OT Navies in WWII

[dragoon500ly]

Above and Beyond the Call of Duty

While in many ways the fighting in the Pacific was different from the other theaters of WWII, in one respect it was very different. Infantry fighting is the most dangerous form of battle, but in the Pacific it was particularly lethal.

For example, the US Army Infantry received, on average, one Medal of Honor for every 800 soldiers killed. The US Army Cavalry received one MoH for every 550 troopers killed. The US Navy received one MoH for every 550 sailors killed.

But the Marines had the most impressive ratio of dead to Medals of Honor, receiving one MoH for every 369 marines killed.

[dragoon500ly]

From a pre-war strength of 18,000 officers and men, the USMC rose to a strength of 485,833 officers and men.

While providing only 5% of the US armed forces in WWII, the Marines suffered almost 10% of the total American casualities, roughly 3% of serving Marines died in combat (1 out of every 34).

The operation suffering the highest casualty rate was the assault on Beito Island in Tarawa Atoll. The 2nd Marine Divisions suffered 3,318 losses---18% of the landing force. The regiment that had the highest casualty rate was the 1st Marines on the island of Pelelie (15-22 Sept 1944) where it suffered 1,672 casualties.

During the 1,364 days, 5 hours and 44 minutes of World War II, the United States Marine Corps suffered:

Killed in Action = 15,161
Died of Wounds = 3,259
Wounded in Action = 67,207 (including those wounded more than once)
Missing in Action, Presumed Dead = 2,822
Killed or Died while Prisoners of War = 348
Prisoners of War = 2,274
Non-battle deaths in combat zones = 4,778

Naval Medical personnel attached to the Marines suffered the following:

Killed in Action = 1,681
Died of Wounds = 252
Wound in Action = 5,153
Missing in Action, Presumed Dead = 529
Prisoners of War = 28

During the war, the USMC earned

18 Presidential Unit Citations (Navy)
3 Presidential Unit Citations (Army)
35 Navy Unit Commendations

During the war, Marines earned
82 Medals of Honor (51 posthumously)
1,026 Navy Crosses
3,952 Silver Stars
606 Legion of Merit
354 Navy and marine Corps Medals
29 Soldiers Medal (Army)

Navy Medical personnel earned 7 Medals of Honor (3 posthumously), 66 Navy Crosses and 485 Silver Stars.

[Graebarde]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

Came across this list....

The food supplies for a typical US Battleship for one week....

Beef, Frozen = 10,000lbs
Veal, Frozen = 2,000lbs
Ham, Smoked = 750lbs
Fish, Frozen = 500lbs
Spam = 250lbs
Potatoes, White = 9,000lbs
Potatoes, Sweet = 900lbs
Carrots = 1,500lbs
Lettuce, Iceberg = 1,200lbs
Tomatoes = 900lbs
Asparagus = 900lbs
Cucumbers = 850lbs
Celery = 600lbs
Rhubarb = 500lbs
Oranges = 1,900lbs
Lemons = 1,200lbs
Eggs = 1,500 dozen
Flour = 14,000lbs
Milk (fresh, condensed and powdered) = 2,200lbs
Seasonings and condiments = 700lbs
Ice Cream = 2,000lbs
Coffee = 4,000lbs

Something else!

Navy eats good that's for sure. Meanwhile the doggies ate K-rats.

[dragoon500ly]

Marine Order of Battle at Midway

Midway consists of two islands (Sand and Eastern) and its defenses were organized on these. On 4-5 June, 1942, there were 2,512 Marines (382 in MAG-22). All Marine, Navy and USAAF air units were at NAS, Midway on Eastern Island.

On Sand Island:
HQ and Service Battery, 6th Defense Battalion (Reinforced)
Batteries A and C (two 5-inch/51 each), Seacoast Artillery Group, 6th DB
7-inch Battery (provisional) (two 7-inch/45), SAG, 6th DB
3-inch Navy Battery (provisional) (two 3-inch/50 cd guns), SAG, 6th DB
One half of Battery G (Searchlight), 6th DB
22nd Provisional Marine Company (provided extra personnel for gun crews)
HQ, Detachment, 2nd Raider Battalion
Company C, 2nd Raider Battalion
Tank Platoon, 6th DB (five M-2A4 light tanks)
HQ, Antiaircraft Group, 6th DB
Battery D (four 3-inch AA guns), 3rd Defense Battalion
Batteries D & F (four 3-inch AA guns each), AAG, 6th DB
HQ, Special Weapons Group, 6th Defense Battalion
one half of Battery H, SWG, 6th DB (six .50 cal water-cooled AA guns)
one half of Battery I, SWG, 6th DB (six M-1917A1 .30 cal HMG)
one half of Battery K, SWG, 3rd DB (four 37mm AA guns)
one half of Battery L, SWG, 3rd DB (four 20mm AA guns)
Detachment, 407th Signal Company, Aviation (USAAF radio station)

On Eastern Island:
HQ, Seacoast Artillery Group, 6th Defense Battalion
Battery B (two 5-inch/51), SAG, 6th DB
7-inch Battery (Provisional) (two 7-inch/45), SAG, 6th DB
3-inch Navy Battery (Provisional) (two 3-inch/50 cd guns), SAG, 6th DB
23rd Provisional Marine Company (provided extra personnel for the gun crews)
Company D, 2nd Raider Battalion
HQ, Antiaircraft Group, 3rd Defense Battalion
Battery E (four 3-inch AA guns), AAG, 6th DB
Batteries E & F (four 3-inch AA guns ea), AAG, 3rd DB
one half of Battery H, SWG, 6th DB (six .50 cal water-cooled AA guns)
one half of Battery I, SWG, 6th DB (six M-1917A1 .30 cal HMG)
one half of Battery K, SWG, 3rd DB (four 37mm AA guns)
one half of Battery L, SWG, 3rd DB (four 20mm AA guns)

