OT? A New Cold War

[RN7]

The best way to knock Russia out would be to blind it. i.e. go for its early warning capabilities.

Russia currently has 58 satellites in orbit including 4 early warning and 2 ELINT/SIGINT satellites, and the GLONASS navigational constellation of satellites which is the Russian alternative to America's GPS. I'd be certain that the USAF could disable, destroy or jam any number of Russian satellites in orbit through using kinetic or laser weapons or electronic warfare packages on an X-37B drone spaceplane or by other means. However attacking Russian satellites in orbit will not be on the agenda due to the fact that Russia would probably launch an immediate nuclear strike on the United States.

Attacking ground based installations might be an alternative.

Russia currently has six rocket launching sites.

Baikonur, Kazakhstan
Dombarovsky (Orenburg Oblast) Russia
Kapustin Yar (Astrakhan Oblast) Russia
Plesetsk (Archangelsk Oblast) Russia
Svodbodny (Amur Oblast) Russia
Vostochny (Amur Oblast) Russia

A military attack on them would provoke the same response from Russia as the United States would react to an attack on Cape Canaveral.

Other ground based installations of interest include satellite control centres, tracking centres and long ranged radar systems.

Satellite control centres
Pican-1 Komsomolsk-on-Amur (Khabarovsk Krai) Russia
Serpukhov-15 Kaluga (Kaluga Oblast) Russia
Titov Space Systems Control Centre-Krasnozamensk (Moscow Oblast) Russia

Rocket and satellite tracking centres
Eysk (Krasnodar Krai) Russia
Kluchi-Barnaul (Altai Krai) Russia
Maloyaroslavets (Kaluga Oblast) Russia
Ternopil (Ternopil Oblast) Ukraine
Ulan-Ude (Republic of Buryatia) Russia
Yeniseysk (Krasnoyarsk Krai) Russia
Yevpatoria (Crimea) Ukraine
Zhelezhnogorsk (Krasnoyarsk Krai) Russia
Znamenka (Tambov Oblast) Russia

Long ranged radar systems
Armavir (Krasnodar Krai) Russia
Balkhash (Kargandy Region) Kazakhstan
Baranovichi (Brest Oblast) Belarus
Gaballa (Qabala District) Azerbaijan
Lekhtusi (St Petersburg Oblast) Russia
Mishelevka-Irkutsk (Irkutsk Oblast) Russia
Mukachevo (Zakarpattia Oblast) Ukraine
Olenegorsk (Murmansk Oblast) Russia
Pechora (Komi Republic) Russia
Sevastopol (Crimea) Ukraine
Sofrino (Moscow Oblast) Russia (ABM engagement radar)

Russia's radar and satellite control network is very widely dispersed over Russia's 17,075,400 square kilometres and neighbouring countries. In the event of NATO intervening during a Russian invasion of Estonia and the other Baltic states, attacking systems in Western Russian districts facing Europe and the Arctic would seriously disable Russia's ability to monitor NATO forces and its own airspace. An attack on GLONASS control centres would also disable Russian aircraft, air defence systems and guided weapons. The question is what do you attack them with before Russia catches on and goes ballistic?

[Webstral]

It’s clear that others understand the basic problem of escalation relative to the prospect of fighting in Estonia. One would hope that fear of the unknown would cool the ardor of all parties involved. Unfortunately, the unknown can have the opposite effect. Whereas Putin might be put off an Estonian adventure by the idea that NATO might attack important strategic assets throughout the country pursuant to prosecuting operations in western Russia, he also might decide that the Americans are more likely to be put off taking the steps that might be necessary to liberate Estonia. In the latter case, the uncertainty of the situation becomes an asset because said uncertainty is believed to affect American thinking deeply enough to offer a window of opportunity. I don’t know nearly enough about Putin to make an educated guess about how he will look at the situation.

Getting back to the American response, I want to shift tracks to the ground offensive. Once Russia is in full possession of Estonia, it’s unlikely that anything short of a major ground offensive will put them out. For the same reasons that the liberation of Kuwait obliged Coalition forces to operate in an adjacent portion of Iraq, a liberation of Estonia will involve ground operations in nearby portions of Russia. If the POTUS isn’t prepared to fight on Russian soil, albeit near the Estonian border, then the whole business is off. At the same time, the liberation will take a large contingent of US forces. It’s hard to imagine that the European allies will be willing to put their ground forces into action while the US supplies no ground troops. At the end of the day, it’s going to take US heavy divisions to liberate Estonia. How many is a question for the Pentagon. I can’t imagine that anything less than 8 divisions will suffice, along with 12 or more NATO heavy divisions. Putting 8 US heavy divisions (mechanized infantry or armored) on the ground in Europe would mean mobilizing part of the National Guard, as well as part of the Army Reserve to provide support units.

The timetable would revolve around getting the required number of divisions to their assembly areas in Eastern Europe, along with their supplies. Let’s call the entire US ground force committed to the liberation Seventh US Army for the sake of argument. Seventh Army is going to have to come over in stages, because even during the height of the Cold War the US could sealift no more than a strong corps (4 divisions) at a time. Nowadays, I would not say that any more than 2 divisions could be sealifted in the first lap between CONUS and Europe. I would be willing to be proven incorrect.

Getting the required equipment to Europe might take 3 trips. We probably can expect that each trip would involve more transport shipping as ships are diverted from their normal civilian routes and otherwise brought out of mothballs in the Naval Reserve. I used to know all the facts and figures for reinforcing Europe by sea off the top of my head, but now I don’t. Under the best conditions, the CONUS-Europe leg would take no less than 6 days. That’s assuming the troops are embarking at Northeastern ports like New York or Boston. If they are embarking at Houston (which is the closest major port to Ft. Hood), one can double the time for transit.

