reference, CA. It seems that the CRV-7 might be suitable for attacking trains, rail yards, factories (under certain conditions or with a huge weight of fire), and other links in the supply chain that might not enjoy the highest level of protection.

The operating assumption is that the attackers enjoy something close to air supremacy because the defending air force has been shot down, grounded for damage or lack of spares, or (in a few cases) destroyed in their shelters by assets that are no longer available for further air action.

[95th Rifleman]

The CVR7 was also adopte by the RAF for their own harriers and jags.

Could be an alternative source of ordnance.

[James Langham]

The Apache can be operated from British ships, some were used this way in Libya. This gives a nice punch to the force.

[95th Rifleman]

Originally Posted by James Langham

The Apache can be operated from British ships, some were used this way in Libya. This gives a nice punch to the force.

A roll on/roll off ferry like the Atlantic conveyor would make a cool "Q" ship packing apaches or ASW helicopters.

[Panther Al]

Originally Posted by Badbru

I'd be thinking generally, if it flys then it can drop bombs. From thinking old school WW1 style, Sopwith Camel pilots dropping 60mm mortar rounds out the cockpit to CH46/CH47/CH53 cargo helo's dropping Daisy Cutter FAE bombs down the rear cargo ramp! It'll all depend upon the defence at the target as to success. Most Industrial targets dont respond well to fire and an FAE bomb creates massive fire.

I also rate the Sea Harriers. In the Falklands war the Brits creamed the Argies and the Argies were good pilots with sometimes better weapons. I vaguely recall the Argies using a newer verion of the sidewinder than the Brits were.

Atlantic Conveyer was a Container Cargo ship they flew a Sea Harrier and a CH47 Chinook off of. You don't even need your pocket carrier Webstral.

I agree that the Harriers did well over the South Atlantic, but do remember they was playing defence against aircraft that was there to attack ships, not play with the defenders any more than they have to: never did any Argie aircraft go out with the specific mission of peeling back the CAP. If they had, I think the record of the Harrier wouldn't have been as good down that way, and they might have done better at knocking back the RN with their attack aircraft.

That said, they did do better than a lot of folks would have guessed before the whole thing got kicked off.

[Sanjuro]

The Task Force went south with, among other things, 100 AIM9-L Sidewinders- then the latest version- the first truly effective all-aspect version. This was one of the unpublicised pieces of US support- on the personal authority of President Reagan, the UK were permitted to take 100 missiles from NATO war stocks, with the US guaranteeing to replace them. The Argentines had no equivalent weapon; it is doubtful if they would have had the training or doctrine to mount an effective CAP-busting mission.

[Canadian Army]

Here are couple of ways the Apache has been used:

"The Apache operated extensively with close air support aircraft such as the Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt II and the USMC's McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier II, often acting as a target designator so the Apache could conserve its own munitions."

"During Operation Desert Storm on 17 January 1991, eight AH-64As guided by four MH-53 Pave Low IIIs destroyed a portion of the Iraqi radar network;the first attack of Desert Storm, an act to allow attack aircraft into Iraq without detection."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_...tional_history

[DigTw0Grav3s]

Relating back to the Falklands, weren't the Argentinian fighters on a very tight fuel schedule? I've read that they were so stretched for fuel that a slight deviation in flight plan would have had the pilot ditching in the drink.

[Legbreaker]

That was discussed here http://forum.juhlin.com/showthread.php?t=3348 a few weeks back.

[copeab]

I've been doing some combat autogyro designs lately for pulp or (very weird) WWII campaigns. The one I posted today is a massive one, with a fuselage about 90% the volume of a B-17 or B-24. 4000 kg of bombs at a speedy 240 kph top speed, but capable of reaching Berlin, Paris or London from inside the Netherlands (I made it a Fokker design as a nod to a Dutchman in a chat room I frequent).

