Criticism of MG Thomason, CG of Fort Huachuca

[Webstral]

Gentlemen, I offer the following for your amusement and because writing rough drafts is better than writing nothing.


Following the main nuclear attacks on the United States (Nov-Dec ’97), the Twilight War imposed a burden of decision-making on American commanders unseen in more than a century of warfare. Arguably, commanders of major formations faced dilemma as difficult as faced by any American leaders at any time in history. To the degree that brigade and division commanders in the US could make meaningful choices in the post-Exchange circumstances, their decisions often were far-reaching in terms of both practical outcomes and philosophical ramifications.

Among the more controversial leaders in post-Exchange America was Major General Charles Thomason, commander of Fort Huachuca in southeastern Arizona at the start of the Sino-Soviet War that led to the more general conflagration. By late November, 1997 Thomason had parleyed a close relationship with the Pentagon’s Division of Contingency Planning (DCP) into a host of benefits for his command and the local communities. Fort Huachuca had received tens of millions of dollars in investments in new barracks, new training facilities, new storage facilities, machine tools, power generation, water purification and reclamation gear, packaged food, and military supplies including ten thousand rifles, five hundred machine guns, light and medium mortars, 105mm howitzers, a small number of armored vehicles, radios, a substantial stockpile of small arms and large caliber ammunition, and a host of other supplies. The weapons, ammunition, and other materiel were provided with the intent that the 111th MI Brigade, which was the resident school brigade for the Military Intelligence School and Center at Huachuca, would be able to assist actively in controlling the US border and providing disaster relief and security throughout southern Arizona. The food, amounting to approximately a half-billion meals, was intended for distribution throughout Arizona in the event that nuclear attack disrupted the communications network of CONUS. The people of greater Phoenix, Yuma, and Flagstaff would see none of that food after June, 1998.

Thomason has been severely criticized for a number of the decisions he made during the critical years of his command—1997-2001. The most significant is almost certainly his July, 1998 refusal to move 111th Brigade west to California to support 6th US Army. Thomason’s detractors maintain that his decision to disobey orders, first from 6th US Army headquarters and then from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, constitutes nothing short of treason. A number of military minds insist that with the 111th Brigade available for a westward thrust into southern California, 6th US Army could have defeated Second Mexican Army in mid-1998. At the very least, claim Thomason’s detractors, 111th Brigade would have helped 6th US Army better secure the Central Valley of California and its agricultural bounty at a turning point in history.

Further, Thomason has been castigated for husbanding his forces in southeastern Arizona, which he named SAMAD, for Southeastern Arizona Military Administrative District. Following the Thanksgiving Day Massacre (TDM), Thomason deployed most of his troops in the area north of Fort Huachuca on disaster relief and security missions. With the outbreak of the Second Mexican-American War in early June, 1998 Thomason ceased all efforts to control territory north of Tucson. He stopped sending supply convoys north to Phoenix or west to Yuma. The great warehouses of food stores at Fort Huachuca had been constructed and filled so that the citizens of Arizona would have a secure larder. Instead, after seven months the food simply stopped flowing anywhere north or west of Tucson. Even after the immediate Mexican threat to SAMAD had receded by the end of the monsoon season (early September), Thomason did not resume distributing food to Phoenix. Nor were any Huachuca-based patrols sent north of Tucson until October, 1998. By this time, many of the small towns of central and eastern Arizona had been sacked by hungry mobs or taken over by marauders. Hundreds of thousands who might have been saved by timely intervention from Huachuca were dead.

The criticism of Thomason’s leadership goes further. The commanding general of Fort Huachuca refused to allow even reconnaissance patrols to cross into Mexico until December, 1998. For months thereafter, cross-border action was limited to small unit patrols with orders to avoid contact whenever possible. Many have argued that Thomason’s essentially defensive stance along the border allowed the Mexican Army to take the initiative locally and at the strategic level. Had Thomason used the 111th Brigade to attack Mexican units and installations in northern Sonora, the Mexican leadership might well have reinforced that area prior to the ill-fated 1999 counteroffensives in Texas and California by 5th US Army and 6th US Army respectively. Some maintain that a small shift in the correlation of forces in either region would have yielded an American victory.

