Fiddle's Green

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by Panther Al

And to be fair, a good bit of the screaming has an element of sour grapes to it. A lot of divisions- as well as the two ACR's, have a lot of traditions, and while the powers that be say the traditions of these units will be intact, its not looking that way to the average joe because, for the most part the divisions will take the field with whatever brigades that happen to be available regardless of what division they officially belong to.

I think this is the part that make troops complain the loudest. It was always intended that a Division trains together to fight together. Yet, even before Operation Desert Storm it has been completely the opposite, with the exception of the 82nd and 101st during that war. Every other Division was made up mix brigades from units that were hand pick for the Armor and Mechanized Divisions.

After the initial invasion, and then the immediate occupation force after that, a Division HQ would be sent over and they would have if lucky one or two of their own brigades under their command, while other Brigades even the Aviation would be form elsewhere. Even the Brigade and Battalions and Companies would be far mix than what they had trained to go over with. Then throw in the new attitude that regardless if the Division was 82nd or 101st it should be expected to support and operate Heavy Brigades within it command and the Armor and Mechanized Divisions were expected to learn how to operate with light units, and with unit that were use to being in M1s and M2 riding around the area in HMMWVs.

You are quite correct the Army on paper has increased the number of Brigades from 30-33 neighborhood to something of 48 was the goal, I think it like 51 or 52 when all added up... Of course it is difficult to really get a tally since some Brigades are still supposedly in transit. While other sites states some Division are here, but other parts are there. Including two Infantry Brigades that what left of the 1st Armor and Mechanized Divisions from their withdraw from Germany.

In the number of combat troops there has been only slight increase of men/women. In reality if one looks at the number of Companies/Batteries/Troops and Battalions/Squadrons the numbers haven't really moved up as much as one would expect of force that was increase by 16 or so Brigades. This seems to be a major concern too.

It is combination that Divisions have lost their sense of accomplishment. Even Brigades and Battalions loose sense since now the battle streamers and worse yet the unit citation become a nightmare. The book keeping as platoons are splinter and composite companies are sent on missions that they were never quite trained for. Armor and Mechanized units using HMMWVs, Artillery units conducting infantry foot patrols. The hard fact in this war is that everyone in the combat zone is expected to act as 11B unless you were medic, even then you better know your stuff just in case.

Even during WWII when each Division had been drown down from 4 Infantry Regiment to 3 Regiment they usually took to the field with addition resource that would gradually equal to a 4th Regiment. Even the Armor Division that originally had two Combat Command had a third one added by the end of the war and wasn't unusually to find Infantry Regiment assigned to them. Even in Vietnam the 23rd Infantry Division was collection of Separate Brigades that were grouped together under a common HQ in theater.

Then you add to the fact that units were told they would go over for only 12-15 months depending on when they were to go over spending up to 18 months there because of this emergency or another. Supposedly staying at home station for 18 months for training which rarely happen. I guess there are reason for the sour grape complaints...

Not that the troop have much room to complain because they did signed up, but after people keep telling you one thing and making promises that they know they can't keep. Well I would expect anyone to cry foul.

One of the things was the pride that units use to have and the amount of time NCOs and Officers would go to instill what the unit had done over the years. Lot of that was thrown out of window when the 3rd Mechanized Division was carved up and later units kept going through rotation after rotation. I think at last count most of the regular Army was working on 5th over and some Guard units were working on their 3rd rotation over in the Middle East. All the while many of the troops knowing they can press their luck only so many times.

Or the fact that their are plenty of 20-24 year old E-5s and E-6s milling around, take this into consideration that many O-1 out of West Point are only 22-24. Back in 1989 there was talk amongst the senior NCOs in my company because E-6 who had less then 8 years had just made E-6. many of these people had been 10-12 years before they made it to E-6.

So it in general there are lot of things that people are grumbling about. It always will be there and lot of it due to lost of traditions. Which to keep is just silly...but it does happen.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Abbott Shaull

I think this is the part that make troops complain the loudest. It was always intended that a Division trains together to fight together. Yet, even before Operation Desert Storm it has been completely the opposite, with the exception of the 82nd and 101st during that war. Every other Division was made up mix brigades from units that were hand pick for the Armor and Mechanized Divisions.

Its always been this way, at least since WWII, units were stripped to provide cadre for a new formed division. Korea was no better, except that units were stripped stateside to provide replacements for the Far East. In Vietnam, the one year and your out policy destroyed a division's cohesion faster than enemy action did. In Persian Gulf I, what a lot of people forget is that after the fall of the old Soviet Union, Bush I started drawing down troops to save money, a lot of brigades were deactivated and this is one of the reasons that you found 3MID units in the 1AD to name one example.