Japanese Opposition:
The 2nd Combined Special Landing Force consisted of 5,000 IJN/IJA personnel. The assault element was made up of the 1,250 Yokosuka 5th Special Navy Landing Force (to land on Sand Island) and the 1,200 Ichiki Force [28th Infantry Regiment, 7th Division] (and yes this is the same force that attacked the 1st Marine Division on Alligator Creek on Guadalcanal) who would land on Eastern Island. The IJN 11th and 12th Construction Battalions would provide support along with follow-up survey and weather groups. At least this was the plan for the June 7 landing.

Midway was attacked by 108 carrier aircraft (and claimed 53 shot down by AA guns and defending fighters; NOTE: this estimate may be a tad over the real losses). A submarine was damaged by Marine guns.

Came across a USMC site that states that Midway had two 7-inch gun batteries, each of two guns.

American air power at NAS, Midway consisted of:

Marine Aircraft Group 22
HQ Squadron 22
Service Squadron 22
Marine Fighting Squadron 221: 21 F2A-3 Buffalo (20 operational) and 7 F4F-3 Wildcat (6 operational)
Marine Scout-Bombing Squadron 241: 19 SBD-2 Dauntless (18 operational) and 21 SB2U-3 Vindicator (14 operational,
only 12 air crews)

USN
Patrol Squadron 23: 14 PBY-5 Catalina (13 operational, 11 dedicated to search, 2 to torpedo attack)
detachment, Patrol Squadron 44: 8 PBY-5A Catalina (7 operational, all dedicated to search)
detachment, Patrol Squadron 24: 6 PBY-5A Catalina (2 dedicated to search, 3 to torpedo attack)
detachment, Patrol Squadron 51: 3 PBY-5A Catalina, (2 dedicated to search, 1 to torpedo attack)
detachment, Torpedo Squadron Eight: 6 TBF-1 Avenger

USAAF
detachment, 349th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy): 1 B-17D photo recon
detachment, 42nd Bombardment Squadron (Heavy): 5 B-17E (4 operational)
detachment, 431st Bombardment Squadron (Heavy): 6 B-17E
detachment, 31st Bombardment Squadron (Heavy): 2 B-17E
detachment, 72nd Bombardment Squadron (Heavy): 1 B-17E
detachment, 18th Reconnaissance Squadron (Medium): 2 B-26 in torpedo attack role
detachment, 69th Bombardment Squadron (Medium): 2 B-26B in torpedo attack role

Finally,
Motor Torpedo Squadron One with PT-20, PT-21, PT-22, PT-24, PT-25, PT-26 and PT-27 at Midway

detachment, MTS1: PT-29 and PT-30 at Kure

at French Frigate Shoals: USS Clark, DD-361; USS Ballard, AVD-10 and USS Thorton, AV-12 (support for Catalinas)

At Pearl & Hermes Reef: USS Kaloli, AOG-13; USS Vireo, ATO-144 and USS Crystal, PY-25 (aviation fuel support)

At Lisianski: USS YP-284

At Gardner's Pinnacles: USS YP-345

At Necker Island: USS YP-350

At Laysan: USS YP-290

The YP or Yippies were converted fishing boats that were armed with a radio and perhaps a machinegun. Their job was to monitor the outlaying reefs/islands to insure that the Japanese didn't try to base floatplanes to support their operations against Midway. The presence of these outlaying ships played a little known part in that, by their very presence, prevented the Japanese from conducting long-range aerial reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor by staging seaplanes (refueled by subs) from these "tiny" rocks.

[Targan]

Gee, the Japanese stuffed up their planning for Midway then. Only twice as many invaders as defenders (not counting naval and air assets obviously). Generally a ratio of 3:1 attackers vs defenders is a bare minimum for any hope of success; 5:1 or better is preferable.

[copeab]

One common myth of the battle of Midway was the invasion of the wester Aleutians was a pointless diversion. This was not the case. Although of arguably dubious value to the Japanese, possessing Attu and Kiska interfered with the US shipping route to Russia via the North Pacific. While Japan was not at war with Russia at the time, she remembered the beating Russia delivered to her in the late 1930's near Mongolia.

So unknown were these defeats of Japan that Hitler was enraged when Japan did not attack eastern Russia after Barbarossa and he had no idea why. Neither did the rest of the world. Russia had humiliated the IJA (twice!) and japan really didn't want any more of them.

Of course, the forces used on the Aleutians would have been better deployed at Midway (perhaps as a 'norther carrier force'), but it was not a pointless diversion.

[RN7]

Originally Posted by copeab

One common myth of the battle of Midway was the invasion of the wester Aleutians was a pointless diversion. This was not the case. Although of arguably dubious value to the Japanese, possessing Attu and Kiska interfered with the US shipping route to Russia via the North Pacific. While Japan was not at war with Russia at the time, she remembered the beating Russia delivered to her in the late 1930's near Mongolia.

So unknown were these defeats of Japan that Hitler was enraged when Japan did not attack eastern Russia after Barbarossa and he had no idea why. Neither did the rest of the world. Russia had humiliated the IJA (twice!) and japan really didn't want any more of them.