For the most part, Thomason husbanded the 111th Brigade inside SAMAD until 2001. Despite a string of defensive victories against the Mexican Army in 1998 and 1999, Thomason never sent forces larger than a reinforced battalion into territory north of Tucson until 2001. Although Thomason’s critics acknowledge that he improved his presence throughout the southern half of Arizona dramatically from the end of 1998 onward, they maintain that he was doing too little too late. His main forces did not stay long enough at towns outside SAMAD to provide ongoing security; his long-range patrols were too small and too isolated to yield good results; his efforts to aid towns in constructing their own defenses did not go far enough.

Worse, Thomason stripped both the federal government and State of Arizona of their assets in the area in August, 1998—thereby denying municipalities outside SAMAD a fighting chance at survival. Thomason took under command all USAF forces at Davis-Monthan AFB in Tucson, all Arizona Army National Guard and Air National Guard at and around Fort Huachuca, the Arizona State Guard (AZSTAG) 3rd Brigade, all state police and law enforcement, all federal law enforcement, surviving Border Patrol, and others. Some claim that these skilled personnel could have aided communities outside SAMAD; instead, they were incorporated into a brigade structure that did little for nearly three years after the bombs fell.

Thomason’s decisions denied the state government in Phoenix the support they needed to keep the great metroplex under control. Without food and without manpower, government forces were unable to keep order in Phoenix after June, 1998. By the time Thomason reinitiated patrols north of Tucson, Phoenix had collapsed in a sea of blood and fire. The surviving forces of law and order fled north to Flagstaff, leaving nearly two million dead and dying Americans behind them. Thomason’s detractors insist that he could have prevented this disaster but chose not to act.

Thomason actively cooperated with Mexican forces in northern Sonora from early 2000 onward. Reinforced battalion task forces conducted several anti-marauder sweeps in conjunction with troops of Brigada Nogales. Thomason allowed trade between SAMAD and northern Sonora, which some hold to have strengthened the enemy.

Also controversial is Thomason’s decision to incorporate EPW (enemy prisoners of war) into his command structure. At the time of the Exchange, Fort Huachuca had several thousand Pact and Pact-allied prisoners on post. Thomason inducted large numbers of them into the 111th Brigade from 1998 onward. He also inducted small numbers of Mexican nationals and even Mexican Army deserters and EPW.

In summary, the criticisms of Thomason are that by refusing to support a broader national initiative in 1998 he brought ruin to literally millions in California. By failing to support the government in Phoenix, Thomason brought death to millions more. By withholding his forces in a small corner of southeastern Arizona, he sentenced hundreds of thousands more Arizonans to violent death and privation at the hands of marauders and warlords. Finally, by incorporating hostile foreign nationals into his forces and by cooperating with the enemy of the United States, Thomason betrayed the trust of his command. Many believe that Thomason’s subsequent actions and the decisions made by the Joint Chiefs regarding his position do not offset the choices he made in the first years after the Exchange.


Webstral

This doesn't even address his part in transforming hundreds of thousands of Americans into serfs.

[headquarters]

well - harsh times -desperate measures..

I do enjpy reading the write up on your Thunder Empire -and these grey areas/nuances makes it even more enjoyable.

[copeab]

Frankly, I'm surprised and disappointed there wasn't a revolt by the Arizona police forces and national guard against Thomasson's forces when he abandoned most of the state to their fate. Not that such a revolt would have worked, but it would have severely hurt Thomassons forces.

Edit: Controversial? I guess becoming a treasonous warlord is controversial ...

[Webstral]

In truth, there are other interpretations of Thomason's decisions. I stayed up too late working on that last night. Some people believe he's a great American hero. Still others see him as a man with no good options simply trying to keep the people under his care alive long enough to ride out the storm.

