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#31
11-10-2012, 09:13 AM
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There are NOT a lot of NCO and officer to strip from these divisions. AND many of the cadre can be convelescent (sp) assignments as the war progressed. I remember the NCO cadre in my BCT and AIT in '68 (taken at two locations btw). The fact they were combat veterans and invoked 'lessons learned' on us (at least my perception) had and influence. Yes they could bring in more convelecent NCO to form the units into 'line units' in the later phases, but I think they would keep the divisions functioning as they were designed as LONG as possible, and the schools would as well. The schools would be putting out new officers and NCOs, such as they did during 'Nam with accelerated OCS and NCOES courses kicking out sergeants (though I think rather than sergeants and staff sergeants they would be better making them corporals and sergants. I was NOT impressed with the honor graduate staff sergeants I came across, and one cost me a stripe after I kicked his ass, but that's another story.) 
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#32
11-10-2012, 11:10 AM
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Your numbers are fairly close. Yes, there are only two officers per company and only three NCOs per platoon. But key is that your company command section is intact. Thats your clerk, commander, first sergeant and supply. Each platoon is getting a very good platoon sergeant and two squad leaders. The brains of the operation - company, platoon are there! These are light infantry divisions, so your HHC doesn't have to be big. You aren't moving sabot rounds for tanks and thousands of gallons of fuel for bradleys. Also, having those few key staff people, the brains of the logistics are there! So the numbers at battalion level would look like this - Three Infantry Companies each: Commander XO First sergeant E-8 PAK clerk E-5 Supply Sergeant E-6 Armorer E-5 3 enlisted basic trainees as RTOs 3x Infantry Platoons each: Platoon Leader (vacant) Platoon Sergeant E-7 2x Squad Leader E-6 1x Squad Leader E-6 (vacant) 8x Team Leader E-5 (vacant) 31 enlisted basic trainees as infantry HHC Commander First Sergeant E-8 PAK clerk E-5 Supply sergeant E-6 Transportation section Section Sergeant E-6 8 vehicle drivers E-4 Mess Section Food Service NCO E-7 4 cooks E-4 Medic Section Squad leader E-6 4 medics E-4 Maintanence Section Motor Sergeant E-7 ULLS clerk E-5 Squad Leader E-6 4 mechanics E-4 Mortar Platoon Platoon Leader (vacant) Platoon Sergeant E-7 2 x Section Sergeants E-6 12 enlisted basic trainees as mortar crews Battalion Staff Commander XO/S-3 S-1 S-2 (vacant) S-4 Sergeant Major Ops Sergeant E-8 PAK section Sergeant E-7 4 enlisted staff E-4 8 enlisted staff (vacant) 8 enlisted basic trainees as RTOs, vehicle drivers, staff As we can see, the missing links are platoon leaders and E-5 team leaders. I am NOT a fan of raw, untrained LTs, but an even bigger pet peeve is "shake and bake" sergeants. The point is, its world war III. If infantry battalions didn't have an S-2 after 3 years of WWIII would it hurt? Probably not. How long do you expect brand new LTs to survive in combat and how much do they contribute, compared to those E7s and E6s ? I'd say not much. These platoons are going to be able to shoot, move, communicate from the direction and training provided by those seasoned senior NCOs. Where I do see a big problem is the missing E-5s. You can train soldiers in groups of 10, but the E-5s really are the ones that catch mistakes and ensure that things are moving along. They only have 3 joes to watch. However, after the first few fights, natural leaders and soldiers that have a knack for infantry combat will quickly rise and they'll be your team leaders. Also, look at the strength for one of these new LIDs. They are running at about 5,000 full strength, not the 12,000 LID of pre-war. Times are desperate. Also, think about this: its 2000 and the US itself is in turmoil. Can't send soldiers overseas because there is no fuel, no ships. There are invaders coming across mexico and in washington state. Where would new draftees even come from? How would we get them to ft benning or ft knox? Closing some of the basic training centers and turning them into divisions just makes sense.
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#33
11-10-2012, 02:12 PM
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It's worth noting that the USAR light infantry divisions do not become maneuver units until the summer of 1998, eight or nine months after the strategic nuclear campaign begins. Presumably, even before the war with Mexico, civil unrest had reached a tipping point where whatever long term ill effects to the training process their conversion represented was deemed less important than augmenting law enforcement and military forces still CONUS in reestablishing order.
From the unit histories, several of those divisions got badly mauled in action against marauders, which speaks to how bad the situation was by late summer/early fall '98. Admittedly some of that may speak to poor performance by units that had limited resources, training, and experience, and some of it may represent covert resistance by well-equipped and organized New America cells rather than bandits and such. But whatever the details on the ground, it's pretty clear that by July '98, the US was in dire straits and desperate for manpower to help with its internal issues.