Of course, the forces used on the Aleutians would have been better deployed at Midway (perhaps as a 'norther carrier force'), but it was not a pointless diversion.

Probably the reason that nobody knew about the Japanese Army's defeat in Mongolia and Manchuria, was because Germany had invaded Poland at the very same time that the Russians were booting the Japanese out of Mongolia. In fact most of the Japanese military were probably unaware of it as well outside of the top brass and the troops directly involved in the fighting, as it wouldn't have done much for its wider reputation and morale considering the mauling the Red Army gave them. The bulk of Japan's Army was in China and Manchuria at this time along with much of its armoured forces and heavy artillery, and remained so even when they were fighting the Western Allies in the Pacific.

To some degree it is considered the reason why the Japanese Army was made to redirect its focus on the territories in South-East Asia and the Pacific Islands under the control of America, Britain, Vichy France and the Netherlands and Portugal, as the Japanese Navy had wanted. Previously the Japanese Army had wanted to annex Mongolia and the Soviet Far East and Siberia as far as Lake Baikal to consolidate its control of China and use the resources of the area. Unfortunately the Japanese Army wasn't the force it believed itself to be, as was shown when it came up against a well organised and fully mechanised opponent such as the Red Army. The poorly supplied and equipped Chinese and second line and over extended American, British and Dutch forces were a much easier target for them in 1941, and even then the Americans gave them a very tough time in the Philippines, and the British might have done so in Singapore and Malaya if they had been better led.

When the Japanese Army came up against well organised and supplied American and British Commonwealth forces in the Pacific Islands, New Guinea and Burma, they increasingly came off second best. The power of the Japanese Navy in the early war years, and the favourable terrain of the Pacific Theatre for Japanese Army tactics preserved their reputation for a while until America's military machine overwhelmed them. Had the Japanese Army taken on fully mechanised American or British forces which were based elsewhere at the time, on an equal footing in an inland campaign the result would probably have been the same as it was when they tried to take on the Red Army in 1939.

[copeab]

Originally Posted by RN7

Probably the reason that nobody knew about the Japanese Army's defeat in Mongolia and Manchuria, was because Germany had invaded Poland at the very same time that the Russians were booting the Japanese out of Mongolia. In fact most of the Japanese military were probably unaware of it as well outside of the top brass and the troops directly involved in the fighting, as it wouldn't have done much for its wider reputation and morale considering the mauling the Red Army gave them.

And the Soviets, ever paranoid, weren't going to say anything

The bulk of Japan's Army was in China and Manchuria at this time along with much of its armoured forces and heavy artillery, and remained so even when they were fighting the Western Allies in the Pacific.

The major contribution of China to the war was tying down a significant portion of the IJA, which could have been better employed elsewhere.

When the Japanese Army came up against well organised and supplied American and British Commonwealth forces in the Pacific Islands, New Guinea and Burma, they increasingly came off second best.

Also, fighting in China in the 1930's taught the Japanese the absolutely wrong lessons about armored warfare and tank design.

Had the Japanese Army taken on fully mechanised American or British forces which were based elsewhere at the time, on an equal footing in an inland campaign the result would probably have been the same as it was when they tried to take on the Red Army in 1939.

Fortunately for the IJA, most of their Pacific possessions were poor tank country. Parts of the Philippines were an exception and where most of the few significant tank battles of the Pacific were fought, which ended up rather one-sided. Worth noting that Allied tanks that had become obsolete in North Africa and Europe (like the Matilda II and M-3 Stuart) were quite effective against Japanese armor.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Targan

Gee, the Japanese stuffed up their planning for Midway then. Only twice as many invaders as defenders (not counting naval and air assets obviously). Generally a ratio of 3:1 attackers vs defenders is a bare minimum for any hope of success; 5:1 or better is preferable.

The whole landing force operation was not very well considered. Naval gunfire support would be by four heavy cruisers, firing for roughly an hour. But as the USN would learn, naval rifles were not the ideal weapon in dealing with a dug in defender. The most likely result would have been shells hitting at a slight angle and ricocheting.

Any attempt to send landing craft up the ship channel would have run into four 7-inch, four 5-inch and at least eight 3-inch guns firing over open sights into a killing area less than a hundred yards wide. Chopped hamburger comes to mind.

If the Japanese landed on the edge of the reef, then they would have faced advancing across a fairly even surface of at least 500 yards, straight into interlocking machinegun fire. Wouldn't have mattered if they landed at high or low tide, since high tide over the reef still didn't give landing craft enough water to float over.

Finally, 6th Defense Battalion spent its time laying in multiple barbed wire barricades seeded with demolition charges and home-made AP mines. I've never found a definite answer on how many barricades were present, but reports that I've seen indicate at least two thick belts with numerous "channeling" barriers in between. But then there are eyewitness acounts of three to four barriers....in either case, it would have been almost impossible for the landing force to cut their way through under fire.

Most likely, the assault troops would have been cut to pieces, just getting to the wire, the IJN could have committed its construction battalions, but there is no indication that the landing force had anything heavier than the 70mm battalion guns (two supporting each island)...and the Marines had plans to use 37mm and 20mm AA guns to support the beach defenses...not to mention that platoon of tanks.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by copeab

One common myth of the battle of Midway was the invasion of the wester Aleutians was a pointless diversion. This was not the case. Although of arguably dubious value to the Japanese, possessing Attu and Kiska interfered with the US shipping route to Russia via the North Pacific. While Japan was not at war with Russia at the time, she remembered the beating Russia delivered to her in the late 1930's near Mongolia.

