BTR in Nevada

[Webstral]

The 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), a predominantly Tennessee National Guard unit, was deployed to Europe in January, 1997. Although the fighting in Germany had entered a lull with NATO forces having reached their declared stop-line at the Oder River and along the East German-Czechoslovak border, the Kremlin was not ready for peace. Soviet maritime aircraft, submarines, and surface combatants that had survived the Battle of the Norwegian Sea continued to attack convoys crossing the Atlantic from North America to Europe. The convoy carrying the equipment of 278th ACR took heavy losses while in the mid-Atlantic. The remaining equipment of the 278th ACR was consolidated upon arrival in the Netherlands and used to equip a single squadron of the regiment. The regiment temporarily was sidelined to await the arrival of replacement materiel.

In early February, Pact forces in western Czechoslovakia attacked NATO forces in southern Germany. The attackers were Soviet and Czechoslovak. The defenders were mostly Dutch. SOUTHAG, under Dutch command since mid-December, gave ground in a bitterly-fought contest that took the Soviets by surprise. The Soviet leadership had intended to inflict such losses on the Dutch Army that the Netherlands would follow France and Belgium out of the war. Instead, the resolve and skill of the Dutch troops as they waged their fighting withdrawal sapped the Pact offensive of its strength. The arrival of German and American reinforcements enabled SOUTHAG to switch to the counteroffensive; within fourteen days, Pact forces had been pushed back to their start lines.

Despite the satisfactory outcome of the February campaign, SACEUR recalled more than a few hair-raising moments. 278th ACR had sat on the sidelines of the fighting, champing at the bit to enter the fray. SACEUR decided that rebuilding 278th to fighting strength took priority. His chief of staff observed that the USAF Security Forces (SF) maintained a large park of light armored fighting vehicles (LAFV) at its air bases throughout Western Europe. Much to the chagrin of the Air Chief in Europe, SACEUR requisitioned enough LAFV to bring 278th ACR up to strength. The Air Force would have to shuffle its remaining vehicles among its air bases until replacements arrived in-theater.

In Korea and in the Gulf, fighting had seriously depleted the numbers of AFV in US Army formations. In both theaters, the senior leadership adopted the practice of appropriating USAF SF vehicles for use in the Army. The USAF deployed replacement LAFV from its bases in CONUS, promising the CONUS security squadrons that they would be re-equipped as soon as possible. However, by January 1997 the demand for armored cars like the V-150 had far outpaced production. Anxious to meet the needs of Third World clients in the climate of superpower confrontation, the Department of Defense moved the resupply of USAF SF in CONUS to the bottom of the priority list.

At the same time, NATO leaders were dealing with the enormous quantities of captured Warsaw Pact materiel. Even before the Pact offensive in southern Germany, the NATO nations had captured thousands of MBT and tens of thousands of lighter AFV, along with artillery, multiple rocket launchers, trucks, and other military end items. The action in February underscored the desirability of moving at least some of this hardware out of Germany. The PRC, which was building for an all-out offensive in late Summer 1997, expressed an interest in acquiring some of the Pact gear NATO had captured. Some Western-aligned Third World nations, like Pakistan and Egypt, were also interested in acquiring some of the NATO haul. Accordingly, the materiel captured between October and January was divided between the NATO countries for use, disposal, or refurbishing for resale as each nation saw fit. It was universally agreed that captured Pact fighting vehicles would not be used by NATO combat forces, as chances for friendly fire incidents were simply too great.

From late January onward, NATO-controlled sealift vessels making the westward trip across the Atlantic bore captured Pact AFV to CONUS. Some vehicles would go to US arms manufacturers for refit. Others would go for testing by the US military. Still others were set aside for use at the National Training Center at Ft. Irwin, despite the fact that the Army had rejected using captured Iraqi vehicles for training following Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Among the interested parties were the USAF SF who were operating either with much-reduced numbers of LAFV or entirely without LAFV.

A small commission of USAF SF officers and NCOs conducted a study of the Pact vehicles available to determine whether a suitable replacement for their LAFV could be found. Quickly, the Air Force team decided that the BTR-80A combined the characteristics of light armor, good mobility, troop and equipment capacity, and reliability. A pilot program was established for the purpose of testing a slightly refitted version of the BTR-80A. The BTR-80A2 would receive a 25mm autocannon in place of its 30mm gun, and the coaxial 7.62mm MG would be replaced by the same 7.62mm MG used on many US Army vehicles. The Soviet-manufactured diesel engine would be replaced by a commercial US engine. Among the handful of USAF bases participating in the program was Nellis AFB in Nevada.

Nellis employed a substantial number of BTR-80A2 in November, 1997. When the Las Vegas area fell apart during the ’97-’98 winter, Air Force security personnel widely used their BTR in an effort to keep a lid on violence. A number of these vehicles were still operating in June, 1998 when the surviving personnel of Nellis AFB and all other military facilities in Nevada were ordered to move their entire base of operations to California in support of 6th US Army. A new warlord calling himself Shogun managed to acquire several of these vehicles, crews, and mechanics during the move from Nellis to Sacramento and afterwards. These vehicles figured into the fighting between 46th Infantry Division and the Shogun’s forces in late 1998 as the 46th moved through northern Nevada en route from Colorado Springs to Sacramento.

As of April, 2001 three BTR-80A2 are still operable and serving in the Gunryo, the army of the Shogun. Now called dragons, these fighting vehicles serve as light tanks for the Shogun’s motorized force.

Webstral

[Legbreaker]

Really good, but I'm thinking there'd probably be far less captured vehicles than you've written.

As far as I know, the majority of Pact vehicles aren't as durable as western AFVs when hit by the larger weapon systems. Unless entire regiments or even divisions surrendered to the west while still in good order, I'd have thought maybe only 1 in 10 (just to pick a figure) of all Pact vehicle losses would be due to capture rather than destruction.

The same would probably hold true for western vehicles lost, however there may be a higher percentage of repairable vehicles.

Of course that's just my impression.

[Webstral]

Captured vehicles includes non-functional vehicles with some salvage value.

[Legbreaker]

This is true. I presume you'd have everything shipped out in captured condition? Repaired later by the receiving nations?

[simonmark6]

There is a possibility for large scale captures as well in my opinion, if the opening stages of the Twilight War played out using the Western tactics of decapitation strikes then several intact units might have been isolated and behind the front with no orders.

Many of these units would either be rolled over or destroyed as they tried to fight back, but some, possibly lower echelon units or ones that were war weary from the Eastern War might have just surrendered on mass. A company of motor infantry that did this would yield something like twenty vehicles (I don't have time to look it up so I could be way out) and a batallion lots more.