In 1930, such a design would possibly have a chance against contemporary biplane fighters. In 1940 against Bf 109's? The only thing the autogyro can do is to fly low and slow -- tthe bf 109 has to either fly dangerously close to it's stall speed to line up shots or fly at normal combat speed and only have a brief time (briefer than against fixed wing bombers) to fire. The Germans in Bf 109's and FW 190's actually had trouble shooting down Russian U-2/Po-2 biplanes because their top speed was about the same as those fighter's stall speeds. Still, this isn't a trick that the autogyro can keep using for a whole fight.

For modern helicopters ... well, the fighter can just fire off an AAM at distance and not give a damn about relative speed. If guns have to be used, even a F-20 or miG 21 has better fire control systems than a Bf 109. Hell, a 109 could shoot down most modern military helicopters ...

I see helicopters -- even AH-64's -- dying quickly if there are any fighters sent against them and they don't have fighter escort.

[copeab]

I think the Soviets experimented with dropping bombs from helicopters and I din't think there is any technical reason why attack helicopters can't do it. While bomb load will be limited, the accuracy of guided munitions can make up forthe reduced load. OTOH, if a target needs a lot of guided bombs ...

[pmulcahy11b]

Originally Posted by Panther Al

I agree that the Harriers did well over the South Atlantic, but do remember they was playing defence against aircraft that was there to attack ships, not play with the defenders any more than they have to: never did any Argie aircraft go out with the specific mission of peeling back the CAP. If they had, I think the record of the Harrier wouldn't have been as good down that way, and they might have done better at knocking back the RN with their attack aircraft.

That said, they did do better than a lot of folks would have guessed before the whole thing got kicked off.

I don't know how other countries teach Harrier fighting, but the US Marines are heavy into "VIFFing" -- Vectoring In Forward Flight. A Harrier can do things with VIFFing like rolling over and dropping right onto the six of an enemy, push the Harrier into tighter turns, pitch the nose up or down quickly, do short faster climbs, or perform an Immelman easier then a normal aircraft. The downside is that when VIFFing you can easily bleed off airspeed faster than you expected, leading to an unexpected stall, and that the heat signature of the Harrier blooms when VIFFing.

[Webstral]

It seems that my initial thinking is supported by many of the comments here. Harriers aren’t the ideal platform for attacking strategic targets, but they can do the job with limitations. Helicopters are even further from the ideal, but they can move some ordinance to the target. Wise use of these assets would involve steering clear of defended targets. The MI types will have to identify all the nodes in the defender’s strategic assets, and the operations people will have to figure out which nodes can be attacked with the greatest negative impact on the enemy’s disposition with acceptable risk/losses to friendly forces. Nothing new, really. The limits on the air assets means that the supply chain might have to be attacked in unconventional ways.

[95th Rifleman]

Originally Posted by pmulcahy11b

I don't know how other countries teach Harrier fighting, but the US Marines are heavy into "VIFFing" -- Vectoring In Forward Flight. A Harrier can do things with VIFFing like rolling over and dropping right onto the six of an enemy, push the Harrier into tighter turns, pitch the nose up or down quickly, do short faster climbs, or perform an Immelman easier then a normal aircraft. The downside is that when VIFFing you can easily bleed off airspeed faster than you expected, leading to an unexpected stall, and that the heat signature of the Harrier blooms when VIFFing.

Yup, the technique was pioneered by the Royal Navy and battle tested in the Falklands.

It was the reason the Harrier could beat the Mirage. On paper the Mirage had all the advantages but when you take into account the harrier's unique characteristics the Argentines couldn't compete.

[copeab]

Originally Posted by 95th Rifleman

It was the reason the Harrier could beat the Mirage. On paper the Mirage had all the advantages but when you take into account the harrier's unique characteristics the Argentines couldn't compete.

I think if the Harrier was that good, then a whole lot more would be in service. I think it's far more likely that the Harrier's success in the Falklands was due to the Argentines playing into it's strengths and not exploiting it's weaknesses.