So unknown were these defeats of Japan that Hitler was enraged when Japan did not attack eastern Russia after Barbarossa and he had no idea why. Neither did the rest of the world. Russia had humiliated the IJA (twice!) and japan really didn't want any more of them.

Of course, the forces used on the Aleutians would have been better deployed at Midway (perhaps as a 'norther carrier force'), but it was not a pointless diversion.

Ever since I read "Incredible Victory" as a young man, I was always puzzled by why the IJN went for the Attu/Kiska at the same time as Midway. Didn't the principle of mass mean that you hit the target with everything that you had?

By all accounts, the northern operation had the goals of establishing a presence far enough out to threaten any US/Canadian operation against northern Japan and to get weather stations for better forecasting; another purpose was to convince the US Pacific Fleet to send major units north. At the time, Japan did not want to threaten any shipping heading into the USSR and thus giving Russia a chance to join the the Pacific War. Good, logical thinking. But it was the timing of the operation that hurt the Japanese more than anything else.

Just think how Midway would have been changed with the addition of two Japanese carriers?

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by copeab

Fortunately for the IJA, most of their Pacific possessions were poor tank country. Parts of the Philippines were an exception and where most of the few significant tank battles of the Pacific were fought, which ended up rather one-sided. Worth noting that Allied tanks that had become obsolete in North Africa and Europe (like the Matilda II and M-3 Stuart) were quite effective against Japanese armor.

Not to mention that the 37mm antitank gun was still a deadly threat to Japanese tanks.

The only reason why the Matilda and Stuarts were replaced with Grant/Lee and Shermans was that their main armament was ineffective against bunkers.

[Legbreaker]

Originally Posted by copeab

Worth noting that Allied tanks that had become obsolete in North Africa and Europe (like the Matilda II and M-3 Stuart) were quite effective against Japanese armor.

The Stuart was not highly regarded by Australians in the jungles, mainly because they were too highly geared and had to be kept in 1st most of the time. The Matildas on the other hand, although a much older design and completely outdated was generally loved (especially by the infantry nearby). With a top speed not much more than a man could comfortably jog, they were ideal for the slow movement of jungle fighting. Heavily armoured (compared to other AFVs of it's period) it was able to withstand almost all the AT weapons the Japanese had at their disposal. It's only real drawback was it's armament of the 2 pounder peashooter of a cannon which was never issued explosive rounds.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

The Stuart was not highly regarded by Australians in the jungles, mainly because they were too highly geared and had to be kept in 1st most of the time. The Matildas on the other hand, although a much older design and completely outdated was generally loved. With a top speed not much more than a man could comfortably jog, they were ideal for the slow movement of jungle fighting. Heavily armoured (compared to other AFVs of it's period) it was able to withstand almost all the AT weapons the Japanese had at their disposal. It's only real drawback was it's armament of the 2 pounder peashooter of a cannon which was never issued explosive rounds.

Don't forget the other major drawback of the Stuart...it used aviation gasoline for fuel (due to the shortage of a decent tank engine, Wright Cyclone radial engines were mounted in many US designs).

Stuarts were also very vulernable to having metal rods thrust into their road wheels, the design had open spokes with external bracing, ideal for immobilizing the vehicle with something as simple as a piece of rebar.

[copeab]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

Just think how Midway would have been changed with the addition of two Japanese carriers?

Actually, things could have turned out quite differently had a single Japanese plane not suffered mechanical problems.

The floatplane that eventually first spotted the US forces was delayed a few hours because it needed repairs. Had it been launched on time, the Japanese could have gotten in a first strike well before the US.

Such are the things the fates of armies (and fleets) depend on.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by copeab

Actually, things could have turned out quite differently had a single Japanese plane not suffered mechanical problems.

The floatplane that eventually first spotted the US forces was delayed a few hours because it needed repairs. Had it been launched on time, the Japanese could have gotten in a first strike well before the US.

Such are the things the fates of armies (and fleets) depend on.

Actually it wasn't the plane that needed repairs. While there is no official documents, there is a story that the Tone's catapult officer was fairly new to the job and that after launching one floatplane, had managed to damage the catapult.

Still...

[dragoon500ly]

The first combat action for the USMC was Pearl Harbor (12/7/41). Units taking part include:

Marine Barracks, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor
Marine Barracks, Naval Ammunition Depot, Oahu
Marine Barracks, NAS Ford Island
Marine Barracks, NAS Kaneohe Bay
Marrine Detachment, Ewa Mooring Mast Field
Rear Echelon, 1st Defense Battalion
3rd Defense Battalion
4th Defense Battalion
Rear Echelon, 6th Defense Battalion
2nd Engineer Battalion (- Companies C & D)
2nd and 3rd Platoons, Company A, 2nd Service Battalion
Marine Ship's Detachments, Pacific Fleet (877 Marines onboard USS Nevada
(BB36), USS Oklahoma (BB37), USS Pennsylvania (BB38), USS Arizona
(BB39), USS Tennessee (BB43), USS California (BB44), USS Maryland
(BB46), USS West Virginia (BB48), USS New Orleans (CA32), USS San
Franisco (CA38), USS Raleigh (CL7), USS Detroit (CL8), USS Phoenix
(CL46), USS Honolulu (CL48), USS St. Louis (CL49), USS Helena (CL50) and
USS Utah (AG16).