Granted, this wouldn't happen too often, but it is within the realms of possibility in my opinion, certainly enough for Webstral's posit to be within the realms of willing suspension of disbelief. Certainly enough for me, good job Webstral, I like the work!

[jester]

Interesting for sure. Although the whole idea of driving a BTR, ick! Although a BRDM would be much better.

I can see the idea of them not being used in Europe, that would be risky. And the idea of them being used in CONUS would be a good idea for dealing with Civ Gov, NA and the assorted rogues, bandits and marauders and warlords. I can even see them on the California front, as long as they stay out of Texas and the Division De Cuba.

Some issues though:

Transport and shipping facilities could be a problem. The vessels will they be there? Will they sit in harbor the extra couple days or weeks now to load them making prime targets for Pact air and sea forces? At sea, more comerce raiders, a laden vessel handles slower than a unladen.

An d of course the facilities to load and unload such vesels, since many of the major port facilities were severely damaged.

Refitting the thingswith the ramp up in production will it be available? I mean the facilities, the personel and the materials to do so.

Crews need to be trained to repair and maintain and even use them.

Russian gear, its bass ackwards in many ways, and the labels, guages, parts and such will all be in Russian.

It would be interested, but also there are several design flaws of pact vehicles, as an American I love the fuel cell in the back doors, something I am sure they aren't thrillled with. Size, most pact armored vehicles are made for people smaller than the average American, that can be a problem.

Overall though it would be a cool idea for internal or domestic forces backhome, it would just have limitations.

Crews would need extra training and need to be smaller in stature <oooh a special group of women AF SF types, or regular police using them> who would have some Russian taught to them to read some of the parts and such, as well as the drivbing characteristics.

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

This is true. I presume you'd have everything shipped out in captured condition? Repaired later by the receiving nations?

Exactly my intent. The folks who are qualified to repair AFV in Germany have very full lives at this point. Back in Canada and the US, cannibalization and substitution can proceed without the threat of airstrikes. As Simonmark6 points out, captured AFV seldom will be fully operable, although NATO does capture fully intact prizes on occasion. The sheer numbers of disabled vehicles strewn across East Germany, though, virtually ensures that cannibalization will yield enough of the right kinds of parts to restore a small percentage of the recovered AFV to operational status even before the issue of manufacturing new parts is raised. Obviously, this is an enormous job; the number of Pact AFV made operational prior to July 1997 will be a small slice of the big pie of vehicles captured in Europe. Nevertheless, I do believe there's a logic to having a few Pact fighting vehicles spice up encounters in North America by appearing in unexpected locations.

Webstral

[Raellus]

In WWII, the Germans captured litterally thousands of weapons and vehicles during the encirclement battles which characterized the opening months of Barbarrossa. A lot of it was completely undamaged. They used many of those captured weapons and vehicles, mounting, for example, captured 76mm DP guns on tracked vehicle chasis and using them as SP AT guns. They captured so many Mosin Nagant rifles and PPsH submachine guns that they each received official Wermacht designations when issued to Axis units. They did the same with captured 203mm howitzers and other Soviet artillery. And, of course, captured T-34s were repainted and used by some Panzer units.

So, I can see large numbers of captured Soviet/WTO gear being used by NATO forces. I haven't, however, thought about those weapons being shipped back to CONUS for use there. It seems like they'd be better put to use in the ETO. Former East German armorers and mechanics and such would be perfect for refurbishing damaged PACT gear and getting it back into circulation with the various NATO armies. But, I suppose that so much PACT gear would be captured in the opening drive towards Soviet soil that quite a few could be spared for shipment back to the States before the nukes started flying. So, what you've postulated, Wed, is completely plausible.

Here in the Tucson area, I get to see military gear routinely being shipped north and south on the I-10 Highway, mostly on flatbed trucks. It's mostly U.S. gear nowadays (lots of Humvees and MRAPs and the army's new 105mm gun) but I've seen a BTR-2, an MTLB, and a M1973 SG gun on flatbeds too. They were all heading south so I assume they were being taken to Fort Huachuca.

[jester]

Here is the question then.

What would the conditions be that a vehicle could be captured/salvaged to where it can be returned to operational status?

I mean as mentioned alot of PACT APCs have that nasty fuel tank in the backdoor which sets the things easily aflame. And a vehicle that has been burnt out would most likely end up in a catrastrophic kill.

So anything hit by a modern anti armor missile would most likely not be in any condition to salvage. Mines well if it took some minor suspension damage maybe.

A soldier with an AT rocket giving it an ass shot would make it useless due to the fire hazard above.

Those are just some things, so really what type of hits would it take where they could be resurected?

[dvyws]

Couple of comments on the shipping issues:-

Transport and shipping facilities could be a problem. The vessels will they be there?

I would assume that the same ships that were bringing reinforcements across would be used to bring this stuff back. You wouldn't need any extra ships - I don't see Europe exporting much (except casualties...) so basically you just take advantage of the "empties", as and when they arise.

Will they sit in harbor the extra couple days or weeks now to load them making prime targets for Pact air and sea forces?

You are assuming old fashioned general cargo ships, which I don't think would be used to transport most military stuff in these circumstances. Even if the container loading system is stuffed (primarily thos huge straddle cranes that put the boxes onb to the ships), the ramp on a Ro-Ro ship makes the turnaround time a couple of days max ( a definite boon when in Damman in Saudi, much less convenient in New Orleans or Kobe...). And in most cases, loading and discharging is carried out simultaneously, so the stay in port would be much less prolongued than you would think.

At sea, more comerce raiders, a laden vessel handles slower than a unladen.

Err, no, not really - in fact the difference is negligible, We never figured in cargo quantity when passage planning. And don't forget, an unladen vessel will take on a large quantity of water ballast, for stability purposes.

An d of course the facilities to load and unload such vesels, since many of the major port facilities were severely damaged.

Well, if you have the facilities to discharge the reinforcements, they will work for the backload. And don't forget, with a ramp, all you need is an undamaged length of quay, no cranes and surprisingly little infrastructure is needed.

So I think the logistics of the idea are reasonable - although personally I think the same effort put in to shipping wrecked NATO gear back for repair/upgrade/cannibalisation/scrap would prove more effective in the long run.

[jester]

Originally Posted by dvyws

Couple of comments on the shipping issues:-

Transport and shipping facilities could be a problem. The vessels will they be there?

I would assume that the same ships that were bringing reinforcements across would be used to bring this stuff back. You wouldn't need any extra ships - I don't see Europe exporting much (except casualties...) so basically you just take advantage of the "empties", as and when they arise.