You hear a lot of talk about "training together and fighting together" but when a moment of crisis happens, it's throw whatever is available into the pot and hope for the best. Face it, the US Military as a whole has never been adequate to protect the intrests of the USA. There was a plan once to move divisions down to the Mexican border to help stem the flow of drugs and illegals crossing the border, had a good chance of working too, until Congress discovered that to seal the border completely would require the commitment of 130 divisions....and please remember, that at the height of WWII, the US only fielded 90 divisions.

After the initial invasion, and then the immediate occupation force after that, a Division HQ would be sent over and they would have if lucky one or two of their own brigades under their command, while other Brigades even the Aviation would be form elsewhere. Even the Brigade and Battalions and Companies would be far mix than what they had trained to go over with. Then throw in the new attitude that regardless if the Division was 82nd or 101st it should be expected to support and operate Heavy Brigades within it command and the Armor and Mechanized Divisions were expected to learn how to operate with light units, and with unit that were use to being in M1s and M2 riding around the area in HMMWVs.

The thinking behind this is that any division commander can command any mix of units...completely disregards that heavy and light units have different capabilities, different tactics and different logistical needs. But HAY! What do I know, I'm just a glorified bean counter nowdays...

You are quite correct the Army on paper has increased the number of Brigades from 30-33 neighborhood to something of 48 was the goal, I think it like 51 or 52 when all added up... Of course it is difficult to really get a tally since some Brigades are still supposedly in transit. While other sites states some Division are here, but other parts are there. Including two Infantry Brigades that what left of the 1st Armor and Mechanized Divisions from their withdraw from Germany.

In the number of combat troops there has been only slight increase of men/women. In reality if one looks at the number of Companies/Batteries/Troops and Battalions/Squadrons the numbers haven't really moved up as much as one would expect of force that was increase by 16 or so Brigades. This seems to be a major concern too.

I agree....if you cut 40 riflemen from your company, it just means that the remaining 80 rifleman have to work harder. And if your unit suffers losses, well then the 60 remaining riflemen have to work even harder. Its a nasty sprial that never ends. There was a lot of flak over the Marines keeping the 13-man rifle squad, vs the 7-man Army rifle squad...hmmmm, more firepower, better able to take losses and remain effective, better command and control...Marines were right.

It is combination that Divisions have lost their sense of accomplishment. Even Brigades and Battalions loose sense since now the battle streamers and worse yet the unit citation become a nightmare. The book keeping as platoons are splinter and composite companies are sent on missions that they were never quite trained for. Armor and Mechanized units using HMMWVs, Artillery units conducting infantry foot patrols. The hard fact in this war is that everyone in the combat zone is expected to act as 11B unless you were medic, even then you better know your stuff just in case.

If even half of what I'm hearing from return soldiers is true, the Army is suffering major problems with morale and discipline. Fragmenting units has been proven to be unworkable through the last three major wars (or is that a war, a police action and whateverthehell Vietnam was supposed to be?). But here we are, in the longest whateverthehell Iraq/Afghanistan are supposed to be, fragmenting units because some think-tank on the Beltway is convienced that it can work.

Even during WWII when each Division had been drown down from 4 Infantry Regiment to 3 Regiment they usually took to the field with addition resource that would gradually equal to a 4th Regiment. Even the Armor Division that originally had two Combat Command had a third one added by the end of the war and wasn't unusually to find Infantry Regiment assigned to them. Even in Vietnam the 23rd Infantry Division was collection of Separate Brigades that were grouped together under a common HQ in theater.

Then you add to the fact that units were told they would go over for only 12-15 months depending on when they were to go over spending up to 18 months there because of this emergency or another. Supposedly staying at home station for 18 months for training which rarely happen. I guess there are reason for the sour grape complaints...

Not that the troop have much room to complain because they did signed up, but after people keep telling you one thing and making promises that they know they can't keep. Well I would expect anyone to cry foul.

Please, as a favor, don't get me started on that diaster known as Tricare!

One of the things was the pride that units use to have and the amount of time NCOs and Officers would go to instill what the unit had done over the years. Lot of that was thrown out of window when the 3rd Mechanized Division was carved up and later units kept going through rotation after rotation. I think at last count most of the regular Army was working on 5th over and some Guard units were working on their 3rd rotation over in the Middle East. All the while many of the troops knowing they can press their luck only so many times.

