Weapons in SAMAD

[kato13]

Webstral 12-01-2005, 08:39 AM Weapons in SAMAD (Southeastern Arizona Military Administrative District)


The forces of SAMAD are relatively well-equipped, by light infantry standards in the year 2000. Much of the credit for this belongs to the Pentagon's Division of Contingency Planning (DCI), set up in 1996 to coordinate military planning and preparations for a strategic nuclear exchange before the year 2000. One of the first moves made by DCI was the purchase of light infantry weapons to make military installations short on light infantry equipment capable of defending themselves and securing the area around themselves.


Fort Huachuca established a solid relationship with the DCI quite early in the history of the DCI. By 1996, Huachuca already had its own Contingency Department (CD), which had been exploring means and methods of keeping Huachuca viable in the event of a major nuclear exchange that did not destroy the post outright. General Thomason, Commanding General of Fort Huachuca, eagerly participated in the early efforts of DCI to establish pilot programs. Due to the work of the CD in 1995 and early 1996, Huachuca was well ahead of other US military installations in having assembled a framework for contingency planning, its own pilot programs, and some lists of equipment required. As a result, Fort Huachuca received a massively disproportionate share of the resources committed by DCI during 1996 and 1997. Among these resources were light infantry weapons and equipment.


One of the first moves made by DCI in 1996 was to order 250,000 M16 rifles and a proportionate number of M249 automatic rifles, M203 grenade launchers, M60 machine guns, and other light infantry weapons. Fort Huachuca had received 10,000 rifles by late November 1997. Additional critical materiel, such as a handful of Stingray light tanks and 105mm howitzers, also arrived as the strategic nuclear exchange heated up. Again, the early work done by Huachuca, plus the strategic location of the post, paid off for Thomason and his troops as the Pentagon scrambled to distribute resources to secure the strategic rear.


Battalions of the 111th Brigade are the best-equipped in SAMAD. The standard rifle is the M16A2. All line platoons in the brigade have M249 Squad Automatic Weapons in their fire teams, along with M203 grenade launchers. All platoons have two M60 machine guns, plus light anti-tank weapons (although these are not often standard-issue LAW or AT4). Companies each use two standard 60mm mortars. Battalions employ four 81mm mortars.


Anti-tank weapons are quite another issue, however. SAMAD manufactures its own bazookas and the rounds for these weapons. These weapons are issued down to the platoon level. Although Mexico possesses a handful of AFVs heavier than the Lynx, none of them are in operation in Arizona or New Mexico. As a result, the SAMAD version of the bazooka is capable of killing any AFV in the region. Like the traditional bazooka, the SAMAD version can be reloaded. Rounds available include HEAT, HEDP, and HESH.


111th Brigade is supported by a composite field artillery battalion. The battalion fields two batteries of 105mm howitzers (some of which are captured Mexican guns), a battery of 120mm mortars (some of which are captured Mexican tubes), and a battery of multiple rocket launchers. The MRL are all of recent manufacture, and as such are far from sophisticated weapons. However, they give the brigade the ability to saturate a grid square with HE fire--something no marauder band can do.


Other units in SAMAD are not as well equipped. The garrison units at Fort Huachuca use M16s, but M249s and M203s are more sparsely distributed than in the 111th Brigade. The police departments throughout SAMAD have been incorporated into the Huachuca command structure, and they also use the M16. However, most of them use M16A1s existing in the police armories or taken from National Guard/federal law enforcement incorporated into the Huachuca command. The police, reorganized and trained as military police, have few SAW and even fewer machine guns. Other reserve units supplement their supply of M16s with civilian rifles and weapons captured from Mexican forces.



Webstral

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Antenna 12-01-2005, 08:43 AM Webstral you are aware of AMARC in AZ ? have you counted in some aircrafts that maybe been put to flying order ?


Just a question


BTW, good work as usual


Antenna

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DeaconR 12-01-2005, 08:44 AM Very nicely written.


Given that this unit seems so well supplied and organized, and are so close to important structures of Milgov, why have they not been instructed to for instance reinforce the 90th Corps in Oklahoma or some other important resource area?

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Webstral 12-01-2005, 09:14 AM The 111th did in fact receive orders to abandon Fort Huachuca and move west to reinforce 6th US Army. This was in August 1998. MG Thomason politely declined his orders, thereby effectively removing himself from the MilGov chain of command. MilGov tried again in 1999, issuing orders that the 111th Brigade support the counteroffensive in CA and TX. Again, Thomason refused, although Huachuca became involved in the general upsurge in fighting throughout the Southwest. Until late 2000, Thomason believed that the Huachuca cantonment wouldn't survive without the 111th Brigade. He and his people had done too much work simply to walk away because the Joint Chiefs had other plans. Also, he believed the 111th wouldn't survive without Fort Huachuca and the base of supply SAMAD offers.


However, by late 2000 the strategic situation has changed. The Mexican Army along the border opposite Huachuca has gone from bitter enemy to wary ally. Having been defeated in two campaigns, the commander of Brigada Nogales was sacked and replaced by a crony from central Mexico. The deteriorating situation in Mexico has made any kind of major offensive into SAMAD unthinkable. Moreover, the Huachucans aren't bad neighbors, as enemies go. As of 01 JAN 00, SAMAD had not launched any major attacks across the Mexican border. Reconnaissance was routine, and there were skirmishes and even a few small-scale raids. But after the 1999 campaign season, Brigada Nogales lost any interest in fighting an active war with Fort Huachuca. Soon after the new commander arrived, he was killed and replaced by an in-house man. The new commander took steps to normalize relations with Huachuca. This bore fruit in an unprecedented joint US-Mexican mission (one battalion per) against a particularly troublesome band of marauders operating east of the territory controlled by Brigada Nogales.


At this point, having established a solid base of support, MG Thomason is starting to think about the future. SAMAD has worked hard to rebuild the 111th and to train new forces with the intent of sending the 111th into the field and keeping a second brigade at home. As of 01 JAN 01, this has become feasible.



Webstral

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DeaconR 12-01-2005, 09:34 AM Thank you for the in depth reply. The reasoning makes a great deal of sense and explains a lot of the problems involving thinking on the larger scale versus dealing with the real problems you can see right in front of you.

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