Will they sit in harbor the extra couple days or weeks now to load them making prime targets for Pact air and sea forces?

You are assuming old fashioned general cargo ships, which I don't think would be used to transport most military stuff in these circumstances. Even if the container loading system is stuffed (primarily thos huge straddle cranes that put the boxes onb to the ships), the ramp on a Ro-Ro ship makes the turnaround time a couple of days max ( a definite boon when in Damman in Saudi, much less convenient in New Orleans or Kobe...). And in most cases, loading and discharging is carried out simultaneously, so the stay in port would be much less prolongued than you would think.

At sea, more comerce raiders, a laden vessel handles slower than a unladen.

Err, no, not really - in fact the difference is negligible, We never figured in cargo quantity when passage planning. And don't forget, an unladen vessel will take on a large quantity of water ballast, for stability purposes.

An d of course the facilities to load and unload such vesels, since many of the major port facilities were severely damaged.

Well, if you have the facilities to discharge the reinforcements, they will work for the backload. And don't forget, with a ramp, all you need is an undamaged length of quay, no cranes and surprisingly little infrastructure is needed.

So I think the logistics of the idea are reasonable - although personally I think the same effort put in to shipping wrecked NATO gear back for repair/upgrade/cannibalisation/scrap would prove more effective in the long run.

I grew up in the tiny tiny tiny city of LOMITA. It was a hop skip and a jump from the port of Los Angeles/LongBeach and San Pedro. I worked in the area and my best freinds father was head of the long shoremans union <all winy bitches these days> who had a view of the harbor. It takes about 94 hours turnaround time for a vessel, true. Under modern times with the facilities. In T2K will we have those facilities?

I totaly agree that we should shit NATO gear back and that should have priority! They are reutilizing vehicles from Iraq the rebuild take a couple months, compared to the year it takes for a new one. In war time, I think we could probably pear down the build time to less no more than 3 months for an APC, if of course all things were running and the parts onhand. Call me optimistic, or just a tyrant, but I would providing the parts be on hand ensure the gear would be turning out a platoons worth of vehicles a week. This of course means running round the clock, no union BS! And the parts and aquisition were on hand.

But, the crux of the problem of hauling disabled vehicles off a pier or storeyard onto a vehicle hauler, is, you will have to lift them with a forklift or some other similiar vehicle place them and load. The roll on roll off vessels, well the vehicles rolling on and off are usualy mobile on their own. Not so with vehicles that have been blown apart. These need to be moved. And that poses a problem, the vehicles moving them need to be hooked up and unhooked, parts fall off, vehicles fall off their teathers and need to be reattatched and put in place. Alot of this takes a good five to ten minutes and more for a heavy mech vehicle. Even with a dozen of such vehicles, well figure 20 minutes per vehicle well we are talking an hour to load 12 vehicles. And the loaders both vehicles and men will need some downtime daily, let alone over a period of 96 hours.

That gives an idea in my mind of some of the issues one would face in such a tasdk, but it woudl be awesome to play. And I for one would love to have my team cruising through the US with a BRDM! It even gives me an idea for a campaign.

[Webstral]

Thanks, dvyws--I can't add much to your contribution.

Overall, I agree with everyone who has pointed out limiting factors behind shipping Pact vehicles to CONUS and Canada and repairing said vehicles. I don't believe that the US is going to refit very large numbers of Pact vehicles by July '97. Among NATO forces, the Germans are almost certainly going to be the NATO players who have the most success with resurrecting Pact gear due to the intimacy the East Germans enjoy (!) with that equipment—as you point out, Raellus.

Regarding shipping schedules, I think turnaround time for the Atlantic convoys will have some complicating factors that may open windows of opportunity to load some of the choicer items liberated from the Communists. Although logistics have taken an enormous stride forward with computerization, there are still so many pieces moving in the Battle of the Atlantic that it’s hard for me to see the Atlantic convoys turning around and heading back to the US in short order each and every time. I’m not a Navy man, so I won’t expound on the Navy’s potential difficulties other than to say that the Navy will be fighting a three-ocean war right through the nuclear exchange. Granted, we know that the Western navies establish a clear superiority in the North Atlantic soon after NATO joins the conflict in Germany; however, as was pointed out in the thread on Australia and nuclear attacks, we know little about the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Both of these bodies of water figured prominently in the superpower rivalry. As a result of early losses during the Battle of the Atlantic, the US and Royal Navies probably will find themselves working very hard to provide sufficient escorts for the Atlantic convoys such that the convoys move with the efficiency and alacrity that SACEUR wants. In other words, there probably will be some ships idled in the Netherlands and Germany between legs. This idle time may or may not offer opportunities for the planning authorities to work in loading for westbound shipments.

Now I certainly don’t believe westbound convoys will be delayed so that captured Pact gear can be loaded aboard them. I do agree that loading American and Canadian gear for refit will be important.

Regarding the state of captured Pact vehicles, I agree that a portion of the Pact AFV will be complete losses. Even catastrophic kills, though, offer some salvageable items. Nor is every kill is a catastrophic kill. One of the lessons of Operation Desert Storm is that APSDFSDU rounds don’t produce catastrophic kills as often as HEAT rounds under conditions where both solid penetrator and plasma bolt penetrate to the interior of the target vehicle. Although the spalling and pyrophoric effects of the uranium solid penetrators do ignite fuel and ammunition, catastrophic kills are markedly fewer among solid penetrator users vis-Ã*-vis HEAT round users achieving penetration to the interior of the target vehicle. The crew of the target vehicle hit by a solid penetrator is, of course, reduced to hamburger and colloidal slime—even when they aren’t sucked out of the exit hole by the vacuum created by the passage of the penetrator through the crew space of the vehicle. Although any electronics may have been rendered unusable as a result of an APSDFSDU hit, the rest of the vehicle may be intact, albeit messy.