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#34
11-11-2012, 04:12 AM
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You also need to look at the dates these units were converted, and whether or not Civgov or Milgov commands them. Post nuke they're not likely to be receiving many new recruits so there reason for being is gone.
__________________
If it moves, shoot it, if not push it, if it still doesn't move, use explosives. Nothing happens in isolation - it's called "the butterfly effect" Mors ante pudorem
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#35
11-11-2012, 07:38 AM
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#36
11-11-2012, 08:49 AM
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#37
11-11-2012, 09:32 AM
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@ Graebarde
Yes, I know that this organization is NOT very pretty. Also, as has been debated, these divisions did not fair very well. I think that some of the contributing factors is that we are all veterans, with knowledge from different eras, and on top of that, the T2K timeline makes everything blurry with "what ifs". When I attended OSUT in the early 90s, every basic training company had 5 platoons, with an E-7 and and E-6 each. Also, if there was a new DS in training, he was not counted in the totals. Further, at one point, some of the battalions had 5 companies in them. I've scaled back from that, but still, its a lot of senior billet holders. That didn't include all the instructors, which in the armor field, was quite a few. There was a full compliment of 14 tanks per company, and a dozen instructors per company as well. Those guys were the E-5s and E-6s. Then, on top of that, the rifle ranges, the mine training course, the hand grenade range, land nav course.... all had their own dedicated staff. I didn't touch any of them either. The mess section in many line units is only authorized a few guys to boil water for the "T" rats, nothing more. Yes, I know, it looks like dog squeeze, but the cooks are going to draw on the infantry for KPs, and old school KP, where you do a lot more than just wash the pots and pans. The place where I would be the most concerned is the medics. There just isn't enough for a platoon medic, and barely enough for company medics. I suppose the they could be sucked off from in-processing or hospital units, but that would be highly concerning to me. As you said yourself, TDs have a cadre of 3,000 people. But they really aren't starting the war with much more than 5,000. Everything you said is completely valid. I guess it just comes down to how you view organization of assets. I'm assuming that you'd have rather seen the 30,000 or so new soldiers distributed amoungst the existing divisions, brining their strength up to 3-7k. The merit to that plan is that you are putting novices with veterans. That could work well, but you end up with the headaches of the vietnam war and WWII individual replacement systems. For me, I'd rather see smaller divisions as they are more agile and easy to weild. I like the idea of divisions training as a unit in CONUS before they deploy. When the LIDs were sent over, I would have then shipped the used up units back on the returning ships. An example of this would be 2nd Armored Division. What good does it do to have a division with less than 1,000 people in it? Thats going too far. I'd use that as a cadre to then build around, in CONUS. It gives the veterans a break and at the same time it gives the unit an expereince base.
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#38
11-14-2012, 02:39 AM
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What I'm seeing here is reality interfering with the game.
The unit histories, etc were originally written back in the early to mid 80's. Many of the points raised about why certain organisational structures can/cannot be possible are from dates and events after the original material was written, and therefore their relevance is questionable at best.
__________________
If it moves, shoot it, if not push it, if it still doesn't move, use explosives. Nothing happens in isolation - it's called "the butterfly effect" Mors ante pudorem
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#39
11-14-2012, 07:51 AM
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"An example of this would be 2nd Armored Division. What good does it do to have a division with less than 1,000 people in it? Thats going too far. I'd use that as a cadre to then build around, in CONUS. It gives the veterans a break and at the same time it gives the unit an expereince base. "
I agree with you completely there Rifleman - that unit, in reality, would have been rotated back and rebuilt. At the time they got hammered in the game they were still bringing in new units. So why leave it in place as an emasculated brigade that was basically useless - instead it would have gone home on the next ships heading back and been rebuilt, most likely using one of the training divisions to build it back up to strength and being re-equipped with stateside gear - i.e. M60A4's and M113's or new build M1's and reconditioned Bradleys. The writers of the game gave the Soviets way too much credit and had the US do things they would never do and act very dumb in many ways. There are other examples - the 25th Light disintegrates in Korea and falls apart and they reform the division with less than 1000 survivors. At the same time you have the 7th Light staying intact but also getting hammered and also having less than 1000 men. So why reform the 25th at all? Send the survivors to the 7th and bring it back up to where it can at least be useful. Having two different divisional structures with only 1100 men between them makes absolutely no sense and in reality the Army would have folded them together or sent them home and used them as cadres of veterans that the training divisions could have been formed around. Same with three Marine Corps division in Korea that between them have 3000 men. That makes absolutely no sense - so why have two weak divisions that are basically peacetime battalions? They should be one division with 3000 men and 20 tanks, which in July of 2000 makes them quite formidable, not three divided formations. The GDW designers seemed to have been reading histories of the Wehrmacht in WWII and not the US Army when they came up with their idea of creating new formations instead of sending them replacements or rotating units back home.