The last combat action of World War II, took place on the island of Guam, 11-15 December, 1945. Japanese holdouts ambushed an Island Command, Guam patrol, killing three men. Sentries were fired upon in other areas. The 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, elements of the 9th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion and Guamanian Police conducted a five day operation that resulted in six Japanese dead and 20 prosioners. While there were holdouts that remained for years, there were no further overt hostile acts.

[dragoon500ly]

In recent posts, a unique Marine organization, the Defense Battalion, has been mentioned. The defense battalion originated in 1937
as a proposal to defend vulnerable American possessions in the Pacific. They would be armed with coast defense and antiaircraft guns and were to be the size of a reinforce battery or small battalion.

The first Defense Battalionwas organized in 1939. Their mission was to counter air attacks, hit-and-run surface ship raids and small landing parties. The full strength Defense "Battalion" were virtually regimental size and were commanded by a colonel. A money-tight Congress was the reason that they were called battalions. Their large size allowed them to be split between islands in the early days.

The typical TO&E in 1939-42 was:

HQ & Service Battery
Coast Defense Group
HQ & Service Battery
2 or 3 Coast Defense Batteries, each armed with two 5-inch/51 rifles.
Antiaircraft Group
HQ & Service Battery
Searchlight Battery with eight 60-inch Sperry searchlights
3 Antiaircraft Batteries, each with four M-3 3-inch AA guns
Machine Group
HQ & Service Battery
2 Machine Gun Batteries, each with 12 M-1917A1 .30-cal HMGs
2 Machine Gun Batteries, each with 12 .50-cal water-cooled HMGs
Provisional Marine Company, with 2 60mm mortars, 2 81mm mortars and 2
37mm M-1918 infantry guns (not always present)

The 1943-44 Defense Battalion TO&E is:
HQ & Service Battery
Seacoast Artillery Group
HQ & Service Battery
2 Gun Batteries, each with four M-1A1 155mm guns
Antiaircraft Group
HQ & Service Battery
Searchlight Battery with 8 60-inch Sperry searchlights
4 Antiaircraft Batteries, each with 4 M-1 90mm AA guns
Special Weapons Group
HQ & Service Battery
Antiaircraft Battery with 6 M-1 40mm AA guns
2 Antiaircraft Batteries, each with 6 Mk4 20mm AA guns
Provisional Marine Company with 2 60mm mortars and 2 81mm mortars
Tank Platoon with 5-8 M-3/M-5 light tanks.

And just to prove that the TO&Es don't always have any contact with reality...

On December 7, 1941, the 1st Defense Battalion was split into four detachments:

Rear Echelon, Pearl Harbor: 261 men with 10 5-inch/51 rifles, 8 3-inch AA
guns, 50 .50-cal HMGs and 50 .30-cal HMGs.

Wake Island Detachment: 422 men with 6 5-inch/51 rifles, 12 3-inch AA guns,
18 .50-cal HMG and 30 .30-cal HMGs.

Johnston Island Detachment: 162 men with 2 5-inch/51 rifles, 4 3-inch AA
guns, 8 .50-cal HMGs and 8 .30-cal HMGs.

Palmyra Island Detachment: 158 men with 4 5-inch/51 rifles, 4 3-inch AA
guns, 8 .50-cal HMGs and 8 .30-cal HMGs.

The large number of weapons held by the Rear Echelon included spares and those awaiting shipment to the other detachments as well as a single
7-inch/45 rifle waiting for shipment to Midway.

[dragoon500ly]

The Guadalcanal Campaign was the first American offensive of the Pacific War. Its initial goals were to capture the seaplane base on Tulagi and an uncompleted airfield on the island of Guadalcanal. It became the focal point of brutal naval, air and land battles that lasted from 7 August 1942 to 8 February 1943. For the IJA, it was there first serious defeat at the hands of the Americans. For the IJN, it was a battle of attrition that bleed the naval aviation units of some of their best pilots and cost them numerous major warships.

The 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal was organized under the D-Series TO&E of 1 July 1942. This would give it a total strength of 19,514 men.

Division HQ
Special Troops
HQ Battalion
HQ Company: 334 men
Signal Company: 267 men
MP Company: 96 men
Special Weapons Battalion
HQ & Service Battery: 99 men
3 Antitank Batteries, each: 100 men; 6 37mm SP ATg & 2 75mm SP ATg
Antiaircraft Battery: 307 men; 16 40mm M1 AAG
Antiaircraft Battery: 126 men; 6 90mm M1 AAG
Parachute Battalion
HQ Company: 106 men
3 Parachute Companies, each: 159 men; 3 60mm mortars
Light Tank Battalion
HQ & Service Company: 80 men
4 Tank Companies, each: 160 men; 18 M-2A4 light tanks
Scout Company: 175 men; 14 M-3A1 scout cars

Service Troops
Service Battalion
HQ Company: 55 men
Service & Supply Company: 352 men
Ordnance Company: 109 men
Division Transport Company: 116 men
3 Regimental Transport Companies, each: 109 men
Medical Battalion
HQ & Service Company: 16 men
5 Medical Companies, each: 98 men
Amphibian Tractor Battalion: 481 men; 100 amtrac, 59 support amtrac

Engineer Regiment
HQ & Service Company: 273 men
Engineer Battalion: 614 men
Pioneer Battalion: 743 men
Naval Construction Battalion: 822 men