Much the same was the case with the Zero early in the war in the Pacific. Allied pilots tried to dogfight it like any other fighter and suffered for t. The two main keys to dealing with the Zero were to not try to out-turn it* or to out-climb it. It's weaknesses? It had virtually no protection for the pilot or fuel tanks (most Allied fighters were better protected). It was slower than many Allied land-based fighters in level flight (the P-40 was 20-30 mph faster, depending on models being compared) and couldn't keep up with them in a dive (the P-40 could out-dive the Zero by about 125 mph).

The Zero was successful during most of 1942 not because it was the best plane, but because Allied pilots played into it's strengths and often failed to exploit it's weaknesses. I think much the same can be said of the Harrier vs Mirage.

* At low speeds, anyway. As the Zero's speed decreased, it's turning ability declined, until at around 350 mph when a P-40 could out-turn it.

[Webstral]

Pilot experience had a lot to do with the balance between the Zero and its American rivals. At the beginning of the war, the Japanese naval pilots had more flying time than their American counterparts. For reasons that I don’t understand, the Japanese were not successful at replacing the pilots lost at Midway. The Japanese filled the cockpits, but their pilots were lacking in flying time. The Marianas Turkey Shoot was more a context between veteran Americans and freshman Japanese than a referendum on airframes.

[copeab]

Originally Posted by Webstral

For reasons that I don’t understand, the Japanese were not successful at replacing the pilots lost at Midway.

The Japanese pilot training program was not geared to producing trained pilots in a fairly short time (unlike the Americans and most other major combatants). I don't think the Japanese every really modified their pilot training program sufficiently to account for having to quickly replace losses.

The Japanese filled the cockpits, but their pilots were lacking in flying time. The Marianas Turkey Shoot was more a context between veteran Americans and freshman Japanese than a referendum on airframes.

by the end of the war (1944-45), the main barrier to Japanese (and German) pilot training was lack of fuel, so the trainees were getting insufficient flight time before being thrown into combat. The Germans had a partial solution by retraining pilots of aircraft types of marginal use late in the war as fighter pilots; I don't know if the Japanese did this.

[Raellus]

Training a combat pilot takes a lot of time and money. Typically, the more time and money spent on pilot training, the more effective the pilot. That's one reason U.S./NATO airforces had so little trouble with the Serbs and Iraqis.

After Midway, the Japanese really didn't have enough of either (time or money/fuel) to replace the experienced core of naval pilots that it lost. At the same time, American pilots were finally beginning to amass the valuable combat experience and technical expertise that would give them the edge against the Japanese flyers.

The Japanese worked around their mid-to-late war limitations by expanding their Kamikaze program. Kamikaze pilots didn't need to learn dogfighting skills so it took a lot less time (and fuel) to train them. Contrary to ridiculous myth, Kamikaze pilots were taught how to land.

Although not particularly well-written, this here book does a really good job describing Kamikaze training and the mentality it took to "volunteer" to kill oneself for Japan and the emperor.

http://www.amazon.com/Dangers-Hour-B...5380386&sr=1-1

[Canadian Army]

On January 17, 1991, Task Force Normandy began its attack on two Iraqi anti-aircraft missile sites. The purpose of this mission was to create a safe corridor through the Iraqi air defense system. The attack was a huge success and cleared the way for the beginning of the Allied bombing campaign.

Task Force Normandy
9 x AH-64 Apache Helicopter
1x UH-60 Black Hawk Helicopter
4x MH-53J Pave Low Helicopter (USAF)

[pmulcahy11b]

Originally Posted by 95th Rifleman

Yup, the technique was pioneered by the Royal Navy and battle tested in the Falklands.

It was the reason the Harrier could beat the Mirage. On paper the Mirage had all the advantages but when you take into account the harrier's unique characteristics the Argentines couldn't compete.