Then there is unloading at the other end. I really don’t know how long that would take. I suppose the answer depends in part on which European ports are being used. If US forces are unloading in several European ports, the unloading will go much more quickly. If they are using only 1 port, unloading is going to take longer. How many ports are being used will depend in part on how many and which NATO allies are on board. Also, physical security will be a concern. Whether the Russians oppose the crossing or not, NATO has to assume the Russians might oppose the crossing. While air and submarine attacks against sealift vessels within 100 miles of the Atlantic/North Sea coast of Europe are unlikely, one simply doesn’t know. Also, mine countermeasures may necessitate using fewer ports because there are never enough minesweepers available. It would be unreasonable to assume that the Russians would not take an interest in mining the approaches to Western European ports once they conclude the Americans mean business about liberating Estonia.

Once the unloading is complete, there is the return trip. The mere prospect of Russian air or submarine attack on shipping in the North Atlantic will compel a convoy system, which will mean that the ships unloaded first will wait for the ships unloaded last before heading back across the Atlantic. Thus a round trip from New York might take 3 weeks. A trip starting in Texas and ending in New York could take a month. At the end of this first reinforcement effort, Seventh US Army may have received 2 divisions, plus whatever assets were airlifted in. The number of divisions could be lower.

While the first reinforcement mission is underway, we should expect the bean counters to have been doing their jobs. Other heavy divisions identified for the mission in Europe will be en route to their ports of embarkation. This is where the exact timing of things is in the hands of the logistics types. How long does it take to move 4th ID from Ft. Carson to whichever port is going to be used? The best ports to use are going to be the East Coast ports, preferably as far north as possible: Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York City, Boston. Rail capacity, port capacity, available shipping, convoy mandates, and other factors will determine which divisions and what supplies are loaded when and where. It may be that after the first flotilla returns, the USN has the assets available to send 2 separate convoys.

Mobilization of the National Guard divisions needed to beef up Seventh US Army will have to be factored in as well. Ideally, each mobilized division would receive 90 days of training before being sent overseas. It’s hard to see how that will happen. I suspect whichever divisions are sent will get more like 45-60 days of training before shipping out to Europe. These divisions will go in the third wave of sealift.

Once a given heavy division is on dry land in Europe, it will have to go forward to Poland at the minimum. This will take some time.

The point of all this is that getting Seventh US Army ready to push the Russians out of Estonia will take some time. I’d be very surprised if 8 US heavy divisions were ready for action in anything less than 90 days. Everything would have to go perfectly for that to happen. Depending on a variety of factors, this could take 6 months—maybe more. Both sides will be very aware of this timeframe. If the Russians decide that NATO isn’t bluffing, they may go to full mobilization. It’s hard to say just how things will go at this juncture. The willingness of the Russians to stay in the fight will depend on what has been going on in the air war up to that point and on the willingness of the other NATO partners to stay the course with the US.

[jester]

You've got the bottle necks of shipping.

The American Merchant Marine and the civilian ships that support the military for such operations have been chronically undermanned. About 8 years ago it came out that in order to pass their inspections they would fly personnel from the East Coast to the West Coast so they could pass. And that is at a moderate to low operational tempo, not one of full mobilization.

So, where do we get the personnel and now the vessels for this increased shipping? As you said, civilian assets may work for personnel and even light vehicles. But your heavy lift to move your armor I doubt will be able to be shipped on the standard car carrier. So, armored units may be a bit on the light side or take longer to form.

Sadly, pulling civilian or retired will give you a lag of skill set until they get up to par as well.

Bringing vessels out of mothballs. Depending on its level of mothball status could mean at the least several months in a shipyard to almost rebuilding the vessel. Sadly in a time of limited drydock and shipyard space since we've closed to many we no longer have those assets of skilled people. (Same for our aviation capacity)

Rail capacity....again, the bottleneck of the railheads. I know how long it takes to load a mech brigade on railcars. A division, a lot longer. The space inside the railhead and the cars available and where they are stored is an issue while the train is being assembled. Then the nightmare of keeping those trains moving cross country....even though military traffic always has right of way. We hit the port facilities. The rail head for off loading.

In ports, we have civilians and their assets working with military at off loading. 2 new crews working together who have not done so before. And again SPACE. How many vehicles and conex boxes belonging to a Brigade or a Division? You will need to clear out vast areas of your ports to make room for this equipment as well as for a security aspect. I can see the ports being slightly more organized than a Chinese fire drill.

Next, convoy, do we have the assets for that in theater and to conduct other operations? And do we have the skills? I recall about 2 years ago, an unknown submarine managed to make it well within a carrier battlegroup....they think the submarine was Chinese. It brought a big question about how our antisubmarine capability has degraded. And it must be asked, not just using Cold War era equipment, but troops who just don't have the skillset and experience.

And lastly, Russia is building up its submarine force again. I can not help but think they are well aware, the easiest way to fight is to keep them from landing. If you can keep your foe from even setting foot on land you've won! With that mindset, I could think they would put effort in keeping forces from crossing the Atlantic. Granted, that goes on the theory that there is not a lot of political bluff that allows for a troop buildup before anything actualy happens.

Another issue, bluff. Or good ol Cold War Brinkmanship. Push it to the limit and see how far you can go. Which in my view is what ol Vlad is doing. The gamble, is a small former block country that has limited ties or common history with Western Europe worth Nato going off? Come on, its only Estonia or Latvia...both are smaller than Los Angeles, they're not worth it. The test was Georgia, and then Ukraine neither Nato members true but a good test of the Wests resolve. Now, if both had completed their admission to Nato, would things have been different?

[Webstral]

The problem with writing off a member of NATO—any member of NATO—is that the credibility of the United States as an ally goes into the toilet as a consequence. One can debate whether bringing a country like Estonia into NATO was wise, given the difficulty of getting forces there and supporting them. Now the deal is done, though. Either we commit, regardless of the inconvenience of doing so, or our metaphorical stock tanks. If we fail to commit the resources of NATO, including the United States, to defending the territorial integrity of a member of NATO, then the whole arrangement comes into question. At that point, we might as well disband NATO for all it will be worth.

The political price to be paid by a POTUS who effectively negates NATO by failing to live up to the country’s obligations under treaty would be enormous beyond measure. His political opponents would call for an impeachment, and they might actually bring it off. It would be very, very difficult to see how he could expect his party to see much success in the 2016 elections unless his party joined hands with the other major party to force the POTUS to honor our treaty obligations. What a nightmare that would be. And then the government of every other country that has signed a treaty with the US (bilaterally or otherwise) would wonder whether the treaty was worth the paper it was printed on.