Or the fact that their are plenty of 20-24 year old E-5s and E-6s milling around, take this into consideration that many O-1 out of West Point are only 22-24. Back in 1989 there was talk amongst the senior NCOs in my company because E-6 who had less then 8 years had just made E-6. many of these people had been 10-12 years before they made it to E-6.

So it in general there are lot of things that people are grumbling about. It always will be there and lot of it due to lost of traditions. Which to keep is just silly...but it does happen.

There are good reasons behind the traditions. Its corny, its silly, its outdated, but it helps the soldier belong to something greater than himself.

[pmulcahy11b]

Dragoon, you're not closing your quotes (it should look like [/QUOTE]) at the end of the quote. That slash is important.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by pmulcahy11b

Dragoon, you're not closing your quotes (it should look like

) at the end of the quote. That slash is important.[/QUOTE]

Sorry, I'm multitasking today, feeding my daughter and having my mind shut down from too much Dora the Explorer!

[rcaf_777]

Pampers melt in a Maytag dryer
Crayons go up one drawer higher
Rewind Barney for the fifteenth time
Breakfast, six naps at nine
There's bubble gum in the baby's hair
Sweet potatoes in my lazy chair
Been crazy all day long and it's only Monday
Mr. Mom

[pmulcahy11b]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

) at the end of the quote. That slash is important.

I didn't mean that the ")" was part of the quote code; I was simply closing my own parentheses for grammar.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by rcaf_777

Pampers melt in a Maytag dryer
Crayons go up one drawer higher
Rewind Barney for the fifteenth time
Breakfast, six naps at nine
There's bubble gum in the baby's hair
Sweet potatoes in my lazy chair
Been crazy all day long and it's only Monday
Mr. Mom

LOL

Nothing like a three-year old to show you what is really important in the world!

[headquarters]

there are a couple more dragoons in here as well - FmDecorba and yours truly both donned the black beret of the armoured cav in our day.(Royal Norwegian Armoured Cavalry , eskadrons 4 and 6 respectivly)

Was in just before the switch from M113 and Nm135 to Cv-90.

Tried my hand at Sisu XA 180 and 185s .

Have to say- if I had to equip a fighting force the CV 90 would be my choice.

While I do like the though as nail simplicity of the m113 series, the CV 90 also have a rugged design with not to many frills but still carry good thermal suite,stabilized ordinance (Bushmaster 30 mm autocannon) and firing computer that means it is going to pack a punch.

Sitting in our m113 and seeing the cv 90s flash by us was like sitting in a rowing boat being overtaken by something out of the opening credits of Miami vice.

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

) at the end of the quote. That slash is important.

Sorry, I'm multitasking today, feeding my daughter and having my mind shut down from too much Dora the Explorer![/QUOTE]

Dora you are getting off light...LOL

Try 1 and half of Barney 18 hours a day...

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

Its always been this way, at least since WWII, units were stripped to provide cadre for a new formed division. Korea was no better, except that units were stripped stateside to provide replacements for the Far East. In Vietnam, the one year and your out policy destroyed a division's cohesion faster than enemy action did. In Persian Gulf I, what a lot of people forget is that after the fall of the old Soviet Union, Bush I started drawing down troops to save money, a lot of brigades were deactivated and this is one of the reasons that you found 3MID units in the 1AD to name one example.

You hear a lot of talk about "training together and fighting together" but when a moment of crisis happens, it's throw whatever is available into the pot and hope for the best. Face it, the US Military as a whole has never been adequate to protect the intrests of the USA. There was a plan once to move divisions down to the Mexican border to help stem the flow of drugs and illegals crossing the border, had a good chance of working too, until Congress discovered that to seal the border completely would require the commitment of 130 divisions....and please remember, that at the height of WWII, the US only fielded 90 divisions.



The thinking behind this is that any division commander can command any mix of units...completely disregards that heavy and light units have different capabilities, different tactics and different logistical needs. But HAY! What do I know, I'm just a glorified bean counter nowdays...



I agree....if you cut 40 riflemen from your company, it just means that the remaining 80 rifleman have to work harder. And if your unit suffers losses, well then the 60 remaining riflemen have to work even harder. Its a nasty sprial that never ends. There was a lot of flak over the Marines keeping the 13-man rifle squad, vs the 7-man Army rifle squad...hmmmm, more firepower, better able to take losses and remain effective, better command and control...Marines were right.



If even half of what I'm hearing from return soldiers is true, the Army is suffering major problems with morale and discipline. Fragmenting units has been proven to be unworkable through the last three major wars (or is that a war, a police action and whateverthehell Vietnam was supposed to be?). But here we are, in the longest whateverthehell Iraq/Afghanistan are supposed to be, fragmenting units because some think-tank on the Beltway is convienced that it can work.



