Criticism of MG Thomason, CG of Fort Huachuca

[Webstral]

Gentlemen, I offer the following for your amusement and because writing rough drafts is better than writing nothing.


Following the main nuclear attacks on the United States (Nov-Dec ’97), the Twilight War imposed a burden of decision-making on American commanders unseen in more than a century of warfare. Arguably, commanders of major formations faced dilemma as difficult as faced by any American leaders at any time in history. To the degree that brigade and division commanders in the US could make meaningful choices in the post-Exchange circumstances, their decisions often were far-reaching in terms of both practical outcomes and philosophical ramifications.

Among the more controversial leaders in post-Exchange America was Major General Charles Thomason, commander of Fort Huachuca in southeastern Arizona at the start of the Sino-Soviet War that led to the more general conflagration. By late November, 1997 Thomason had parleyed a close relationship with the Pentagon’s Division of Contingency Planning (DCP) into a host of benefits for his command and the local communities. Fort Huachuca had received tens of millions of dollars in investments in new barracks, new training facilities, new storage facilities, machine tools, power generation, water purification and reclamation gear, packaged food, and military supplies including ten thousand rifles, five hundred machine guns, light and medium mortars, 105mm howitzers, a small number of armored vehicles, radios, a substantial stockpile of small arms and large caliber ammunition, and a host of other supplies. The weapons, ammunition, and other materiel were provided with the intent that the 111th MI Brigade, which was the resident school brigade for the Military Intelligence School and Center at Huachuca, would be able to assist actively in controlling the US border and providing disaster relief and security throughout southern Arizona. The food, amounting to approximately a half-billion meals, was intended for distribution throughout Arizona in the event that nuclear attack disrupted the communications network of CONUS. The people of greater Phoenix, Yuma, and Flagstaff would see none of that food after June, 1998.

Thomason has been severely criticized for a number of the decisions he made during the critical years of his command—1997-2001. The most significant is almost certainly his July, 1998 refusal to move 111th Brigade west to California to support 6th US Army. Thomason’s detractors maintain that his decision to disobey orders, first from 6th US Army headquarters and then from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, constitutes nothing short of treason. A number of military minds insist that with the 111th Brigade available for a westward thrust into southern California, 6th US Army could have defeated Second Mexican Army in mid-1998. At the very least, claim Thomason’s detractors, 111th Brigade would have helped 6th US Army better secure the Central Valley of California and its agricultural bounty at a turning point in history.

Further, Thomason has been castigated for husbanding his forces in southeastern Arizona, which he named SAMAD, for Southeastern Arizona Military Administrative District. Following the Thanksgiving Day Massacre (TDM), Thomason deployed most of his troops in the area north of Fort Huachuca on disaster relief and security missions. With the outbreak of the Second Mexican-American War in early June, 1998 Thomason ceased all efforts to control territory north of Tucson. He stopped sending supply convoys north to Phoenix or west to Yuma. The great warehouses of food stores at Fort Huachuca had been constructed and filled so that the citizens of Arizona would have a secure larder. Instead, after seven months the food simply stopped flowing anywhere north or west of Tucson. Even after the immediate Mexican threat to SAMAD had receded by the end of the monsoon season (early September), Thomason did not resume distributing food to Phoenix. Nor were any Huachuca-based patrols sent north of Tucson until October, 1998. By this time, many of the small towns of central and eastern Arizona had been sacked by hungry mobs or taken over by marauders. Hundreds of thousands who might have been saved by timely intervention from Huachuca were dead.

The criticism of Thomason’s leadership goes further. The commanding general of Fort Huachuca refused to allow even reconnaissance patrols to cross into Mexico until December, 1998. For months thereafter, cross-border action was limited to small unit patrols with orders to avoid contact whenever possible. Many have argued that Thomason’s essentially defensive stance along the border allowed the Mexican Army to take the initiative locally and at the strategic level. Had Thomason used the 111th Brigade to attack Mexican units and installations in northern Sonora, the Mexican leadership might well have reinforced that area prior to the ill-fated 1999 counteroffensives in Texas and California by 5th US Army and 6th US Army respectively. Some maintain that a small shift in the correlation of forces in either region would have yielded an American victory.

For the most part, Thomason husbanded the 111th Brigade inside SAMAD until 2001. Despite a string of defensive victories against the Mexican Army in 1998 and 1999, Thomason never sent forces larger than a reinforced battalion into territory north of Tucson until 2001. Although Thomason’s critics acknowledge that he improved his presence throughout the southern half of Arizona dramatically from the end of 1998 onward, they maintain that he was doing too little too late. His main forces did not stay long enough at towns outside SAMAD to provide ongoing security; his long-range patrols were too small and too isolated to yield good results; his efforts to aid towns in constructing their own defenses did not go far enough.

Worse, Thomason stripped both the federal government and State of Arizona of their assets in the area in August, 1998—thereby denying municipalities outside SAMAD a fighting chance at survival. Thomason took under command all USAF forces at Davis-Monthan AFB in Tucson, all Arizona Army National Guard and Air National Guard at and around Fort Huachuca, the Arizona State Guard (AZSTAG) 3rd Brigade, all state police and law enforcement, all federal law enforcement, surviving Border Patrol, and others. Some claim that these skilled personnel could have aided communities outside SAMAD; instead, they were incorporated into a brigade structure that did little for nearly three years after the bombs fell.

Thomason’s decisions denied the state government in Phoenix the support they needed to keep the great metroplex under control. Without food and without manpower, government forces were unable to keep order in Phoenix after June, 1998. By the time Thomason reinitiated patrols north of Tucson, Phoenix had collapsed in a sea of blood and fire. The surviving forces of law and order fled north to Flagstaff, leaving nearly two million dead and dying Americans behind them. Thomason’s detractors insist that he could have prevented this disaster but chose not to act.

Thomason actively cooperated with Mexican forces in northern Sonora from early 2000 onward. Reinforced battalion task forces conducted several anti-marauder sweeps in conjunction with troops of Brigada Nogales. Thomason allowed trade between SAMAD and northern Sonora, which some hold to have strengthened the enemy.

Also controversial is Thomason’s decision to incorporate EPW (enemy prisoners of war) into his command structure. At the time of the Exchange, Fort Huachuca had several thousand Pact and Pact-allied prisoners on post. Thomason inducted large numbers of them into the 111th Brigade from 1998 onward. He also inducted small numbers of Mexican nationals and even Mexican Army deserters and EPW.

In summary, the criticisms of Thomason are that by refusing to support a broader national initiative in 1998 he brought ruin to literally millions in California. By failing to support the government in Phoenix, Thomason brought death to millions more. By withholding his forces in a small corner of southeastern Arizona, he sentenced hundreds of thousands more Arizonans to violent death and privation at the hands of marauders and warlords. Finally, by incorporating hostile foreign nationals into his forces and by cooperating with the enemy of the United States, Thomason betrayed the trust of his command. Many believe that Thomason’s subsequent actions and the decisions made by the Joint Chiefs regarding his position do not offset the choices he made in the first years after the Exchange.


Webstral

This doesn't even address his part in transforming hundreds of thousands of Americans into serfs.