I’m not a gambling man, but I’d put the mortgage money down on an American commitment to Estonia. In my mind, the real questions revolve around efficacy and an ability to marshal the political will to embark upon the biggest war since WW2. The American public will be all up in arms at first. Once the initial excitement wears off and the National Guard and Reserves begin getting called up, the electorate will begin to realize that this is more than just good TV. And then when someone broaches the idea of increasing taxes to pay for the biggest war since WW2, the voters will suffer a distinct flagging of enthusiasm. So it will be up the POTUS to set expectations up to and including taxes, full mobilization, and even a draft as the USAF is fighting its first combat missions over the Baltics. I hope the appropriate staffs have been working on scenarios, because the first 12 hours after Russian troops cross the border are going to be an important time to say and do the right things.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Webstral

The American public will be all up in arms at first. Once the initial excitement wears off and the National Guard and Reserves begin getting called up, the electorate will begin to realize that this is more than just good TV. And then when someone broaches the idea of increasing taxes to pay for the biggest war since WW2, the voters will suffer a distinct flagging of enthusiasm. So it will be up the POTUS to set expectations up to and including taxes, full mobilization, and even a draft as the USAF is fighting its first combat missions over the Baltics. I hope the appropriate staffs have been working on scenarios, because the first 12 hours after Russian troops cross the border are going to be an important time to say and do the right things.

I think that the reaction will be mixed. I doubt that more than 10% of the population of the U.S.A. could point Estonia out on a map, even given the context clue that it borders Russia. And like you said, once the bills start to come in, or talk of reinstituting the draft begins, much of any enthusiasm does exist will probably fly out the window.

In terms of ground fighting in Estonia, NATO would immediately be at a several disadvantages. Even given the best-case scenario that NATO could get its ready reaction force (its exact current composition is unknown but it is believed to consist of one or two brigades of mostly light troops each from the U.S., U.K., Germany, and Poland) to Estonia before its own military is annihilated, it would immediately be outnumbered and outgunned by the Russians. NATO's supply lines would also be much longer. and NATO troops would be further from its air cover/support. It's unlikely that this relatively small, light military force, at the end of a long, vulnerable logistics chain, could do much more than slow the Russians down.

If the Russians were able to defeat the NATO RRF, would NATO member nations approve of a larger, stronger campaign to liberate Estonia? It's hard to say. One could argue that an early defeat could galvanize NATO members/supporters and stiffen their backbones. It could also go the other way, with an early defeat causing NATO members to lose their stomach for further combat, especially if the Russians offer to negotiate a settlement. Said settlement would undoubtedly lead to at least part of Estonia changing hands and ending up under the Russian flag.

This is why I think that the NATO RRF is a bad idea, in practice. It's not strong enough to stop a determined, large-scale Russian combined-arms offensive, and its loss could jeopardize further military measures to liberate the afflicted Baltic member state(s). ATM, it's not much more than a token gesture- a sop to those crying out in the Baltic wilderness.

The only real guarantee of Baltic security is basing NATO heavy brigades there. I'd be willing to wager a large sum that even just serious talk of doing such a thing will provoke a serious escalation in the region, likely leading to some sort of preemptive military action by the Russians.

As a side note, I've heard that, like in 1914 and 1941, the rail gauges between Poland and Lithuania change, complicating any ground trans-shipment of NATO heavy brigades from Germany/Poland to the upper Baltic States.

[Webstral]

The chicken hawks will be all over it. We can count on certain media outlets to pump as much oxygen as possible into whatever feeble flames exist among their viewership. One party, which shall go nameless, will very happily spend tax dollars in whatever quantity can be financed by sales of bonds to those of means on the consumption of machines and supplies for war with Russia. A certain segment of the population will be delighted that the Russians are the bad guys again.

I agree that reactions will be mixed, overall. A handful of setbacks during the buildup to the main ground offensive will test national commitment. While I agree that few Americans know where Estonia is right now, after they see it on the screen 30+ times daily for a month or so, the general populace may be able to distinguish Estonia from Rhode Island. In any event, I think even people who would not be inclined to go to war can understand the value of honoring a treaty, a contract. After all, if the federal government can back out of honoring the most fundamental NATO obligation, then they back out of honoring any obligation under whatever pretext comes to hand.

[Raellus]

All good points. I guess I probably couldn't have pointed out Kuwait on a map back in '91 (I was 16 or so) before the Iraqis invaded.

My second point still stands, though. If the NATO RRF is deployed and gets its butt kicked, will the public stand for round two, especially if it means full mobilization (including the draft) is put into effect, tax hikes to pay for a large-scale conventional war, etc.? Instead of a shooting war, we might be looking at a new Berlin crisis situation, with a new wall and highly militarized border zone going up to separate Russia's new conquest and its nearest free neighbor.

[Webstral]

If NATO were to insert a rapid reaction force, it would get its butt kicked. In some ways, that would be part of the point. The 82nd Airborne could have accomplished nothing more than being turned into road kill by the Republican Guard if Hussein had invaded Saudi in 1990. The American command knew this and chanced it anyway. It was a supreme act of chicken. If Hussein had annihilated the 82nd Airborne, the leadership was gambling that the American public would demand payback.

Obviously, not everybody would be on board for a crusade to liberate Estonia. What would be interesting is how the forces that be would manage getting people on board and keeping them on board through tax hikes, bond drives, and a draft of some sort. The Military-Industrial Complex would go all in, obviously. How other interest groups would respond would be very interesting to watch. People who normally have a knee jerk reaction to tax increases would have to be convinced, co-opted, or distracted. People who would be opposed to a major war, which is what this probably would become, would have to be silenced or discredited. The military manpower reserve and their parents would have to be motivated.

