November 18 1989 - an analysis

[robj3]

I was reading through back issues of the 'Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists'

http://www.thebulletin.org/archive

(thanks Google Books!)
and thought I'd compare the TM1-1 numbers to what was actually around at the time. Apologies for the formatting.

Total strikes from TM1-1 target list:

Type      #     Yield(Mt)
SS-16     12      12
SS-17     95      76
SS-18-1   25     625
SS-18-1b   9       -
SS-18-2  106    2120
SS-19     34     61.2
SS-N-8    55    110
SS-N-17   67    100.5
Total    394    3104.7 in 1937 bursts

This is a very small proportion (16.7%) of the total Soviet strategic offensive missile force described at the end of the target list.

The description of total Soviet forces in TM1-1 is close to the actual number.
The description is probably taken from the Time magazine issue referred to in the TM1-1 bibliography - the Soviets complied with the provisions of the SALT, so the actual 1989 numbers would closely match with the TM1-1 projection.

The only hints of ICBM bio-warheads I can find in the open literature come from Ken Alibek, former director of Biopreparat and the late Bill Patrick of USAMRIID, as well as some OTA reports. I will not discuss them further here.


Dockery, TM1-1:

Missile  Warheads     N      
SS-16     1x1Mt       60 
SS-17     4x200kt     752
SS-18-1   25Mt        110
(bio variant          50)
SS-18-2   10x2Mt      110
SS-19     6x300kt     240

SS-N-8    2Mt         452
SS-N-17   3x500kt     544

Total     8294       2308 
          8763.6Mt   (2358)

Bull. Atom. Sci. 7/1989, p.56 Nuclear Notebook:
Strategic offense (l = launchers, w = warheads):
ICBMs: SS-11, SS-13, SS-17, SS-18, SS-19, SS-24, SS-25:1368 l, 7300 w
SLBMs: SS-N-6, SS-N-8, SS-N-17, SS-N-18, SS-N-20, SS-N-23: 942 l, 4000 w
Bombers: Blackjack, Bear A,B,C,G,H (bombs and cruise missiles): 170 l, 1400 w

There are some discrepancies in inventories.
For example, the SS-16 was never deployed. There were some other weapons in the Soviet force that made up the numbers, described below.
In general, the yields as discussed in TM1-1 were also on the high side.


Present in reality but not in TM1-1:

Type      Warheads(n x Mt)   Number**
SS-11       1.1/1.3            360
            3x0.35 MRV[1]
SS-13       0.75               60
SS-17       4x0.35, 0.55-0.75  100
            3.5-6
SS-18-1/3   18-20 or 25        36
SS-18-2     8x0.5-1.3          272
SS-18-4/5   10x0.55-0.75
SS-19       6x0.5-0.75         300
            2.5-5       
SS-24       10x0.35-0.55       80
SS-25       0.55               170

Subtotal                       1378

SS-N-5      0.8-1, 2-3.5       24
SS-N-6      1, 3x0.6-1.2       224
SS-N-8      0.5-1, 0.8         280
SS-N-17     0.5                12
SS-N-18     3x0.2, 0.45, 7x0.1 224
SS-N-20     10x0.1             120
SS-N-23     4x0.1              80

Subtotal                       964               

Total                          2342

** Podvig et al. Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces. Table 4.1 p.138, Table 5.1 p.251.
Numbers are not quite the same as the Nuclear Notebook estimates. Also
note the presence of the SS-N-5 in the inventory (it was being phased out).

[1] multiple re-entry vehicles (non-independent).


Given the data above, the TM1-1 attack looks 'small'.

It is not clear to me why this should be the case. By the 1980s, both sides had very well developed early warning systems - alerts were due to false alarms. A first strike from either side would not catch a large proportion of
the opponent's force on the ground.

At worst, time from launch to arrival would be 7 minutes (sub-launched missile from close to a target nation's coast). 15-30 minutes would be an average value. The time required to launch was about ten minutes for Soviet ICBMs and most of the SLBMs once the decision to go had been made.

The Soviet strategic bomber force would be used on targets in Europe and Asia.
The primary target for the bulk of the Soviet rocket force would be North America, I think.

The reliability of rockets and bombs is not an explanation either. A pessimistic value for rocket reliability would be 1 in 6. A pessimistic value for warhead reliability would be 1 in 100.

Fratricide - warhead failure due to being caught in the radiation zones of other detonating warheads (the neutron flux causes predetonation with a very low yield) seems unlikely as well.

The circular error probable (CEP) for the weapons listed above ranges from 0.3 - 2.8km (SS-N-5), with the later generation weapons being more accurate. The later generation weapons tend to be MIRVed, so are less susceptible to fratricide effects.

The TM1-1 attack, despite being 'small' is devastating.
Urban attacks (vs. named towns/cities):

SS-16    7 
SS-17   46 
SS-18-1 15 
SS-18-2  9 
SS-19   16 
SS-N-8  28 
SS-N-17 36
Total  157

The total urban area affected by 5psi overpressure or greater exceeds 18,000 square miles (46,692 km^2).

For reference:
New York 'Tri State' area: 6,720 square miles
Los Angeles metro: 4,850 square miles

and see:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of...es_urban_areas
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Table_o...tistical_Areas

As a rule of thumb, the number of survivors inside the 5psi radius equals the
number of fatalities outside it; so this is a shorthand for a 100% prompt fatality zone - no survivors within the affected area.

Using a conservative population density of 1,500 people per square mile yields 27 million prompt casualties. Every population centre with more than 200,000 people has been hit by at least one weapon (using 2000 census data from Wiki page above).

Conspicuous in their absence from the TM1-1 list are the continuity of government sites (e.g. Mount Weather, Mount Pony, the Graybrier) in the Virginia-Maryland region, as well as oil refineries across the country.


Sorry about the length of this post.


Rob