Please, as a favor, don't get me started on that diaster known as Tricare!



There are good reasons behind the traditions. Its corny, its silly, its outdated, but it helps the soldier belong to something greater than himself.

Yes the Original Bush started to draw down the Army at a time when the Cold War was 'Officially' over. Also at this times many more units were left understrength. Don't get me started on that...lol

Yeah well the wet dream was to field something like close to 150 Division or more, with several more Armor Division, but there was lend-lease and combat loses seemed to deem those dreams ineffective... So yeah the closing of the border of that border will never happen...

You forgetting the minor invasion of Gernada (sp) and Panama where at each the 2/3 of the 82nd Division made it. Of course the two Brigade Commands were mixed with 2 of the regularly schedule Battalions and the Brigade that HQ that sat home sent two of three battalions to the first action. Lessons were learned and during Panama none of that foolishness was entertained.

I agree the Marines have it right. Not that they have got it entirely correct. There were plenty of Marine Platoons operated with 2 Marine Rifle Squad instead of the 3 Squads so to keep full squads instead of reducing the Squads. Since 9-11 things have improved some in filling out the staffing.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Abbott Shaull

You forgetting the minor invasion of Gernada (sp) and Panama where at each the 2/3 of the 82nd Division made it. Of course the two Brigade Commands were mixed with 2 of the regularly schedule Battalions and the Brigade that HQ that sat home sent two of three battalions to the first action. Lessons were learned and during Panama none of that foolishness was entertained.

Please! I'm still trying to forget Grenada!!!! There is nothing like trying to plan a military operation from a tourist guide book map of the island!

"And I want 3rd platoon to hook through Henry's Bar & Grill and then advance on the Hilton, watch out for that miniature golf course on your left, S2 thinks that the Cubans have set up around the windmill!"

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

Please! I'm still trying to forget Grenada!!!! There is nothing like trying to plan a military operation from a tourist guide book map of the island!

"And I want 3rd platoon to hook through Henry's Bar & Grill and then advance on the Hilton, watch out for that miniature golf course on your left, S2 thinks that the Cubans have set up around the windmill!"

Yeah I know, it was entirely a cluster from what I heard of the troops and NCOs who had the misfortune of being on that operation. Again it was one of those operation where it was better left to Marine Expeditionary Unit or the logical argument could of seen a MEB being used.

Sending 2/3 of the the 82nd with a unhealthy mix of Special Forces, Rangers and SEAL was a grand recipe of more deaths and wounded than their needed to be... Oh well.

Panama was just as bad. Everyone wanted piece of the action. As a result again more people lost their lives than if they kept the entire thing KISS. Especially since literally we had forces in place. It was the movement of troops Bragg that finally gave up that the operation was underway since they were looking at the same flight information as we were...*shrug*...

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Abbott Shaull

Yeah I know, it was entirely a cluster from what I heard of the troops and NCOs who had the misfortune of being on that operation. Again it was one of those operation where it was better left to Marine Expeditionary Unit or the logical argument could of seen a MEB being used.

Sending 2/3 of the the 82nd with a unhealthy mix of Special Forces, Rangers and SEAL was a grand recipe of more deaths and wounded than their needed to be... Oh well.

Panama was just as bad. Everyone wanted piece of the action. As a result again more people lost their lives than if they kept the entire thing KISS. Especially since literally we had forces in place. It was the movement of troops Bragg that finally gave up that the operation was underway since they were looking at the same flight information as we were...*shrug*...

Sometimes this Joint Service stuff is a real pain in the a**!! The only good to come out was the creation of the Joint Special Operations Command...an act which has reduced numerous general and flag officers into foaming fits!!! IMAGINE, giving Rangers, SEALs and Green Berets equal fooring with the traditional branches!!!!

ROFLMA!

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

Sometimes this Joint Service stuff is a real pain in the a**!! The only good to come out was the creation of the Joint Special Operations Command...an act which has reduced numerous general and flag officers into foaming fits!!! IMAGINE, giving Rangers, SEALs and Green Berets equal fooring with the traditional branches!!!!

ROFLMA!

Yeah well the sad thing is that most of the members who were the one who could best explain their capabilities rarely rose high enough with-in their separate commands. Granted there were people in all of the branches Special Operation Commands before they joined by the Joint Special Operations Command that would sneak under the radar to become Brigadier General, Major General, or Rear Admiral. Yet, these promotions were rare and far to find. Also there were senior officers who look upon Special Operation troops as if they are provide nothing to of value to their forces.