I think the manner in which the air war was waged and represented (not necessarily in that order) would be important factors. Intrepid reporters operating in occupied Estonia would have to send out word of Russian atrocities. The willingness of the noble Poles to go to the mat with the evil Russian aggressors would have to be played up. Putin's likeness to Hitler would have to be ridden for all the mileage it was worth. If these things could be done--if the people doing the fighting and paying for the fighting could be convinced that this was a chance to do what Britain and France and the rest of the world failed to do when Hitler could have been managed--then it might be possible to get a majority on board and keep them on board for the necessary effort.

[jester]

Here is another question on this line.

Have we updated out plans for a Russian offensive west? Or, are we still using the Fulda Gap scenario that we used when my uncle manned a bridge facing the then Soviets in years after WWII? Over many a glass of port he would explain that his unit, (Radio relay and engineer) had 1 job. Blow that bridge. And as was explained to them buy them 1 day. In reality, they would of done their job is they'd of bought a couple hours.

Somehow, I am not confident the plans have been kept up.

Also, lets not forget that the Russians have used infiltration for many of their invasions. In A-stan they came in initialy as civilian aircraft if I recall right. And well, in Ukraine they are only soldiers on leave doing it on their own....those Russian soldiers who have been captured that is. The rebels who speak with distinct regional dialects are locals

So, who is to say, they will not send in people from the GRU to stir the pot? And then claim it is an "INTERNAL" issue. So they can send in humanitarian aid and peacekeepers to protect the ethnic Russians? Hmmm, where have we heard this scenario before? Does it end with "Good luck, you're on your own?"

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by jester

So, who is to say, they will not send in people from the GRU to stir the pot? And then claim it is an "INTERNAL" issue. So they can send in humanitarian aid and peacekeepers to protect the ethnic Russians? Hmmm, where have we heard this scenario before? Does it end with "Good luck, you're on your own?"

I'd considered this option too, since the Russians have a fairly proven track record of employing infiltration and destablization tactics. If it ain't broke, why fix it? The following article suggests that's where Russia is heading.

http://www.businessinsider.com/bill-...rategy-2014-11

I'm kind of on the fence now, because said tactics employed against/within a NATO member nation would very probably lead to the deployment of NATO counter-insurgency forces being to Estonia. This would up the stakes and complicate any planned follow-up conventional invasion on the part of Russia. If tensions rise gradually, NATO would be given time to strengthen its conventional military presence in the region; this might spoil Russia's chances of seizing the territory by force. I think that Putin would balk at the presence of a couple of NATO heavy brigades. On the other hand, if NATO has combat troops in action near Estonia's border with Russia, even if it's only a few dozen SOF operators, Putin can frame the situation as NATO aggression, and use it as a casus belli, spinning any Russian invasion into an act of self-defense.

Given recent Russian defense appropriations, I don't think that the Russians are content to limit themselves to unconventional means in order to gain the territory that they covet. For the last few years, Russia's been working on building a conventional military that can compete with, or even defeat, NATO's capabilities.

[jester]

We also have one other thing.

CHANCE!

Dumb luck....bad luck.

As Senator Fred Thompson said when he was staring as the carrier commander in Clancys "Hunt for Red October" "this will get out of hand and we'll be lucky to live through it." or something similar.

Remember, how Arch Duke Ferdinand was killed?

The assasins botched the job three or four times. And one of the assasins failed, was in a sandwich shop, when the driver of the car, lost turned around right infront of him. Dumb luck.

Forces, operating in close proximity who are pumped up. As they say, "stuff happens." Either by accident, or by someone who has an axe to grind...after all the East/West are our age old enemies and lets finaly settle things! All it takes is a wildcard. And before you know it, we're slipped over the brink.

[stormlion1]

A question will be if the Russians will have learned the lesson the Iraqi's failed to heed before the first Gulf War. Up until the start of operations the Iraqi Army could have sweeped down out of Iraq and Kuwait and taken Saudi Arabia and put everything we had put in out right fast. They gave us time to prepare. Would the Russians be that dumb to allow us time to ship all that gear over? I have a feeling they wouldn't. There would be suspicious sinking's, accidents, Power outages, industrial sabotage at ports, rail lines, etc. No matter what happens it won't be up to the US to be the leading edge, but the members of NATO inside Europe. The chronically undermanned, under equipped NATO members in Europe.

[Webstral]

I agree that unconventional warfare is not the strong point for US forces. The US Army and its support mechanisms are optimized for a high tempo war in which stupendous and highly accurate firepower combine with speed of action to destroy the enemy in an updated version of blitzkrieg. Shock and awe is not a bad title for this, regardless of what one thinks about how OIF turned out for everyone. The Army is so specialized for this mission that even after 8 years of OIF and 13 years of OEF the force remains oriented on fighting and winning this kind of war. The downside is that we don’t focus as much on other areas.

Of course, this doesn’t mean that the Europeans have to look at things the same way. It’s entirely possible for a European counter-insurgency force to operate within a ring of American conventional combat power.

Tactics have to reflect intent. It all comes down to what Putin really hopes to get at a price he’s willing to pay. There’s what Russia wants, consciously or otherwise, which is to reabsorb the Baltic Republics for their population, economy, and theater depth. Moving the border of Russia back to northern Poland would be a tremendous boon to Russian security. The question is one of method and cost. If Putin can get any territory rich in ethnic Russians back into the Russian fold, he will be a hero. If he can be seen to back NATO off or at least stand up to them, he will be a hero. If he can win a military engagement with NATO at a reasonable cost in treasure and, more importantly, Russian lives, he will be a superhero. Will he go for the smaller victory at a smaller cost, or will he go for the big win at great risk? I don’t the man well enough to make any predictions in this regard. It should be noted, though, that the little win is not necessarily a stepping stone to the big win.