Less dramatically, AFV break down or lose tracks fairly frequently. Due to the nature of the battlefield in East Germany during December, the Soviets may find themselves forced to abandon large numbers of fighting vehicles which are essentially serviceable. Support services among Soviet divisions are markedly inferior to those of Western divisions in terms of abundance (teeth-to-tail ratio) quality (fewer long-term professionals). So long as Soviet forces remain on the offensive, the follow-on forces can collect knocked out vehicles or those that have suffered breakdowns. When the Soviets are withdrawing, they will be incapable of recovering their vehicles to the same degree as their Western counterparts (who may not recover lots of vehicles, either). When III US, V US, VII US, I Br, and II Br Corps (including Canadian forces) roar across the Inter-German Border in early December ’96, they are going to hit Pact formations on the attack against West German defenders. The situation may not be a complete replay of Operation Desert Storm, but a lot of the aspects of the Gulf fighting will be recreated. The Anglo-American forces will be fresh. They will have massive air support operating from nearby friendly air bases. The enemy will be tired from seven weeks of hard fighting. It’s going to be a bad, if brief, period for Reds. NATO will recover a lot of fighting vehicles that would be fully operable except for an engine in need of servicing, a broken track or damaged wheel/axle, a dead crew (and a small hole in the armor), or simply an empty gas tank.

Sorting all of the captured Pact gear out is going to be a gargantuan task. In all likelihood, vehicles will have to be moved to marshaling points, categorized, and moved onward. The fact that trucks, trailers, and trains are going to have to move westward after delivering their materiel to the front lines offers an opportunity to move all of this hardware, provided that the loading and unloading of the hardware does not seriously impede the process of getting the tools of war forward in January, February, and March. I haven’t considered many of the details of this part of the process.

Back in the US, the cash motive may prompt the DoD and applicable contractors to find space for refitting captured Pact vehicles into the flow chart governing the use of skilled labor. Come December, the US is going to be in the war full-time. The losses in Germany, over Western Europe, and at sea will be vastly greater than the losses endured during Operation Desert Storm. The US government is going to have to pay for a lot of hardware. Payments from China will dry up because production for China will probably come to a screeching halt in December, if not in October. Refitted Pact gear can be sold for cash or kind to China and other Third World players. These sales will in no way offset the massive expenditures the US will undertake. However, every little bit does help.

The Russian language labels inside the vehicles will have to be replaced, for sure. I’m confident a fairly expedient solution can be found, though. Stickers and stamped sheet metal with English labels will be fairly easy to manufacture compared to some of the other challenges that await.

Lack of familiarity with the vehicles will be an obstacle for refitters in the US to overcome, for sure. Translating operators’ and maintenance manuals into English will be the first challenge, although this too is probably an issue of lesser significance. Typesetting and publishing aren’t especially difficult in 1997. Getting good translations in a timely fashion will be somewhat more challenging; however, it may be that the appropriate manuals already have been acquired and translated prior to the US entrance into the war. The Chinese will have captured some of the gear and manuals in 1995 and 1996. Surely the US would have obtained copies of these manuals and translated them already. It might be a good exercise for Russian linguists.

I foresee the captured Pact vehicles being segregated by type into massive parks where cannibalization can occur on an industrial level. While this is happening, civilian technicians can become familiar with the vehicles. Specifications for the most needed parts can be drawn up and submitted to machine shops around the country while assembly lines are being planned.

Sadly for this grand scheme, the nuclear exchange begins in July and catches up with CONUS in November. Some users, like Nellis AFB, will have received complements of vehicles. For the most part, though, the captured AFV will be rusting in Germany, the Netherlands, or in ad hoc depots in North America and the UK. Lack of parts and skilled labor will create a tight bottleneck in the process of restoring captured Pact vehicles to operable condition.

Webstral

[copeab]

Originally Posted by jester

Those are just some things, so really what type of hits would it take where they could be resurected?

Based on WWII, any AFV that didn't suffer an ammo or fuel explosion, or wasn't completely burned out, could probably be returned service given (1) a means of bringing it to a repair shop, (2) enough trained mechanics and (3) sufficient spare parts. Basically if the hull is still structurally sound the AFVC can be brought back from the dead.

[jester]

From my experience with burnt out Pact style vehicles, all of them were burnt out. Even the small penetrators when they send the penetrator rods through they send molten metal inside the compartment which starts things afire as well.

And we have the rear hatch fuel tank as I have mentioned which catches fire easily enough again setting them afire.

The ones I see that would survive enough to be rebuilt,

mobility kills, the engine, transmission or drive train is damaged the vehicle is abandoned. <provided the engine doesn't burn> This however is a simple modular repair but, the parts to a non standard vehicle may be a problem.

Mine, rocket launcher or light ordinance hit to the drive train, again taking out a couple wheels.

Bogged down in a tank trap or swamp or soft soil or even a river crossing.

A concussion that kills the crew.

A vehicle accident, a roll over, or even the vehicle slides from a slope, or down a hill etc and the crew is injured or killed.

The crew is shot while out of the vehicle.

Those are just some of the ideas I can see where a Pact vehicle would be taken intact.

However, one question, often vehicles that are forced to be abandoned or about to be surrendered are usualy destroyed, it is quite common among most forces to destroy or disable equipment that has to be abandoned so it can not be of use to the enemy.

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by jester

From my experience with burnt out Pact style vehicles, all of them were burnt out. Even the small penetrators when they send the penetrator rods through they send molten metal inside the compartment which starts things afire as well.

Anecdotal experiences are the basis of statistical wisdom. The only thing I can say is that enough American fighting vehicle crews in the Gulf had somewhat different experiences such that the lack of catastrophic kills associated with the use of the silver bullet has been noteworthy in literature on the subject. My conversations with tankers from Operation Desert Storm support the idea that APSDFSDU rounds don't produce catastrophic kills as frequently as HEAT rounds.

Originally Posted by jester

However, one question, often vehicles that are forced to be abandoned or about to be surrendered are usualy destroyed, it is quite common among most forces to destroy or disable equipment that has to be abandoned so it can not be of use to the enemy.

I think every army makes destruction of abandoned equipment standard procedure. How often this happens is another question entirely. The Viet Minh defeated the French at DBP with the aid of American 105mm guns provided by the Chinese, who acquired them in Korea. Surely some abandoned vehicles will be destroyed in accordance with SOP. Surely others will not.

Good point about rollovers, jester. These will be increasingly common as fighting drags on and crew fatigue builds. Rollovers on the sides of East German roads may be one of the best sources of intact Pact vehicles.

Regarding concussion, I believe the Israelis pioneered the technique of using a Maverick with the warhead removed against Arab tanks. The concussion kills the crew and leaves the tank intact for retrieval later. Although I'm inclined to think that the USAF would consider itself above such piracy, the German government may ask its NATO allies that capture be maximized to provide the East German Army with a reserve of Pact equipment--a hedge against the possibility of ongoing war and shortages of materiel.
Jester, I think you're right about the difficulties of repairing Pact engines that aren't widely used within the Pact. NATO nations may avoid trying to salvage the oddballs. Common vehicles, like cargo trucks, BTR, and MTLB, probably will be amenable to cannibalization to address almost any breakdown. Alternatively, the engine could be replaced with a Western diesel power plant. This is what I have in mind for the BTR-80A2 in Nevada. Both the corporate bigwigs and the unions at Ford and GM will be delighted at the prospect of providing several hundred more big diesel engines for Pact vehicle refit.