Granted by this time I know in the Army Special Operation Command top job was Lt General. Outside of the the individual Services Special Operation Commands there were few jobs outside of these Commands for people to get promotions. In general if they did make it to Flag rank they were placed back in staff positions or in other none relate Special Operations type Commands. For most of the time they would make back to their respective Special Operation Commands or staff position for planning at the Pentagon or the various other Joint Commands.

On serious note it more like elevation of Marine Corps Commandant to a Full voting member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When the Marine Corps is suppose to be branch of the Navy.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Abbott Shaull

Yeah well the sad thing is that most of the members who were the one who could best explain their capabilities rarely rose high enough with-in their separate commands. Granted there were people in all of the branches Special Operation Commands before they joined by the Joint Special Operations Command that would sneak under the radar to become Brigadier General, Major General, or Rear Admiral. Yet, these promotions were rare and far to find. Also there were senior officers who look upon Special Operation troops as if they are provide nothing to of value to their forces.

Granted by this time I know in the Army Special Operation Command top job was Lt General. Outside of the the individual Services Special Operation Commands there were few jobs outside of these Commands for people to get promotions. In general if they did make it to Flag rank they were placed back in staff positions or in other none relate Special Operations type Commands. For most of the time they would make back to their respective Special Operation Commands or staff position for planning at the Pentagon or the various other Joint Commands.

On serious note it more like elevation of Marine Corps Commandant to a Full voting member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When the Marine Corps is suppose to be branch of the Navy.

Ah the Green Machine! The day it ever makes sense is the day I will fall over from sheer heart failure!

[dragoon500ly]

Mulling over things, in between coffee breaks, I got to thinking about the light tank. Now in the US Army, we like our tanks to be big and heavy and equipped with large caliber guns and all kinds of electronic doo-dads. But I keep coming back to the light tank. It offers all kinds of advantages when you sit down and think about it. To be sure, it doesn't have heavy armor, but it can be more strategically portable than a M-1. Prior to the intro of the 120mm smoothbore, the US was developing a series of improved 105mm shells that were as capable as the 120mm, and in at least two cases, bloody well out performed the 120mm!

Now a bit of background...the first "official" light tank other than the WWI French FT would be the M-3 Stuart, now before anyone bursts a bubble, the M-2 series of combat cars were never considered to be light tanks, simply because they were the only tanks that we had in the pre-World War II era. The Stuart is the best example of a light tank, well armored for its weight, a lovely horsepower to weight ratio and for its period, adequate armament. Too bad that it was thrown into combat against vehicles that were a generation ahead of its design. Its 37mm main armament quickly proved to be lacking in fire power.

The M-3 Stuart was replaced with the M-5 Stuart; this improvement used a newly designed hull to delete some of the numerous shot traps of the M-3s design, but kept pretty much the same turret and armament. The designers of the M-5 ignored reports coming back from the front about how inadequate the 37mm cannon had become. This was the developmental end of the Stuart.

Next out of factory was the first true advance, the M-24 Chaffee light tank. For its weight, it was adequately armored, horsepower-to-weight ratio was not as high as it could have been, but the main gun was now the 75mm cannon (it was the same cannon mounted in the B-25J medium bomber). The problem with the armament was that by the introduction of the M-24 (1945), the 75mm had pretty much lived out its developmental lifespan. The Korean War proved to be the undoing of the M-24, although I believe that this was due more to the tank being thrown up against the T-34/85 tank than any design flaw. Norway upgunned its M-24s with a 90mm and by all reports are still quite happy with the design.

The next and last US light tank was the M-41 Walker Bulldog. Lightly armored for its weight, it had excellent horsepower-to-weight and was armed with the 76mm cannon. The Bulldog didn't last long in US service as the decision was being made to go with the Main Battle Tank concept. The Bulldog served in several armies, but its moment of fame came in the Vietnam War where it equipped several companies of the ARVN. It proved to be a reliable, nimble design and several PT-76s and T-54/55s of the PAVN were destroyed prior to the fall of South Vietnam.

A few years ago, a design for a light tank was pushed. Called the M-8 Buford Mobile Gun System, it was an intresting concept. It was air-portable. Its armor could be beefed up by adding additional armor panels to met three basic threat levels. It had an excellent horsepower-to-weight ratio and was equipped with the 105mm rifled cannon. The initial tests of the M-8 showed it to be a capable design, but alas! It fell prey to the next round of budget cutbacks. Something about a Congressman needing a bridge in Alaska.