If Putin decides to go the route of fomenting unrest in Estonia pursuant to annexing the Estonian Sudetenland, he makes some gains for some losses. This would be an extended effort. As others have pointed out, the likelihood of NATO troops being introduced for the purpose of peacekeeping, policing, counterinsurgency, or whatever one wants to call the mission grows with every incident between ethnic Russians and ethnic Estonians in Estonia. Once NATO troops go in, the option for a quick conquest of Estonia with minimal risk of a wider war with NATO goes off the table. Whatever contempt one may have for our European allies, I think it’s unreasonable to expect that they would shrug off a Russian diplomatic effort supposedly conducted for the purpose of deciding the fate of Russian Estonia that turns into an outright invasion and annexation of all Estonia which kills or captures a sizeable body of NATO troops assigned to peacekeeping missions in Estonia, a NATO member. This would be classic Russian thuggery, were Putin to go this route. In some ways, a diplomatic effort that ends in an invasion would be even worse than an invasion out of the blue because of the false pretenses and deaths among NATO troops sent to Estonia during the unrest. As a former KGB man, Putin would understand this.

So if Putin goes for annexing Russian Estonia through diplomacy (following fomented unrest, etc., etc.) he is tacitly taking the prospect of a flash invasion followed by a settlement off the table. This is not to say he couldn’t invade and win at any given point along the way. However, the first video of NATO troops being machine gunned by Russian fighting vehicles and/or the first NATO vehicles aflame with NATO troops hanging out the doors/hatches will inflame public opinion. While some will take this as evidence that NATO membership for Estonia was a bad idea to begin with and that Estonia ought to be cut loose, I believe a majority will view as an act of war hostile action against their troops by foreign troops as said friendly troops conduct lawful missions on the soil of an allied state. Public opinion does not suffer this sort of thing well, regardless of the place or time. History is replete with examples of how an aggressor thought a little bloodshed and an early setback would terrorize the other side, only to discover that the other side became more resolute, not less. Again, as a former KGB man Putin would be more sensitive to this trend than a former military man.

If Putin is willing to settle for a modest boost to his standing among his people, such that might accrue from adding Russian Estonia to Russia by diplomatic means, then he can go the route of deploying agitators and engaging in the extended theatrics that accompanied splitting the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia. This is not without its downside, though. The Europeans are even more likely than we are to see Hitler’s methodology at work. The other Baltic Republics and Poland are quite likely to demand a summit with NATO and demand to know whether membership in NATO is worth a flying [expletive deleted]. If NATO replies that membership does count for something, the newest members naturally will ask for proof. It’s hard to see that said proof will not result in the forward deployment of NATO assets. Thus far, NATO has avoided thus under, I believe, the thesis that moving significant numbers of NATO troops into Poland in a replication of the garrison forces of West Germany would antagonize the Russians unnecessarily. Whether this policy would hold up under the stress of Russian demands on Estonian territory and subsequent Balto-Polish demands that NATO show the colors more flagrantly is an unknown.

Tangentially, it’s possible that the more thoughtful Europeans might make some arrangement to forestall Russian territorial demands on the remaining Baltic territory and/or Poland by moving the remaining Russians out. The Russian minority in Poland is very small in numbers and as a percentage of the population, but the number in Latvia is very significant. In Latvia, more than 500,000 Russians comprise more than a quarter of the population. If Putin is able to absorb Russian Estonia, there is no reason to believe Latvia won’t be the next target. If Putin’s goal is to bring ethnic Russians back to Russia (as he has stated in the past), and if doing so nets him political gains, then it may be possible for the EU to provide funds to “buy out” Russians in Latvia and move them to Russia, among other possible ideas. If, on the other hand, Putin wants to capture territory or believes he needs to capture territory, then any buy-out/move-out scheme will meet resistance.

Swinging back the other way, I find it hard to believe that Putin wants outright war with the West. If he were hungry for war, he could have invaded Ukraine already. This would have been a good way to put his forces through their paces before starting the big show. I’m sure a pretext for war with Ukraine could have been found or fabricated. It’s entirely possible that Putin as a Russian could find himself in a position to believe that war with the West is a necessity for creating a better territorial situation in northwest Russia and far southern Russia.

[Raellus]

I agree with you, Stormlion1, but I wonder whether both sides wouldn't try to keep the conflict regional. Web already pointed out some practical issues with this, and I tend to think that it would quickly boil out of control, but, at first, I think that both sides would try to limit the scope and intensity of the fighting. I think Russia would frame it as an internal issue, claiming that large chunks of Estonia and Latvia are geographically, historically, and ethnically Russian. It's very much the same position they've held regarding the Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, and other bits and pieces of the former Russo-Soviet Empire. The idea here would be to keep the conflict contained because I don't think that either side is ready to engage in a large-scale conventional war, and the spector of nuclear war which looms over any potential armed conflict between atomic rivals.

To illustrate what I mean by keeping it regional, I think that Russia might not attempt to inderdict shipments of U.S. troops and material in the Atlantic, at least not initially. Instead, I think they would do all that they could to stop said shipments within the territorial waters/econ. exclusion zone of the affected Baltic States, focussing on the Gulf of Riga. Now, if the U.S. started striking targets within Russia proper, I think that all bets would be off. Similarly, if it looked like NATO had the will to launch a large-scale liberation operation in support of the Baltic States, then perhaps Moscow would green light the wider interdiction of the means said op.

In my soon-ready-to-be-shared (I hope) WWIII scenario, the war starts in Estonia but expands quickly, and the Russians have a big hand in that.

[Raellus]

First off, Web, let me just say that I find your posts (forum-wide, but in this threat, in particular) thoughtful, erudite, and well-written. For whatever it's worth, I find that I agree with most of your points.

I don't see a buy-out/move-out scheme happening. It's just too reminiscent of the ethnic cleansing campaigns of the 1930-'40s and the more recent Balkans conflict.

Second, Ukraine and Estonia are two different beasts. Ukraine is a much larger, more populous nation, and, at its westernmost extent, has a much longer shared border with established NATO nations. Estonia is small, even weaker militarily, and only borders one other small, similarly weak NATO nation. An outright annexation of Estonia is much more plausible, militarily, logistically, economically, and politically, than an outright annexation of Ukraine. I'm not saying that the Russians couldn't do it, but it would be more difficult, more expensive, and probably more diplomatically damaging, despite the fact that Ukraine doesn't have any NATO ties.