Webstral

[copeab]

Originally Posted by Webstral

In truth, there are other interpretations of Thomason's decisions. I stayed up too late working on that last night. Some people believe he's a great American hero. Still others see him as a man with no good options simply trying to keep the people under his care alive long enough to ride out the storm.

I have a hard time believing Arizona law enforcement would willingly abandon their families (or even communities) to come be under Thomasson's command.

It's one thing to keep assets that were supposed to go to the rest of the state, it's another to strip assets from around the state to protect yourself.

[cavtroop]

Originally Posted by copeab

I have a hard time believing Arizona law enforcement would willingly abandon their families (or even communities) to come be under Thomasson's command.

It's one thing to keep assets that were supposed to go to the rest of the state, it's another to strip assets from around the state to protect yourself.

What if your choice is to stay and fight the marauders alone, or to take your family to SE Arizona, where you'll have food, shelter and protection, in return for your service?

[copeab]

Originally Posted by cavtroop

What if your choice is to stay and fight the marauders alone, or to take your family to SE Arizona, where you'll have food, shelter and protection, in return for your service?

How much of your family does Thomasson let you bring?

(Phoenix alone has 3,500 officers and 700 support currently. Arizona DPS numbers 2,000, but I don't know how many of those are actual officers. Then you have the tribal police on Indian territory who certainly *wouldn't* leave.)

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by copeab

I have a hard time believing Arizona law enforcement would willingly abandon their families (or even communities) to come be under Thomasson's command.

It's one thing to keep assets that were supposed to go to the rest of the state, it's another to strip assets from around the state to protect yourself.

I see what you're saying. The only people Thomason scoops up are the ones operating on "his" turf as of the end of July, 1998. For all intents and purposes, this means folks operating in Pima, Santa Cruz, and Cochise Counties. There are some exceptions, but that's pretty much it.

For what it's worth, Thomason foresees the problems associated with a large-scale breakdown of order and the impact on the families of uniformed service members. He invites everyone who comes under his command to move their families to Huachuca, Davis-Monthan, or Sierra Vista. He can't offer luxury accomodations, but he can ensure that the families of his troops are as safe and well-fed as they are going to get.

Interpretations of his motives range from loyalty to cynicism. It's probably safe to say that both elements are present. In the days following the TDM, Thomason is not the only one to realize that the families present a distraction of the first order for soldiers, police, and others who are keeping the peace and providing services at gunpoint. A leader who keeps his soldiers' families safe, warm, dry, and fed is a leader who can count on a powerful degree of loyalty from his troops.

I agree, copeab, that the Phoenix cops aren't likely to bail on their responsibilities. Nor are the police on the reservations or anywhere north of Phoenix likely to make their way to SAMAD, although there are always exceptions. The Phoenix cops have their hands full right where they are. In fact, once the Second Mexican-American War kicks off Phoenix explodes. The Phoenix cops, State Guardsmen, state police, USAF SF at Luke AFB, and anyone else loyal to the forces of law and order find themselves in a losing battle to keep a lid on the city, then certain neighborhoods, then an enclave, then Luke AFB. In a truly heroic effort, the remaining forces at Luke AFB make a breakout with the families and whatever else can be saved before the final assault by the gangs of Phoenix. The survivors join the remnants of AZSTAG 1st Brigade in Flagstaff. Many posthumous Medals of Valor (the highest medal awarded to members of the Arizona armed services) are awarded to single servicemen who volunteer to fight a hopeless rearguard action to enable the families to escape. [Irrespective of the fact that many of the fallen are federal personnel]

AZSTAG (Arizona State Guard) is organized regionally. 1st Brigade is drawn from and responsible for everything north of Phoenix. 2nd Brigade is Metro Phoenix. 3rd Brigade is everything south of Phoenix. When the 2MAW kicks off, 3rd Brigade is already operating in the Huachuca-Tucson area anyway. For those who have families, their families are local.