Well, yes and no. As hard as it is to learn how to turn and burn in a conventional fighter, it takes an awesome, outstanding pilot to learn to use VIFF in a dogfight -- it's part of the reason why Harrier trainees have a much higher drop-out and casualty rate than F/A-18 and F-18E pilots do. The Harrier is the "sexy aircraft the Marines never told you about." If you think about it, several of the new fighter designs the past years have had some degree of thrust vectoring or routes to uncoupled flight -- Harrier pilots have been doing that for a good 30 years or more.

[pmulcahy11b]

Originally Posted by Webstral

It seems that my initial thinking is supported by many of the comments here. Harriers aren’t the ideal platform for attacking strategic targets, but they can do the job with limitations. Helicopters are even further from the ideal, but they can move some ordinance to the target. Wise use of these assets would involve steering clear of defended targets. The MI types will have to identify all the nodes in the defender’s strategic assets, and the operations people will have to figure out which nodes can be attacked with the greatest negative impact on the enemy’s disposition with acceptable risk/losses to friendly forces. Nothing new, really. The limits on the air assets means that the supply chain might have to be attacked in unconventional ways.

A prime example of that was the air war against Vietnam. Virtually the entire campaign against North Vietnam was done by using tactical aircraft for strategic bombing. Meanwhile, a good many of the B-52 strikes were against the Ho Chi Minh Trail, NVA, and Viet Cong in South Vietnam.

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by pmulcahy11b

A prime example of that was the air war against Vietnam.

Good point!

Tangentially, it's funny how we lost sight of the lessons that came out of Vietnam at the strategic level. The leaders who fought and won Desert Storm believed in applying overwhelming force AND having an exit strategy. We won the conventional parts of Iraq and Afghanistan, but we had no exit strategies. We got stuck fighting another pair of Vietnams, despite our advances in technology, tactics, and troop handling. We had no idea what it would take to win the peace in either place because we had no idea that Western democracies wouldn't spring out fully grown like Athenas from the heads of the respective Zeuses. Tactical aircraft for strategic bombing, mechanized units for peacekeeping, riflemen for nation-building. Oy!

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Webstral

Good point!

Tangentially, it's funny how we lost sight of the lessons that came out of Vietnam at the strategic level. The leaders who fought and won Desert Storm believed in applying overwhelming force AND having an exit strategy. We won the conventional parts of Iraq and Afghanistan, but we had no exit strategies. We got stuck fighting another pair of Vietnams, despite our advances in technology, tactics, and troop handling. We had no idea what it would take to win the peace in either place because we had no idea that Western democracies wouldn't spring out fully grown like Athenas from the heads of the respective Zeuses. Tactical aircraft for strategic bombing, mechanized units for peacekeeping, riflemen for nation-building. Oy!

In Desert Storm, we stuck to the Powell Doctrine. In Iraq and Afghanistan, we largely ignored it.

I'm teaching my juniors about the Vietnam War this week and the parallels I see to the current war in Afghanistan are staggering.

• An elusive enemy who fights "dirty" (i.e. guerilla tactics) and hides in plain sight (VC=Taliban).
  
• A cross-border refuge that more or less allows the enemy to come and go unmolested (Cambodia/Laos=Pakistan).
  
• Civilian casualties (most unintentional; a few shocking exceptions, deliberate)
  
• Winning most pitched battles, but losing the stomach for the seemingly endless grind and attrition.
  
• No real end in sight- at least none with a very happy ending

.

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by Raellus

In Desert Storm, we stuck to the Powell Doctrine. In Iraq and Afghanistan, we largely ignored it.

The civilian leadership bears the responsibility for most of of the ignoring, and this fact highlights one of the great weaknesses of our system of government. Continuity can be nearly non-existent. When we vote for a leader based on his charisma and positions on tax cuts, we get no guarantees about his willingness to hear unpleasant things from his officials--including his generals. This applies to the Left and the Right. Generals are stuck working with whatever the elected leadership gives them.