[Raellus]

This is more like it. Unfortunately, the article doesn't say which "Eastern European country" the tanks will be based in.

http://www.inquisitr.com/1637309/u-s...an-aggression/

[RN7]

The brunt of any initial NATO response to a Russian invasion of Estonia would likely be borne by the German and Polish armies. The British Army would probably contribute their two armoured brigades still based in Germany, but other NATO members would likely only contributing some rapid reaction infantry battalions or the odd armoured and artillery regiment. However even the German and Polish armies have shrunk dramatically in size over the past two decades. The German Army has downsized to just two armoured divisions, one special operations division, and some German infantry and support contingents in European multinational formations such as the Eurocorps. The Polish Army fields just three divisions and some independent brigades and regiments. On mobilisation NATO nations would likely begin to reactivate formations that were disbanded in the drawdown after the end of the Cold War.

The US Army would have to reactivate forces that were disbanded in the drawdown after the end of the Cold war. Unlike in the Cold War when there was nine US Army divisions based in Germany along with a bunch of brigades and cavalry regiments, today there are just three US Army combat units in the whole of Europe; the 2nd Cavalry Regiment and the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade in Germany and the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy. There are some air defence, engineer, signals, military police and training units in Germany, but nothing even resembling the component of even one heavy division. The US Army still maintains POMCUS equipment sets in Europe, although no known ones remain in Germany. POMCUS military material configured to fill four brigades under Combat Equipment Group-Europe (CEG-E) are located at four sites in the Netherlands, and two sites in Belgium and Luxembourg. CEG-E also maintained a field artillery battalion set in Norway. During the Cold War POMCUS held equipment sets for four divisions in Europe.

In the 1980's the US planned to rapidly reinforce NATO with land and air forces by using US and NATO ships and aircraft. Within ten days of hostilities with the Warsaw Pact the US planned to reinforce Europe with over 5 US Army divisions,1 US Marine brigade and 60 tactical fighter squadrons. 300 USAF transports were earmarked to land US troops in Europe within 24 hours of hostilities. 80 NATO military transports and 300 US civil airliners were added to this fleet to transport additional troops to Europe within 72 hours of hostilities. Within 12-15 days of hostilities 50 US military sealift and Atlantic Ready Reserve Force ships would arrive with the first major shipment of heavy equipment. From one to three months after hostilities up to 240 US National Defence Reserve Fleet and US civil cargo ships would be assigned to transport US forces across the Atlantic, with another 600 NATO civil cargo ships. An additional 19 US Army divisions and 20 brigades were available for deployment in the US along with 4 Marine Divisions, 74 USAF tactical fighter squadrons, 3 Marine air wings, a Canadian Army brigade and two Canadian tactical fighter squadrons.

IISS Military Balance lists the US Army (including NG and Reserve) with 10 combat divisions (2 armored, 5 mechanised), 4 combat brigades (2 armored, 1 mechanised) and 2 armored cavalry regiments excluding special forces and aviation, artillery and support brigades and battalions in 2013. There are also 3 Marine divisions. The USAF also has 368 heavy and medium transport aircraft in active service, and the US Navy has 29 principal amphibious ships with 12 more in the naval inactive fleet. US Navy Military Sealift Command operates 34 ships in the combat logistic force, 30 maritime preposition ships, 18 strategic sealift ships (at 4 days readiness), 16 special mission ships, and 14 service support ships. The National Defence Reserve Fleet operates 82 ships, with 48 ships in the Ready Reserve Force (30 days readiness).

The USAF still has substantial combat assets in Europe with the Third Air Force in Germany, Britain and Italy, with support forces based across Europe. The USAF also maintains Munitions Support Squadrons (MUNSS) at geographically separated units in Germany, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands. In the event of a war today with Russia over Estonia, the main US contribution to a NATO liberations of Estonia would be the USAF at least at first. The first US heavy land forces to be deployed against the Russians might now be US Marines before the US Army can bring its force to bare.

[Raellus]

Maybe NATO doesn't enjoy quite the edge in the air that we thought we did...

http://www.thedailybeast.com/article...st+Articles%29

[Webstral]

An East-West confrontation that goes hot will have surprises for everyone.

[bobcat]

Originally Posted by RN7

What non-nuclear EMP technology does NATO use and what is it's range?
What computer viruses would NATO use to degrade Russian command and air defence systems?
What defences against Russian computer viruses do NATO command and air defence systems have?

these three questions are easiest to answer.
1: We have a number of systems of varying range available. most are generally used to test equipment for combat suitability(you don't want to feild gear that can be shut down with a COTS pinch). but the rusians likely do the same testing which means that attack mode is out of the question.

2: Officially we do not engage in cyber warfare.

3: We do have countermeasures for if networks are taken out by viruses, surgical strikes, environmental factors, etc. unfortunately IMHO we do not train as effectively as we should to conduct missions in this manner.

in summary NATO capabilities in these areas need significant training. mostly training senior leaders to allow subordinate commanders to actually make decisions. but that's always the case for every unit. which is why big army sucks at unconventional warfare.

[bobcat]

and while everyone is considering the cost-benefit ratios for conventional military strike let me remind you the US and the UK have a large number of military age males that fight dirty. be it sneak into the Cosmodrome and arrange for the propellant and oxidizer tanks cross feed and ignite which would prevent launches of space based systems. or a number of very small cells attacking Russian airfields(a little bit of the right compounds properly dispersed could destroy a large number of aircraft in short order.). even dropping off sabotaged ammo in ASP's could destroy moral. Less than 1000 men with the right training could cripple an entire army faster than the first gulf war.

and while everyone is worried about how long it would take to field heavy units in Europe let us not forget the lessons our Finnish friends taught us during the winter war. you don't need tanks to fight tanks in the mountainous regions of Eastern Europe. small squads roaming the hills at will could easily damage/destroy road-bound heavy armor. whether they fight with javalins and goose guns, or IED's and my favorite drink. when in rough terrain the tank is useless.

[RN7]

Originally Posted by bobcat

these three questions are easiest to answer.
1: We have a number of systems of varying range available. most are generally used to test equipment for combat suitability(you don't want to feild gear that can be shut down with a COTS pinch). but the rusians likely do the same testing which means that attack mode is out of the question.