GDW also pushed something they called the LAV-75, didn't exist, even as a design concept, but its armament was in development. The 75mm gun was coupled to an autoloader that allowed the weapon to fire 10 rounds in the time it took you to read this sentence. Impressive, no? The drawback to the 75mm gun was the same one that doomed the older 75mm in WWII, armor penetration was for shit. What good did it do to hit a T-62 ten times if none of the rounds penetrated? That was pretty much the end of the 75mm gun concept.

A light tank in the US Army...nowdays we have a Stryker with a 105mm gun that the service is trying to fix (recoil is such a b***h!). A light tank battalion could be attached to the airborne/air assault/light infantry divisions and give them some badly needed firepower. The divisional cavalry squadrons could also use a light tank design. Just some random musings!

[Adm.Lee]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

Please! I'm still trying to forget Grenada!!!! There is nothing like trying to plan a military operation from a tourist guide book map of the island!

It was a little better than that. One of the staffies somewhere had actually visited, and written his Staff College paper on how to invade it. I agree, though, the execution was sub-par.

[Adm.Lee]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

GDW also pushed something they called the LAV-75, didn't exist, even as a design concept, but its armament was in development. The 75mm gun was coupled to an autoloader that allowed the weapon to fire 10 rounds in the time it took you to read this sentence. Impressive, no? The drawback to the 75mm gun was the same one that doomed the older 75mm in WWII, armor penetration was for shit. What good did it do to hit a T-62 ten times if none of the rounds penetrated? That was pretty much the end of the 75mm gun concept.

Are you sure it's the same 75mm? I figured it was the same 75mm statted from the Scorpion and/or AMX. The Sherman's 75mm was a low-velocity thing, designed by an artillery-experienced ordnance team. According to "Steel coffins", they wanted a barrel that could last 2,000 shots before wearing out, but experience showed that tanks didn't last that long.

[Panther Al]

A couple of things, back in the day Armour Magazine had a bit about the M41's true claim to fame: the ARVN army wound up with a company actually pulling off an true air assault. From what I recall, a coup was being run in Siagon, and per policy the US did nothing. But the word was slow in reaching Cahm Ram Bay, where a ARVN company did get word and asked the Air Force for lift for an "purely administrative" move. They said yes, and the moment the tanks arrived they started lighting up those that was backing the coup located on the airbase before rolling into the city.

The second is one (and yes, I do sound like a broken record at times ) is back way earlier I mentioned the CV90 series as a potential replacement for all the armoured vehicles in a cav regiment, one of the options is either a 105 or a 120 nato gun armed light tank version. Not a bad thing in my view.

[James Langham]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

Mulling over things, in between coffee breaks, I got to thinking about the light tank. Now in the US Army, we like our tanks to be big and heavy and equipped with large caliber guns and all kinds of electronic doo-dads. But I keep coming back to the light tank. It offers all kinds of advantages when you sit down and think about it. To be sure, it doesn't have heavy armor, but it can be more strategically portable than a M-1. Prior to the intro of the 120mm smoothbore, the US was developing a series of improved 105mm shells that were as capable as the 120mm, and in at least two cases, bloody well out performed the 120mm!

Now a bit of background...the first "official" light tank other than the WWI French FT would be the M-3 Stuart, now before anyone bursts a bubble, the M-2 series of combat cars were never considered to be light tanks, simply because they were the only tanks that we had in the pre-World War II era. The Stuart is the best example of a light tank, well armored for its weight, a lovely horsepower to weight ratio and for its period, adequate armament. Too bad that it was thrown into combat against vehicles that were a generation ahead of its design. Its 37mm main armament quickly proved to be lacking in fire power.

The M-3 Stuart was replaced with the M-5 Stuart; this improvement used a newly designed hull to delete some of the numerous shot traps of the M-3s design, but kept pretty much the same turret and armament. The designers of the M-5 ignored reports coming back from the front about how inadequate the 37mm cannon had become. This was the developmental end of the Stuart.

Next out of factory was the first true advance, the M-24 Chaffee light tank. For its weight, it was adequately armored, horsepower-to-weight ratio was not as high as it could have been, but the main gun was now the 75mm cannon (it was the same cannon mounted in the B-25J medium bomber). The problem with the armament was that by the introduction of the M-24 (1945), the 75mm had pretty much lived out its developmental lifespan. The Korean War proved to be the undoing of the M-24, although I believe that this was due more to the tank being thrown up against the T-34/85 tank than any design flaw. Norway upgunned its M-24s with a 90mm and by all reports are still quite happy with the design.