Artillery Regiment
HQ & Service Battery: 159 men
105mm Howitzer Battalion
HQ & Service Battery: 154 men
3 Firing Batteries, each: 151 men; 4 M1A1 105mm howitzers
3 Pack Howitzer Battalions, each:
HQ & Service Battery: 152 men
3 Firing Batteries, each: 151 men; 4 M-1 75mm pack howitzers

3 Marine Infantry Regiments, each:
HQ & Service Company: 173 men
Regimental Weapons Company
Company HQ: 48 men
Gun Platoon: 34 men; 2 towed 75mm M1897A2 field guns
3 Antiaircraft & Antitank Gun Platoons, each: 38 men; 2 M1921A1 .50-cal
water-cooled AAMGs, 6 37mm M3A1 antitank guns
3 Infantry Battalions, each:
HQ Company: 111 men
Weapons Company
Company HQ: 29 men
Antiaircraft & Antitank Platoon: 2 M1921A1 .50-cal water-cooled AAMGs,
4 37mm M3A1 antitank guns
Mortar Platoon: 76 men; 4 81mm mortars
3 Machine Gun Platoons, each: 48 men; 12 M-1917A1 .30-cal water-
cooled HMGs
3 Rifle Companies, each: 183 men; 2 M-1919A1 .30-cal LMGs, 2 60mm
mortars


The Divisions was equipped with:

M-1911A1 .45-cal pistols: 798
M50/M55 .45-cal submachine guns: 4,208
M-1903-series .30-cal rifles: 10,953
M-1918A2 .30-cal Browning Automatic Rifles: 7,406
M-1917A1 .30-cal water-cooled HMGs: 544
M-1919A4 .30-cal LMGs: 656
M-1941 .30-cal LMGs (para bn only): 87
M-2HB .50-cal HMGs: 360
M-1921A1 .50-cal water-cooled HMGs: 32
M-3A1 37mm antitank guns: 54
M-6 37mm SP antitank guns: 20
M-1 40mm antiaircraft guns: 16
M-1 90mm antiaircraft guns: 6
M-3 75mm SP antitank guns: 6
M-1897A2 75mm field guns: 6
M-1A1 75mm pack howitzers: 36
M-2A1 105mm howitzers: 12
M-2 60mm mortars: 63
M-1 81mm mortars: 36
M-1 2.36-in rocket launchers (bazookas): 132
M-1 rifle grenade launchers: 456
M-2A4 light tanks: 72
M-3A1 scout cars: 14
LVT-1 troop amphibian tractors: 100
LVT-1 support amphibian tractors: 59
M-1 portable flamethrowers: 24

[dragoon500ly]

The Marine Raider Battalion TO&E: 24 Sept 42

HQ Company: 139 men; 2 M-1919A4 LMGs, 4 Boys .55 AT Rifles
4 Rifle Companies, each: 135 men; 2 M-1919A4 LMGs, 2 60mm mortars, 2
Boys .55 AT Rifles
Weapons Company: 211 men: 8 M-1919A4 LMGs, 3 60mm mortars, 2 Boys .55
AT Rifles

Grand Total of 901 men; 18 M-1919A4 LMGs, 11 60mm mortars and 14 Boys
.55-cal AT rifles.

Personnal weapons was a mix of Rising SMGs, M1903 rifles and pistols.

There are some reports that M-1 Garands were being used, but the offical records only mention Springfields.

Operational, the only known use of the Boys AT Rifle in USMC service was on the Makin Atoll raid were it was used to destroy two seaplanes. There is no record that any Boys were used in action on Guadalcanal, although there is a photograph showing a Boys being carried on a jungle patrol (possibly a staged photo). Veteran stories are that the Boys were left at battalion HQ or were rapidly combat-lossed.

[copeab]

(I'll toss this in, as it's something I've researched for my Weird WWII campaign)

The M-1903 Springfield with M-1 rifle grenade adapter was a superior platform to the M-1 Garand with the M-7 rifle grenade adapter. On the Garand, firing rifle grenades required the weapon be unloaded and the gas port turned off. Additionally, live ammo could not be fired with the M-7 adapter on the gun. OTOH, the Springfield could fire regular ammo with the M-1 adapter on the rifle and, as it had a magazine cutoff, it could keep it's internal magazine loaded with live ammo while firing rifle grenade blanks while operating as a single shot rifle. The US used the M-1903 for its grenadiers well into the war due to the problems with the M-1/M-7 combo.

[copeab]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

Personnal weapons was a mix of Rising SMGs, M1903 rifles and pistols.

I thought the Marine Raiders used the M-1941 Johnson rifle (not to be confused with the M-1941 Johnson LMG).

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by copeab

(I'll toss this in, as it's something I've researched for my Weird WWII campaign)

The M-1903 Springfield with M-1 rifle grenade adapter was a superior platform to the M-1 Garand with the M-7 rifle grenade adapter. On the Garand, firing rifle grenades required the weapon be unloaded and the gas port turned off. Additionally, live ammo could not be fired with the M-7 adapter on the gun. OTOH, the Springfield could fire regular ammo with the M-1 adapter on the rifle and, as it had a magazine cutoff, it could keep it's internal magazine loaded with life ammo while firing rifle grenade blanks while operating as a single shot rifle. The US used the M-1903 for its grenadiers well into the war due to the problems with the M-1/M-7 combo.

Its also one of the reasons why the M-1 Carbine was adopted to fire rifle grenades during Korea.