The rule of thumb for families is nuclear family only. Grandma and Grandpa are seldom turned away, though there are some ugly incidents; and no one can prove that nieces and nephews aren't daughters and sons. Uncles, aunts, and the like are offered the opportunity to enlist. Quite frankly, the operating assumption is that the families are going to be doing something useful on-post. Work details, victory gardens, machine shops, and the like all need warm bodies. The food is there (for a year), since in July Thomason hoards what is left for SAMAD. (More on this to come)

In summary, Thomason doesn't have the ability to steal assets from elsewhere in the state, although as time goes on SAMAD acts as a powerful magnet for manpower and resources. I should have been clear about that when I was writing. (Attention to detail, candidate!) Only state assets within or near SAMAD get taken under command. Thomason rolls up everyone in his little realm, federalizes them under his command, and rebuilds the 111th Brigade.

Webstral

[cavtroop]

Webstral

I have to say, I love reading your posts on the SE Arizona area - great detail, and good reading. If I ever get to run a tabletop game, I'd love to poach some of the ideas (with your permissions, of course!).

[Legbreaker]

Not a bad draft. Could do with some polishing but still a damn good read.

He definately appears to have been setting himself up as a king as early as the immediate aftermath of the nukes. Seems a little strange that higher command didn't notice and jump on him, but I suppose they were just a little occupied with what was arguably more important issues elsewhere...

[Raellus]

This is very interesting stuff. What becomes of Thomason? Do the JCS forgive him? It seems to me that by refusing direct orders from higher command as early as '98, he would basically be considered as having gone rogue and his units classified as enemy combatants by MilGov and/or CivGov. It sounds like he's basically just a "kinder and gentler" American version of the Margrave of Silesia or Black Baron, looking out for his own little cantonment, at the expense (or, at least, neglect) of others. Does the federal government[s] ever lay down the law in SEA?

Or does the national government just consider him the only game in town and overlook/forgive his numerous indescretions?

Also, would a lot of AZ's civilian law enforcement have been called up to active military duty? It seems like a lot of cops are former military. This would reduce the number of folks who could potentially oppose Thomason's rule (or refuse to serve in his forces)?

What kinds of appeals would Thomason use to keep his troops in line, especially officers who might know of his refusal to follow orders? Is he more or a carrot or stick type?

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

Could do with some polishing...

It's true. Sadly, between the new boy, the better half, the house, the rabbits, and algebra and chemistry, rough drafts are about all I have time for. Also, I've been told that I have to exercise more to prevent PTSD-related outbursts or give up whiskey. Bought myself and the boy a running stroller this weekend... Additionally, I've noticed that much of my work on Thunder Empire has evolved over the course of time. Once I can settle on a complete volume of material, I'll go back and make that sucker shine.

I'm hoping that most of the other questions will be answered in the next installment.

Webstral

[Targan]

Originally Posted by Webstral

Also, I've been told that I have to exercise more to prevent PTSD-related outbursts or give up whiskey.

No contest. Exercise more, keep drinking whiskey

[copeab]

Originally Posted by Webstral

In summary, Thomason doesn't have the ability to steal assets from elsewhere in the state, although as time goes on SAMAD acts as a powerful magnet for manpower and resources.

Okay, the revisions fixes the biggest problem I had.

As to him hoarding the supplies he was supposed to distribute to civilians ... his official response might be that he felt that he lacked the manpower to adequately guard the supply convoys against bandit attacks while at the same time protecting the territory under his command. This is a weak excuse, especially before the Mexican invasion, but it is still an excuse. This could also explain why he later refused to aid American forces in California.

As for consorting with the Mexican army, at least the elimination of marauders could be claimed as dealing with a more serious threat to the civilian population.

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by cavtroop

Webstral

I have to say, I love reading your posts on the SE Arizona area - great detail, and good reading. If I ever get to run a tabletop game, I'd love to poach some of the ideas (with your permissions, of course!).

Thank you kindly; and do poach away.

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by copeab

As to him hoarding the supplies he was supposed to distribute to civilians ... his official response might be that he felts that he lacked the manpower to adequately guard the supply convoys against bandits attacks while at the same time protecting the territory under his command. This is a weak excuse, especially before the Mexican invasion, but it is still an excuse. This could also explain why he later refused to aid American forces in California.