The next and last US light tank was the M-41 Walker Bulldog. Lightly armored for its weight, it had excellent horsepower-to-weight and was armed with the 76mm cannon. The Bulldog didn't last long in US service as the decision was being made to go with the Main Battle Tank concept. The Bulldog served in several armies, but its moment of fame came in the Vietnam War where it equipped several companies of the ARVN. It proved to be a reliable, nimble design and several PT-76s and T-54/55s of the PAVN were destroyed prior to the fall of South Vietnam.

A few years ago, a design for a light tank was pushed. Called the M-8 Buford Mobile Gun System, it was an intresting concept. It was air-portable. Its armor could be beefed up by adding additional armor panels to met three basic threat levels. It had an excellent horsepower-to-weight ratio and was equipped with the 105mm rifled cannon. The initial tests of the M-8 showed it to be a capable design, but alas! It fell prey to the next round of budget cutbacks. Something about a Congressman needing a bridge in Alaska.

GDW also pushed something they called the LAV-75, didn't exist, even as a design concept, but its armament was in development. The 75mm gun was coupled to an autoloader that allowed the weapon to fire 10 rounds in the time it took you to read this sentence. Impressive, no? The drawback to the 75mm gun was the same one that doomed the older 75mm in WWII, armor penetration was for shit. What good did it do to hit a T-62 ten times if none of the rounds penetrated? That was pretty much the end of the 75mm gun concept.

A light tank in the US Army...nowdays we have a Stryker with a 105mm gun that the service is trying to fix (recoil is such a b***h!). A light tank battalion could be attached to the airborne/air assault/light infantry divisions and give them some badly needed firepower. The divisional cavalry squadrons could also use a light tank design. Just some random musings!

The LAV75 did actually exist - it was known as the Ares Light Tank.

I am actually working on this and I've put my draft thoughts on. Sorry it's not as polished as usual.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Adm.Lee

Are you sure it's the same 75mm? I figured it was the same 75mm statted from the Scorpion and/or AMX. The Sherman's 75mm was a low-velocity thing, designed by an artillery-experienced ordnance team. According to "Steel coffins", they wanted a barrel that could last 2,000 shots before wearing out, but experience showed that tanks didn't last that long.

It wasn't the same 75 as the mounted on the sherman, just shared the same caliber. It officially was a 75mm, 65-caliber. A shorter version was marketed for a time by AIRES Corps as the AIRES 75...the great selling point was the auto loader. The Scorpion mounted a short-barrelled 76mm, but the Brits used HESH, HE, Smoke and Canister and ignored the AP round. The AMX-13 75mm gun was a near copy of the 75mm used on the Panther.

The Sherman short-barrelled 75mm was designed to meet then current Armored Corps doctrine which held that tanks were not to be used to destroy other tanks, that was the sole preserve of the tank destroyer corps. So when the Sherman went into combat from El Alemain forward, it found itself serously outgunned by the Mark IV, Panther, Tiger, King Tiger combo. It was only when the Sherman was upgunned to the 76mm that it had any chance of taking on the Germans...and even then, it was seriously outgunned.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by James Langham

The LAV75 did actually exist - it was known as the Ares Light Tank.

I am actually working on this and I've put my draft thoughts on. Sorry it's not as polished as usual.

Information I've got states that the Ares was developed as a show case for their 75mm gun system. The vehicle itself was never turned over to the military for testing and that total production only came to 3-4 vehicles. Their gun was actually turned over to Aberdeen Proving Grounds for testing where it impressed everybody with its high rate of fire, until it was tested on tank hulls and failed to penetrate the old M-47 hull that was used. And the final saw was that the gun failed to penetrate the armor...and that was the end of that discussion.

Ever since then, the discussion has been using a gun of no less than 90mm. Not that the budget people will discuss a light tank.

[Dog 6]

the LAV- 75 was the US Army's " High Survivability Test Vehicle Light " it was armed with the Ares corps hyper velocity automatic cannon XM274. it had a 12.5 mile range, armor penetration is listed as 350mm at 2000m with APFSDS. It can fire a three round burst. Excessive heat transfer and barrel erosion was a major drawback.

[Abbott Shaull]

Yes a good Light Tank would be a good start to give the 10th Mountain, 82nd Airborne, and 101st Airborne Divisions some extra fire power. It wouldn't be bad to see some to go to the Airborne Brigade with the 25th Infantry and the 173rd Airborne Brigade.

These could also be used in the Stryker Brigades too. To help add some effective fire power so that they don't have to rely on 105 mounted Stryker and hope if they fire over the side that they don't roll over...