[copeab]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

Its also one of the reasons why the M-1 Carbine was adopted to fire rifle grenades during Korea.

From what I've read in multiple sources, there was a rifle grenade adapter issued for the M-1 carbine in WWII.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by copeab

I thought the Marine Raiders used the M-1941 Johnson rifle (not to be confused with the M-1941 Johnson LMG).

When the M-1 Garand was first introduced in 1937, there were teething problems with the sights, the gas port (leading to jamming problems), the Marines were slow to adapt the new rifle before the bugs were worked out.

The M1941 Johnson was first tested by US Army Ordnance in 1939. several features were liked about the rifle, but there were concerns about the strength of the magazine body, the overall length of the receiver as well as the fact that the rifle would not function reliably when fitted with a bayonet. The Ordnance report stated that the Johnson was not materially superior to the Garand and recommended against further consideration as a replacement for the M-1 rifle.

The NRA weighed in against the Garand when their requests to be provided with copies for independent testing was refused by the Ordnance department. The NRA went so far as to publish a series of articles condeming the Garand and praising the Johnson.

The Garand-Johnson controversy reached its peak in early 1940 when Congress threatened to halt funding for the continuing production of the Garand. A shoot-off was conducted in the presence of various high-ranking military officers and various Congressmen. As one Senator stated, "From a layman's viewpoint, they are both mighty fine guns, and there is no particular difference. If the Garand is as good as the other, and we have the machinery already set up to produce it, I see no reason to go into production on a second good gun." This was the first and biggest nail in the Johnson's coffin.

A Marine Corps shoot off held in November 1940, using a Springfield as the control rifle and testing the Garand, the Johnson and a Winchester design ended with the Corps making the decision to maintain the Springfield. The Garand was considered to be superior to the Johnson and plans were made to switch over to the Garand as production capacity ramped up. This was the second nail in the coffin, Johnson's beloved Marine Corps didn't like his rifle.

The Johnson was still considered to have several excellent design features: the barrel could be easily removed, allowing the rifle to be stored in a kit bag for airborne operations. It had excellent accuracy. The straight line stock made it easier to control. It was designed to be manufactured on general production tooling in small to medium machine shops. It had a 10-round rotary magazine that could be easily topped with issue 5-round chargers.

The Johnson M1941 rifle was never adopted by the US Army. The USMC purchased limited numbers and it was issued for testing purposes to the Corps paratrooper and raider battalions (1st Parachute Battalion on Guadalcanal and 4th Marine Radiers Battalion on New Georgia), but it was never an official TO&E requirement. A total of some 70,000 were built, mostly for sale to various foreign governments, of which the Dutch East Indies were perhaps the largest buyer.

But perhaps the most damning verdict on the Johnson rifle came from those fellow Marines who carried it into combat:

"Feed problems were experienced and the Johnson often had to be loaded, one round at a time."

"The configuration of the exposed barrel was considered a delicate design requiring the user to always be careful to protect the exposed barrel."

"The weapon would not always satisfactorily cycle when its bayonet was attached."

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by copeab

From what I've read in multiple sources, there was a rifle grenade adapter issued for the M-1 carbine in WWII.

I stand corrected (boy did I drop the ball on this...LOL).

The M-8 grenade launcher was standardized on 11 February 1943. Design refinements slowed production and the inital production run of 50,000 was not completed until February 1944. Initial issue was to units in the Pacific some time in December 1943. It did not appear in the ETO until January 1944.

Demand proved to be much higher than anticipated and production was resumed in late 1944 with the first production batch being completed in January, 1945. Total manufacture was 387,165.

In spite of problems with the stock cracking/splitting when firing rifle grenades (the M-1A1 was to only be used as a GL in case of emergencies as the recoil force would bend the metal stock), the M-8 was more popular than the M-7 since it could still fire standard ball rounds with the launcher in place.

[dragoon500ly]

In contrast to his M1941 Rifle, Johnson's M1941 Light Machine Gun was well received by the troops. While it never entered major production, it did see service with the US Army's First Special Service Force as well as the Marines Paratroop and Raider battalions. There are also unconfirmed reports of US Army Rangers having been issued M1941 LMGs.

The primary drawback to the Johnson LMG was that it was considered to be a bit too fragile and delicate for extended military use. The long, unsupported barrel as well as some internal components were not durable enough, being prone to rust or breakage. There was also a tendency to jam during extended firing.

Johnson corrected most of these problems with his M1944 LMG, but by this time in the war, it was felt that changing horses in midstream would not be a good idea.

Perhaps the best view of the M1941 Johnson LMG came from the 4th Raider Battalion on New Georgia, "Men now armed with them wouldn't trade them for any other." This is the highest possible praise for any weapon.

[dragoon500ly]

The Marine Defense Battalions used four different cannons for coastal defense.

The 3-inch/50-cal, Mark 21, Mod 0 was standardized in 1939. It was nicknamed the "3-inch Navy". It weighed in at 7,510lbs and had a maximum range of 14,000 yards. It could fire HE, AP, shrapnel and Illum rounds at a rate of fire of 18rpm. This was a former navy gun removed from various ships.

The main stay of the USMC cd guns was the 5-inch/51-cal, Mark 15, Mod 0. It was standardized in 1938. Nicknamed the "Five-incher" it weighed 23,400lbs. Maximum range was 17,100 yards, It could fire Common HE, High Capacity HE, AP and Illum rounds. Rate of fire was 20rpm. This was another former navy gun, being removed from older battleships as they were modernized.