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#40
11-14-2012, 08:53 AM
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#41
11-14-2012, 02:53 PM
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#42
11-14-2012, 03:02 PM
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I would think that similarly, having these 400 person divisions as one "brigade" wouldn't cut it. Its just a waste of combat power and reasources. However, using them as a cadre, and as others have pointed out, scooping up starving refugees and putting an M231 or M16 in their hands, would provide a unit to do either security missions or clearing out bandits or even policing duties. It would go a long way towards restoring stability in the US.
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#43
11-14-2012, 04:07 PM
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I've been working on a write up that might get submitted for the next Good Luck e-zine (assuming I can actually get it done by then) about the 194th Militia Regiment -- basically the local defense militias active in the 194th Armored Brigade's AO in southern Illinois/Missouri/Kentucky. The militia does local security functions and frees up the personnel from the brigade to focus on security for the refinery at Robinson and more proactive, longer range patrolling. It also allows the brigade to rapidly focus more of its combat power against larger threats or objectives without having to completely leave its farming communities swinging in the breeze.
The basic premise is kind of a low budget Vietnam CAP program crossed with the Iraq/A'stan ETTs -- the militia has its own NCOs and officers, but has limited number of cadre from 194th Arm'd Bde embedded all the way down to platoon level. The Regimental structure also incorporates attempts to reestablish civilian law enforcement in the AO and a company headquarters that coordinates scout/liaison teams of local militia assigned to 194th Armored's units for their knowledge of local terrain and human terrain. Organizationally, it's mostly part-timers with the building block being four squad platoons recruited from individual settlements -- during low threat (or high labor demand) time periods, each squad does one week of active service per month, but this can be flexed as resources allow and threat level dictates. Armament is a mix of M16EZs and an assortment of civilian firearms, everything from AR-15s and other military style weapons to hunting rifles and shotguns. Uniforms are, likewise, anything from BDUs to civilian hunting clothing to street clothes, worn with locally made copies of the 194th Arm'd Bde's patch and a militia patch either sewn on or worn on a brassard. I think this sort of arrangement would be prevalent in pretty much all cantonment areas with a military garrison in the US (MilGov or CivGov), and means that in a real emergency a military unit in an established cantonment area could exceed its listed manpower by 50-100% (though these extra forces probably aren't capable of much more than conducting static defenses, and lack the firepower to go toe to toe with a well equipped, well trained opponent). I'd imagine that overseas where US or other forces were foreigners and outsiders, I'd think this system would also be workable, though probably with the de jure arrangement typically being that local militia were affiliated with the host nation military but being de facto incorporated into the local cantonment's military unit, whatever the nationality. (Though, obviously, this only works anywhere if the military unit in cantonment is not dealing with significant hostility and unrest from the local population -- in the face of pronounced overt or covert resistance from the locals, this kind of militia organization would be more problematic and less successful.)
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#44
12-09-2012, 10:04 AM
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Maybe one of the reasons for the Training Divisions being converted is that there was not any infrastructure to allow them to get new recruits to train. With everything going to Hell, a logical alternative might be to have each division recruit and train locally.
As for the illogical nature of decisions I still maintain the theory that history shows that few governments or leaders have a good record of making good decisions...
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#45
12-10-2012, 07:50 AM
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You run into the same problem...would it be a more efficient use of resources to "create" a dozen "new" LIDs, or use the cadres to bring existing divisions up to strength?
In this case, the Army would have deactivated several of the Training Divisions and assign their cadre to other divisions (allowing able-bodied soldiers to be sent to the front) or sent en-bloc to reinforce a division already in combat.