This thread had gotten me thinking about the locations and size of depots housing Pact vehicles and equipment within CONUS, plus the fate of the numerous Pact soft-skinned vehicles. Imagine, for instance, that the DoD decides to consolidate all of the BTR or even just all of a single model of BTR at a location in Nevada. The climate promotes long-term storage, the federal government owns something like 85% of the land, there are remote bases in the state, and contractors can be shipped in to work on-post. As an added bonus, Las Vegas and Reno are within easy driving distance for weekends of frolicking. If the BTR park is located in Nevada, then the local warlord potentially has a large stockpile of parts available for cannibalization. It’s a possibility that bears further consideration.

Pact soft-skinned vehicles are another matter entirely. Despite the paucity of trucks in Pact divisions relative to the number of trucks in Western divisions, the number of trucks in motor rifle division is still quite large. Soft-skinned vehicles obviously are not nearly as durable as armored vehicles, so a lot more of them will be destroyed by air attack and artillery. (I believe this is the point of interdiction.) By the same token, though, crew fatalities are far more common. Flying objects kill crews in unarmored cabs pretty easily without necessarily destroying the vehicle. There might be a very large number of damaged and broken-down trucks lining the sides of East German roads come Christmas ’96. Of course, given the insatiable demand of mechanized formations for fuel and ammunition, intact and easily-repaired Pact trucks might be incorporated into the NATO armies. North America might receive very few trucks. It’s a matter for further consideration.

Webstral

[JHart]

I think every army makes destruction of abandoned equipment standard procedure. How often this happens is another question entirely. The Viet Minh defeated the French at DBP with the aid of American 105mm guns provided by the Chinese, who acquired them in Korea. Surely some abandoned vehicles will be destroyed in accordance with SOP. Surely others will not.

The Chinese also had A LOT of US gear from WW II. But the Chicoms captured a good deal of gear in Korea with their initial attacks that panicked US troops left.

This is what I have in mind for the BTR-80A2 in Nevada. Both the corporate bigwigs and the unions at Ford and GM will be delighted at the prospect of providing several hundred more big diesel engines for Pact vehicle refit.

I'd think that US auto makers would rather build wheeled APCs from scratch than refit foreign gear. More work and money for them. I could see John Deere, Caterpillar or some other domestic heavy equipment manufacturers who don't have experience building APCs, but know how to make engines and parts getting a lot of work.

North America might receive very few trucks. It’s a matter for further consideration.

I would doubt any trucks would be sent to the USA. Nobody has more cars and trucks than the US. Even after the nukes fall and new manufacturing stops, there are still millions of vehicles around. The only advantage Pact vehicles may have is if they have fewer electronics, they are less susceptible to EMP effects.

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by JHart

I'd think that US auto makers would rather build wheeled APCs from scratch than refit foreign gear. More work and money for them. I could see John Deere, Caterpillar or some other domestic heavy equipment manufacturers who don't have experience building APCs, but know how to make engines and parts getting a lot of work.

Fair enough.

Originally Posted by JHart

I would doubt any trucks would be sent to the USA. Nobody has more cars and trucks than the US. Even after the nukes fall and new manufacturing stops, there are still millions of vehicles around. The only advantage Pact vehicles may have is if they have fewer electronics, they are less susceptible to EMP effects.

I'm thinking refit for foreign sales rather than for domestic use. One of the main attractions of Soviet gear is its relative simplicity and ruggedness. Third World allies, who are chronically short of trucking, may prefer a cheap refit of a Pact truck over a more expensive American truck fresh off the assembly lines. Nevertheless, I agree that few or no trucks may be sent to CONUS.

Webstral

[Raellus]

Canon states that, once the United States entered the ground war full bore, NATO forces made it all the way to the edge of Soviet territory. This seems to suggests that several large encirclement battles took place during which hundreds (if not thousands) of abandoned PACT vehicles could have been captured/recovered by NATO forces. Yes, it is SOP to destroy vehicles that have to be abandoned but panicked, rookie crews often times don't follow protocols. Add in mobility kills and other contingencies, and you'd end up with a lot of AFVs that could be repaired and returned to service.

Here's an idea. Some captured PACT vehicles were saved and shipped to CONUS for eventual transshipment to the PRC army. Once the U.S. entered the war, its armaments manufacturing would be hard pressed to keep its own nation's fighting forces equipped, let alone continue to supply the Chinese. Therefore, as a stopgap measure, viable PACT gear would be shipped to China instead of U.S.-made gear. The Chinese already have experience with Soviet-made gear so they should be able to fix them up and put them into front-line duty relatively quickly.

Now, once the nukes start flying and port and fuel facilities were destroyed or damaged, shipping that PACT gear anywhere would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. With a need for AFVs at home, the remaining stocks of captured PACT AFV's destined for China would be kept, repaired (a must) and refurbished (if possible) and put in service with U.S. forces in CONUS. Even just a couple dozen (each) BRDMs, BTRs, BMPs, T-xx tanks would be enough to equip an armored battalion or two in a reserve infantry division, or an MP brigade, or defend a few airbases, etc. Heck, you could even build an slightly understrength ACR around captured gear.

Here's a question, though, with regards to APFDS round kills. Where the penetrator is made from depleted Uranium (aren't most, nowadays?), wouldn't there be the issue of toxic contamination? I know that at least some folks still claim that exposure to DU debris is/was the cause of "Gulf War Syndrome". I can imagine some folks' reluctance to crew such vehicles.

Show me the CarFax. DU kill? No thanks- I'll pass.

Also Web, remember this thread. There's some more discussion of similar topics here:

http://forum.juhlin.com/showthread.php?t=448

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by Raellus

In WWII, the Germans captured litterally thousands of weapons and vehicles during the encirclement battles which characterized the opening months of Barbarrossa. A lot of it was completely undamaged. They used many of those captured weapons and vehicles, mounting, for example, captured 76mm DP guns on tracked vehicle chasis and using them as SP AT guns. They captured so many Mosin Nagant rifles and PPsH submachine guns that they each received official Wermacht designations when issued to Axis units. They did the same with captured 203mm howitzers and other Soviet artillery. And, of course, captured T-34s were repainted and used by some Panzer units.