The largest gun in the USMC arsenel was the 7-inch/45-cal Mark 2, Mod 0. Standardized in 1939. This gun weighed in at 50,500lbs and had an effective range of 16,500 yards. It could fire HE and AP rounds. Rate of fire was 5rpm. There were 12 of these in service, removed from the predreadoughts Connecticut, Mississippi and Vermont prior to World War One and intended for use by the 10th Regiment in France as heavy artillery, these guns never left the US. They were emplaced on Midway, Johnson and Palmyra Islands. USMC records indicate two 2-gun batteries on each island, Navy records say two 1-gun batteries on each island with the rest in reserve at Pearl Harbor.

The above mentioned guns were used until 1943 when the were replaced by the M-1A1 155mm gun. Nicknamed the "Long Tom", it weighed 30,100lbs. Unlike the former navy guns, the 155mm could be towed to different positions. Its maximum range was 25,715 yards and it could fire HE, WP, High Capacity HE, and Illum rounds. Rate of fire was 3rpm.

[dragoon500ly]

Operation Watchtower, the US Invasion of Guadalcanal took place on 7 Aug 42 and lasted until 3 Feb 43.

The 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) (Marine Landing Force, Task Force 62.8) deployed in five groups:

Guadalcanal Group
Combat Group A
5th Marines (-2nd Battalion)
1st Battalion (Combat Team 1)
3rd Battalion (Combaat Team 3)
2nd Battalion, 11th Marines (75mm Pack How) (-Battery E)
Co A, 1st Light Tank Battalion
Co A (-2nd Platoon), 1st Engineer Battalion
Co A (-2nd Platoon), 1st Pioneer Battalion
Company A, 1st Medical Battalion
Company A (-2nd Platoon), 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion
1st Platoon, Battery A, 1st Special Weapons Battalion
1st Platoon, Company A, 1st Service Battalion
1st Platoon, 1st Scout Company

Combat Group B
1st Marines
1st Battalion (Combat Team 4)
2nd Battalion (Combat Team 5)
3rd Battalion (Combat Team 6)
3rd Battalion, 11th Marines (75mm Pack How)
Company B, 1st Light Tank Battalion
Company C, 1st Engineer Battalion
Company C, 1st Pioneer Battalion
Company E, 1st Medical Battalion
Company B, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion
3rd Platoon, Battery A, 1st Special Weapons Battalion
3rd Platoon, Company A, 1st Service Battalion
3rd Platoon, 1st Scout Company

Support Group
1st Engineer Battalion (-Companies A, B and C)
11th Marines (Artillery) (-1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battalions)
1st Special Weapons Battalion (-1st & 3rd Platoons, Company A)
1st Pioneer Battalion (-Companies A & B)

Northern Group
Tulagi Group (seizure of Tulagi Island)
1st Raider Battalion
1st Battalion, 2nd Marines (D+1 reinforcement)
2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines (D+1 reinforcement)
2nd Battalion, 5th Marines (Combat Team 2)
Detachment, 3rd Defense Battalion (1/3 Antiaircraft elements)
2nd Platoon, Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion
2nd Platoon, Company A, 1st Pioneer Battalion
2nd Platoon, Company A, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion
Platoon (-detachment), Company C, 2nd Light Tank Battalion (M-3)
Detachment, Company A, 2nd Medical Battalion
Marine Barrage Balloon Squadron 3
Gavutu-Tanambogo Group (seizure of Gavutu-Tanambogi Islands)
1st Parachute Battalion
3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines (D+1 reinforcement)
Detachment, Platoon, Company C, 2nd Tank Battalion
Florida Group (clear Florida Island)
1st Battalion, 2nd Marines (Combat Team A)

Division Reserve
2nd Marines (Reinforced) (-2nd Battalion)
3rd Battalion, 10th Marines (75mm Pack Hows)
Company C (-one platoon), 2nd Tank Battalion
Company A, 2nd Engineer Battalion
Company A, 2nd Pioneer Battalion
Company C, 2nd Service Battalion
Company D, 2nd Medical Battalion
Platoon, 2nd Special Weapons Battalion
1st Platoon, Service & Supply Company, 2nd Service Battalion
1st Band Section, 2nd Marine Division Headquarters Company.

[Adm.Lee]

Originally Posted by copeab

Actually, things could have turned out quite differently had a single Japanese plane not suffered mechanical problems.

The floatplane that eventually first spotted the US forces was delayed a few hours because it needed repairs. Had it been launched on time, the Japanese could have gotten in a first strike well before the US.

Such are the things the fates of armies (and fleets) depend on.

No, actually, if Tone #4 had launched on time, he wouldn't have seen anything. He was both out of sector (and cutting his route short) and behind schedule when he found the Yorktown. (Shattered Sword, pp.146-8) PO Amari was only about half an hour late in launching, but that's still not good. Chikuma's #1 plane should have spotted TF17, but must have been over the clouds.

[copeab]

Originally Posted by Adm.Lee

No, actually, if Tone #4 had launched on time, he wouldn't have seen anything. He was both out of sector (and cutting his route short) and behind schedule when he found the Yorktown. (Shattered Sword, pp.146-8) PO Amari was only about half an hour late in launching, but that's still not good. Chikuma's #1 plane should have spotted TF17, but must have been over the clouds.

Bah! Why have reality intrude on alternate reality?