And what are these systems? Have they been weaponised? What is their effective range? How would they be deployed against Russian forces? ie on aircraft, missile or on land?

Originally Posted by bobcat

2: Officially we do not engage in cyber warfare.

3: We do have countermeasures for if networks are taken out by viruses, surgical strikes, environmental factors, etc. unfortunately IMHO we do not train as effectively as we should to conduct missions in this manner.

in summary NATO capabilities in these areas need significant training. mostly training senior leaders to allow subordinate commanders to actually make decisions. but that's always the case for every unit. which is why big army sucks at unconventional warfare.

I have to say this doesn't fill me with too much confidence.

[RN7]

Originally Posted by bobcat

and while everyone is considering the cost-benefit ratios for conventional military strike let me remind you the US and the UK have a large number of military age males that fight dirty. be it sneak into the Cosmodrome and arrange for the propellant and oxidizer tanks cross feed and ignite which would prevent launches of space based systems. or a number of very small cells attacking Russian airfields(a little bit of the right compounds properly dispersed could destroy a large number of aircraft in short order.). even dropping off sabotaged ammo in ASP's could destroy moral. Less than 1000 men with the right training could cripple an entire army faster than the first gulf war.

And how would all these commando's be deployed into ultra paranoid and heavily defended Russian territory undetected? And how would they then travel across the vast distances that is Russia to target different bases and facilities widely dispersed across the length of Russia and allied territory?

Originally Posted by bobcat

and while everyone is worried about how long it would take to field heavy units in Europe let us not forget the lessons our Finnish friends taught us during the winter war. you don't need tanks to fight tanks in the mountainous regions of Eastern Europe. small squads roaming the hills at will could easily damage/destroy road-bound heavy armor. whether they fight with javalins and goose guns, or IED's and my favorite drink. when in rough terrain the tank is useless.

But Estonia and the Baltic states, and Byelorussia, and most of the Western Ukraine and Russia and also the northern half of Poland and Germany are located on the Great European Plain which extends from the Pyrenees Mountain in France to the Ural Mountains in Russia. Its the largest mountain-free land form in Europe and is renowned tank country!

[Webstral]

RN7 is absolutely correct that the Winter War experience will be very difficult to replicate in the Baltics. With the right number of troops doing the right thing the right way, Baltic urban areas can be turned into very hard nuts to crack. Under the current circumstances, however, the Russians will overwhelm the Baltics at will.

Getting 1000 special operations types into position to hit dozens of targets simultaneously would be hard enough if we were talking about attacking the DR Congo. Attempting to put them into position in western Russia would be an act of folly. If we were not currently at war, the Russians would view such an act as an act of war. If we were at war, I think the challenges of penetrating Russian airspace on a scale necessary to get these people to their drop/landing zones would be insuperable barring air supremacy. Getting them in overland… It’s hard to imagine that SACEUR would treat such a priceless resource so carelessly. Then there’s the little matter of getting them back out, unless one is content to have them killed or captured.

This is not to say that some special operations actions cannot be undertaken. But they can hardly substitute for action by the USAF and allied air forces.

[bobcat]

sending 1000 "exchange students" to russia would actually be rather easy on a modern timeline. now doing so at the height of the cold war would take a bit more planning but it's doable. and lets face it you don't need tier 1 operators for that kind of work, any appropriately trained engineering or chemistry student will do. heck i've caused similar havok with POG's playing OPFOR (lets face it nobody ruins your day like army finance, nobody).

as for locking down the Baltic cities yes it would require a bit of warning before the balloon goes up. but it doesn't matter whether your in mountains, forest, deserts, or those rainy plains in Spain light forces are far better at holding ground than heavy armor. and tank country also is artillery country. it doesn't matter if soviet SHORAD can keep the A10's off if you've got an FO dressed like a shrubbery directing 105MM DPICM onto their armor and supporting infantry. especially if his rather bored PSD(those infantry dudes) remembered to bring the ATGM's that the FM's keep saying are supposed to be pushed down to platoon level.

not to say that tank's aren't useful it just that they are better suited to offense rather than defense. so getting them on site while we're just holding the line isn't as critical as having someone there to hold the line initially.


RN7: as for EMP devices they range so widely that it's hard to say.
heck you can buy them here even: http://www.amazing1.com/emp.html
and they're tactically useless anyway for reasons i have already explained.

[Raellus]

I see your point, Bobcat. Hezbollah has demonstrated how deadly current generation ATGMs can be against amor in difficult terrain and urban settings. But current generation MBTs are rolling out new active point defense systems that can, to some degree, protect from anti-tank rockets and missiles. It's a constantly evolving game of cat and mouse. The advantage seems to shift every few years. Based on the success of Trophy and other Israeli point defense systems during the latest round of fighting in Gaza, the advantage currently appears to lie with the modern AFV. A few years prior, in southern Lebanon, it looked like the modern ATGM had the upper hand. My point is that modern ATGMs are not a trump card (neither are MBTs, to be fair). I'm eager to see what kind of defenses the new Russian ARMATA series of advanced AFVs, especially the MBT version, will feature (it's supposed to roll out on May Day this year).

As for artillery, the Russians have long been big believers in the liberal application of artillery, tube and rocket both, on the battlefield and light infantry are very vulnerable to its effects. Unfortunately for our Estonian and Latvian allies, their stocks of artillery are neither numerous or particularly capable. NATO light brigades do have their own organic artillery, but usually nothing heavier than 105mm howitzers and 120mm mortars. Russian mechanized forces have tube and rocket artillery that can easily outrange and outweigh (in terms of explosives delivered per shell/barrage) NATO light artillery.

For the reasons cited above, if I had to put my money on a defending light infantry force or an attacking heavy mechanized force on a conventional battlefield, I'd put it on the latter. Recent history supports my decision. Although insurgents in Fallujah c. 2004 didn't have access to their own heavy artillery, nor did the Chechen rebels in Grozny, both were fighting from carefully prepared urban positions, and both had access to prodigious quantities of AT rockets, land mines, IEDs, etc. Although both put up a valiant fight, neither could hold their city against combined arms attacks by forces employing armor, heavy artillery, and air power.

