OT: Rhodesian War Resources

[Webstral]

I've been reading a Christmas present over the past couple of weeks: The Saints: The Rhodesian Light Infantry. This, together with Fireforce by Chris Cocks, The Bush War in Rhodesia by Dennis Croukamp, Britain's Rebel Air Force (author unknown--I gave it to my father), and a USMC review of the Rhodesian War paint a fascinating picture of the Rhodesian counter-insurgency effort. One of the more interesting points is that the insurgents got creamed until Chinese-backed ZANU, operating out of Mozambique, started using Maoist methods of turning the local population in northeastern Rhodesia. At this point, the intelligence that had been so critical to Rhodesian security efforts dried up. Equally importantly, the British South African Police (basically, the Rhodesian cops) led the counter-insurgency effort in many areas until ZANU started using its Maoist methods in the northeast. Until that time, the BSAP could obtain information from the locals easily. After ZANU infiltrated a given village, the police lost their effectiveness entirely.

The lessons of the Rhodesian War probably have more application to the NATO effort in Afghanistan than the Twilight War. Still, a few of the salient points can be applied, perhaps. The Rhodesian Air Force operated a tiny fraction of the airframes the USAF, USN, and USMC operated over South Vietnam, but they were able to provide good air support to the Rhodesian troops on the ground. Aircraft availability was higher than for the USAF in South Vietnam, despite the embargo imposed on Rhodesia. Conventional wisdom holds that counterinsurgency forces need to maintain a 10:1 force ratio. The Rhodesians maintained something like a 1:1 ratio and won every fight for fifteen years. They were moderately-well equipped. Their effectiveness all seems to come back to morale, discipline, and training. The level of motivation was very high.

In particular, the Selous Scouts deserve mention. The Scouts fought the enemy on his own terms and did him one better. The Scouts went into the water to fight the shark, so to speak, and learned to bite him hard indeed. Okay, I'm getting away from lessons that are applicable to Twilight: 2000.

Support of the local population matters--especially when one is operating small units of light infantry. If the primary form of combat in a region is raids by light fighters, then the attitude of the locals makes a big difference. When an Army formation is trying to control a large area, such as the 78th Infantry Division in New Jersey, then the willingness of the locals to provide information may be the difference between success and failure in the Army's efforts to track and destroy marauders, etc. Generally, we'd think that the locals would be happy to provide whatever information they could on the bad guys; however, if the bad guys are good at intimidating the locals or have figured out a way to get the locals on their side, a small reaction force might not be able to deal with the marauders. I know we've discussed this idea many times, but reading about how ZANU used Maoist tactics to defeat the Rhodesians brings the lesson home to me again.

Freedom to use the roads means freedom to bring overwhelming force to bear. The wise enemy will try to deny Blue Force the ability to use the roads in his own rear area. The effect on mines on the Portuguese in Mozambique was pretty debilitating. Raiders from both sides will try to disrupt transportation in the enemy's rear. As applied to Thunder Empire, Mexican raiders will try to prevent Fort Huachuca's forces from using the roads to bring in overwhelming combat power once (if) the Mexican raiders are discovered. A steady trickle of random casualties also would be a good thing, if only to sap American morale and make road movement an exercise in anxiety.

Small quantities of equipment in the hands of well-trained, highly-motivated, and well-led troops can perform brilliantly on the battlefield. Obviously, this is not news to anyone here. The Rhodesian experience, however, really highlights the fact that this principal can be applied to very small forces.

Again, though, the Rhodesian War probably offers more lessons for Afghanistan than for Twilight: 2000.


Webstral