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Dog 6

the LAV- 75 was the US Army's " High Survivability Test Vehicle Light " it was armed with the Ares corps hyper velocity automatic cannon XM274. it had a 12.5 mile range, armor penetration is listed as 350mm at 2000m with APFSDS. It can fire a three round burst. Excessive heat transfer and barrel erosion was a major drawback.

Now the Armor Journal articles I'm looking over state that the APFSDS rounds failed to penetrate the armor on the target vehicle, citing "the shattering of the penetrator on impact as well as the complete failure of other test rounds to penetrate more than 2cm. Failure of the auto-loader in sustained fire, excessive heat damage to the components as well as several breech explosions, again due to the heat. The Ares gun never achieved its designers expectations.

As for the High Survivability Test Vehicle Light, there were 18 designs submitted for that, none of which entered US service. You have to remember that defense contractors come up with multiple designs and try to sell to the military, it is possible to see the same mock-up turret design on multiple hulls, it really depends on what can be cheaply modified by the contractor.

Just one example is a Bradley that was modified to mount a 30m high, boom in place of the troop compartment, you simply opened the over head hatch, raised the boom and activated its sensor package. The "eyeball" mounted CCTV, thermal sights, laser rangefinder and a laser designator. The theory is that the Brad would set up in back in the woods, out of sight, raise the eyeball to scan for targets and designate for Hellfire and Copperhead then retract the boom and move back before the Soviets could figure out were it was. Five were actually built and displayed at various arms shows and around several military bases. There are plenty of pics of the vehicle and at least one book that identifed it as Bradley variant that was entering service. It never entered service, and in point of fact, was never purchased or requested by the US Army. The "LAV-75" falls into this category of vehicle. It was a design concept that failed the early testing process.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Abbott Shaull

Yes a good Light Tank would be a good start to give the 10th Mountain, 82nd Airborne, and 101st Airborne Divisions some extra fire power. It wouldn't be bad to see some to go to the Airborne Brigade with the 25th Infantry and the 173rd Airborne Brigade.

These could also be used in the Stryker Brigades too. To help add some effective fire power so that they don't have to rely on 105 mounted Stryker and hope if they fire over the side that they don't roll over...

Just flipping through a copy of Jane's Armored Fighting Vehicles shows serveral decent designs:

The Austrain SK-105 Kurassier design; combat weight weight of 17,700kg, armed with the 105mm cannon and with a road speed of 70km/hr and a range of 500km

The Swedish Ikv-91; combat weight of 16,300kg, armed with a 90mm cannon; a road spd of 65km/hr and a range of 500km

The UK Scorpion/Scimitar/Sabre; combat weight of 8,073kg, armed with a 76mm cannon (30mm autocannon); a road spd of 80km/hr and a range of 644km

The Cadillac Gage Stingray; combat weight of 21,205kg, armed with the 105mm cannon; road spd of 67km/hr with a range of 483km

The Swedish CV-90; combat weight of 22,800kg, armed with a a 105mm or 120mm cannon, road spd of 70km/hr, range of 500km

The Cadillac Gage ASV-150; combat weight 13,408kg, armed with a 90mm cannon, road spd of 100km/hr, range of 708km

These are just a few that I pulled out. There are other designs like the South African Ratel and Rooikat designs that I like...but its enough to give you an idea.

[Panther Al]

The South African Rookiat is a good example of how its done. Has a relatively low profile, wide tyres, a wide wheelbase, fast and long ranged. Armour is a little better than the Stryker, but most importantly, they did an outstanding job of keeping bloat away. Has a 76mm because its all they need, nor does it have tons of electronics, and has a 360 degree firing arc- even with the 105 version. Its honestly my favourite armoured scout car out there.

[Adm.Lee]

How many of these A/C designs were tested in the pre-Stryker run-up? I recall being told that there were a lot (2 dozen?) of foreign & domestic vehicles collected, and each turned over to a team of NCOs to run through their paces.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Adm.Lee

How many of these A/C designs were tested in the pre-Stryker run-up? I recall being told that there were a lot (2 dozen?) of foreign & domestic vehicles collected, and each turned over to a team of NCOs to run through their paces.

There were a lot of US designs and 5-7 foreign designs. But from almost the beginning of the tests, all you heard about was how great the Stryker was.

In these tests, there is a very high if-its-not invented-here-its-no-good.

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

There were a lot of US designs and 5-7 foreign designs. But from almost the beginning of the tests, all you heard about was how great the Stryker was.

In these tests, there is a very high if-its-not invented-here-its-no-good.

Sounds like when they tested and later fielded the M16. Then the M4 trials. Seems their minds were already made up...