The best a light infantry force could hope to accomplish in the Baltics is slow down the Russian mechanized forces long enough for friendly mechanized forces to arrive. I think we've already adequately addressed the difficulties of getting heavy units to the northern Baltic states in anything like the numbers required to beat back a determined Russian all-arms assault.

[Webstral]

Sending 1,000 undercover saboteurs into Russia is a very different matter than sending 1,000 operators into Russia. I don’t object to a change of subject as long as we acknowledge that they are very, very different creatures.


Sabotage based on undercover operations is hard to pull off on the scale we’re talking about. Getting 1,000 people under cover to plan and execute simultaneous attacks against sensitive military or economic targets is no simple matter. There’s a lot than can go wrong with inserting a single agent into a society that still has a better internal security apparatus than we do. Inserting 1,000 is asking a very great deal of our luck. Human operations is not our strong suit. We might be better off planning to hit those targets with missiles and manned aircraft than trying to infiltrate Russian civil society with so many people trying to execute attacks on important targets.

Originally Posted by bobcat

but it doesn't matter whether your in mountains, forest, deserts, or those rainy plains in Spain light forces are far better at holding ground than heavy armor.

I’m not quite sure how to address such an egregious overstatement of the power of light infantry in a fashion that separates my response to the idea from my respect for the individual. The nature of the terrain makes a huge difference in the effectiveness of light infantry on the defense. As a rule, light infantry is not very effective at defending against mechanized forces (which is what the Russians would bring to bear) on open ground. Light infantry cannot maneuver in the face of enemy mechanized forces without sacrificing any advantages derived from fortifications and virtually all advantages derived from defending restricted terrain. The ability of mechanized formations to maneuver gives the mech commander the initiative, which in turn enables him to decide whether to fight or whether go around enemy strong points. Superior mobility enables the mechanized force to concentrate at the chosen point of attack, such that sheer weight of numbers and firepower can achieve a breakthrough, which in turn renders the defensive line of the light force inert. Superior mobility enables the mechanized force to seek out and exploit weak points in the defense. Superior firepower enables the mechanized force to prepare a chosen place for breakthrough.


An armored force is very powerful on the offense, but it’s even more powerful on the defense, all things being equal. A tank in a hull down position, whether in a prepared position or firing from behind the crest of a hill, possesses an enormous advantage over a tank making an assault on that position. Obviously, the position has to be selected to exploit the field of fire of the tank. However, since that’s true of any weapon sited for defense, I won’t elaborate. In an ideal world, the defending tank can hide in a turret-down position and not even be seen by the enemy until he moves into his firing position. Once there, he can fire on an oncoming enemy’s full silhouette, whereas the attacker is forced to engage only that part of the tank exposed by giving a fire line of fire from the gun of the tank to the target. Depending on the type of tank and whether the tank is defending from a position prepared by engineers or from an unprepared position behind the crest of a terrain feature, the amount of defending tank exposed ranges from 50% of the full frontal silhouette to 20%.

The defending tank is much less vulnerable to the enemy’s supporting barrage than defending infantry, DPICM notwithstanding. Since DPICM is expensive and still comparatively rare, it’s not realistic to assume that artillery supporting the attack is going to be firing DPICM under every circumstance. To this day, most artillery rounds are HE, while most of the remainder are smoke. Under their armor, the crew of a tank is invulnerable to HE shock and concussion that would incapacitate light infantry—even in good fighting positions. Depending on the type of tank, the tank crew is also significantly less vulnerable to chemical weapons. The optics of a modern tank enable the defending tank to retain good visibility even in inclement weather and under conditions of an enemy smoke screen.

The main gun of a tank can service targets at a much greater rate of fire than can ATGM. An M1A1 can put more than three times as many rounds downrange in the first minute of an engagement as a Javelin crew with an equal chance of scoring a hit with each round. Depending on what kind of tank is doing the defending and the quality of the defensive position, the defender may get off 10 rounds before the attacker comes in range.


Just as importantly, a tank can displace in the face of the enemy’s attack. Once the attack of an enemy mechanized force starts, it’s very difficult to suicidal for a defending infantry force to move back to another firing position. The infantry can defend in depth, but is not the same as being able to move a unit back to a new firing position.

In short, under almost any circumstances the superior firepower, survivability, and mobility of the tank makes it a much superior weapon of defense than the infantry. Whether it is cost effective to use tanks for the defense under a given set of circumstances is another matter entirely.

[Raellus]

This article about a recent Israeli air strike inside Syria contains some interesting reporting concerning the cat-and-mouse game between modern strike aircraft and SAM systems. Although the Syrians are using some fairly sophisticated Russian-made SAMs, their AD network doesn't appear to be all that advanced. Still, they managed to shoot down one of the Israeli guided munitions.

https://medium.com/war-is-boring/fou...s-a28cff11323d

It's also pretty telling that the latest defense appropriations bill asked for a substantial sum in order to purchase a number of Super Hornet variants specializing in defense suppression (aka "Wild Weasel" missions).

[Raellus]

The hardware and tactics described in this piece might help NATO establish a sustained presence over/around/near a beleaguered Baltic State after a Russian invasion.

http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/the...get-1669729445

The Israelis effectively used a similar tactic against Syrian air defenses in the 1982 air campaign over the Bekaa Valley, using Pioneer drones to trick the Syrian SAM crews into turning on their targeting radars before Israeli Wild Weasel's swept in to take them out.

I wonder if the Russians have any countermeasures for this sort of tactic.

[Webstral]

It would be very interesting to see how the different strengths of the air forces involved played out over western Russia. The surprises would go on and on. Over the course of time, I would expect the surprises to level out and the core strengths of the air forces involved to become prominent. This would probably play to the advantage of the Western air forces. Even if we imagine that the Russians have learned how to be as adaptable as the Westerners, the NATO conglomerate has several different national commands working together. We can expect them to try a variety of ideas, the most successful of which would rise to the fore. Also, the willingness of the different Western air forces to try their own ideas would complicate the Russian mission of devising standard tactics for defense.