As for consorting with the Mexican army, at least the elimination of marauders could be claimed as dealing with a more serious threat to the civilian population.

You've anticipated more-or-less what happens. During the initial phase of the fighting in Arizona, Mexican troops cut I-10 at Tucson and are on Fort Huachuca's doorstep while the 111th is fighting in Yuma. Only tenacious action by the remnants of the Tucson Police Department, the 355th Wing at Davis-Monthan AFB, the MPs at Huachuca, the battered remains of AZSTAG 3rd Brigade, and a scattering of AZ ARNG and USAR units keep the situation from falling apart completely. The above list of units includes a lot fewer people than the list might make it seem. During this time, no rations trucks go out of Huachuca at all.

The 111th strikes east along I-8 and meets a Mexican forward element at Casa Grande. After defeating the Mexicans at Casa Grande, the 111th moves southeast along I-10 and takes on Mexican forces in Tucson. There is some bitter fighting, but the Americans get the best of it thanks to their Ridgways, considerable assistance from civilians in Tucson, the dedication of a handful of SWAT officers, and some shrewd maneuvering by the mechanized elements of the 111th. The Mexicans fall back from Tucson. The withdrawal becomes a rout as they attempt to run an American gauntlet just established along I-19 by the Ridgways and some motorized infantry.

At Huachuca, Nogales Brigade breaks contact and heads back across the border before the noose can close about them, too.

I'll go into more detail, but essentially Thomason comes to believe that the 111th needs to rest and refit. The nature of the various commands throughout the area robbed the Americans of what should have been a clear-cut numerical advantage, which is one reason why Thomason takes everybody under command. The 111th has lost nearly two-thirds of its manpower since December. The brigade is on its last legs. Thomason comes to believe that the brigade simply can't hang with moving into combat in California until a major reorganization has been completed and the troops have a chance to rest. (Really, they have been in combat since December.)

Worse, the security situation in Phoenix has degenerated to the point at which convoys can't reliably reach Luke AFB except with massive escort. Lots of trucks get lost in the effort.

Withdrawing from Huachuca means packing up everything that can be moved into available trransport. Hundreds of thousands of people would get left behind. Enough stored food to give the 400,000 survivors in SAMAD one meal per day for eighteen months would fall into Mexican hands. Ammunition, fuel, machine tools, spare parts--the lot would have to be left, in all likelihood.

Moving to California means crossing the Colorado somewhere. The bridges at Yuma are down, blown by the 111th during its withdrawal. The bridges at San Luis Colorado are in Mexican hands. The I-10 bridges might be reachable, but Thomason is no longer of a mind to send soft-skinned vehicles through Phoenix. Bypasses certainly are possible, but the roads that bypass Phoenix to the south and west and which can be traversed by requisitioned tractor trailers run into territory now probably controlled by the Mexican Army.

All of these factors taken together cause Thomason to conclude that he just can't support 6th US Army. All he can do is throw away what has already been saved. Rightly or wrongly, he just can't bring himself to do it.

Food does go out to Phoenix and other locations in Arizona before the war starts. In the seven months between the TDM and June '98, about half of the total stockpile at Huachuca is distrubuted at a massive cost in fuel and worn-out (some destroyed) trucks. AZ ARNG, AZSTAG, and USAR units conduct these duties, assisted by deputized civilian haulers. Despite the fact that the food is calculated to give each adult a mere 1,200 calories daily, it's the main fatcor that keeps Phoenix going after the bombs fall.

You've hit the nail on the head regarding cooperation with the Mexican Army. By 2000, marauders are everyone's worst enemy. Nogales Brigade has had a change of command in 1999, and the new leadership has zero interest in prosecuting the war with the US. It doesn't hurt that the Huachucans have treated Mexican EPW reasonably well and that Mexican refugees receive the same treatment as everybody else. Both sides have good reason to look to their own interiors rather than skirmishing along the border. Since Thomason is already on the outs with MilGov, he has nothing to lose by working with the Mexicans toward common goals.

Webstral