So, I can see large numbers of captured Soviet/WTO gear being used by NATO forces. I haven't, however, thought about those weapons being shipped back to CONUS for use there. It seems like they'd be better put to use in the ETO. Former East German armorers and mechanics and such would be perfect for refurbishing damaged PACT gear and getting it back into circulation with the various NATO armies. But, I suppose that so much PACT gear would be captured in the opening drive towards Soviet soil that quite a few could be spared for shipment back to the States before the nukes started flying. So, what you've postulated, Wed, is completely plausible.

Here in the Tucson area, I get to see military gear routinely being shipped north and south on the I-10 Highway, mostly on flatbed trucks. It's mostly U.S. gear nowadays (lots of Humvees and MRAPs and the army's new 105mm gun) but I've seen a BTR-2, an MTLB, and a M1973 SG gun on flatbeds too. They were all heading south so I assume they were being taken to Fort Huachuca.

Yes, I see a large share of the loot at least being used to keep the former East German units equipped. With that said, I do see a trickle of vehicle leaving Europe for the purpose of resale and to help offset some of the vehicle that take from the US and Canada to help equip units at the various fronts.

[Legbreaker]

The more I think about the less likely bulk amounts of Pact vehicles are going to be available.

When you consider that it is standard practise to destory vehicles to deny them to the enemy (if only for the intel value) and I believe it's usually standard to destroy the enemies vehicles captured, particularly in the first months of the war, It's doubtful significant numbers are going to remain in any sort of usable form.

Also, it is highly unlikely that the broad, sweeping encirclements occured as it took litterally MONTHS for the NATO forces to cross Poland. This doesn't bode well for outflanking manouvres, etc but speaks more of head to head engagements.

Originally Posted by Webstral

They will have massive air support operating from nearby friendly air bases. The enemy will be tired from seven weeks of hard fighting. It’s going to be a bad, if brief, period for Reds.

As for the above statement, canon doesn't support it. Going from memory, the Pact air forces virtually destroyed German airpower before anyone else even thought about joining the war. After that may have been different as the US, Britain, etc joined in, but you also had increasing numbers coming across from China.

Large scale encirlements without air superiority are a recipe for disaster. However, this is not to say a vehicle here, a plattoon there wasn't captured intact (or close to it), just that these events are likely to have been few and far between.

Of course move the timeline along 6 months or so and you've got the Pact offensive back towards the west, nuking as they go with Nato apparently falling back in disarray. Now there's a time for massive amounts of captured equipment and personnel. Unfortunately it's the Pact getting the best of it...

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

The more I think about the less likely bulk amounts of Pact vehicles are going to be available.

When you consider that it is standard practise to destory vehicles to deny them to the enemy (if only for the intel value) and I believe it's usually standard to destroy the enemies vehicles captured, particularly in the first months of the war, It's doubtful significant numbers are going to remain in any sort of usable form.

I don't think it would be standard to destroy vehicles captured, especially if general orders to the contrary were issued. It is standard when a fear of the vehicles being recaptured during quick counterattacks or recrewed by stay-behinds and used in the attacking army's rear areas. This is why many abandoned Iraqi AFV were destroyed in place during both invasions of Iraq. Even so, many were captured and either shipped back to the states for evaluation and training purposes or given back to the new and "improved" Iraqi defense forces. If the abandoned and damaged vehicles were left far enough behind the FOB during a conventional war, there wouldn't be a need to destroy them in place, especially with dedicated recovery teams operating in full swing.

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

Also, it is highly unlikely that the broad, sweeping encirclements occured as it took litterally MONTHS for the NATO forces to cross Poland. This doesn't bode well for outflanking manouvres, etc but speaks more of head to head engagements.

I respectfully disagree. Encirclement battles were fought throughout the entire four year course of the Great Patriotic War/Ostfront, with both sides taking turns doing the encirclement and being encircled. I'm not suggesting the same sort of success for NATO that the Wermacht enjoyed during the first few months of Barbarrossa. NATO armies would have to stop and rest, consolidate gains, clean up pockets of resistance, allow the supply trains to catch up, etc. before embarking on the next envelopment. And then there are Soviet-PACT counterattacks/counteroffensives to contend with.

Furthermore, broad-front steamroller-style offensives are not a part of NATO offensive operational doctrine. Nor would NATO have the strength to sustain the attrition that would go hand-in-hand with such battering ram-style offensives. Look at the Coalition offensive during Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom: deep penetration/envelopment attacks designed to distrupt enemy command and control and logistics and encircle large enemy formations. There's no reason to believe that NATO would change it up radically when fighting the Soviet-PACT. Especially since the Red Army was much more formidable than the Iraqis.

[Legbreaker]

I agree that while broad front is not doctrine, information in canon appears to support a slow moving offensive. This to me says large scale encirclements were very few and far between. This is not to say the odd small unit wouldn't have been cut off though.

It also implies that the Pact forces fought over every inch of ground. To do so would likely result in heavy casualties, especially front line vehicles. With the (at best) air parity, artillery and rear assets would probably have suvived relatively intact, pulling back from time to time to safer positions.

The can be no comparison between Poland in T2K and Iraq in either war. T2K details a very slow advance while both of the Iraq invasions were over almost before they began. In Iraq, masses of troops and equipment were captured due to the speed of the advance and the generally crap quality and fighting spirit of the soldiers themselves. I doubt the same could be said for Poland and it's early war allies.

[Webstral]

It’s true that canon does not specifically address the issue of Anglo-American (or Dutch, Danish, or Norwegian) air power in Europe. However, the fact that canon doesn’t address the issue of Anglo-American air power over Germany in December ’96 doesn’t mean that Anglo-American air activity doesn’t contribute massively to Allied victory in the opening stages of the superpower confrontation in Europe.

We know a few things about air power in Europe in Twilight: 2000. Perhaps the most relevant to the subject at hand is the idea that the SAF(1) leaves its most advanced airframes in the West, despite the ongoing conflict in China. [v1 chronology] Qualitatively, the SAF in the West is a match for the Luftwaffe, while having a quantitative advantage over the West Germans. We may infer that the Luftwaffe is nearly annihilated during the 06 OCT-30 NOV timeframe; I think this is a reasonable conclusion. However, if we’re going to be canon fundamentalists, then it should be pointed out that all we really know is that the Luftwaffe fails to provide adequate support for the Bundeswehr. I’m perfectly happy discussing what I believe is the likely demise of the Luftwaffe within the context of acknowledging that any speculation about the numbers of aircraft lost under what conditions is beyond the reach of the existing body of canon. (I don’t have the NATO Vehicle Guide, so I am happy to be brought up to speed by any information given therein.)