__________________
The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#46
12-10-2012, 08:55 AM
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__________________
If it moves, shoot it, if not push it, if it still doesn't move, use explosives. Nothing happens in isolation - it's called "the butterfly effect" Mors ante pudorem
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#47
12-11-2012, 07:33 AM
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According to "Armies of NATO's Central Front"
The US Army Reserve maintained the following Training Divisions: 70th; 76th; 78th; 80th; 84th; 85th; 91st; 95th; 98th; 100th; 104th; and the 108th The "American Vehicle Guide" disposes of these divisions as follows: 70th is converted into a LID 20Jul98 and committed to Austria 76th is converted into a LID 20JUL98 and goes to Yugoslavia 78th gets converted into a LID 20JUL98 and is at Fort Dix 80th is converted into a LID 20JUL98 and goes to Yugoslavia 84th goes LID 29JUL98 and stays in V Military Region(northern US) 85th becmes a LID 20JUL98 and is serving in the SW US 91st goes LID 20JUL98 and is in central California 95th goes the way of the LID 20JUL98 and is in Oklahoma 98th becomes a LID 20JUL98 and is in Louisiana 100th becomes a LID 20JUL98 and is at Fort Carson Colorado 104th goes LID 20JUL98 and is in the Pacific NW 108th becomes a LID 20JUL98 and is in the III Military Region So at the height of WWIII, when troops are badly needed as replacements, the decision is made to gut the training establishment and convert everything into LIDs and then throw them into combat. I'm the first to admit that the DOD normally does not allow logic to interfere with its plans, but this would create a deadly sprial; without a training establishment of some kind, then there would be no replacement troops, which means that the combat units will rapidly sprial into total combat in-effectiveness within an very short period of time. Perhaps GDW intended this to explain how divisions were reduced from 15-16,000 down to 1-2,000. The argument can even be made that with the press of civil unrest, a Soviet invasion of Alaska and a Mexican invasion of the Southwest, that there is a pressing need for organized troops to hold the line. But if the decision was made for that reason, then it is, without a doubt, one of the most short-sighted decisions ever made as it would doom any future combat operations.
__________________
The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#48
12-11-2012, 10:14 AM
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It's worth noting the there was a rapid succession of Presidents in the 2-3 months before this occurred. There was nobody in charge at the time the changes were made, and not exactly a lot of organisation above the local level.
Without working infrastructure around them, the training units were extremely unlikely to receive further recruits. Therefore, with events deteriorating rapidly both overseas and at home, the best use for the training units was not to keep them as they were and idle, but to transform them into something useful for civil defence, and reinforcements for the three main theatres (Europe, Middle East, Korea). Note also, the Soviets had just landed in Alaska (which explains the 104th).
__________________
If it moves, shoot it, if not push it, if it still doesn't move, use explosives. Nothing happens in isolation - it's called "the butterfly effect" Mors ante pudorem
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#49
12-11-2012, 10:47 AM
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the one training division conversion that makes no sense is the 70th - why send it over as a new division when it would have made a lot more sense to allocate its troops to divisions that were hard hit? The 2nd Armored was basically an empty shell of itself by then - those men would have been able to restore it back to being an effective unit.
Ditto several other units in Germany. The rest I could see as emergency units that were needed because there wasnt enough left in the US - but the 70th definitely should have gone over as replacements for other units.
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#50
12-11-2012, 11:51 AM
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Then look at the units in Centag as a whole. Besides the two divisions mentioned above, there's only one other division - the 35th Infantry. The remaining two units both suffered major damage earlier in the war and consist (on paper) as no more than a brigade/regiment. This area of the front obviously required reinforcement at the time and the 70th ID was likely the logical choice since taking a previously existing unit from another location would have had serious consequences. Sure, the manpower could have been broken up and used as replacements, but the 70th was already a functioning unit with it's own internal command and logistical structure, with the NCOs and Officers having worked with each other for some time previously. Breaking it up would throw away the working relationships and "shorthand" these people had developed with each other - not something to be done lightly.
__________________
If it moves, shoot it, if not push it, if it still doesn't move, use explosives. Nothing happens in isolation - it's called "the butterfly effect" Mors ante pudorem
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#51
12-11-2012, 11:55 AM
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70th Livonia MI (????) Several choices, but none really in CivGov AO. 76th West Hartford CT (Cp Edwards/Ft Devens MA) 78th Newark NJ (Ft Dix NJ) 80th Richmond VA (Ft AP Hill VA) 84th Milwaukee WI (Ft McCoy WI) 85th Chicago IL (Ft Campbell KY) 91st San Francisco CA (Ft Ord CA) 95th Oklahoma City OK (or Tulsa) (Ft Chaffee AR) 98th Rochester NY (Ft Polk LA) 100th Louisville KY (Ft Knox KY) 104th Vancouver WA (Ft Lewis WA) 108th Charlotte NC (Ft Bragg NC) Given the 'home' area of the respective divisions many stayed where they were from per se. The ones sent overseas under the CivGov orders of course didn't. Only the 85th from Illinois which was sent to the SW, the 98th from New York which was sent to Louisiana, and the 100th from Louisville found themselves away from home country. Of course the relocations are under MilGov in CONUS and would be to meet the demand of the situation. Only the 98th would be at it's mobilization/training center I think.
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