We know that the United States transfers III US Corps to Europe to claim equipment stored in POMCUS sites before the US joins the fighting in Europe. We also know that some US Army formations, such as 5th Infantry Division, were sent to Europe by air and sea in time to join the fighting in East Germany in December ’96. (US Army Vehicle Guide) In other words, while West Germany is duking it out in East Germany, the United States is REFORGER into practice. Canon may not actually say the USAF reinforces Western Europe to its pre-assigned levels, but should canon have to tell us that? If the Army is going to reinforce Europe to the level given in the US Army Vehicle Guide, then the only reasonable conclusion is that the USAF is also reinforced massively.

By 01 DEC 96, the SAF in the West has been fighting for seven weeks or so. Seven weeks of high-tempo operations are going to take their toll on aircraft readiness. Even if the Pact sweeps the Germans from the sky, front-line commanders still will be screaming for air support. The danger (as opposed to the likelihood) of losing the fight in Germany will seem so great to the Soviets that they are likely to feel compelled to maintain CAS and interdiction missions at the greatest possible tempo. Commissars may play their role in all of this, pointing out that tens of thousands of Soviet patriots have spilled their blood on the ground. Why the [expletive deleted] do the pilots deserve to sit on the ground drinking coffee and eating doughnuts while the battle against the hated Germans hangs in the balance?

By the end of November, the Soviets probably enjoy air supremacy over the DDR; this may seem good reason to ground the air superiority fighters, give the crews a rest, and let the ground personnel catch up on maintenance. However, the Anglo-Americans loom over the western horizon. One simply never knows when the Anglophones will get off the fence and treacherously join the invasion of the DDR. Therefore, some fighters will have to escort strike missions and maintain CAPs against Anglo-American involvement. As a consequence, the fighter crews may not be able to catch up on rest and maintenance as much as the air situation may indicate.

When the Anglophones join the fight, it will be with relatively fresh air crews, fresh aircraft, and a wealth of information about how the Soviets operate over Germany. The numerical advantage of the Pact air forces vanishes once the USAF and RAF (and CFAC) enter the war. I’m not going to reiterate all of the advantages the NATO aircraft, crews, and operational handling have over their Pact counterparts. To some degree, the experience in China will offset some of the inherent weaknesses of the SAF. However, the Allies will have good intelligence regarding changes in the Soviet application of air power due to the fact that Germany and China have abundant recent experience. Also, the Communists are firmly wedding to the idea of positive ground control because they are firmly wedded to the idea of controlling the military. Only in WW2, when the fate of the Soviet Union was at stake, did the political officers lose some of their power. Even then, it took some time for the effects to manifest themselves. Inertia is going to keep the SAF over Germany recognizably Soviet, even if a modest loosening of ground control improves effectiveness somewhat.

Given the advantages on the Allied side, there is no good reason to assume that the Allies don’t take control of the air over Germany in short order. Operating under surge conditions, the USAF will generate two to three sorties per day per aircraft, whereas the Pact air forces will have passed the time when they can generate a surge lasting more than a day or two. Therefore, the USAF, RAF, and CFAC will be putting their aircraft up two to four times as often as the Pact defenders. In effect, the sortie rate will act as a multiplier on the apparent number of airframes. Since one of the main missions of the Anglo-American forces will be to knock out runways and hardened aircraft shelters, the initial advantage possessed by the English speakers will increase dramatically in the first few days.

As for Soviet aircraft returning from China, I believe indeed the Soviets would transfer some air regiments to the West in October. However, this is not canon. Nevertheless, since I am not a canon fundamentalist, I will address the idea of transfer of forces by saying that the introduction of veteran regiments of late-model MiGs and Sukhoi into the fight in Europe would be a problem for the West out of proportion to the numbers of aircraft and pilots introduced. However, as my wife is always telling me, timing is everything. If these regiments of veterans flying late-model fighters transfer to the West at the beginning of the German-Soviet fighting, then by 01 DEC 96 they will be in much the same condition as the aircraft and crews left in the West: fatigued, in need of down time, and with a few kill markers under their canopies. If the air regiments in question transfer west once the American get involved, they will find themselves operating without their support. This may not be too much of a problem, since the arriving air regiments can operate from airfields in western Russia. Still, there are only so many ground crews familiar with the MiG-29, MiG-31, Su-27, and so on. Getting them and their gear from their air bases in the Far East will take a few days. By then, the USAF will have generated literally thousands of sorties. It’s a problem for the Soviets.

I do want to note that I am addressing only the fighting in East Germany at this point. Poland is another matter entirely, which I believe we addressed at some point in the past year. The introduction of ten or more fresh US/UK heavy divisions into the fighting in the DDR in early December will change the situation on the ground completely. Here the Allies will almost certainly attempt large-scale envelopments. Pact troops, overmatched by their fresh and numerous counterparts, will be obliged to conduct rapid withdrawals. In some instances, Pact forces will break completely. Under these conditions, some troops will dutifully destroy their own vehicles and hardware. Others won’t, either because they don’t bother or don’t have the opportunity.

Again, Poland is a completely different situation. I agree with you, Leg, that envelopments and large-scale surrenders will be few and far between during the Poland phase of the NATO drive towards the Soviet border.

Regarding the immediate destruction of Pact gear, there are a couple more users who might appreciate having some Pact gear: Jugoslavia and Romania. Whether a single BMP captured in East Germany ever reaches either nation isn’t the point. The intent to supply the new NATO members with equipment similar to their own is enough reason to hold onto captured gear.

1. Soviet air forces are divided into several groups that have distinct and sometimes overlapping roles. Rather than spend time nitpicking about which of the Soviet air arms does what, for the purposes of this discussion I’m going to roll all of the Soviet air power into a single umbrella term: SAF

Webstral

[Raellus]

I'm not sure we're speaking the same language here. Encirclement battles don't have to be lightening fast or bag thousands of prisoners and thousands of tons of intact enemy hardware. We're not talking a single operation with Bagration-like results. Instead, we're talking about a half-dozen (if not more), large corps-level encirclement battles, each lasting several weeks (if not months).

Pretty much every major land battle you can think of in WWII either started out or ended up as an encirclement battle.

For example, the hard-fought, rather lengthy Normany campaign ended up with most of a German army nearly encircled. The Allies failed to adequately close the trap around Falaise but the destruction, especially of material, was pretty spectacular. Allied failure to aggressively press the German army meant the war lasted nearly a year longer.

One tends to think of Stalingrad as a purely urban battle but it only became a massive German defeat/turning point when the entire German 6th army was encircled in a double envelopment and could not be rescued.

Kursk, still considered by some military historians to be the biggest tank battle of all time, was a failed attempt at a double envelopment.

Hitler's Ardennes offensive(Battle of the Bulge), likewise was an attempt to drive a wedge between two armies and seize Antwerp, in effect cutting off an Allied army in northern Belgium. It resulted in the smaller encirclement/siege of Bastogne. There are dozens of photos of Panthers and Tiger IIs either abandoned or knocked out without having been destroyed by fires and/or catastrophic internal explosions.

I just finished reading a massive book about the Korsun-Cherkassy pocket battles in February of '44. From the first phases of the Soviet encirclement operations to the German break-out, was about four weeks. Most of the two German corps encircled around Korsun were able to escape after over two weeks of encirclement but nearly all of their vehicles and artillery had to be left behind (albeit in very bad condition).

In that book, there are several accounts of Soviet tank crews bailing out after seeing neighboring tanks hit by enemy fire. One crew even bailed out when they heard what they thought was a shell hitting their tank. It wasn't even damaged. When German tank crews had time, they destroyed their tanks if they had to be adandoned to the enemy. However, when in combat, this was not always possible and intact tanks were abandoned.

So yes, it is entirely plausible that the NATO campaign in the DDR and Poland consisted of several large encirclement battles.

[Legbreaker]

This has got me thinking about my next project - to take all of the canon source material covering the initial 6 months of the war in Europe and roll it together into one, a little like I did with the 2000 summer offensive a while back.

[Webstral]

Envelopments often, if not typically, occur when the side being encircled aids and abets the side doing the encircling. The battles of envelopment along the Soviet frontier in 1941 and in other locations occurred just as much due to Stalin’s directives as to anything the Germans did. He ordered large armies to hold their ground, giving the attackers the opportunity to close the jaws of the panzers behind them. Sixth Army could have gotten out of Stalingrad if Hitler hadn’t put his pride ahead of the fate of his troops. The UN forces in North Korea during the first winter of the Korean War might have been enveloped by the Chinese, except that they withdrew rather than be enveloped. The larger the envelopment, the more the side being envelops has to participate in its own destruction.

Even into 1945, the Red Army rarely conducted deliberate envelopments. Stalin didn’t like them, the Soviet success at Stalingrad notwithstanding. Soviet attacks were conceived more as parallel wedges being thrust into the enemy’s front. The enemy would be forced to withdraw rather than be encircled. Where the defenders stood fast (thank you, Herr Hitler), they would of course be encircled.

The invasion of France worked in large part because events moved faster than the defenders could react to them. More exactly, events moved more quickly than the Allies had anticipated they could, and so Allied countermeasures to the German thrust towards the Channel typically were rendered moot by the rapid advance of the mobile attackers. Had the French been in possession of a better doctrine and a leadership not so inclined to think on WW1 time tables, the Allies might well have fared better.

In Poland, it’s entirely possible that there will be envelopments. They are unlikely to be the kinds of envelopments that occurred in Belarus in 1941 or Kuwait and southern Iraq in 1991. The Soviets in Poland almost certainly will use the pause in operations in that part of Europe (from the end of December through April) to construct a most formidable series of defensive fortifications. I think we all know just how formidable such defenses can be if constructed with a will and the kinds of resources the Soviets (and Poles) still had available. I won’t repeat what has been said in earlier posts on the subject.

On the NATO side, the goal would be to carve corridors through the defensive belts so that whole areas could be isolated and so that mechanized formations could break out into the open on the far side of the prepared defenses in Poland. The problem, of course, is that these defenses would be modeled on Kursk—squared or cubed. Having observed in China that a mobile attacker can have the steam taken out of his stride by confronting him with multiple echelons of minefields, wire, water obstacles, and well-fortified and camouflaged firing positions with overlapping fields of fire and connected by covered trenches and tunnels, the Soviets put into practice what they have learned in the Far East at great cost.

In this case, the Soviets tacitly aid encirclement efforts by basing their defenses on fixed positions. They are trying to buy time by trading Polish space. I think they would anticipate the NATO modus operendi and try to defeat it with mobile reserves. Just as the Allies try to isolate areas of fixed defenses for attention by light and medium forces which can attack the isolated defenders at a deliberate pace, the Soviets want to prevent their deep defenses from being neutralized through isolation. Ergo, there would be periodic counterattacks by heavy forces attempting to use tactical surprise and restrictive terrain to nullify the superior range of NATO main tank guns. The Soviet efforts don’t succeed in stopping the NATO offensive, as we all know. However, they do slow the pace of advance such that it takes nearly three months for the Allies to cross Poland.

The poor Poles. After all of the fighting in 1997, it’s a wonder one brick lies atop another anywhere in the country.

Webstral

[Raellus]

You make a couple of good points, Web.

It's possible, according to your description of Soviet defensive strategy in the early stages of the European Twilight War, that on a couple of occasions at least, Soviet defense belts were penetrated and Soviet/WTO formations encircled.

This would justify the large numbers of captured, viable Soviet AFVs. I was trying to help you out!

As a historical sidenote, the Korsun-Cherkassy operation was conceived entirely as an encirclement operation from the get-go and was approved by STAVKA/Stalin as such. He was rather keen on repeating the success of the Stalingrad encirclement. Despite early successes in severing the German salient in the Dnieper bend, the Soviets did not continue to feed units into the holes they punched in the German lines, instead being perfectly content to settle for a more modest double envelopment and pocket reduction operation. Envelopment operations were a key component of Soviet Deep Battle doctrine. Perhaps it was not the goal in all cases, but it was a standard operational contingency.

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by Raellus

This would justify the large numbers of captured, viable Soviet AFVs. I was trying to help you out!

I know, and I appreciate it.

[TiggerCCW UK]

I'm a great believer in making reality fit my game world, not the other way round. No player in a T2K game will ever know exactly what happened throughout the war, so if you want to have the USAF using Sov/WarPac vehicles for airfield defence, then do it. All kinds of wierd things happen in the military, I would imagine that would be especially true in war time. Back in the early '90s I was on a field excercise with my cadet unit in Otterburn camp, in the north east of England, and you can imagine my surprise at discovering there was a running T34 (not sure what model) parked up just off the parade ground. Not quite the same thing as having a company of BTR's in CONUS, but its just an example.

[kato13]

Came across this thread because a spammer was unsuccessfully trying to spam it. I am bumping this thread for two reasons.

* It mentions the "Shogun" Webstral covered recently.

* I did not properly tag it with his name until now, so those looking for all of his work might have missed it.